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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers actors as ‘manual philosophers’; it engages the proposition 
that acting can reveal aspects of existence and Being. In this sense, forms of acting 
that analyse and engage with lived experience of the world offer a phenomenological 
approach to the problem of Being. But rather than arrive at abstract, general 
conclusions about the human subject’s relationship to the world, at least some 
approaches to acting investigate the structures of experience through those 
experiences themselves in a lived, physical way.  
 
I begin with the troubled relationship between philosophy and theatre and briefly 
consider the history of attacks on actors. I suggest that at the heart of 
antitheatricality is what Jonas Barish (1981: 3) calls ‘ontological queasiness’: theatre 
poses a problem in the distinction between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’. Turning to 
phenomenology as a particular way of doing philosophy that challenges any dualistic 
understanding of subjectivity, I reflect on Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time as a 
lens for viewing the process of performing and preparing for a role. Heidegger 
emphasises the intermeshed relationship between the human subject, Dasein (Being-
there), and the world to the point that it is impossible to consider one without the 
other.  
 
I have chosen three of the most influential theatre and acting theorists of the 
twentieth century and examine how each uncovers aspects of existence that are 
presented in Heidegger’s phenomenology. Firstly, I consider Constantin 
Stanislavski’s ‘system’ which emphasises action for a purpose within an 
environment, the individual’s relationship to objects in the world and its involvement 
with other people who share the same type of Being in the world. Secondly, I 
examine Antonin Artaud’s conception of theatre that seeks to resist the structures of 
Being, the way the world is interpreted by others (the ‘They’) and the way that the 
world gets handed over to consciousness for the most part. In many respects, 
Artaud’s theatre is the embodiment of Anxiety, a world-revealing state where Being 
becomes apparent. Thirdly, I discuss Bertolt Brecht’s theatre practice as an 
attestation to authenticity (a truthful engagement with human existence as 
possibility) through the medium of performance. Brecht seeks to engage audiences 
in philosophical debate and change the world. Like Heidegger, Brecht also stresses 
the historical and temporal constitution of the human subject, whilst emphasising 
practicality in theatre making. 
 
By examining these approaches to performance as case studies, this thesis rethinks 
the notional intersection of philosophy and theatre, concentrating on process rather 
than literary analysis. This application of phenomenology is new in that it does not 
merely consider theatre analysis from an ‘ideal’ audience point of view (i.e. provide a 
phenomenology of theatre). By focusing on acting, I emphasise the development of 
artistic creation and becoming, and show how certain types of acting are 
phenomenological. 
 
The bold upshot here is a conception of philosophy that acknowledges various 
theatre practices as embodied forms of philosophical practice. Furthermore, theatre 
might well be thought of as phenomenological because it can be an investigation of 
Being firmly entrenched in practical action and performance. Conversely, philosophy 
is more than just words on a page; it is a performed activity. Actors can be 
considered manual philosophers in so far as they engage with the problem of Being 
not in mere abstraction but in the practical challenges of performance. 
Active Metaphysics 
 iii 
The actor must first of all believe in everything that takes place on the stage, and most 
of all he must believe in what he himself is doing. And one can believe only in the 
truth. Therefore it is necessary to feel this truth at all times, to know how to find it, and 
for this it is unescapable to develop one’s artistic sensitivity to truth. It will be said, 
‘But what kind of truth can this be, when all on the stage is a lie, an imitation, scenery, 
cardboard, paint, make-up, properties, wooden goblets, swords and spears? Is it all 
truth?’ But it is not of this truth I speak. I speak of the truth of emotions, of the truth of 
inner creative urges which strain forward to find expression, of the truth of bodily and 
physical perceptions. I am not interested in a truth that is without myself; I am 
interested in the truth that is within myself, the truth of my relation to this or that event 
on stage, to the properties, the scenery, the other actors who play in the parts with me, 
to their thoughts and emotions. 
 
Constantin Stanislavski (1980a: 265-266), My Life in Art. 
 
Not merely philosophy but also the fine arts work at bottom towards the solution of the 
problem of existence. For in every mind which once gives itself up to the purely 
objective contemplation of the world, a desire has been awakened, however concealed 
and unconscious, to comprehend the true nature of things, of life and of existence. For 
this alone is of interest to the intellect as such, in other words, to the subject of knowing 
which has become free from the aims of the will and is therefore pure; just as for the 
subject, knowing as mere individual, only the aims and ends of the will have interest. 
For this reason the result of every purely objective, and so of every artistic, 
apprehension of things is an expression more of the true nature of life and of existence, 
more an answer to the question, ‘What is  life?’ 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1958: 406) ‘On the Inner Nature of Art’ in The World as Will 
and Representation Vol. 2. 
 
For Artaud, theatre is fire; for Brecht, theatre is clear vision; for Stanislavsky, theatre is 
humanity. 
 
Peter Brook (1988: 43), The Shifting Point. 
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(Stepping out in front of the curtain) 
 
CHORUS: We do but walk around the modern stage 
And ponder on the problems of our age 
That you may take some thought away tonight 
And change your life but little if you might 
Consider from another point of view 
Just what ‘the world’ might mean for you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prologue 
The curtain is about to rise. The pre-show music level in the auditorium comes down. Blood 
starts to pump in the veins and a rush of energy circulates through the body. A sickness 
sinking to the bottom of the stomach. Cannot go on. What if it all falls apart? Rehearse the 
first line of dialogue. Make sure where the beginning is. Rehearse the first movement. Check 
that all costume is in place. The habits that have been ingrained in the body are about to be 
tested. The dress tech has come and gone. This is the opening night. Parents are in the 
audience. A familiar laugh is audible through the curtain. 
 
The buzz of voices fades away. A quiet expectancy spreads out. The curtain rises. The 
footlights and overheads shine into the eyes. The audience is a sea of black. An abyss 
sucking the energy from the body. An ocean of eyes watch the movements of the body. 
Focus on the other actors on stage. Cross the space controlling movements made well 
familiar in the muscles. 
 
The cue for speech comes. Words rise from the inside. A kind of flow. Think the meaning of 
the words – hear them as they are said. See the world around, but also keep a few moments 
ahead of what is happening – anticipate the next line. Come in at the right time. Sweat starts 
to seep under the heavy costume. The lights beat down. Exit on cue. 
 
Re-enter the stage. In the middle of the scene. Awareness of the words but then a lapse in 
concentration. A voice: ‘You will forget the next line’. What comes next? A blank. The gaping 
black hole of the audience stares. Then silence. The words won’t come from the lips. For an 
instant (eternity) the spell breaks. Panic arises from the stomach. 
CHORUS: With critical appraisal now apply 
To this but humble work your gen’rous eye.  
And so we beg that you will lend your mind 
To these poor arguments herewith and find 
Some grain of truth with your kind sympathy: 
We say ‘to act is questioning to be’. 
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hen I was a young high school student I used to walk down to the school 
grounds early in the morning, often with a friend, across a large sports 
oval and up a steep hill. I remember one cold, misty sunrise, the dew was 
heavy on the grass. Damp was accumulating on our leather school shoes 
as we strode with heavy backpacks on. In one hand we clutched musical instruments 
and in the other, sports equipment. Our heavy woollen school clothes prickled against 
our skin. The sun was still rising over our backs, casting an ethereal light on our 
destination at the top of the rise, and we were deeply immersed in a philosophical 
discussion (the contents of which I cannot remember). When we reached the top of 
the slope, I looked back into the sunlight and over the oval. I still have a vivid image 
of seeing the footprints we made across the field. The impressions in the dew did not 
make up one straight line, but rather described a series of smaller curves as if we had 
chosen a short-term destination, reached it, and then chosen another, making a series 
of arches across the grass. At the time, we were completely unaware that we were 
walking in such a fragmented pattern. Only afterwards, looking back could we see the 
trajectory of our walk made of small units informed by a larger sense of direction. In 
the same way, this thesis has developed in a series of small steps and arcs. Rather than 
a singularly linear path, this PhD project has evolved and revolved around the idea of 
manual philosophy, like walking through a field. In part, I had originally intended to 
write an apology for the art of acting but gradually became interested in the notional 
intersections between philosophy and theatre. Starting with the tradition of analytical 
philosophy and aesthetics I had begun to ask what theatre is.
1
 At this point I turned to 
phenomenology as a significant philosophical movement of the twentieth century 
which showed promise as a tool for analysing the lived experience of acting rather 
than a formal ontology of art. I chose three theories of theatre to analyse – Constantin 
Stanislavski, Antonin Artaud and Bertolt Brecht; each in their own way reflects the 
relationship between philosophy and theatre. And eventually I moved towards the 
idea of acting as manual philosophy, lived, embodied form of exploring what it means 
to be. 
Metaphorically, these movements in thinking left an impression on a field – traces on 
a page in the work you are currently reading. Heidegger (1998) used a similar 
metaphor for the way to philosophical thinking in his use of the term ‘pathmarks’ 
(Wegmarken). Philosophy is finding one’s way through a forest off the beaten track, 
some paths of which are dead ends and others which lead a winding way. 
Occasionally, the traveller may come into a clearing (Lichtung) where they are able to 
see around with clarity. This paradigm – acting as manual philosophy – is at the heart 
of performance studies. Just as Heidegger saw philosophy as a journey through many 
pathways and open spaces, so too are some processes of performance. Occasionally, 
one might catch a glimpse of footprints left on a dew-covered field both in the process 
of thinking and in journey of acting. 
                                                
1 I was interested in the ‘ontological’ status of theatre and re-visited the key readings in this area of 
aesthetics; Mimesis as Make-believe, Kendal Walton (1990), Art and the Aesthetic, George Dickie 
(1974), Meditations on a Hobby Horse, Ernst Gombrich (1971) and Languages of Art, Nelson 
Goodman (1976). I also had a brief detour into Critique of Pure Judgement, Kant (1952), thinking 
about the interaction between ‘reason’ and ‘imagination’ and even went back to Plato’s expulsion of 
the representational arts from The Republic (1992). 
W 
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Part I: Theatre and Philosophy 
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Other arts call out only one half of a man’s powers – the bodily or the mental: the 
pantomime combines the two. His performance is as much an intellectual as a physical 
exercise: there is meaning in his movements; every gesture has its significance; and 
therein lies his chief excellence. The enlightened Lesbonax of Mytilene called 
pantomimes ‘manual philosophers’, and used to frequent the theatre, in the conviction 
that he came out of it a better man than he went in. 
 
Lucian of Samosata (1905: 259), Of Pantomime. 
 
Introduction  
This thesis reflects upon actors as ‘manual philosophers’, artists who can uncover the 
meaning of Being.
1
 Lucian’s observation above uncovers the idea that performance 
might engage both the bodily and the intellectual aspects of Being. This thought is 
consistent with Martin Heidegger’s argument that knowing is not the fundamental 
way we experience the world. Our understanding of life is based in a broader and 
practical engagement with the world. It is no mistake, then, that theatre has caused 
debate in the field of ontology: the art of acting destabilises a fixed definition what the 
human subject is and causes concern for what Heidegger calls ‘metaphysical’ systems 
of philosophy.  
Wondrous Art 
Lucian of Samosata (c.120–180 A.D.), Syrian rhetorician, mentions the idea of 
pantomimes as manual philosophers because of their insight into representing all 
aspects of human life (Lucian 1905: 259). In dialogue with Crato, a cynic regarding 
the representational arts, Lycinus, lover of the theatre, argues that these amazing 
players (pantomimes) are possessors of wondrous self-knowledge. The pantomime’s 
task is 
to identify himself with his subject, and make himself part 
and parcel of the scene that he enacts. It is his profession to 
show forth human character and passion in all their variety; 
to depict love and anger, frenzy and grief, each in its due 
measure, Wondrous art! – on the same day, he is mad 
Athamas and shrinking Ino; he is Atreus, and again he is 
Thyestes, and next Aegisthus or Acrope; all one man’s work 
(1905: 259).  
Nevertheless, Crato would rather contemplate the sages of old through the philosophy 
of Plato and Aristotle than ‘watch the antics of an effeminate creature got up in soft 
raiment to sing lascivious songs and mimic the passions of prehistoric strumpets’ 
(Lucian 1905:  239).
2
 Lycinus claims that these adaptable performers are soothsayers 
of the soul of man and draws upon the Homeric opinion that spectators of the theatre 
leave ‘gladder and wiser’ than when they had entered (Lucian 1905: 240). He 
                                                
1 Following the convention of Macquarie and Robinson’s translation of Being and Time (1962), I will 
capitalise Being when used as a substantive noun and leave lower case when used as a verb. Page 
references refer to the original German pages and are marked with ‘H’ before the page number. 
Macquarie and Robinson include these references in the margins of their edition. 
2 Perhaps this sort of comment could equally come from a cynic of actors today! See Kohansky (1984). 
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suggests that the spectacle of the pantomime is ‘no less than a fulfilment of the 
oracular injunction KNOW THYSELF; men depart from it with increased knowledge; 
they have something that is to be sought after, something that should be eschewed’ 
(Lucian 1905: 261). Lycinus elaborates upon the reflexive insight gained through 
performance and the didactic potential of theatre, communicated through the 
performer’s ability to display an experience of the world not through words but 
through actions. In the end, Crato concedes (in a rather abrupt about-face) and 
proclaims himself converted (perhaps a little too easily), after Lycinus explains that if 
he would only accompany him to the theatre he would fall under its spell through the 
golden wand of Hermes (Lucian 1905:  263).  
Although Lucian of Samosata was primarily a writer and rhetorician, his thoughts are 
provoking in that they position the art of the performer as being related to self-
knowledge. One might be wary of hyperbole, sarcasm and irony in his words – this 
tract might well be simply a rehearsal of arguments for rhetorical practice rather than 
truly held beliefs. Nevertheless, Lucian introduces the idea that performance might 
pose a challenge to the epistemology traditionally offered by philosophers and may 
offer an alternative way of understanding the world. 
Pantomimes of the second century were certainly very different from any theatrical 
form we would recognise today. In the world of Lucian, the pantomime was a 
particular type of performer who would represent their story or subject through 
movement, music and words. The word ‘pantomime’ is here the translation of 
orchaesis – dancers in the chorus, not what we consider as acting in a modern day 
context. However, in extrapolating Lucian’s idea of manual philosophy from this 
ancient art-form to the wider concept of performance (and perhaps elsewhere to art in 
general), I suggest that one might find an important new framing of what it means to 
act or perform. ‘The pantomime above all is an actor,’ Lucian claims (1905: 256). 
Certainly, the criticisms that Crato expresses against pantomimes in the dialogue have 
been levelled in one way or another against a range of performances. Lucian does 
consider other performing arts, including comedy and tragedy, in tandem with the 
pantomime and even the art of rhetoric in Of Pantomime (Lucian 1905, 249). 
Nevertheless, this ancient debate opens up the question of how actors could be 
considered as manual philosophers. 
Ontological Queasiness 
Not all views of acting are so rosy. At least since the ancient Greeks in the second 
century BCE, actors and performers in the West have been accused of misleading 
audiences as to the nature of reality. For some, acting is the antithesis of truth on 
stage. Others see potentially damaging thoughts and ideas in the art of acting that 
threaten the very fabric of society.
3
 This suspicion of artistic representation led Plato 
(1992) in the Republic Book X to banish dramatic poets (and representatiional arts) 
from his ideal city. In The Antitheatrical Prejudice, Jonas Barish notes: 
[t]he fact that the disapproval of the theater is capable of 
                                                
3 See the ‘Lighting History of Attacks on Acting’ below. 
Acting as Manual Philosophy 
 6 
persisting through so many transformations of culture, so 
many dislocations of time and place, suggests a permanent 
kernel of distrust waiting to be activated by the more 
superficial irritants. The durability of the prejudice would 
seem to reflect a basic attitude toward the lives of men in 
society that deserves to be disengaged and clarified (1981: 
4). 
According to Barish, this fear of performance and performers seems to go to the heart 
of our existence. Of course, it would be reductive to think that there is one thing that 
theatre or acting is. Through time and across cultures, the nature and context of 
theatrical performance has varied dramatically (excuse the pun). The discipline of 
performance studies has developed in part to address this problem and embrace the 
wide range of cultural activities that come under the rubric of performance.
4
  
One might well argue that what acting ‘is’ has been obscured because of a suspicion 
about the ‘ontological queasiness’ of the stage (Barish, 1981: 3). Actors evidently 
inhabit a strange world half-way between truth and fiction and, furthermore, might 
even drag fiction over into the real world by performing in everyday life. Of course 
acting might not necessarily be one thing – nor need it be a thing; this is a crucial part 
of the problem and indeed forms one of the central concerns of the discipline of 
performance studies. On the whole, throughout history acting has been superficially 
understood in a metaphysical way and with a certain ontological understanding.
5
 
Part of the suspicion about theatre is that actors have been seen as particularly 
susceptible to the unpredictable dominance of emotion that is otherwise kept in check 
by the properly functioning citizen. Plato suggested that acting is indeed a kind of 
madness because it is irrational to display the external signs of a situation that are not 
necessitated by ‘real’ circumstances as is the case in many types of performance (Ion 
in Plato 1987). Even worse, many believed that the unnatural manipulation of the 
emotions may lead to irreversible physical and emotional imbalance (diskrasia). This 
view persisted throughout the Middle Ages and beyond – that acting had the potential 
to upset the balance of one’s bodily humours (Roach 1985: 39). The fear was that this 
may in turn lead to the actor using their art of deception in real circumstances: one of 
the earliest repudiation of the art of acting was recorded when Solon the lawmaker in 
his old age accused Thespis the actor of lying and dissimulation and Rousseau’s 
concerns about establishing a theatre in the city of Geneva.
6
 
Yet still, many others have seen theatre as a great source of enjoyment, entertainment 
and even education.
7
 Some have thought that the stage is precisely an important place 
                                                
4 See Carlson (1996) and Schechner (2006) as useful introductions to performance studies, together 
with Sauter (1997) on the development of Theatre Studies towards an emphasis on the ‘theatrical 
event’. States (1996) notes the problem of using performance as a metaphor and its apparent resistance 
to definition, whereas Jon McKenzie (2001) attempts to rehearse a general theory of performance.  
5 I will develop Heidegger’s idiosyncratic understanding of the concept of ‘metaphysics’ in Being and 
Time below in Chapter Four. 
6 See Nagler (1952) or Plutarch (1975) and Rousseau (1960). 
7 Consider the Jesuit learning plays of the sixteenth century, the Mystery Plays of the middle ages and 
indeed, the role of theatre in ancient Athens. See Barish (1981), Meredith (1985), Cartledge (1997) 
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in which to carry out a serious discussion of the human condition. In the Poetics Book 
IX Aristotle (1996) made the statement that theatre is more philosophical than history 
because theatre deals with the possible whereas history deals with what was once 
actual. The stage can be a space in which to seek out possible ways that the world 
might be and contemplate them by playing them out. 
As Jonas Barish hoped to ‘illuminate if possible the nature of the theatrical, and 
hence, inevitably, of the human’ (1981: 4), I also aim to show something 
fundamentally revealing of existence can be found in theatre practice. Hidden within 
this statement is the underlying premise that to be human is to be theatrical. Further to 
the theatrum mundi idea of the Middle Ages to early Renaissance, we might even 
consider our species as homo theatricum – that there is something intrinsically 
performative to our being.
8
 It is difficult to interpret theatre and life independently 
because our understanding of the world is already theatrical in a sense. I intend to 
challenge the general view of acting as deceit and argue that acting has the potential 
to be ‘truth-revealing’. This will require a different conception of truth, shifting from 
a ‘correspondence theory’ where propositions correspond to facts towards an idea of 
truth as a happening (Ereignis), which is where Heidegger’s phenomenology 
ultimately leads.
9
 Both theatre and phenomenology are reflections on what it is ‘to 
be’. One might be careful, however, of privileging ‘the human’ over a broader 
understanding of existence.
10
  
Acting and Phenomenology 
In this thesis I am interested in how acting can investigate concepts of self and world 
in a profound way. This is hardly a new thought. Anthropology, for instance, has long 
since seen cultural practices and art in particular as revealing of world-views.
11
 But 
framing acting as manual philosophy reveals how theatre can uncover the question of 
Being.  
This research is important for at least two reasons. First, acting has been spurned and 
rejected for so many centuries primarily on ontological grounds. According to these 
attacks, actors do not portray reality but a poor imitation of the world.
12
 This is a 
sentiment propagated even today, judging by the Hollywood press and media 
representation of the profession.
13
 Nevertheless, I will argue that the art of acting can 
                                                                                                                                       
respectively. 
8 For reference, see Huizinga, Homo Ludens (1955). 
9 For a summary of different theories of truth, see Grayling (1998), see An Introduction to 
Philosophical Logic. 
10 In his ‘Letter on Humanism’ Heidegger (1993) himself realised that there was a problem with placing 
the human at the centre of being there, because he was looking for the meaning Being in general.  
11 Turner (1990) investigates theatre’s origin in ritual as playing out the ‘subjunctive mood’,  the ‘as if’ 
by which societies engage in public reflexivity and repair breaches in society’s proper functioning. 
Geertz (1983) stresses the way in which art uses signs and symbols as vehicles of meaning which play 
a role in society. In ‘From Ritual to Theatre and Back’ Schechner (1976) considers performance in 
terms of efficacy – how artistic and ritual practices can transform the world. 
12 See ‘A Lightning History of Attacks on Actors’ below. 
13 For a discussion of modern attitudes to Hollywood and the actor, see Kohansky (1984: 172ff). 
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be approached as an investigation of ‘how we are’ and a ‘disclosure’ of Being.
14
  
Second, even the academic study of performance has largely focused on the point of 
view of an ideal audience rather than the actor engaged in the creative process. To 
judge acting as manual philosophy we need to leave the darkened auditorium and 
enter the rehearsal space and cross to the other side of the proscenium (if there is one). 
The process of acting is an embodied form of many of the philosophical issues 
debated in journals, but from the practical perspective of the art of performance. Until 
the advent of performance studies, theatre has also been theorised largely from an 
abstract spectator’s point of view, focusing on the text or the fictional context of what 
is being performed.
15
 The activity of acting has had relatively little attention to it 
compared to play texts partly because there is a supposedly stable object for 
researchers to interpret. 
Both the ‘antitheatrical prejudice’ and past academic approaches to the study of 
theatre may be grounded in what Heidegger calls metaphysics. Metaphysics in 
Heidegger’s view is a misguided view of ontology and understanding of Being. The 
misunderstanding of the question ‘what is Being?’ is addressed by phenomenology. In 
terms of its Ancient Greek root, phenomenology is ‘to let that which shows itself be 
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself’ (Heidegger 1962: 
H34). Philosophy, for Heidegger, is fundamental ontology – inquiring into the 
question of Being. In this sense, to consider acting as manual philosophy is to 
consider the ways in which the art of acting investigates the meaning of Being. 
Heidegger argues that our understanding of Being is more than the detached scientist 
or philosopher (or in this case the theatre theorist) contemplating the world from 
which they are separated. An understanding of Being is not merely knowing the world 
in an intellectual sense. Being is revealed in practical engagement with the world. 
Following Lucian’s comments quoted in the epigraph of this chapter, this thesis will 
consider some specific ways in which the bodily and intellectual engagement of actors 
broaden what we might call philosophical practice.  
My argument is not that all acting is manual philosophy. I am interested in how some 
(influential Western) theories of acting uncover an understanding of the relationship 
between self and world. By considering these case studies and contrary to historical 
attacks on acting, one discovers that audiences are not being lied to in the theatre 
event. Performance is a complex, communal and inter-subjective process of self-
reflection that involves a heightened awareness of the act of performance itself.
16
 
                                                
14 As will be discussed below, Heidegger thinks that ‘Being’ is a term that has been covered up in its 
meaning. For him, phenomenology is the uncovering of that meaning. For specific examples of the way 
that acting practice uncovers Being, see Part II. ‘Disclosure’ (erschliessen) can also mean ‘laying open’ 
what is given. (See Heidegger (1962) footnote at H75.) 
15 For a useful survey of the Drama/Theatre/Performance distinction, see Shepherd and Wallis (2004), 
Schechner (2006), Sauter (1997), Carlson (1996). Carlson (1993) notes Aristotle’s contribution to the 
focus on formal qualities of drama in literary criticism over the subsequent two millennia. 
16 Richard Bauman, oral folklorist, suggests that ‘[p]erformance… calls forth special attention to and 
heightened awareness of the act of expression and gives licence to the audience to regard the act of 
expression and the performer with special intensity’ (1984: 11). 
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On a broader view, this reconsideration of acting is important because it might shed 
new light onto how we can understand ourselves as human beings or, perhaps, on an 
even wider level, as Being-there. I suggest that our suspicion of acting throughout the 
ages is a reaction to the potentially destabilising understanding of Being presented on 
the dramatic stage. Rather than simply apply theory to particular performances, this 
thesis takes artistic practices as presenting a philosophical understanding of our 
Being-in-the-world. Performance can thus be seen as a critique of philosophy too. The 
upshot is a broadening of what we might accept as valuable contributions to 
philosophy and philosophical thinking. 
Thus, rather than providing a simple apology for acting, I hope to broaden the types of 
practices that might count as doing philosophy. This is one possible (an I would 
argue, valuable) way of how phenomenology might be applied as a theoretical method 
for investigating theatre and indeed many other cultural practices that reflect on what 
it means to be. The key thought here is that specific forms of acting provide a 
phenomenology that can be analysed and engaged with in philosophical terms. 
In this way, this research adds a contribution to the field of performance studies: to 
see performances as works of philosophy that engage and can be talked about in 
philosophical discourse. Of course, this is already well founded in the discipline as is 
evidenced by the complex interaction between cultural theory and performance 
practices.
17
 I suggest that a cluster of ideas presented in Being and Time (BT) 
articulate philosophical problems independently investigated practically in at least 
some theories of acting. At the same time, any academic approach to theatre, 
performance and acting should take into account the essential concept of process. 
Performance is not a thing. Some approaches to acting explore the possibilities of 
what Heidegger calls ‘Being-in-the-world’ through process. 
Aletheia and Existential Sight 
In order to consider actors as manual philosophers one needs to shift away from truth 
as a correspondence or representation of the world towards truth as an ‘uncovering’. 
As Barish (1981) points out, the ontological queasiness of acting is that it somehow 
presents a representation of the world, and as far as Plato was concerned, a false and 
degenerate representation. If truth is an uncovering, an unconcealing, the curtain 
drawing back to reveal a stage (if there is a curtain) is an uncovering of truth. Instead 
of the actor checking their own representations with a pre-existing external truth, the 
rehearsal process is a matter of uncovering truth and performance is a moment of 
revealing that truth. The truth of acting is not a representation of the world, a 
correspondence between the stage and reality, but rather an uncovering and disclosure 
of Dasein (‘Being There’) in itself. For Constantin Stanislavski, this was the truth of 
artistic creativity, for Antonin Artaud it was the truth of unmediated experience, and 
for Bertolt Brecht it was the truth of social relationships played out on stage. From 
                                                                                                                                       
16Also Schechner and Turner (1990) on Theatre as an evolution from ritual and redressive processes in 
the social drama. 
17 For collections and reflections on critical theory and performance, see Reinelt and Roach (1992) 
Fortier (1997) and Auslander (2003). 
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this perspective, acting is not about representing, but rather uncovering Being as it is. 
Heidegger sets out his concept of truth in opposition to what he calls the traditional 
conception of truth. In paragraph 41 of BT, ‘Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth’ (1962: 
H213ff), he rules out the idea of truth as the correspondence or agreement of a 
judgment with its object. For Heidegger, truth is not a relation between knowledge 
and the Real (1962: H216). Instead, truth can be found in the uncovering of an entity 
towards which an assertion is made (1962: H218). We don’t represent things to 
ourselves as pictures inside our heads and then check the reality against that picture. 
The ‘is true’ refers to the thing itself. Being true is thus a Being-uncovering. Truth is 
found in a return to the things themselves. Heidegger takes Aristotle’s term !"#$%&! 
(aletheia) – unhiddenness to denote this conception of truth. The most primordial 
phenomenon of truth is in ‘uncovering’. As it happens, this uncovering is precisely 
the task of phenomenology – to show things as they are in themselves in the way that 
they show themselves. Truth shows not only what is uncovered but also how it is 
uncovered. Ultimately, the rest of BT shows that truth is also originally in the Being 
of Dasein: ‘Dasein as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. 
Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein’ (1962: H226).  
In his later piece ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (OWA) (first delivered as a public 
lecture in Freiburg, 1935), Heidegger dwells on this truth-revealing function of art 
(Heidegger 1977). To a large extent, the work of this current thesis has drawn upon 
his ideas presented in the lecture, especially the idea of art revealing world and truth. 
In fact, a consideration of acting in relation to Heidegger’s later works might well be 
the topic of an entirely separate thesis that I have not pursued here. In OWA, 
Heidegger argues precisely that ‘Art then is a becoming and a happening of truth’ 
(1977: 196). He begins by considering art as the precondition for particular art works, 
and artists as the creators of those works. But art is that which makes an artist, so the 
origin of art is cyclical. To break into this hermeneutical circle, Heidegger considers 
the ‘thingly’ aspect of a work of art, the relation of things to equipment, truth as 
aletheia, the way in which art both reveals and creates the world, and ultimately all art 
as in essence, poetry. 
Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving is the spring 
that leaps to the truth of beings in the work. To originate 
something by a leap, to bring something into being from out 
of its essential source in a founding leap – this is what the 
word origin (Ursprung – primal leap) means (1977: 202). 
There are two criticisms that might be launched at this conception of art. Firstly, by 
starting with the ‘thingly’ nature of a work, Heidegger seems to privilege the plastic 
arts over performance.
18
 Two examples he uses in the lecture to show how the world 
                                                
18 In his examples of the ‘thingly’ nature of the work Heidegger strangely refers to the fact that 
‘[w]orks of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black Forest, During the First 
World War Hölderlin’s hymns were packed in the soldier’s knapsack together with cleaning gear. 
Beethoven’s quartets lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar’ (1977: 145). 
This raises the problematic as to whether the words on the page are the poem, or the scribbled notes on 
the stave a symphony. To be generous to Heidegger, that is the point he is making – the work is not just 
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is revealed by the work of art are Van Gough’s Peasant Shoes as revealing the work 
world of the peasant and a Greek temple as an historical object which no longer has 
its world in the same way as when it was in use (the gods have fled the temple, as it 
were). The art of acting, in particular is does not leave any trace or stable support by 
which it lives throughout history.
19
 The moment of the actor disappears in its own 
birth. Secondly, by placing poetry as the essence of all art (1977: 197) Heidegger 
places a prime emphasis on language. By considering acting as manual philosophy, 
one moves away from understanding Being simply in terms of words, but rather 
engages the whole of Dasein and its world. 
One might also consider how what Heidegger calls ‘metaphysics’ falls into the trap of 
privileging ‘seeing’ and ‘sight’ as the fundamental way in which we experience the 
world. Part of the historical misunderstanding of acting as emotion, as evidenced by 
Stanislavski’s description of the mistakes of the untrained actor discussed below, is 
the tendency to rest with external representations of action. This is also a problem in 
the analysis of theatre, which has taken an audience point of view of what acting is 
rather than considering the process and activity of actors themselves. Being is not 
something that can be seen (‘present-at-hand’) but is disclosed in activity, in doing, in 
uncovering and disclosing. Seeing is part of but not the totality of the way that we 
understand the world. Although as I will note below, metaphors of light, of showing, 
clearing and shining come up in both theatre and Heidegger’s philosophy, we 
experience the world not in a way that can be seen scientifically through a 
microscope. Being is only understood in relationship to the totality of Being-in-the-
world within time. Both theatre and philosophy are about the world as possibility. The 
creative process of acting is about choosing from possibilities. 
Finally, it worth noting how the concept of manual philosophy refers back to manus 
(hand) and thus to manipulating the environment through instruments and tools. In the 
art of acting, it is not just the hands, but the whole body – and I argue the whole of 
Dasein – that is both the user and the tool. Actors work on themselves and are, 
themselves, the work of art in the moment of performance. Lucian of Samosata 
(1905) expressed awe at performances he saw as manual philosophy, yet we might 
even take a step further and see the art of acting as an existential sight, a seeing of the 
possibilities of Being. With our hands we build the world but ultimately that work is 
always directed towards the Being that we ourselves are: Dasein. 
Scope 
Realising the breadth of such a task, I have chosen three modern theories of acting to 
reconsider or reframe in terms of manual philosophy. These theories are modern in 
the sense that each works on a specific understanding of the self not as a static and 
unchanging entity or soul, but rather as a developing entity involved with its 
                                                                                                                                       
a thing. 
19 Interestingly, photographic records of performances in particular are fetishised as somehow 
preserving the moment in some way, yet the essence of the performance, of Being-there slips away. 
Again, this is a topic for another thesis. 
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environment.
20
 What follows is an attempt to re-think the work of the actor in terms of 
Being – the traditional object of metaphysics. Ultimately, as Heidegger argues, any 
understanding of Being is deeply intermeshed with and inseparable from an 
experience of time. A very different phenomenology arises when we take the 
perspective of actors engaged in their craft – the activity of acting, rather than the 
mere appearance of acting.
21
  
Obviously, it would be too great a task to deal with the entire history of philosophy 
and the history of acting. There may be many other projects possible using aspects of 
other brands of philosophy and forms of theatre.
22
 So, I have chosen phenomenology 
as a way of doing philosophy not merely at random, but because it provides a fruitful 
description of the acting process and emphasis on lived experience. In this sense, I am 
not writing a phenomenological description of the experience of acting or performing 
here or aiming to describe the particular modes of being that occur on the stage.
23
 But 
I am arguing that at least some approaches to acting are phenomenological because 
they investigate aspects of Being. 
The three theorists I have chosen as case studies here are undoubtedly amongst the 
most well known and widely written about theatre practitioners of the twentieth 
century: Constantin Stanislavski, Antonin Artaud and Bertolt Brecht. In a sense, this 
is a great disadvantage as so much has been written about them and so many 
interpretations have been made and re-made elevating these names to iconic status in 
theatrical discourse. I am not attempting to provide a detailed introduction to each of 
these three theorists and their theories of acting. What follows, however, is an attempt 
to point out phenomenological elements in their writings about acting. In different 
ways, each approach to theatre is an active investigation of what it means to be. 
Again, the literature on Heidegger is immense and his writing is difficult. Rather than 
become bogged down in Heideggerian interpretation, the disputes over his writing and 
politics, I will outline some of his key ideas in BT and show how the art of acting 
engages with these concepts in a practical way. This is not to overlook the 
complexities and problems with Heidegger’s work itself but simply to suspend those 
debates in order to use his thinking as a tool for interpreting acting and performance.
24
  
                                                
20 Puchner notes a particularly modernist anti-theatricality: ‘What [modernists] tend to object to is a 
particular form of mimesis at work in the theatre, a mimesis caused by the uneasy position between the 
performing and mimetic arts’ (2002: 5). Instead of defining modernism as a key term in this present 
thesis, perhaps it is better to talk of ‘modernist discourses’ (Reiss 1982). In terms of philosophy, I 
develop Heidegger’s understanding of the human subject not as a material ‘thing’ but in terms of 
becoming and process. This unstable notion of the self is at the heart of the modernist rebellion against 
mimesis. Milling and Ley (2001) also avoid defining modernism, but rather point to a set of writings 
about theatre largely considered as modernist (2001: vi-vii). 
21 This also has to do with mimesis as the fundamental understanding of what acting is. When we look 
at twentieth century theories of acting, the tendency is a move away from simply representing a 
character towards an awareness of the social, political and cultural effects of what representation does. 
For a more extensive discussion, see Puchner (2002). On the history of mimesis see Ley (1999). 
22 See Krasner and Saltz (2006) and the literature review below. 
23 For a useful phenomenological description of acting, see Zarrilli (2004). 
24 For useful introductions to Heidegger’s thinking and politics, also see Dreyfus (1990), Dreyfus and 
Harrison (1992), Farias (1989), Guignon (1993), Ott (1993) and Sheehan (1981). 
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The three theories that I have chosen to analyse here – Stanislavski’s method for 
physical action, Artaud’s theatre of cruelty and Brecht’s epic theatre practice – 
obviously differ in their respective definitions or prescriptions for actors. Each also 
had a different role in their encounter with theatrical practice: Stanislavski was a 
director and actor, Artaud was an actor and poet and Brecht was a playwright and 
director. Each of these writers altered their views considerably throughout their lives 
in both theoretical approaches to performance and performance practice, so it is 
difficult to make generalisations. Nevertheless, it is possible to take some of the key 
ideas from their writings that have been widely influential in theatrical theory and 
practice since and consider the distinctively phenomenological trajectories of those 
ideas. Each theorist engages with Being in different ways and provides a different 
entry point into the process of ‘unconcealing’ Being. Stanislavski develops a 
phenomenology of the world in order for the actor to prepare for a role. Artaud resists 
the concept of world in order to achieve a transcendent performance mode that would 
be a direct experience of Being itself. Brecht hopes for an acting style that will present 
different perspectives on social problems and challenge contemporary, complacent 
attitudes towards human existence. 
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to see these different theories of acting as 
mutually exclusive of one another in every aspect. Late in his career, Brecht 
understood his theories as not entirely incommensurate with Stanislavski’s.
25
 Artaud’s 
emphasis on the body as the site of performance, Brecht’s theory of Gestus and 
Stanislavski’s emphasis on the physical elements of acting all highlight the 
performing body. Emotion also seems to have a complex role in each of these 
practitioners’ work and it would be wrong to say that epic theatre always abolishes 
feelings, whereas Stanislavski’s system works solely from an emotional centre. The 
point is that each of these practitioners theorise the theatre in a specific cultural 
context and emphasised various elements of performance while not necessarily ruling 
out other approaches. Again, my intention here is not to compare and contrast 
elements of these different theories of acting but to consider what sort of 
phenomenology each presents and how they engage in asking the question of Being. 
Finally, aspects of theatre and philosophy I have surveyed in this thesis are 
specifically ingrained in a Western perspective. This is not to say that important and 
valuable investigations might not be made in other cultural traditions.
26
 Indeed, the 
complex relationship between theatre and philosophy is revealing of how we 
understand what it means to be in so far as those practices enact a set of beliefs about 
what a self is. 
A Practical Perspective 
A few years ago, I had the fortune of being taken on by an agent, who has sent me off 
                                                
25 See Eric Bentley’s ‘Are Stanislavsky and Brecht Commensurable?’ in Martin and Bial (2000). 
26 See Meyer-Dinkgräfe (1996), for instance, which looks at Indian theories of acting as a frame for 
rethinking consciousness and the actor. It should be noted, however, that some problems with his 
analysis arise in that Dinkgräfe uses ‘Vedic science’, a twentieth century movement associated with 
Transcendental Mediation to discuss consciousness. Indian philosophy and psychology are 
considerably more complex and varied. 
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fairly regularly for auditions. When I go in for casting calls, I usually fill out a 
wardrobe form, get a small white-board with my name written on it, stand in front of 
the camera, introducing myself, saying who my agent is and then go ahead with the 
lines or action in the script. I am generally not concerned with the question of Being 
(what does it mean to be?) when I am hocking some fast food product or sipping at a 
revolting sugar filled milk drink designed to appeal to inner-city trendies. The 
industrial practice of the actor may well be at odds with the lofty artistic ideals of 
training. The theory that I discuss here may come into practice very rarely (depending 
on where you look in the industry). It is not uncommon for many of my fellow actors 
(in auditions and on set) to be unaware of Artaud or Brecht. Even in a (contemporary 
Australian) text-based theatre process where actors generally get four weeks’ 
rehearsal before the production goes on, there is little time to waste idling about the 
meaning of being. Commercial imperatives aim at maximising the ‘bums on seats’, 
not indulging in metaphysical contemplation. 
To this extent, one might ask whether there is also a divide between the artistic 
practice and everyday or industrial practice of the actor in the world. Training 
institutions and state funded theatre processes often have the time and resources to 
engage in more philosophical aspects of performance. Of course, this does not 
preclude artistic elements in the industrial world (Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht all 
lived in times of crushing commercial imperatives and this drove their own 
innovations and practice in many cases); nor must the philosophical aspects of acting 
be only occur where it is an ‘art form’. Nevertheless, the reality is that many actors 
probably do not think of themselves as philosophers or artists. But this does not mean 
that the art of acting does not at least possess the potential to be a philosophical 
practice. And in the case studies I have chosen here, I suggest that acting can be 
exactly that. 
On the other hand, mentioning the idea of acting as manual philosophy to 
philosophers might variously be attacked for irresponsibly conflating what Heidegger 
said or meant or thought with the profession of the actor. In fact, mentioning 
Heidegger to some philosophers, I have found, is the philosophical equivalent of a 
dirty word.
27
 In a sense, my work is not committed to defending Heidegger’s 
particular brand of phenomenology, or to evaluating the precise philosophical 
workings, merits, problems, and indeed politics in his work so hotly contested. The 
theories of acting explored here are at times in direct conflict with Heidegger’s 
phenomenology and may even be used to critique it. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology provides a useful 
framework for re-considering acting. His description of the intermeshed relationship 
between self and world is borne out in some of the most significant theories of acting 
of our time. And these theories can be used in turn to reconsider Heidegger’s notion 
of Being-in-the-world
28
 because they form not merely a theoretical but embodied 
investigation of Being. 
                                                
27 See Blackburn (2000) for a rather ridiculing perspective on Heidegger’s language. 
28 The meaning of this phrase is discussed below, see particularly ‘Stanislavski: Being-in-the-world and 
world-creating’. 
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Overview 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I introduces some approaches to analysing 
performance, a historical overview of attacks on acting and Heidegger’s conception of 
phenomenology. Part II takes the three artists Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht and 
considers how elements of Heidegger’s phenomenology are useful in interpreting 
their theories and theatre practices.  
Chapter One sets out some basic issues in considering acting as manual philosophy 
and outlines the methodology I have chosen here. Chapter Two is largely a literature 
review of the current approaches that attempt to apply philosophy to theatrical 
practices and the broader interrelation between theatre and theory. Chapter Three 
forms a brief history of attacks on acting and considers how they are bound up with an 
ontological queasiness concerning theatre that has relentlessly persisted in Western 
culture (Barish, 1981: 3). Chapter Four introduces Heidegger’s phenomenology and 
provides some background to his major work, Being and Time. Chapter Five 
considers Stanislavski and Heidegger’s concept of Being-in-the-world. Chapter Six 
investigates Artaud and Heidegger’s notions of selfhood and language. Chapter Seven 
interprets Brecht in terms of Historicality, Temporality and Authenticity. Finally, 
Chapter Eight draws some conclusions about acting as manual philosophy, presents 
questions about the future application of theory beyond phenomenology and considers 
how phenomenology can be used as a tool for performance studies. 
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Understanding constitutes … the Being of the ‘there’ in such a way that, on the basis of 
such understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of 
sight, of looking around, and of just looking. In all explanation one uncovers 
understandingly that which one cannot understand; and all explanation is thus rooted 
in Dasein’s primary understanding. 
If the term ‘understanding’ is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it 
means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which any 
Dasein exists. In understanding one’s own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in such a 
way that ones Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of.  
 
Martin Heidegger (1962: H336), Being and Time. 
 
1. Manual Philosophy: Research Framework 
The connection between philosophy and theatre is an issue that goes to the core of 
performance studies; the theory/practice divide raises the matter of how to think, 
theorise and analyse what acting is. Rather than indicate a division between theory 
and practice, acting can provide an active investigation into and ontology of the 
world, the actor and the acting process. This chapter outlines some key issues in 
acting as manual philosophy and presents some initial research frameworks. These 
include considerations of methodology, of performance as self-reflexive process, of 
the theory/practice divide, and of the relationship between phenomenology and 
semiotics.  
How to Research Manual Philosophy? 
The practice of acting is an embodied activity, not a detached theorisation about the 
world. Yet, the epigraph above quotes a key section in BT where Heidegger suggests 
that knowing is not the fundamental relationship that we humans have to the world. 
Human subjects understand the world through involved activity (Heidegger 1962: 
H83ff). In part, phenomenology is the uncovering of that involved activity. As I will 
elaborate, theatre also occupies a unique position of being both engaged in the world 
and in communal meaning-making, and at the same time bringing that understanding 
into question. In Poetics Book X, Aristotle (1996) suggests that drama is about 
considering not only the actual but also the possible. Heidegger’s understanding of 
Being is an authentic facing of one’s own possibilities.
1
 One condition of acting as 
manual philosophy, I suggest, is that it inquires into Being as possibility.  
In making such a claim, I consider that the writings of Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht 
independently present a particular phenomenology of the world not identical with 
Heidegger but as might be brought into dialogue with his philosophical thinking or as 
a form of philosophical practice in their own right. This thought centres around a 
dialogue between theory and practice. Though these theatre makers did not explicitly 
consider themselves phenomenologists, their theoretical writings are grounded in 
theatrical practice and reflection upon experience as the basis for their art.2 
                                                
1 See Chapter Four, ‘Heidegger’s Phenomenology’ below. 
2 Spiegelberg (1971) considers whether a philosopher defines themself as a phenomenologist as one 
fact in also defining them as such, but it is not a necessary condition. Rather than share a common 
terminology or discourse, I suggest that acting and phenomenology a unity in practice. 
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Phenomenology is fundamentally about returning to lived experience and an 
engagement with the world as a basis for philosophy. Edmund Husserl (2001: 252 and 
Heidegger 1962: H24) famously called for a radical return to ‘the things themselves’. 
Because of their practical engagement with the stage, many theatre practitioners base 
their understanding of the world in experience, thus also enacting a return to the 
things themselves. I aim to show how some aspects of theatre practice can be 
elucidated as phenomenology. In other words, the theories of acting discussed here 
present an understanding of the world based in the activity of theatre-making. This 
activity is a phronesis – a practical wisdom.3 
The notion of manual philosophy may well be at odds with what actors think and even 
say they are doing. Indeed, anthropology as a practice can often turn on the 
discrepancy between what participants claim to be doing and what they actually do. 
This may be true of Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht too: in many cases what these 
practitioners theorised does not fit their actual theatrical practice perfectly. For this 
reason, it occurred to me early on to go out, observe and talk to contemporary 
practitioners and interview them on the idea of acting as manual philosophy. This 
would have involved discourse analysis specifically concerning the notions of truth 
that seem so prominent in practice. 
My research could have taken on an ethnographic element, then, asking actors what 
they think they are doing and observe their practice as would have been in line with 
the evolving discipline of rehearsal studies here at the University of Sydney. In fact, 
in 2004 I did sit in on part of a rehearsal period of Brink Company’s staging of Sarah 
Kane’s 4:48 Psychosis.4 Nevertheless, it seemed somewhat artificial to be looking for 
philosophy in the rehearsal process. How does one look for philosophy? There were 
moments when the content of the play itself and discussions that took place made 
reference to philosophical concepts. Yet to focus on the text and words in such a way 
is to overlook the embodied sense in which the actors were working with those 
concepts. 
Instead of pursuing this fieldwork aspect to this PhD, then, I decided to focus on how 
aspects of phenomenology can be useful in approaching theatre practice. I see an 
ethnographic element of ‘the question of Being’ possible, but it is another (large) 
project altogether. In this sense, this project is just one step in a much wider 
consideration of acting as phenomenology.  
The connection between acting and philosophy is not simple. Actors do not 
(necessarily) write books, present essays and arguments, get degrees, advise 
governments, draw subtle semantic distinctions, produce verbose, poetic discourses, 
or rule an ideal Republic. And philosophers do not generally put on make-up, learn 
their lines, carry out physical warm-ups, do accent classes and go to opening night 
parties. However, one particularly phenomenological element of many processes of 
acting is that a high degree of self-reflexivity is required. This self-awareness can 
                                                
3 Aristotle (2000) introduces the world phronesis in his Nichomachean Ethics in the context of moral 
action and practical wisdom. 
4 Brink is an Australian theatre company originally based in Adelaide. The two-week rehearsal process 
took place in July 2004 at the Rex Cramphorn Studio, The University of Sydney. 
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bring up general questions about meaning, actions and existence. What separates 
novelists, playwrights and creators of the written word from acting is the physical, 
embodied presentation of ideas. These other forms of investigation into the human 
condition may well be philosophical but it is not the concern of the present 
investigation.
5
 
On the one hand, it may be possible to provide a phenomenological description or 
philosophical account of any human practice – riding a bike, or playing sport. Simple 
awareness is not enough to constitute labelling an activity as phenomenological. In 
the initial stages of learning, for instance, there is a great awareness of on the part of 
the newcomer to the phenomenal aspects of the activity. So when I am riding a bike 
for the first time, I am aware of my muscles on the pedal, the balance of my body, 
where my eyes need to look in order to steer etc. This fades with experience though it 
may be regained with a certain phenomenological attention (which often interrupts the 
activity itself, interestingly). But what sets acting apart from everyday human activity 
is the way in which actions are performed not only with a high degree of awareness, 
but also because those actions are placed together in order to draw out some meaning 
for an audience. The argument here is not that every instance of acting is manual 
philosophy but that the practitioners chosen for investigation here do display 
phenomenological techniques in their theatre practices. Acting has the potential both 
to investigate and show Being on stage. 
I have chosen to concentrate on Heidegger’s analysis of Being although there are 
other phenomenologists who address the idea of the embodiment in an explicit way 
(Maurice Merleau-Ponty is the obvious example). In my own classes, students often 
misunderstand phenomenology as being solely to do with bodily experience. In fact, a 
phenomenological understanding of the body does not conceive of the body as 
separate from mind but in a radical continuity with the world.  
If acting is potentially a manual form philosophy, it is involved in discovering and 
showing truth. Obviously this opens up the immense question of the relation of truth 
to a work of art. It may also be possible that art can falter from the path of truth and 
there is always the danger that what is true may not be useful (a conclusion that 
Nietzsche (2007) reached). At the same time, even though theatre and art more 
generally may get at painful truths, or even banal ones, the very act of performance 
(and watching) might also legitimate our lives and adds value to them.
6
  
The key methodology I have employed here is to investigate the writings of 
Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht, showing how their approaches to acting uncover 
aspects of Being of how phenomenology can aid in interpreting their practices. This 
follows Heidegger’s claim that knowing is not the fundamental mode in which we are 
in the world. Theatre also has the ability to conceive of the human subject not merely 
as a ‘knower’ of the world, but as an engaged participant. 
                                                
5 See for instance Martha Nussbaum (1990) on literature as philosophy. 
6 Wilshire (1982) uses the term ‘authorization’. 
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The Theory Explosion 
In order to consider acting as manual philosophy it is important to look at recent 
applications of theory to theatre. In the past fifty years, as Richard Schechner (2006: 
21) points out, there has been a radical change in the intellectual landscape of the 
humanities which has seen an implosion of disciplinary boundaries and a borrowing 
of techniques of analysis within the social sciences and humanities. In 
Theory/Theatre: An Introduction, Mark Fortier (1997: 2) suggests that theory has 
become the lingua franca of the humanities. In Critical Theory and Performance, 
Reinelt and Roach (1992: 4) point out the ‘theory explosion’ of the last century that 
has spawned the analysis of texts and cultural practices from many different 
perspectives: psychoanalysis, deconstruction, semiotics, post-colonialism, feminism, 
etc. As such, the investigation of the relationship between theory (if that can equated 
with philosophy) and theatre is near infinite and as such research concerning their 
relation has become prolific. As is widely noted, the Greek root of theory and theatre 
is in seeing (Fortier 1997: 5). This proliferation of theory is precisely where Krasner 
and Saltz (2006) begin their book on philosophy and theatre in order to bring some 
clarity to the relationship between these two terms. They suggest that philosophy 
plays a vital role in discourse ‘not necessarily by contributing knowledge that most 
other philosophers accept as truths (as in the sciences) but by stimulating further 
dialogue and keeping the philosophical ball rolling’  (2006: 3-4). As anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz (1983) suggests, it is the talk about art that matters, even though we 
may never get to the bottom of what art is.  
For Reinelt and Roach (1992), the theory explosion also returns the humanities to 
philosophy. There continues to be a re-examination of the underlying assumptions and 
methodologies and objects of inquiry in the fields of theatre and performance studies. 
The question of agency and subjectivity return studies of performance to the question 
of the nature of the self in a kind of philosophical anthropology. In this way, 
philosophy has always spilt over into other discourses and colonised other disciplines 
as their basis. This is precisely the intersection that I am approaching by way of 
phenomenology in this thesis. 
Whilst the birth of performance studies as an inter-disciplinary field brings with it a 
myriad of different and useful approaches for performance analysis, there is a 
constant danger of misuse and abuse of those theories extracted from their original 
theoretical context. Ideas and methodologies are at times transferred from one 
discourse to another, sometimes uncritically.
7
 At the same time, academic analysis 
sometimes seems to miss the point of performance or what performers are actually 
doing – actual behaviour.8 This is the danger of simply stimulating philosophical 
dialogue without engaging with the object of study: performance itself. 
Performance theory and criticism largely brings into question the idea that 
performances are self-evident. Since Aristotle’s Poetics, the aesthetic dimension of 
                                                
7 See Geertz (1983), ‘Blurred Genres’ for a discussion of a similar problem in anthropology. 
8 See Meryk (2003), ‘The Limits of Theory: Academic versus Professional Understanding of Theatre 
Problems’. 
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analysis has been the primary concern of theatre theorists in the West. However, more 
recently, theory is widely used to uncover ideological positions taken in various 
performances and texts (see Blau 1992, for instance). By adapting anthropological 
theory and techniques, performance studies has also tried to understand theatre by 
paying attention to practice (in the work of Richard Schechner and Victor Turner in 
particular). The claim of self-evidence is also one of the entry points of 
phenomenology for the discipline – uncovering the self-evident – and considering the 
Being of things which is for the most part overlooked in everyday experience.  
Reinelt and Roach (1992) acknowledge the diverse institutional sites feeding into 
research in the field of performance. These differences produce tensions and 
contradictions within theories and analyses provided. The object of these analyses – 
performance – includes traditional dramatic texts and a diversity of performance 
genres from Shakespeare to Kathakali. Reinelt and Roach claim that theory can also 
revitalise old texts (1992: 3) as well as inspire the creation of new performances. 
Politically, they think that theory ‘revises, challenges, rewrites, interrogates, and 
sometimes condemns received readings’ (1992: 3). Reinelt and Roach note that 
(t)heory as a discursive literature devoted to fundamental 
principles, has had a longer history in the academic study of 
theatre than almost any other discipline in the humanities 
(1992: 3-4). 
At least from Plato’s time, theory has been intermingled with literary history and 
theory. Drama studies sought structural principles across periods and genres as 
theatrical performance itself has also had a vast array of writings about it. 
Mark Fortier (1997) embarks on the ambitious task of introducing the relation 
between the two terms of the title of his book, Theory/Theatre. Rather than inserting 
the conjunction ‘and’ or ‘of’ the title leaves open the relationship between the two 
terms or perhaps sees them as two sides of the same coin (indicated by a ‘/’). Fortier’s 
range of theory goes back to ancient Greece, through to Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche. He 
notes that cultural theory has more recently had a boom since the 1960s and since 
been just called ‘theory’ (1997: 2). So rather than define theory, Fortier analyses 
specific theoretical practices. Specifically, he focuses on deconstruction, feminism, 
post-colonialism, semiotics, queer theory which all fall under the rubric of theory as 
ways of looking at culture, politics and society. Fortier notes that in theatre studies, 
theory has had a troubled relationship to practice because it has been seen as a 
contemplative activity rather than practical pursuit. 
Fortier indicates an appropriation of theory by ‘literary theory’ and the linguistic turn: 
which maintains ‘the importance of language as the basis, even the fate of humanity’ 
(1997: 3) He postulates a possible misrecognition from this literary point of view that 
writing is at the heart of what it is to be human. Such a perspective fails to meet the 
understanding of theatre ‘as rooted in the physical, the sensual and the visceral as 
much as it is in the verbal and ideational’ (1997: 4). The ensuing problem of the 
literary bias has been played out in the dominance of drama (the study of the text) and 
its appropriation by literature departments, neglecting its performance in the theatrical 
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event. On the other hand, theatre performance too has been seen as a text and 
subjugated by the linguistic model – a physical language to be decoded and 
understood in terms of the functioning of signs. In this way, Fortier intends the 
friction between the verbal and the non-verbal to be an underlying theme of his book 
(1997: 4). This thesis also takes issue with the thought that language is the only way 
of understanding performance. I argue that setting out from Heidegger’s wider 
investigation of Being will reveal a different and perhaps more enlightening 
perspective on what acting is. 
Nevertheless, theatre is not simply a passive object of study. As Fortier notes, theatre 
can speak back to theory. For example, Shakespeare explicitly reflected upon culture 
and reality in his plays and performances (1997: 6). In this way, theatrical events 
might well be seen as works of theory. However, the relationship is not as smooth 
sailing as it might seem. Fortier cites Maranca’s (1995) suspicion of theory in theatre 
studies and the dogmatic application of specific theories as opposed to the spirit of 
openness that is inherent in theoretical pursuit but warns for mindful, application 
rather than theory by template. By the same token she also rejects the separation of 
practice and production from reflection and thinking. Perhaps mindful of this 
criticism, Fortier leaves the relationship between theory and theatre open, and 
challenges readers to formulate their own view (1997: 7). 
Fortier includes theorists from outside the theatre though the theories are applied to 
specific theatre practices in the book. Fortier cites Blau (1992) as refracting many 
different theories in his own writing and claims a similar intention for his own work.  
On the other hand, Reinelt and Roach (1992) present a many and varied collection of 
perspectives (see below). Fortier wants to keep a broad view of theory whilst 
maintaining a unity of voice. He structures his approach on theory/theatre as a double 
articulation of the verbal and non-verbal, the people involved in the theatre and the 
theatre institution and the world.  He notes the problem of categorising theorists in 
such a way. Fortier looks at textuality and embodiment – semiotics, phenomenology 
and deconstruction; in subjectivity, he looks at psychoanalytic theory, feminist theory 
and reader response theory; in the theatre and the world, he looks at materialism, 
postmodernism and post-colonialism. 
‘Analogy’ and ‘equivalency’ are two different relationships between theatre and 
theory according to Fortier. He explores an analogue of phenomenology in Chekhov, 
and deconstruction in Artaud and Herbert Blau, for instance (1997: 11-12).  He also 
notes cases where theatre enacts a theoretical position such as in Caryl Churchill’s 
Cloud Nine and psychoanalytic theory (1997: 12). Fortier suggests that sometimes 
performance might both enact and be equivalent to theory, thus taking up multiple 
relations or positions. In this thesis, I aim to investigate how Stanislavski, Artaud and 
Brecht enact a phenomenology through their theatrical theories and practices.  
In Performance: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies Auslander (2003) 
takes Schechner’s (2002) valuable suggestion ‘that the study of performance revolves 
around two basic categories whose simple yet profound difference is expressed in the 
two little words “is” and “as”’ (2003: 2).  So on the one hand, theorists can study 
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things that self-evidently ‘are’ performances such as ‘theatre, dance, music, 
performance art, circus acts, puppetry, poetry readings and film’.  On the other hand, 
academics may focus on other research objects ‘as’ performance. Examples of the ‘as’ 
category are where theatre is taken as a blue-print for Turner’s model of social drama, 
Kenneth Burke’s understanding of history as drama and ritual drama as a primary 
model for human behaviour, Robert Crease’s examination of of science using theatre 
as a model, the analysis of political protests as theatre by Lee Baxendall and Baz 
Kershaw as well as ‘folkloric expressions, gossip, social scientific presentations, 
everyday behavior, the self, identity, literature, and legal texts’ (Auslander, 2003: 15). 
This ‘is’/‘as’ distinction is particularly relevant for my thesis, though I have turned the 
relationship on its head. Instead of viewing philosophy as performance (which indeed 
may be a fruitful and interesting project to follow up) I have considered performance 
as philosophy. In this way, the possibility of analysing performances as the enactment 
of thought, ideas and philosophical concepts, representing a world-view. 
Phenomenology is also an important re-framing of the concept of performance. The 
relationship between theatre and everyday life picked up in several of the essays in 
Auslander’s collection, some of which challenge the theatre-metaphor for analysis 
and its validity. The theorists I have chosen stand well with what might broadly be 
recognised as performance, though Artaud and Brecht in particular challenge the 
separation between performance and real action. Inherent in the concept of 
performance itself is a slipperiness which is hard to define drawing on many 
ambiguities and blurred boundaries (see Auslander 2003: 1-2).  
The relationship between philosophy and theatre that I draw here is neither merely 
one of metaphor nor analogue. I am not using philosophy to describe theatre (i.e. 
provide a descriptive phenomenology), nor am I simply pointing out characteristics 
that philosophy and theatre have in common. In describing actors as manual 
philosophers, the ‘as’ is a bringing to light of aspects of acting with respect to 
Heidegger’s formulation of the Question of Being. Just as phenomenology might be 
thought of as a way of seeing, this investigation invites a way of seeing the processes 
of acting that is doubled in these practitioners’ reflections on their own work. The 
manual part of ‘manual philosophy’ is significant because it points towards the 
concrete way in which actors can work through Being. Heidegger himself points out 
that knowing is not the fundamental way in which we experience the world: Being-in-
the-world is an ontologically prior relationship that we have to our environment.
9
 
Perhaps ‘manual’ really is a good way of thinking about it, since Heidegger saw the 
equipmental structures of the world as revealing world itself. We discover the world 
as ‘handy’ (or not handy as the case may be). So this work is not primarily a piece of 
philosophy but a work of performance studies – considering the way in which 
philosophy might be used as a perspective on performance practices. 
Fortier understands ‘performance’ ranging from marked performances, paratheatrical 
along a continuum to any performative human activity in everyday life (1997: 13). 
The rich interconnection of drama/theatre/performance is not unproblematic, but 
                                                
9 ‘A Founded Mode in which Being in is Exemplified. Knowing the World’ (Heidegger 1962: 59-62). 
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Fortier wants to focus on theatre as the object of his study. I suggest that rubric of 
performance seems to bring with it a propensity towards phenomenology, engaging 
with the lived, human experience of the world and an acknowledgment of becoming 
over static being (as is perhaps the tendency of purely textual analysis). 
Reinelt and Roach (1992) begin with the problematic nature of the ‘post’ inherent in 
modern critical theory. They note that theory is of its nature fast changing and alive in 
a state of flux. Framed by the underlying notion of ‘postmodernism’, Reinelt and 
Roach cite François Lyotard’s (1984) formulation of the post-modern condition 
doubled in the structure of the book itself: a site of pluralism and multiplicity of 
individual perspectives. They note the impossibility of an ideologically neutral 
aesthetics of performance that was perhaps once thought to be achievable. At the 
same time, they realise the problematic taxonomy and divisions of the chapters and 
theories, many of which converge, overlap and might well have been placed in an 
altogether different part of the book. Many of the theories introduced have an 
interdisciplinary origin and others emerged from a specific disciplinary practice, and 
yet others from a philosophical basis. Again, each theory could be seen to have more 
than one origin – containing a mix of methodologies and subject matter. Others are 
sites of critical convergence. 
Fortier (1997) is also aware that his introduction to theory and theatre is not 
ideologically neutral. In the same way as Carlson (1993) and Schechner (2006) 
acknowledge their own social, historical and cultural situatedness, Fortier is aware 
that writing is always ideologically positioned, but wary of the extremities of an 
introduction with a specific agenda (Eagleton, 1983) and an uncollated collection of 
perspectives, he treads the median line in surveying a range of views from the one 
voice. This thesis is certainly speaking from a certain position. One may well be wary 
of the political implications of using Heidegger’s philosophy as a method for analysis. 
Philip Auslander (2003) also presents an introduction to performance and theory 
negotiating ideological perspectives. Reproducing many key essays and writings in 
the field of performance studies chosen in relation to both influence on the author’s 
own work and broadly recognised in the discipline (2003: 18) Auslander realises that 
such diverse perspectives are far from being monological. In his introduction, 
Auslander traces out several narratives and connections between the texts chosen, 
ranging from ‘Theatre Studies, Speech and Oral Interpretation, Performance Studies, 
Dance Studies, Anthropology, Sociology, Art History, Philosophy, Literary Criticism, 
Law and Film Studies’ (2003: 2). 
Jon McKenzie (2001) responds to the challenge of the theory explosion by a 
performative piece of writing in Perform or Else. He aims at ‘linking performances of 
artists and activists with those of workers and executives, as well as computers and 
missile systems’ (2001: 3). In other words, the book is a (self-acknowledged, self-
defeating) attempt to ‘rehearse a general theory of performance’(2001: 4) in bringing 
together at least three different contexts of the word – organisational management, 
technological, cultural performance. McKenzie is endeavouring to investigate 
political actions, business performance, everyday speech through performance as a 
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paradigm – an atmosphere surrounding our lives. The premise is that we can stratify 
the many layers of this atmosphere. 
Through a play on the linguistic field of the word ‘performance’, McKenzie relies on 
the different meanings of performance in the book’s structure. Beginning with the 
front cover of Forbes magazine, he riffs on the combination of ‘perform or else’ as a 
threat to members of the business community to produce results and the vaudeville 
joke of a cane threatening to pull the figure depicted in the image off the stage (thus 
conflating business and stage performance in the joke). Lurking behind the 
playfulness of the writing are ideas of knowledge, power and discipline from Deleuze 
and Guattari, Foucault and Derrida’s notion of the ‘lecture machine’ (2001: 19-22). 
McKenzie’s strategy is to employ the ludic deconstruction of (dare we say?) 
postmodern writing practice with a double delivery of meaning in form and content. 
His clever hat-tipping or wink to theory in the very performance of writing displays 
the difficulty in communicating ideas clearly. 
Rather than launch into a performative piece of writing here, I have decided to 
structure my own work with as much clarity as has been possible. Also, rather than 
start with the many meanings of performance and the very different uses to which the 
word is put, I have considered particular theories of performance as presenting a 
phenomenology of the world. This thesis is not a general theory of performance, so 
much as a suggestion that we might use philosophy and phenomenology more 
specifically to analyse performance. 
A tendency to privilege theatre as a product rather than a process is underpinned by a 
conception of performance solely from the spectator’s point of view. Theatre is not 
just the viewing of performance but the creation of action on stage. In this creation, 
something philosophically important is going on.
10
 More importantly, I think that the 
kind of knowledge that actors gain is not merely intellectual, but it is grounded in 
experience – indeed, its medium is experience – not just words.
11
  
This present thesis sees performance as both an object of study and a mode of 
analysis. As such, performance studies is a strangely positioned discipline whose 
object of study has the ability to talk back. Our own department at the University of 
Sydney has a close connection with theatre practitioners who draw on our research, 
provide performances to study and perform about the results of our investigations.
12
 
This shows the exceptional reflexivity of actors who are able both to observe their 
own performance while being engaged in the performance itself. Such a surprising 
capacity for simultaneous observation and execution was pointed out by Diderot 
(1957) in his famous Paradox of Acting. At the same time, performance also has a 
                                                
10 States (1996) makes the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of performance theory. The 
former are professionally involved in the arts and artistic creation whereas the latter are concerned 
more with social performance at the largely unintentional level (1996: 3). 
11 Indeed, Plato’s Ion refutes the idea that actors (rhapsodes) have any definite knowledge at all in 
creating their art. Heidegger argues that knowing is not our fundamental way that we encounter the 
world which is why I have lingered on the idea of actors as manual philosophers. 
12 See Maxwell (2006) on the evolution of performance studies here at the University of Sydney. 
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complex relation with society itself.
13
 In a sense, actors are ‘intuitive anthropologists’ 
if I could coin a phrase, in being able to tap into Geertz’s (1983) notion of 
‘sensibility’ – interpreting the society’s ‘feeling for life’. But performance has more 
than a simple understanding of the way that we are with others, a feeling for life. The 
act of performance has the potential to subject this to analysis and contains a certain 
reflexivity that is not present in everyday life. Performance can force us to reflect of 
how we are and that we are – precisely the core of Heidegger’s (1962) investigation 
into the question of Being. So apart from exploring specific social issues and debates, 
the act of performance can also ask the big question ‘What does it mean to be?’  
Performance, Theatre and Acting 
In this thesis, I use ‘acting’, ‘theatre’ and ‘performance’ somewhat interchangeably. It 
is not my view that they are identical.
14
 In fact, I have tried to steer away from 
generalisations here and merely attend to what three different theorists saw as possible 
in performance and they wrote down those thoughts that have become so influential to 
theatre students and practitioners alike over the last hundred years or so.
15
 This does 
not rule out considering other theorists as manual philosophers, nor even other forms 
of acting, such as film acting. But the way in which those practices could be 
considered as manual philosophy needs to be worked out in its own way (if at all). 
Incidentally, the same can be said of other art forms. 
Performance has variously been defined as ‘marked’, ‘framed’ or ‘reflexive 
behaviour, twice behaved’, or any human action that is special involving ‘heightened 
awareness’ of the act of performance itself.
16
 Alternatively, or in addition, a 
distinction between performance and everyday life has been challenged to include the 
idea of performance in the sense of achieving a goal or outcome.
17
 A definition of 
performance or acting is not really my goal here (although the arguments in that field 
are pertinent). My thought is that acting and performance can be framed as 
phenomenological in Heidegger’s sense – searching for the meaning of Being. 
Performance and acting can be set apart from everyday life and everyday action 
because they examine the underlying principles in a situation (that they are 
performing) in order to be able to represent a particular set of circumstances. There 
are, of course, many and varied human experiences that are explored in the 
ontological laboratory of the stage.
18
 
The approach of this thesis focuses on the actor a possible site of phenomenology in 
the theatre. Of course, theatre is always a collaborative process involving a complex 
                                                
13 See Turner (1990) and the spiralling figure eight theory of the interaction between aesthetic and 
social dramas. 
14 For a useful introduction to the distinction and history of these terms in academic discourse, see 
Shepherd and Wallis (2004). 
15 This is not unlike Zarrilli’s (1995) approach, leaving open the continuity between performance and 
acting by focus on various performance practices as concrete examples rather than put forward a 
general theory of acting. 
16 See Goffman (1956), Fitzpatrick (1995), Schechner (2003). 
17 See Jon McKenzie (2001) on organizational performance and technological performance and 
Wilshire (1982) for criticisms of the theatre metaphor. 
18 See McKenzie’s comments on Reinelt and Roach in his discussion of Cultural Performance. 
Acting as Manual Philosophy 
 26 
interrelation between playwrights, directors, and actors. Nor should we overlook the 
role of the audience or spectator in the theatrical event. Indeed, the task of acting is 
deeply intermeshed with the audience as a communicative and phenomenological 
exchange. This present project, however, focuses on the perspective of the performer 
that has largely been overlooked in criticisms of theatre and requires close attention.
19
 
As I will discuss below, I believe that phenomenological attitude also applies to wider 
concepts of art, as the boundaries of art and performance have been challenged and 
blurred both in theory and practice of the last century.
20
 This is not to mention the 
myriad of other different practitioners that make performance possible: lighting 
designers, set and stage designers, make-up and special effects artists, musicians, 
composers and sound-designers among others. All of these artists engage in the 
specific Being of those different aspects of theatre to create the performance event. It 
is no mistake that late nineteenth century theorists such as Wagner and Hegel saw the 
possibility of a Gesamtkunstwerk – bringing together all the arts into a ‘total-work-of-
art’. Nevertheless, there is still something unique in the art of the actor in that their 
own body – their own Being – is both artist and the medium – the controller and the 
means of portrayal, as well as the temporal unravelling of performance in the presence 
of others. 
Acting as manual philosophy might not simply be in the moment of performance 
itself. Theatre is a process, not a stable work of art. In many cases, the rehearsal 
process and the course of actor training is where the philosophical part of the art takes 
place. At that point we could even say that the philosophy is in the muscles of actors 
as they walk about on stage. Training and habituation help to bring out such 
behaviours controlled by the artist in performance and in many cases these are the 
sites where the question of Being arises most pertinently. At the same time, 
performances can often inspire audiences to contemplate the nature of existence 
whether through the content of a work being performed, or just because of the act of 
looking which may bring with it a certain wonder at Being.
21
 This thought points 
toward many sites and times of manual philosophy in the process of theatre. 
The significance of acting as manual philosophy is precisely in that it takes 
experience as its mode of delivery and its meaning – letting that which shows itself 
appear in the way that it shows itself. Actors do not merely present philosophical 
concepts in abstraction; they represent concepts in a tangible, material, physical and 
bodily way.
22
 The ‘heightened awareness’ of the stage highlights the way of showing 
and the thing shown.
23
 Such a process is more than everyday activity – acting has a 
                                                
19 It is not necessarily a criticism that approaches such as Garner (1994) and Wishire (1982) have 
looked at theatre from the audience perspective, but simply that considering the point of view of the 
actor as phenomenological provides an additional dimension to the issue.  
20 See Bert States (1983) for his discussion of the phenomenological attitude. 
21 Stephen Mulhall (2005) uses an example from a novel as his starting point for the question of Being, 
and Heidegger referred to the poems of Hölderlin, Rilke and Trakl  in Poetry, Language, Thought 
(Heidegger 1975) as a form of asking the Question of Being. 
22 Philosophical themes and ideas may well explicitly form the subject for playwrights too – Tom 
Stoppard, David Williamson, Bertolt Brecht to name but a few. But to investigate the discussion of 
philosophical concepts in plays throughout the ages would be another project altogether. 
23 Of course, ‘the stage’ is not necessary for many forms of acting. The heightened awareness of 
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special significance because not only is it a doing; it is also the showing of doing 
something. In many cases, actors need to have a complex understanding of what they 
are doing and how they are doing it that is not merely pre-theoretical as many 
everyday activities are. In a sense, acting is post-theoretical: the work of construction 
and rehearsal has been done by the time that the performance arrives and that 
significance shines through. Yet even in improvisation and spontaneous moments of 
performance, an actor’s past training and experience informs the action that takes 
place. 
The separation of performance and everyday life is an issue that has somewhat 
parallel or peripheral significance to the overall argument here that actors can be seen 
as manual philosophers.
24
 In one sense, theatrical performances can be off-line 
investigations of actions that would otherwise be invested with a real outcome. On the 
other hand, what happens in the performance of a play is a real event with real people 
in real space – something is actually happening. Various periods in history have seen 
an emphasis on the aesthetic qualities of a work over the social change that it brings 
about.
25
 Of course, the notion of art and aesthetics are a relatively modern advent in 
cultural thought. For Kant (1952), art is defined by the disinterested representation of 
beauty whereby the aesthetic pleasure is not derived from the actual existence of the 
art object but rather the feeling and reception of beauty that it provokes. By the advent 
of the twentieth century, many artists emphasised and considered the real 
ramifications and consequences of art. In other words, the work of the artist was 
(explicitly) politicised rather than remaining functionally neutral and linked to the 
mere representation of beauty. In at least some cases (think of Brecht’s practice 
discussed bellow), the notion of practical philosophy hinges on the idea that actors are 
not just presenting philosophical ideas for contemplation; they are actively portraying 
and provoking philosophical thought to stimulate action in the audience. In this sense, 
acting differs from everyday life in that it can be a conscious, self-aware, critical 
process. This process of acting is not merely unreflective action and everyday 
absorption in the world.  
From the point of view of theatrical creation Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht all 
focused on acting as a real activity. This is opposed to theoreticians such as Diderot 
(1957) who took the perspective of an ideal audience member. An understanding of 
the performance event is not exhausted simply by taking an aesthetic view, though 
this has been the traditional territory of criticism and the study of drama. Richard 
Schechner (1976) uses the term ‘efficacy’ to describe the real social action of 
performance and its capacity to effect social change. When engaged in the practical 
activity of artistic creation, the theorists I have chosen as case studies reflected on 
what they were doing and tried to have that reflection then inform their practice. In a 
way, part of the history of antitheatricality comes from the perspective of the spectator 
                                                                                                                                       
performance comes from the performers awareness of what they are doing and the spectator’s 
awareness of what is being done. 
24 Goffman (1955) argues that everyday life is structured like a dramatic performance with off stage 
areas and marked or framed scenes. Bruce Wilshire (1982) argues that acting and everyday life are 
separate. See also Schechner’s theory of the ‘performance continuum’. 
25 For instance, see Schechner’s (1976) discussion of efficacy versus entertainment.  
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– what is seen is false, indulgent and morally destructive. From the perspective of the 
practitioner, theatre is not about presenting a false view of reality but rather actually 
doing something. In a sense, one might characterise modernism as precisely this turn 
towards this social reality of performance and as a reaction against the Romantic 
contemplation of beauty. Without doubt, significant global events such as the rise of 
science (the Enlightenment), industrialisation and two world wars affected a 
rethinking of art as beauty towards art as an active engagement with social reality. 
In the sense that different contexts of acting may display various aspects of 
phenomenological investigation, one need not necessarily draw a distinction between 
artistic and non-artistic practices (if that is at all possible).
26
 As mentioned above, 
each of the theorists I investigate in Part II were working under considerable financial 
pressure to make a commercial profit from their theatre practice. This did not rule out 
artistic pursuits. Just as each theory takes a slightly different view of what acting is, so 
too do they differ in their consideration of what art is. Again, my goal here is not to 
come up with a theory of art that will encompass a specific set of practices, but rather, 
to show how the practices of these theatre-makers (or rather, their reflections on that 
theatre-making) reveal elements of a phenomenological investigation into Being-
there. 
Finally, the spectator, director and other participants of theatre may constitute an 
investigation of Being (albeit from a different perspective). Bruce Wilshire (1982) 
notes the phenomenological detachment that art brings with it – but this is from the 
position of the spectator. Spectatorship is an active creation of meaning and an 
interpretative practice. Phenomenology is an interpretative practice that aims at 
getting at the structures of Being. 
Theory and Practice 
Any consideration of the relationship between acting and philosophy brings with it the 
potential chasm between theory and practice. Phenomenology has also been criticised 
in that too much writing is in the philosophical realm of theorising phenomenology 
and not enough of doing it.27  
One might note that it is possible to look into the phenomenological aspects of other 
art forms. A wealth of material has appeared in the phenomenology of dance, for 
instance.
28
 In the visual arts, various elements of Being can also be brought to the 
fore.
29
 There has also been a slippage between different art forms. So too has there 
been a breakdown in the disciplinary boundaries of universities – actually allowing 
such a thesis to be made: that actors are manual philosophers. Methods and theories in 
the humanities are often adapted and applied in other areas and disciplines. Likewise, 
performance has also become a metaphor applied in numerous discourses. J.L. Austin 
(1962) and performative speech acts, Erving Goffman’s (1955) Presentation of Self in 
                                                
26 See Geertz’s (1983) discussion of the intertwining of art and the understanding of social and cultural 
contexts in ‘Art as a Cultural System’. 
27 See Grant’s (2005) critique of Herbert Spiegelberg. 
28 See Fraleigh (1987) for instance and at my own department, Taylor (2007) and Manley (2007). 
29 See especially Mikael Dufrenne (1973) and Merleau-Ponty (1962).  
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Everyday Life and Judith Butler’s (1990) notion of performed gender take up the 
notion in different ways. In my own department, performance is not admitted as a 
legitimate medium for a postgraduate degree – the idea of performance as research 
poses various problems to the academic institution. Performance does not articulate 
phenomenology in the same way as an academic treatise though it may engage in 
many of the same questions and problems as the literary counterpart. 
In their introduction to Modern Theories of Performance, Milling and Ley (2001) 
note the difficulties of the theory/practice divide: 
[t]he relationship between theory and practice, or between 
performance and theory, is obviously complex at any time or 
in any given case that might be isolated (2001: vii).  
Writing about theatre feeds back into its performance which in turn inspires more 
writing and so on.
30
 Theatre practitioners also find motivating ideas in writing that 
does not deal explicitly with theatre (think of Brecht’s fondness of Marx). The 
conditions that allowed Stanislavski, Brecht and Artaud to produce a body of writing 
on theatre is no doubt key to their legacy that has remained over the last century. For 
institutional and historical reasons, their writings have become widely available and 
read by large audiences. 
Just as theory feeds into practice, Heidegger’s writing, as a way of framing theatre, 
could feed back into the artistic process itself. It is possible that some of the ideas that 
I develop here are also applicable to practice – professional and amateur, religious and 
secular, in acting schools and academic institutions. For instance, it may be possible 
to generate an approach to acting founded in the elements of Heidegger’s description 
of Being-in-the-world, taking into account aspects such as readiness-to-hand, the 
equipmental structure of the environment, Being-with-others, Temporality and 
Historicality (and so on). On the other hand, this present thesis points out that those 
structures are precisely already apparent in these theorists that I have chosen to 
analyse. By making those themes explicit I hope to highlight theatre practice as 
theory. The idea is not an original one, as Houston Hollis articulates: 
[t]he gap between performance and thought is not simple, 
but is composed of subgaps on either side, between the 
pedagogical imagery of performance and the flesh which 
performance possesses, between thought about the theatre 
and metathought which plays though the theatre… The 
performer and the thinker could momentarily meet in the 
sign’s provisional and already receding closure. The two 
might be – is it too much to ask? – the same person (Hollis 
Huston quoted in Zarrilli 1995: 1). 
This is the compelling value of considering actors as manual philosophers – shrinking 
the gap between philosophy and acting acknowledges the practice as an embodied, 
                                                
30 This interaction is not dissimilar to Schechner’s braided figure eight diagram of the interaction of 
performance and society. 
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inter-subjective search for the meaning of Being. 
Perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of the theory/practice interrelation is the 
way in which the many interpretations and misinterpretations obscure both theoretical 
writings and performances.
31
 Translation is one of the key issues here. This is 
especially true of Stanislavski’s writings which have still not been translated in a 
complete works edition in English.
32
 Each theorist left behind a legacy of writing but 
also influenced other practitioners who took on their theories and learnt from their 
practices.  I have not dealt largely with the legacy of these theorists but have rather 
concentrated on the writings that they have left behind. There is a sense in which the 
notion of a Brechtian theatre is still very much thriving or Stanislavski’s system still 
lives on – and in constant revision. (I am not sure what to say about Artaud’s theatre, 
which, of course, never existed.) Again, it is another project related to this one which 
would include an active engagement with contemporary theatre practices with respect 
to the question of being, but that is not the task at hand. 
‘Post-structuralist’ criticism might also point out that theory is also a practice – no 
thought is from within a void.
33
 In order to situate one’s own writing in its context, the 
theoretician’s eye necessarily turns onto itself and situates theoretical practice as a 
concrete activity within a specific social context with specific interests and desired 
outcomes etc. This does not necessarily doom theoretical pursuit to failure. The 
practice of ethnography, for instance, can engage with the problem of access to 
objective, universal truths through the process of thick description – attending to the 
concrete details of experience and making an attempt to situate one’s own practices in 
the context of that which is being observed.
34
 This move is very much motivated by 
phenomenology’s maxim of a ‘return to the things themselves’.
35
 
Phenomenology or Semiotics 
My use of phenomenology as a lens for analysing performance also raises the 
question of how phenomenology relates to the wider field of theory. The metaphor of 
a lens is problematic in that such an analysis implies that what is to be analysed can 
be seen (in an ordinary sense). As I will argue, phenomenology is not only about 
seeing with the eyes, but about understanding the possibilities of Being.  
In Great Reckonings in Little Rooms Bert States (1985) argues that we can develop a 
‘binocular vision’ between phenomenology and semiotic analysis where ‘one eye 
enables us to see the world phenomenally; the other eye enables us to see it 
significantly’ (1985: 8). As Heidegger points out, the articulation and assertion of an 
interpretation is just one part of the wider concept of understanding. Our experience 
                                                
31 Also consider Meryk (2003) on how performance and theory do not sit easily together. 
32 Note that a new translation of Stanislavski’s book, An Actor’s Work, by Jean Benedetti is currently 
forthcoming. This will offer an alternative translation to Hapgood’s translation of An Actor Prepares 
(Stanislavski 1980). 
33 See Foucault (1984) ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’. 
34 Geertz, (1983) ‘Thick Description’. Also consider the notion of ‘experience near’ and ‘experience 
far’ description. 
35 Phenomenology need not necessarily devolve into relativism either. Heidegger thought that the 
whole idea of realism versus idealism was misguided from the outset. 
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of the world is not merely in the interpretation of signs. Perhaps it is better to say that 
once we enter into the world of language, words and signs are deeply intermeshed 
with our Being-there that they are inseparable. Heidegger argues in BT that signs are a 
special case in our relation to the world that has the potential to reveal the structures 
of the world (‘Reference and Signs’ 1962: H77 ff). 
In some cases, much of the work of the actor is a practical hermeneutics – interpreting 
texts in such a way as to create a performance. In a sense I could claim that actors are 
‘manual semioticians’. But the work does not end with a merely intellectual or verbal 
interpretation. The work of the theatre practitioner is to turn interpretation into 
experience. So unlike States, I think that phenomenology encompasses semiotics as 
one of the facets that go in to make up our experience of the world. Heidegger said 
himself that ‘language is the house of Being’ (‘Letter on Humanism’ in Heidegger 
1993: 239) and close attention to the words that we use can reveal the world when we 
attend to it in a certain way – a phenomenological way. Derrida’s deconstruction can 
in many ways be seen as the uniting of the projects of semiotics and phenomenology 
in that he asserts that meaning is never based in a stable, universal ground, but rather 
shifts and defers in context and through time. But the instability of the word always 
dooms interpretation to lack finality. By the same token, one might even take on the 
project of theatre as practical deconstruction, practical Marxism, or practical feminism 
etc. The particular relevance of phenomenology here is that each of these theoretical 
frames picks out certain aspects of Being-in-the-world, and each of these approaches 
to acting is a manipulation of the performer’s own experience of being.  
Conclusions 
The development of theory in the twentieth century has seen a burgeoning of 
applications in the humanities. Rather than floating off into abstraction, the anchoring 
of performance studies (at the University of Sydney) in ethnography and 
anthropology helps to provide an important contact with practitioners and the industry 
itself. Whilst this thesis has its base in textual analysis, it is not limited simply to 
interpretation – semiotic or hermeneutic. Phenomenology acknowledges the lived, 
embodied element of theatrical practice which I have tried to recognise. The body has 
become an important theme for thinking about performance, though not merely as 
materiality, but in a lived and experiential sense. Theory has been useful in making 
this point. 
But the theory explosion should be approached with caution. Rather than simply 
apply theory indiscriminately, the relationship between the theory and theatre practice 
ought to be examined critically. I suggest that different acting practices can be seen as 
an enactment of a certain world-view and philosophical position. In this sense, theatre 
itself has a tendency towards phenomenology because its own practices are 
phenomenological; theatre practitioners maintain a primary concern with the way 
things show themselves. Drawing on Auslander (2003) and Schechner (2002), I have 
undertaken an analysis of theatre ‘as’ philosophy. But in doing so, I suggest that this 
opens the door for seeing acting as a practical form of philosophy. This methodology 
I have adopted here is not simply to apply theory to a certain cultural practice. By 
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taking on Heidegger’s notion of phenomenology as investigating the meaning of 
Being, I suggest that acting can be  a practical form for that investigation. 
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The philosophical upshot, if I may put it that way, of a century of acting theory has 
been the re-discovery of theatre as an activity which directs its efforts at giving us the 
world as it is. That is to say, theatre imitates the world on the world’s own terms.  
 
Aldo Tassi (1998: 49), ‘Philosophy and Theatre’ 
 
2. Intersections: Acting/Theory 
Key texts and academic research related to the intersection of philosophy and acting 
have largely concentrated on either the analysis of play texts or considered the art of 
acting from an ideal spectator’s position in the auditorium. My suggestion is to 
consider actors engaged in their creative process where a philosophical reflexivity is 
evident. I have divided this literature review into sections dealing with historical 
overviews of theories of theatre and acting practices, applying critical theory to those 
practices, applying phenomenology to performance analysis and parallel areas of 
applying philosophy in other academic disciplines. 
Theories of Theatre and Acting.  
It is significant that early theatre theory came from some of the most influential 
philosophers in Western history. For instance, Plato named the ‘ancient quarrel 
between poetry and philosophy’ (1992: 607b). Following from such a starting point, 
Marvin Carlson’s (1993) Theories of the Theatre: a Historical and Critical Survey 
from the Greeks to the Present traces criticism of theatre from ancient Greek tragedy 
to the present day and provides a synoptic overview of theatrical theory. Carlson notes 
that ‘[n]either “theory” nor “theatre” is a term of unambiguous application…’ (1993: 
9) The ambiguity of each term creates part of the contested field problem of 
performance studies.1 In his work, Carlson uses ‘theory’ to refer to: 
statements of general principles regarding the methods, aims, 
functions, and characteristics of this particular art form. It is 
thus separated on the one hand from aesthetics, dealing with 
art in general, and on the other hand from the criticism of 
particular works and reviews of particular productions 
(1993: 9). 
So for Carlson, theory is somewhere in the tension between abstract ideals of art and 
specific works and between aesthetics and criticism. Carlson’s aim is to follow the 
historical development of approaches to theatre though different theories as they 
became prevalent. Interestingly, he is also interested in performance and the forms 
that theatre has taken throughout the ages. In discussing these forms, he considers 
texts from a range of different backgrounds: philosophers, poets, theologians, 
sociologists, critics and theatre practitioners and so on. Of the theories that Carlson 
discusses, some influenced theatre and inspired theatrical production (theatrical 
theory), and others more generally considered the nature of the human relation to the 
world (philosophy) (1993: 10). These wider theories about the world in turn 
                                                
1 ‘From Ritual to Theater and Back: The Efficacy-Entertainment Braid’ in Schechner (2003: 132) 
proposed a braided interaction between theatre and the social drama. 
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influenced how humans understood themselves and hence what theatre is. Carlson 
recognises the distinction between ‘drama’ as the written text and ‘theatre’ which 
takes into account the production and performance of those texts. In the development 
of academic approaches, he also notes the development of the term ‘performance’ 
which breaks out of the theatre building into a wider realm including such ideas as 
‘spectacle’ and ‘paratheatrical activities’.  
Although there may be some debate over whether Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht 
present theories of acting, I present them as such because each reflected on their own 
theatrical practice or what theatre might possibly achieve. The ideas set down by these 
particular practitioners also inspired much of the performance practices of the next 
century and, no doubt, beyond. Certainly, they did not produce a theory of the same 
order as a scientific theory. As employed here, a theory of acting is as much a 
description of a set of practices for a possible theatre. The theories presented in Part II 
need not even be thought of as systematic or internally coherent (as might be expected 
of a scientific theory, perhaps). Theory in this sense is not a rational set of ideas about 
the art of acting if we see acting as a holistic practices engaging with the mind, body 
and spirit. This is particularly true of Artaud’s ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ which is an 
explicit rejection of the possibility of theory or to use Derrida’s (1978) terms, a 
rejection of logos as the basis of Being. In the same way, phenomenology is not a 
theory so much as a set of practices or a way of doing philosophy that attends to 
experience as its basis. 
In Modern Theories of Performance, Jane Milling and Graham Ley (2001) are 
concerned with the recent emergence of a handful of now canonical or influential 
practitioners who have been studied in classrooms around the world most notably in 
North America and Europe. Milling and Ley note the widespread attention to this 
group of theatre makers: Stanislavski, Appia and Craig, Meyerhold, Corpeau, Artaud, 
Grotowski, and Boal. In an attempt to contextualise those theories, the authors stress 
the conditions which allowed those figures to become so influential. No doubt, the 
dissemination of writings were pivotal in achieving widespread acclaim and 
prominence of these figures, together with their theatrical practice. In this sense, the 
key to research in this manner is the texts left behind by the practitioners and 
interpretative work that can be done on those written traces. Yet Milling and Ley note 
the curious fact that designers, for instance, have not received such great attention 
(2001: vii). They argue that theory has become increasingly of interest and seek to 
engage in a (not necessarily hostile) criticism as ‘vital act of reception’. Like Milling 
and Ley, I have focused on the texts and writings of theatre practitioners, leaving an 
anthropological approach to acting as manual philosophy for another occasion.  
Milling and Ley take ‘the text’ as the primary focus of their research, noting this  
chosen emphasis exists partly from the existence of many 
studies which take performance as their principal subject. 
What we offer here is complimentary to those initiatives and 
simply recognizes that theory is hard to read, even when 
there is a strong compulsion to approach it and sound it out 
for its inspiration and its value (2001: vii). 
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The rigour of such a focus on the text is not without value and clearly shows that 
much context and interpretation of performance cannot leave textual analysis behind 
full-stop. In relation to my own project, I have also focused fairly closely on perhaps 
some of the most influential texts in twentieth century theatre.
2
 But rather than 
analyse texts per se, I have tried to look through to the theory of performance posited 
by each text (if this is possible – fraught as it is with issues of interpretation). This is 
an appropriation of these key texts as a phenomenological description of theatrical 
practice. The next step crucial to my argument is that each theatrical practice then in 
turn provides a specific phenomenology of the world. So rather than sounding out the 
inspirational value of these key texts to twentieth century performance, I have tried to 
see them as presenting theatre and acting as an investigation of Being, each 
highlighting various phenomenal aspects of Being-in-the-world. 
The model of textual analysis as the basis for the study of drama is well established. 
Carlson (1993) observes that Aristotle’s poetics is foundational for the next two 
millennia of theatre theory, which was mainly concerned with the literary form of the 
text rather than the performance or specific focus on the Drama. (This is really one of 
the main turns in the second half of the twentieth century.) Carlson’s entire work is 
concerned with the intersection between philosophy, theory and theatre. The 
distinction between these two fields becomes very cloudy. For example, he notes: 
[i]n early nineteenth-century Germany the dominant 
philosophers, Kant and Hegel, and the dominant dramatists, 
Goethe and Schiller, all had in one way or another supported 
a view of art as idealization, the revelation of universal, 
eternal truth hidden behind mundane, empirical reality. The 
concept of drama as idealized life or revealed truth remained 
strong in the theorists and the dramatists who followed them 
(1993: 248). 
In a sense, one might well follow the idea of art as expression of truth common to 
both philosophers and theatre makers, though crucially, I suggest, this would require a 
rethinking of the notion of truth which could encompass both sides. Carlson is mainly 
concerned with the historical forms that theatre has taken as mentioned above – the 
methods, aims, functions, and characteristics of performance throughout the ages. My 
own focus on the intersection between philosophy and theatre is not solely aimed at 
art nor necessarily even the forms of making that art. Nor am I interested in revealing 
the singular truth of an individual play text. I am primarily interested in the reflexivity 
of the theories and practices of Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht as revealing of a 
general relation to the world and an investigation of that relation. In a sense, the break 
is from Aristotle and his analysis of form towards theatre as a form of analysis. 
Like Milling and Ley, Jean Benedetti looks at a number of different texts in his survey 
of various approaches to acting throughout the ages in The Art of the Actor (2005).  
Directed more at students studying acting, this book concentrates on acting as a 
                                                
2 Namely, An Actor Prepares (Stanislavski 1980), The Theatre and its Double (Artaud 1958) and 
Brecht on Theatre (Brecht 1964). 
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profession and technical aspects of the art. As with my on approach in this thesis, 
Benedetti focuses on the actor as the locus of communication in the theatre.  
On the surface, the idea that there could be an ‘essential history of acting’ as the 
book’s sub-title suggests seems to be reductive.3 Perhaps this is merely responding to 
a need for clarity in the academy at an introductory level. Theatre historians often 
grapple with the view of history as a linear development and that there may well have 
been many and varied competing performance practices that have existed throughout 
time.
4
 Benedetti does note that ‘we need to be aware of our own historic position and 
realise how different our expectations with regard to entertainment are from any 
previous period’ (2005: 4). Indeed, one may be wary of any discourse of universality 
in the actor – the idea that acting is somehow has a single core regardless of historical 
or social context. One may do well to keep in mind the cultural specificity of acting 
practices and the considerably different concepts of performance that have existed 
historically and across cultures. Benedetti asserts that ‘(a)cting is a normal human 
activity. Everybody acts in one way or another almost every day’ (2005: 1). The 
natural/professional divide – the idea that acting might seep over into everyday life – 
has been of concern to attacks on theatre as I will consider in the next chapter. 
Underlying this thought is the idea of naturalness which is far from unproblematic in 
any justification of a practice or discourse. Benedetti notes that the ancient Greek 
‘hypocrite’ was the word for the actor in that culture perhaps hinting at the 
antitheatrical prejudice and the puzzling duplicity of the art of acting. The basic 
impulse of the professional actor according to Benedetti is 
the desire to communicate an experience of something that 
has happened, or might have happened, but is done by 
pretending to be what we are not (2005: 1). 
Benedetti implies that there is some foundational drive within humans to act. I would 
not like to dismiss this thought tout court, but simply suggest that rather than draw 
universal conclusions, one may also do well to look at specific instances of theatre 
and acting with respect to the communication of events that have happened or might 
happen – i.e. possibilities. Benedetti takes care to recognise actors in relation to 
audiences, of many and various types, relative to genres, theatre as a social art, taking 
place within a designated space, as part of a community and culture subject to time, 
place and technical equipment: 
It is possible, however, to test out the body of knowledge 
that has come down to us against the findings of modern 
science and philosophy, notions of intentionality, the nature 
of memory and consciousness, but unfortunately, so far, no 
systematic attempt has been made to apply new research to 
the study of the actor’s process (2005: 233). 
Apart from the concentration on acting as an integral part of theatrical practice, 
                                                
3 See also Rozik (2002) – ‘Acting, the quintessence of theatricality’. 
4 On this issue, see Theatre Histories (Zarilli 2006). 
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Benedetti’s investigation shares more in common with my own research presented in 
this thesis. To ‘test out’ specific theories of acting against Heidegger’s description of 
Being-there is a major part of my project. A second and stimulating thought is that 
such an investigation might feed back into theatrical practice and as Benedetti 
suggests, might be useful in the planning, training and rehearsal of theatre. He 
continues: 
But we would need to proceed with caution. When the 
mechanisms have been defined, acting remains an intense 
personal activity. We act because we want to, perhaps 
because we have to, not because someone tells us to. We do 
not act abstract rules, but the rules may provide means 
through which we can create more easily. An understanding 
of the mechanisms of personal and social behaviour could be 
useful for planning the process of training and rehearsal 
(2005: 233). 
The idea that we cannot act out abstract rules is precisely the sense in which I am 
using the concept of manual philosophy – to consider concretely the possibilities of 
existence that the world offers. So rather than falling into essentialism, this thesis 
presents acting as a specific and practical exploration of abstract thought otherwise 
presented in philosophical discourse. 
Applying Theory to Acting Practices 
In Acting (Re)Considered Phillip Zarrilli focuses on approaches to acting from a range 
of critical perspectives, ‘strategies, techniques, theories, ideas, and approaches that 
particular actors or groups of actors have developed for performance’ (Zarrilli, 1995: 
1). Zarrilli notes the many languages and discourses on acting, both spoken and 
written. He suggests that too seldom do actors and theorists talk to each other, with 
the resulting gap between theory and practice (1995: 1).  
Zarrilli privileges the perspectival approach in a similar way to Reinelt and Roach 
(1992) and attacks the notion of a stable truth:  
Acting (Re)Considered invites students of acting, actors, and 
theorists alike to put aside parochial preconceptions and 
points of view that propose acting as a truth (that is one 
system, one discourse, one practice). This book invites 
instead a pro-active processual approach which cultivates a 
critical awareness of acting as multiple and always changing. 
Of course, in the moment of performance, the actor must 
embody a specific set of actions as if these were absolute. 
But every ‘absolute’ viewed historically and processually is 
part of a multiplicity (1995: 3). 
In a move that seems distinctly phenomenological (though he does not articulate this 
claim in such terms), Zarrilli stresses the importance of the working and learning 
environments which have allowed various acting processes to come about. So 
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whereas talk about acting often claims a primacy and universality in its discourse, 
Zarrilli seeks to show the contingencies of all artistic practices. The scope of the book 
is not only about art, however, but also the material circumstances of production. 
Similarly, issues of race, gender, class, and ethnicity are all pertinent to moments of 
(re)consideration. 
In The Player’s Passion Joseph Roach situates the actor’s body as the site, instrument, 
medium, and chief means of creative inspiration (1985: 11). He traces the historical 
influence of physiology, psychology and philosophy and theories of acting. At the 
centre of the debate, according to Roach, is emotion (1985: 11). Rather than present a 
linear account of the development of approaches of acting, Roach stresses the specific 
understanding of the body and scientific world-views as crucial to analysing any 
historical period. Drawing on Thomas Kuhn’s notion of ‘paradigm’ and Michel 
Foucault’s concept of ‘episteme’, Roach traces the ways in which those world views 
were constituted by contemporary knowledges and traces the parallel histories of the 
actor’s body and the physiology of emotion.  
Roach’s thematisation of the body as an important concern for performance studies is 
crucial and his sensitivity to historical understandings of science and physiology is 
key to his forensic analysis of theories of acting. Nevertheless, recent scholarship 
would perhaps also stress the phenomenally lived body not merely as an object of 
scientific investigation and understanding, but as thoroughly intermeshed with the 
life-world of the time. This is the point at which phenomenology becomes useful in 
talking about the body not as object, but Being-in-the-world. Whilst historical 
discourses of science may have fallen into dualistic understanding of the body, the 
fact that the actor’s body on the stage is in the flesh and within time also offers a 
unique relation to experience. Thus rather than considering the actor solely as 
instrument, by reconsidering actors as manual philosophers I will try to express actors 
as both the investigator and the object in various theories of acting. In Heidegger’s 
analysis, the history of philosophy is also the history of the meaning of Being. As 
such, I will position the actor as an inquirer into Being. 
For Zarrilli (1995), the term ‘(re)considered’ is meant to signal the constant 
processual nature of considering together with the idea that society and human beings 
are performative and perpetually under construction. Theatre making, as a mode of 
socio-cultural practice, is not separate from everyday reality, history, politics or 
economics. For Zarrilli, theatre is a complex network of interactive practices that 
constitute and shape selves, historical events and relationships, always in a material 
way and within a specific cultural context. Actors too are continually undergoing 
intellectual and psychophysiological negotiations according to Zarrilli (1995: 2).  
There is a continual negotiation between the self, competing paradigms and 
discourses surrounding the practice of theatre making. Constant revisions are thus 
encountered in performances, theory and the training process associated with theatre 
(which are all intimately linked). 
(Re)Considerations in Zarrilli’s sense occur at times when actors’ practice and 
thought crystallise in an insight into their embodied performance practice and 
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technique (1995: 2). These alterations show that there is never complete neutrality in 
any discourse – all theatrical practice is from a concrete and material set of theoretical 
practices put in action. (Re)considering happens on different levels, according to 
Zarrilli: the personal, socio-cultural and ideological  – involving both individual and 
social dimensions. Zarrilli notes one example of (re)consideration may be observed in 
the rethinking of American versions of Stanislavski as it was received by those who 
taught from his legacy and his method of physical actions. So (re)consideration can 
occur from a historical perspective, forming a revision of our understanding of the 
past. On the other hand, specific performances and performers can also incite such a 
(re)consideration of their own practice whether it be in watching, or in a pivotal 
moment or change of perspective with respect to their own way of working. 
Zarrilli suggests that every time an actor performs, he or she implicitly enacts a theory 
of acting (1995: 4). Conventions of style, shape of actions and the performer’s 
relationship to the audience are all necessary in any performance. Presumably, this 
also enables any performer to have a revisionary moment with such an engagement 
with theory or alternative theories of acting. 
One essay of note in Zarrilli’s collection dealing with issues of subjectivity and a 
post-structural critique of discourses of the self in various acting theories is 
Auslander’s – ‘Logocentrism: Just be Yourself’. Auslander looks at the ways in which 
Stanislavski, Brecht and Grotowski are ‘logocentric’ in that they posit a fundamental 
self in their theories of acting. My approach of phenomenological reading attempts to 
free these theories from the charge of logocentrism, precisely because theatre 
practitioners’ work is always founded in experience. The concept of self that each 
theorist holds is different, but somehow aimed at truth in the sense of aletheia which I 
hope to show in this thesis. 
Instead of seeing theatre as marginal to our society, in this thematic approach to 
history Roach (1985) claims that ‘theater exists at the centre of civilized life, not at its 
peripheries’ (1985: 12). Each generation’s conventions of acting have been seen as 
natural and in reaction to the less realistic depictions of those who have gone before 
(1985:15). As such, the art of acting is a key practice through which to investigate 
historical understandings of naturalness. Roach dwells on the paradox of the actor 
whose ‘spontaneous vitality seems to depend on the extent to which his actions and 
thoughts have been automated, made second nature’ (1985: 16). As such the historical 
contingency of understandings of nature bear a direct impact to stage practices and 
approaches to performing. Yet ‘the central issues of psychology and physiology, by 
whatever names they are known, are not remote abstractions to the performer, but 
literally matters of flesh and blood’ (1985: 16). The immediacy of the body for the 
performer is a central issue to understanding theatre as night after night actors succeed 
in ‘reactivating in time and space ornate sequences that have been absorbed into 
muscles and nerves’ (1985: 17). 
One significant attempt to reassess the practice of acting in terms of a non-western 
model of mind is Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe’s Consciousness and the Actor (1996).5 
                                                
5 See footnote 26 on p.13 above. 
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Meyer-Dinkgräfe takes Diderot’s paradox concerning the actor’s emotional 
involvement in the part as the basis for his study and surveys a range of influential 
twentieth century theatre practitioners, tracing their historical contexts and influences. 
The author proposes that Vedic Science, an interpretation of classical Vedic texts of 
literature by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, may provide useful insights into the art of 
acting whilst providing a more extensive explanation and understanding of the actor’s 
emotional involvement during performance. 
Meyer-Dinkgräfe’s work is significant for my own argument here in that I also am 
attempting to reinterpret certain acting practices, though I have not taken emotion as 
the locus for my own study here. Instead of using Vedic science as a tool for 
understanding acting, I have drawn upon Heidegger’s phenomenology. Meyer-
Dinkgräfe also takes ‘consciousness’, ‘interculturalism’ and ‘postmodernism’ as key 
terms for his investigation. 
The concept of consciousness is particularly important in Meyer-Dinkgäfe’s work in 
that he attempts to provide a non-dualistic version of the term: ‘Consciousness cannot 
be defined in isolation from the body’ (1996: 14). The author surveys a range of 
different approaches to acting, including Diderot, Stanislavski, Meyerhold, Strasberg, 
Brecht, Artaud, Grotowski, Schechner, Barba, and Brook. He contextualises each 
theorist and considers them in relation to altered states of consciousness, pure 
consciousness, the mind-body relationship and points of contact with Indian 
philosophy and theatre theory (the Natyashastra). 
This approach is obviously relevant to my own thesis in that phenomenology also 
offers a critique of dualistic explanations of consciousness and indeed offers an 
account of human experience of the world. Meyer-Dinkgräfe suggests a list of 
attributes that any model of mind in theatrical theory should fulfil (1996: 113-4). He 
concludes, that this reinterpretation ‘provides a cogent description of hierarchically 
structured levels of the mind, ranging from the most concrete level of the senses to the 
most abstract level of pure consciousness or Self, via desire, the mind, the intellect, 
the emotions and feelings, and the ego’ (1996: 165). Heidegger would, perhaps, 
critique the very language of mind, desire, intellect, emotions, claiming that a 
dualistic way of thinking is inherent in the language itself. I have deliberately 
repositioned my own consideration of acting without taking the emotions as a starting 
point. This historical tendency to see theatre in terms of displays of emotion is in 
many cases the basis for attacks on acting. Yet one might also note that in the theories 
that I have surveyed, emotion is not the starting point either. In these theories, what 
actors are doing is not primarily about emotional involvement but rather the act of 
performance. It may well be significant that Diderot, who theorised acting in terms of 
emotion, was not a theatre practitioner himself: he mistook what the actor was doing 
because of his point of view from the auditorium. 
Philosophy, Phenomenology And Theatre 
Aldo Tassi (1998 and 2001) explicitly questions the relationship between philosophy 
and theatre. Tassi articulates the argument that theatre constitutes an investigation of 
Being and metaphysics despite philosophy’s general tendency away from such terms. 
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He considers Nietzsche as providing a revisionary insight into the separation of 
philosophy from theatre with the arrival of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. He suggests 
that theatre is a potentially truth-revealing activity and notices the particularly 
metaphysical turn in twentieth century discourses on acting. Tassi’s thinking is a 
major springboard for the work that I have presented here, though I would be wary of 
leaping into talk of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ as he does. Tassi begins with the 
premise that ‘[s]omething extraordinary has happened to metaphysics. At the very 
moment when philosophy is focusing its efforts at bringing metaphysics to an “end”, 
metaphysics finds itself flourishing in the theatre, which speaks of itself as 
“metaphysics-in-action”’ (Aldo Tassi 1998). My use of Heidegggerian 
phenomenology is a critique of such metaphysical language and understanding of 
Being. 
The notion of performance as phenomenology can be found in the work of Bert States 
(1985), Bruce Wilshire (1982), Stanton Garner (1994) and in a different way, in Mark 
Fortier (1997), Alice Rayner (1994) Janelle Reinelt and Joseph Roach (1995). The 
application of phenomenology as a mode of performance analysis is of particular 
importance in reconnecting the experience of theatre with research, though I suggest a 
phenomenology not from the ‘look’ of performance but from the perspective of the 
engaged practitioner: the actor as manual philosopher. Equally it would be possible to 
provide a phenomenology of other participants in the theatre event.  
Past approaches to studying theatre have predominantly focused on texts or 
formulating an ideal spectator’s perspective rather than the actual experience of the 
event (Sauter 1997). These metaphysical systems threaten to disconnect performance 
from its analysis because they are unfounded in lived contact with the world and 
based on a concept of reality transcending experience.   
In Staging Philosophy: Intersections of Theater, Performance and Philosophy, 
Krasner and Saltz (2005) offer some stimulating discussions about the two central 
concepts of this thesis. The editors note the discrepancy between philosophy used in 
North American theatre and performance studies departments and philosophy 
departments (what might called analytical philosophy); whereas the theory explosion 
has mainly included currents mainly drawn from continental philosophy, there are 
other considerations in need of exploration. Krasner and Saltz aim to raise issues of 
critical importance drawing from a range of philosophical positions and schools of 
thought (2005: 1). 
By taking a philosophical perspective on performance, the editors distinguish 
philosophical analysis from a critical study and prescriptive manifestos (2005: 2). 
Rather than interpret theatrical practices or say how they should go about creating 
performances, a philosophical approach advances new arguments and new approaches 
to the nature of theatre and performance in general (2005: 2). 
Like philosophy, theater often sheds light on a reality 
obfuscated by appearances. Moreover, theater like 
philosophy, exposes that reality by representing and 
analysing human action and demonstrating causal 
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relationships… Theater and philosophy shed light on 
thought, behaviour, action and existence while 
simultaneously enhancing our comprehension of the world 
and ourselves (2005: 2-3). 
This statement is at the core of my own thesis. Rather than leave these aspects of 
theatre as self evident, however, I have tried to highlight specific philosophical 
themes using Heidegger as a springboard to phenomenology. Of course, it may be 
possible to relate many other philosophers to theatrical practice in such a way. I am 
not prescribing how theatre should be made nor simply analysing theatrical forms of 
the past, but pursuing a new approach to understanding acting as manual philosophy. 
Krasner and Saltz note the common link of seeing (2005: 3) – both philosophy and 
theatre make concepts clear for sight. One warning I would issue to this suggestion, 
and one that I will develop in conjunction with Heidegger’s philosophy, is a certain 
metaphysical understanding of sight to which philosophy may be prone. The 
metaphor of sight may suggest that the world is that which can be seen. The 
existential turn in Heidegger suggests that we don’t just see material things but 
possibilities. If Aristotle is right in suggesting that theatre, too is about seeing 
possibilities (The Poetics) – the way things might be – then the metaphor is not 
merely in a regular sense perception, but a kind of existential sight. Krasner and Saltz 
also note Tassi, who suggested that theatre can be understood as an ‘unconcealment 
process’ (Tassi 1995: 472). This indicates that any theory of truth which wishes to 
take theatrical practice as bearing out truth in a philosophical sense may need to be 
broadened from mere correspondence towards truth as a process or event. 
The editors note Plato’s Socratic method as a dialogue, an active engagement in the 
world rather than a passive detachment. The value of philosophy is not necessarily 
getting agreement on truths but in stimulating further dialogue (2005: 3-4). They note 
the internal dramatic structure of philosophical works which often formulate a 
hypothesis and then respond by arguments and counterarguments not rushing to the 
conclusion (one might also note that Plato’s dialogues were in explicitly dramatic 
form). The authors claim that philosophical statements are never mere abstraction, but 
carry with them a force of action, to be contextualised in terms of the surrounding 
argument in an active exchange of ideas.  
Krasner and Saltz give a useful overview of the continental/analytic divide. The later 
deals with the meaning of certain concepts such as ‘knowledge’, ‘belief’, ‘truth’ and 
‘justification’ and assessing a thesis by understanding its constituent concepts; on the 
other hand, the former stems from Hegel and Nietzsche, phenomenology, 
hermeneutics, existentialism, the Frankfurt school and postructuralist theory – 
uprooting claims of science, knowledge, truth, language, morality, self and value 
(2005: 5). Nevertheless, the dichotomy of these two traditions may well be 
meaningless, ‘rather as though one divided cars into front-wheeled drive and 
Japanese’ (Williams 1996: 25). 
Krasner and Saltz also note the difference between ‘doing’ and ‘using’ philosophy. 
Many scholars have addressed performance using theories developed in literary 
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theory and cultural studies; for example, using Butler, Baudrillard or Bourdieu to 
analyse a particular production or practice. The validity of such arguments may well 
stand or fall depending on the theory rather than in the scholar’s own argument. Yet 
Krasner and Saltz claim that the theorists in their own edited collection offer 
arguments which stand or fall on their own, despite drawing on previous theorists. 
Actors can be interpreted as manual philosophers in that they are both doing and using 
philosophy. The philosophical force of this argument is an expansion of what the field 
of philosophy is. My use of Heidegger is an example of how the work of a particular 
philosopher is explored in theatrical theory and practice.  
In Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of the Theater Bert 
States (1985) deals explicitly with phenomenology and theatre. Rather than providing 
a formal phenomenology of the theatre, which he thinks would be far more scientific 
than his own approach, States claims that this book is a collection of notes on the 
theatre as phenomenon (1985: 1). He focuses on ‘the activity of theatre making itself 
out of its essential materials: speech, sound, movement, scenery, text etc. Like most 
phenomenological description, it will succeed to the extent that it awakens the 
reader’s memory of his own perceptual encounters with theater’ (1985: 1). In the 
same way as Garner after him, States also feels that the experience of theatre is in 
need of critical attention. 
The origin of theatre, for States, lies in man’s [sic] desire to imitate the world. 
Impersonation gets its power prior to and independent of this desire. Truth arrives on 
stage without the need to refer to something absent. In viewing a work of art, we are 
offered a different kind of here to that uncovered by scientific objectivity: ‘The 
painting is a place of disclosure, not a place of reference’ (1985: 4). By bringing a 
phenomenological understanding of the truth of art, States hopes to overcome the 
biases of mimetic theory which posits this relation of an external world to a 
represented reality. 
The longstanding problem of mimetic theory is that it is 
obliged to define art in terms of what it is not, to seek a 
source of artistic representation in the subject matter of art, 
and to point to a place where it can be found, if only in a set 
of abstract ideas or truths, or in some field of essences or 
archetypes (1985: 5). 
In leaving the mimetic understanding of theatre, States also departs from the scientific 
project of establishing the correct solution to the problem. In this move, then, art is in 
many cases incoherent or even self-contradictory. Clearly, the sense of truth being 
invoked here is of a different order to a scientific conception of truth. 
At the heart of mimetic theory and semiotics are the processes of mediation and 
transmission of meaning.
6
 Semiotics, States believes, potentially lies open to the 
mistaken belief that ‘you have exhausted a thing’s interest when you have explained 
                                                
6 Perhaps there is a subtler view of mimesis as creating rather than mere representing. For instance, see 
Benedetti  (2005) and Ley (1999). 
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how it works as a sign’ (1985: 7) This strips the theatre of the perceptual impression 
left on the spectator and reduces the talk about art to talk about language. States offers 
the view that semiotics and phenomenology are complementary modes of seeing –
binocular vision. For the most part we are concerned with the significance of things 
(i.e. semiotics). Occasionally, phenomena can reveal themselves as they are rather 
than what they mean (phenomenology). States also refers to Roland Barthes’ 
distinction between the ‘stadium’ and the ‘punctum’, the ground of culturally 
constructed meaning and the elusive element that makes something a work of art, for 
instance (States 1985: 9-11). 
States attends to ‘the scene’ and ‘the actor’. The former is the consideration of 
material elements – the use of speech and carpentry to create a world. The later is 
considered not as a performer, but in terms of the way that it makes a scene. He 
argues that the theatre holds a mirror up to nature and consumes it like an organism. 
For the examples of the work, States looks at the three areas of Shakespeare, 
naturalism and the experimental theatre. In considering the actor, he is not considering 
the psychology – preparation, thinking and feeling – but the viewing of the actor. 
States considers the actor’s relation to the text (as different from other types of 
writing) and the way an actor addresses the audience. One confines the limits of 
performance and the other makes theatre occur. In this way, the actor is considered as 
a ‘healthy schizophrenic’ (1985: 14).  
States’ writing is, in most cases, from his ‘mind’s eye’ (perhaps an attempt at eidetic 
reduction). He wards off the criticism that his description is not what actors intend or 
do by taking this stance of the ideal spectator. From this point of view in the 
auditorium, he thinks that it is important that an actor might fail to be Lear, for 
instance: this is the danger of performance. Hamlet, as his favourite play always lurks 
in the wings and perhaps serves as the basis for this ideal imagining of a theatre 
performance. 
Alice Rayner’s (1994) To Do, To Act, To Perform: Drama and the Phenomenology of 
Action is a significant work applying phenomenology to dramatic texts. Using the 
gravedigger’s scene from Hamlet (Act V Scene 1) Rayner considers the ways in 
which various plays bear out different aspects of ‘act’. The gravediggers contemplate 
Ophelia’s death and classify three branches of an act, which Rayner takes as the title 
of her book. The three strands of action, according to this analysis, include the 
intentionality, materiality and performativity of action (1994: 12). Rayner examines 
these three senses of ‘act’ in relation to various texts: the intentional in Waiting for 
Godot, materiality in Macbeth and performativity in Three Sisters. According to 
language, grammar and word use, Rayner theorises these distinct yet related parts of 
an act. Hamlet is used to draw these three strands together and the movement from an 
inward to an outward act. Drawing on the phenomenological objection to a dualistic 
understanding of an agent’s relation to the world, she sees the subject as both active 
and passive.  Thus, Rayner argues, the social aspects of action cannot be considered 
separately from the individual performing that action. 
Again, this book is significant to my own work in that it applies phenomenology as a 
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mode of analysis to dramatic texts. Yet crucially, Rayner overlooks the performance 
of those texts and perhaps emphasises the ideal spectatorship of the theorist. 
Stanton Garner’s (1994) Bodied Spaces: Performance and Phenomenology presents 
the idea of drama as phenomenology. Garner sets out to ‘reclaim a space in critical 
discourse of performance and the insights that it is uniquely able to provide’ (1994: 
13). The significance of the human body and corporeal experience is central to his 
investigation as he draws from a range of contemporary performances from the 1950s 
onwards, with a particular emphasis on the play texts of Samuel Beckett ‘as the first 
drama of sustained phenomenological intent’ (1994: 8). Garner focuses on the 
mutually reliant elements of spatiality and the perceiving human body, founded in the 
mode of theatrical watching. For Garner, the body in the theatre is both subject and 
object – the organising site and zero-point positioned in this watching. In some 
moments, he takes the play-text as the essence of performance, abstracted from its 
particularity on the stage and open to possibilities from the mind of the theoretician. 
Balancing this approach, he also looks at the phenomenological layering of the 
theatrical event as an opportunity to ‘confront a peculiarly rich, complex inter-
subjectivity’ (1994: 7). 
Garner draws particularly on the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. He 
appropriates the term as ‘an observational stance and set of theoretical strategies’ 
(1994: 2). He notes the range of phenomenologies influential within the theoretical 
arena. For Garner the aim of phenomenology is: 
to redirect the attention from the world as it is conceived by 
the abstracting “scientific gaze” (the objective world) to the 
world as it appears or discloses itself to the perceiving 
subject (the phenomenal world); to pursue the thing as it is 
given to consciousness in direct experience; to return 
perception to the fullness of its encounter with the 
environment (1994: 2).  
Garner sees phenomenology as an investigation into how any life-world is constituted 
as world. This method of philosophy moves away from Cartesian objectivity 
(especially in our understanding of space) and emphasises the essentially perspectival 
nature of experience. 
Garner seeks to head off several criticisms of phenomenology that might be levelled 
in the current theoretical environment. Of specific interest is the way in which 
phenomenology can highlight the historical contingency and constitution of the 
subject and provide a description of history as it is experienced. In trying to head off 
the objection that phenomenology is blind to ideological construction, this description 
of being in a historical age draws attention to its own constructedness. Garner also 
notes the visual obsession of modernity (1994: 10). This emphasis on the visual is 
linked with the dominance of semiotics as a mode of analysis and the technological 
advances that allow practitioners to create visually spectacular theatrical productions. 
At the same time, the modern has also achieved a certain level of reflexivity that has 
become characteristic of theatre in the last century. In heading off the charge of 
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essentialism that could be levelled at phenomenology (cf. the eidetic reduction 
explained in ‘Heidegger’s Phenomenology’ below) Garner carefully defines the 
phenomenological task of dealing with the ‘givenness’ of experience. 
Phenomenology, he argues, aims ‘to uncover the invariable structure of these modes’ 
(1994: 12). In warding off this post-structural accusation of an insidious metaphysics, 
essentialism in this context is an ‘opening rather than a mystification of the theoretical 
field’ (1994: 13). Finally, Garner calls for a post-structuralist phenomenology which 
takes into account the criticisms laid down by advances on the theory since the 1960s. 
If such a project is possible, he thinks that it is possible to bring back the livedness of 
theatre that is so central to its experience. 
In Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor, Bruce Wilshire 
(1982) provides an investigation of the notion of self from the phenomenological 
perspective and critically considers the theatrical metaphor that has become 
predominant in the humanities and social sciences. He addresses the book not to any 
specific discipline (the other books I have considered here are more or less centred on 
theatre studies) but to all disciplines that study human beings. He begins from a 
concept of theatre as imitative involvement characterised by aesthetic detachment. He 
argues that theatre is fundamentally life-like and life is theatre-like yet the 
‘metaphorical connection of these concepts, though powerful and irreducible is yet 
limited in its ability to reveal life’ (1982: 1). Wilshire gradually introduces the idea of 
theatre as phenomenology from the point of view of the spectator. He thinks that 
theatre shares a certain continuity with viewers of other forms of art in its aesthetic 
detachment: 
[o]ur hypothesis is this: theatre is a mode of discovery that 
explores the threads of what is implicit and buried in the 
world, and pulls them into a compressed and acknowledged 
pattern before us in its ‘world’. Theatre discovers meaning, 
and in its peculiar detachment, reveals our involvement 
(1982: xvi). 
Specifically, Wilshire traces out the idea of self as being ‘authorized’ by others in the 
same way that actors are authorized in their standing in for a character by the 
spectator of a play. Theatre is thus an excellent laboratory for exploring the notion of 
selfhood. Wilshire shows how this notion is explicitly drawn out in plays such as 
Oedipus, Hamlet, Waiting for Godot, and also modern, experimental works from 
Ionesco, Grotowski, and Wilson. Theatre thus shows or brings to light off stage 
features of the world such as language, being-with others, projection, possibility and 
mood. In real life, too, we are authorized by the gaze of Others. Yet we are also 
deeply intermeshed with those others through this inter-subjective experience. There 
is no separate self, cut off from the world, controlling behaviours from the backstage 
and preparing lines to be delivered. 
Wilshire argues that the limits of theatre as metaphor, specifically as set out by 
sociologists such as Erving Goffman (1956), is in the assumption of a transcendental 
self. The self is always given roles by the world. According to Wilshire, art selects, 
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arranges and removes ‘the open’ from life whilst also avoiding the ethical 
responsibility of roles and action which condition identity. This problem of a lack of 
authenticating ground poses a problem for modern society according to Wilshire. 
Wilshire distinguishes the perspectives of the actor as artist, as character and as 
person. He sees the danger of looking only at character in the theatre metaphor. Such 
a view will bring with it a passive view of the self. If we emphasise the artist, we end 
up with the idea of a consciousness, coolly controlling a façade of behaviour. By 
considering the actor as person, Wilshire acknowledges the totality of the human 
organism in the artistic process: ‘Our task will be to formulate an adequate theory of 
theatre and of role playing on stage that can account for an actor’s speaking himself 
though a fiction’ (1982: xvii). 
Parallel Areas  
Finally, it is worth noting that in many other disciplines the consideration of ‘X as 
philosophy’ has become a popular approach. Sondra Horton Fraleigh (1987), for 
instance, in Dance and the Lived Body investigates dance as existential philosophy; 
Martha Nussbaum (1990) meditates on the notion of literature as philosophy in Love’s 
Knowledge; Read and Goodenough (2005) present a collection of essays in Film as 
Philosophy. Michael Jackson (1996) considers the application of phenomenology to 
anthropological debates. The scope for sideways glances is multitudinous. In this 
literature review I have tried to limit the number of texts most relevant to my own 
research. 
It is also worth mentioning the excellent work in my own department of researchers 
looking at phenomenology as a paradigm for performance studies which seems to be 
burgeoning at present. Stuart Grant (2007) attempts a practical phenomenology of 
audiences in his PhD thesis Gathering To Witness and Pauline Manley (2007) 
provides wonderful phenomenological descriptions of the dance class, for instance, in 
her PhD thesis, A Phenomenology of Movement: Involution and Dehiscence in 
Contemporary Dance. Yana Taylor’s (2007) Doctors of Presence: Tadashi Suzuki's 
Training Methods in Sydney Contemporary Performance also looks at philosophical 
aspects of dance and movement practices. These works indicate the practical 
directions for applying phenomenology as a mode of analysis to theatre. Such 
practical work of phenomenological description of audience and performance 
practices complements and furthers my own thesis here considering actors as manual 
philosophers.  
Conclusions 
Performance practices themselves are worthy of philosophical attention. By taking 
this thought seriously, performance studies opens up the range of objects which we 
can take as philosophical over and above the formal philosophical tract. Obviously the 
language and discourse used by Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht draws on 
philosophical terms. This language itself is enlightening as to the philosophical 
position enacted in each theory. I suggest that it is not the language alone which is 
philosophical but rather the practice which is manual philosophy. 
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This thesis is a (re)consideration of acting in Zarrilli’s sense acknowledging the 
eternally processual nature of human societies and the performative contexts 
occurring within them. Rather than be a merely incidental or marginal human 
practice, I have drawn on Roach’s (1985) notion that theatre is not at the periphery, 
but central to our understanding of the world and our place within it. In other words, 
the performance practices of any society reveal an implicit theory of self and world. 
In this sense, phenomenology applied to acting is not merely another interpretation. 
Theories of acting enact a specific understanding of Being. Rather than simply be 
submerged in a pre-reflective mode, actors actively reflect on their relationship to the 
world in various ways. 
This project focuses on the actor. Garner (1994), Rayner (1994), and Wilshire (1982) 
all apply phenomenology as a model for understanding theatre predominantly from 
the (ideal) audience’s point of view. Performance studies is not content with such a 
unitary understanding of the theatre object – indeed that it is not an object but an 
event. (Heidegger later used the term Lichtung – clearing – to describe the unfolding, 
lighting of truth.)
7
 
Finally, the relation between theatre and everyday life lurks behind all the arguments 
presented here. Again, performance studies is not so much concerned with 
differentiating the aesthetic from non-aesthetic, art from non-art. The social, 
historical, anthropological, and cultural aspects of performance are equally important 
to understand what actors are doing. I propose that the philosophical can also be 
enacted on the stage. Certainly the theatre metaphor has been applied in many 
different contexts and at times the world has been framed as a stage. Rather than see a 
radical separation between performances and the everyday, perhaps it is useful to 
consider Schechner’s ‘performance continuum’ from highly marked performances to 
less marked ones.
8
 Performance poses an ontological problem that has been 
recognised throughout history, as I will investigate in the next chapter. 
                                                
7 See ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ in Basic Writings (Heidegger 1993). 
8 ‘Performance is an inclusive term. Theater is only one node on a continuum that reaches from the 
ritualization of animals (including humans) through performances in everyday life – greetings, displays 
of emotion, family scenes, professional roles, and so on – through to play, sports, theatre, dance, 
ceremonies, rites, and performances of great magnitude’ (Schechner 2003: xvii). 
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Histrio-mastix. 
The players scourge, or, actors tragædie, divided into two parts. 
Wherein it is largely evidenced, by divers arguments, by the concurring authorities and 
resolutions of sundry texts of Scripture, That popular stage-playes are sinfull, 
heathenish, lewde, ungodly spectacles, and most pernicious corruptions; condemned in 
all ages, as intolerable mischiefes to churches, to republickes, to the manners, mindes, 
and soules of men. 
And that the profession of play-poets, of stage-players; together with the penning, 
acting, and frequenting of stage-playes, are unlawfull, infamous and misbeseeming 
Christians. All pretences to the contrary are here likewise fully answered; and the 
unlawfulnes of acting, of beholding academicall enterludes, briefly discussed; besides 
sundry other particulars concerning dancing, dicing, health-drinking, &c. of which the 
table will informe you. 
 
Thomas Prynne (1974 [1632]), The title from Histriomastix, The Players Scourge. 
 
3. A Lightning History of Attacks on Acting 
The history of attacks on acting and the kinds of arguments that have been used 
against the profession outline an ontological queasiness about theatre – the thought 
that acting is a debased, threatening and corrupt representation of reality. The 
literature concerning attitudes to acting is immense and it would be a mistake to try to 
deal with everything here, so the most that this chapter can give is an overview of 
some of the major themes and proponents of hostility towards actors. The thinkers 
presented here are largely from the Western tradition, though unfavourable views of 
acting are by no means limited to the West.
1
 Debates and negative attitudes also still 
rage over acting today. The themes of these disapproving estimations are far from 
new. As I will go on to suggest, this ontological queasiness is based in a metaphysical 
view of Being and a privilege of seeing the ‘present-at-hand’ rather than 
understanding the art of the actor as a practice. What happens on stage is not an object 
but a process. 
Antitheatricality 
Aldo Tassi (1998) notes the instability of acting and its threat to the traditional 
Western understanding of the world:  
To engage the world as a stage is to find oneself articulating 
what is at bottom an inherently unstable view of the world. 
As anyone who is familiar with the theatre knows, if it takes 
a performance to bring a world to presence, then the 
intelligibility or meaning of what transpires cannot be 
guaranteed in advance. 
Jonas Barish (1981) also begins The Antitheatrical Prejudice noting one persistent 
concern with acting is the ontological queasiness of stage (1981: 3): theatre poses a 
problem in distinguishing what is and what is not. How real is the action of the actor 
and what effect might it have on reality? As it happens, the gap between appearance 
and reality is a theme which also concerns the history of philosophy (and an issue to 
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which phenomenology takes a novel approach, as I will suggest in the next chapter). 
As such, the history of performance is never really separate from the history of 
philosophy. Historical notions of the self and selfhood underlie both past conceptions 
of acting and attacks on the art which also intertwine with what Heidegger would call 
the history of our understanding of Being (see Roach 1985 for such an investigation). 
In this way, I suggest that it is the history of metaphysics that underlies historical 
ontological uncertainty about actors. 
Barish (1981) also notes that theatre has the peculiar characteristic of maintaining 
negative connotations as opposed to the other arts.
2
 ‘Making a scene’, ‘acting up’, 
‘putting on a show’ have the various connotations of exhibitionism, insincerity, 
calculated behaviour, and manipulation whereas to refer to something as ‘lyrical’, 
‘sculptural’, or ‘musical’, for example, all indicate a positive view of those respective 
arts (1981: 3). The underlying assumption, then, is that there is something deeply 
disturbing about acting and performance that gives rise to these attitudes. Barish 
thinks that this is rooted in the human condition and is in need of further investigation 
(1981: 3). But the matter is not easy. Many writers have held a contradictory position 
towards the theatre – both being attracted to and repulsed by the art of performance. 
This simultaneous fascination and revulsion goes back at least to Plato and his 
reluctant banishing of artists from his ideal city in The Republic. 
With this limited overview of some attacks on acting, the opposition of acting to 
truthfulness is most apparent. Plato charged all types of representation with being 
counterfeit and removed from reality. He argued that representation is morally 
corruptive, lacking in true knowledge of any object, lacking in real worth. 
Furthermore it upsets the delicate balance between reason and appetite in the human 
soul and provides false content to the senses. Aristotle defended mimesis as a concept 
though he inaugurated a formalism for the construction of drama that was to privilege 
drama over performance. Christian attacks saw theatre as blasphemous and debasing 
of God’s creation, directing human emotions to non-existent objects, of rivalling the 
pulpit without any moral basis. Later, the fear of acting was that it would flow out of 
the theatre into everyday life and social activities as deceits, ostentation, and vanity. 
Actors themselves were attacked for debauched behaviour and playhouses were seen 
as flypaper for immorality and disease. Then acting was seen as psychologically 
dangerous for actors themselves and directed towards insincerity. Finally, theatre was 
seen as the passive reception of morality and detached from the true unindividuated 
reality at the heart of the universe. 
Changing conventions of theatrical forms throughout the ages also incited new attacks 
with such innovations taking place. No doubt, the specific social and historical 
conditions of actors within society have determined social attitudes towards the 
profession. Some attacks have been levelled at theatre’s damaging effects, the 
condemnation of its players, theatre houses and performance venues as places for the 
spread of immorality and physical disease. Later, the theatre’s opponents were afraid 
that elements of performance were spreading into everyday life at the cost of 
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sincerity. The ontological and the moral elements thus combine in a concern of 
leakage or infection of reality with the unreal and evil’s use of illusion and deceit to 
gain control over the world. 
Before surveying these attacks, it is worth remembering that there is no one history of 
theatre, nor is it possible to generalise about various attitudes towards acting 
throughout history (for an expression of this attitude, see Zarrilli 2006). However, the 
persistence of what Barish calls the ‘antitheatrical prejudice’ seems to hint that there 
might be something deeper going on with the historical concern over theatrical 
representation. Also, we may wish to be wary of concptualising history as a 
progressive narrative of cause and effect. A genealogical view will take into account 
jumps and gaps rather than seeing history as a linear progression. There are many 
reasons – historical, socio-economic, political and material – why certain people and 
thoughts have become predominant and handed down throughout history. 
Nevertheless, having said all of this, Barish’s observation of the apparent 
steadfastness of the antitheatrical prejudice is worthy of attention. By viewing actors 
as manual philosophers, we see that they can present a view of the world not rooted in 
essences, substances, souls and Forms, but in activity. I suggest this is the reason for 
apprehension about the art of acting.  
Greece 
One of the earliest and most potent attacks on acting throughout all history came from 
Plato (c. 429-347 BCE) in a number of his texts. In the Republic, Book X, Plato 
(1992) recommends the reluctant banishment of all representative artists and poets 
from the ideal city. When Plato attacks poetry, he is really attacking the idea of 
impersonation or speaking in another’s voice than one’s own. The core argument is 
that artistic representation is merely a reflection of a reflection of true reality and has 
potentially damaging consequences in the education of model citizens. One major 
problem with representative art for Plato is that it depicts the world indiscriminately – 
both the good and the bad. Plato emphasises the power that art can have over its 
audience. This is perhaps one of the longest standing and most frequently recurrent 
objections to the theatre – that seeing wicked acts performed on stage might induce 
and tempt audience members (and the actors portraying these roles) to mimic the 
behaviour seen and performed. 
For Plato, the role of philosophy is to contemplate the Good and Beautiful which are 
ideal forms and not sullied by the particularity of concrete things in the world. Most 
people’s view of the world is based in mere sense-perception and not in 
contemplation. Our eyes deceive us, but the logical and abstract consideration of 
Forms is never false for him. In the famous cave metaphor, Plato likens ordinary 
people to prisoners bound at the bottom of a cave, tied to the spot so that they can see 
nothing but shadows cast on a wall (2002: 514a-521a). The shadows are caused by 
dancing puppets in the light of a flame behind the prisoners’ heads. Philosophers are 
the ones who break free of their shackles and undertake the painful ascent to the cave 
mouth, thus seeing true reality and the brilliant light of the sun. In Plato’s opinion, 
artists lack the ability to judge what is good and what is bad because they do not have 
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the proper philosophical education required to be guardian of the ideal city. As such, 
representations may in fact harm that education process which must be aimed at all 
things good. 
Socrates, Plato’s speaker in the dialogue, goes on to prescribe what sorts of form and 
content would be appropriate in the education of the young future guardians. The 
characters of poetry should be good, courageous, temperate and devout. They should 
act as good role models, rather than base and wicked characters who might cause 
damage. In fact, the epic form itself should be abandoned because it involves one man 
playing many roles or parts. People should only imitate the good and the true on this 
opinion, and as such the representation of women, people of another social class or 
professional level and animals should not be depicted in artistic representation. There 
is little doubt that Plato felt that theatre was the quintessentially representative art 
form. 
The Republic introduces many other arguments against representation. First, Plato 
thinks that artists merely counterfeit the truth rather than actually perceiving truly. At 
issue is the notion that sensory data is unreliable and subject to delusion. Also, the 
fact that performance takes place in time means that it falls short of the eternal 
stability of the Forms, being subject to change and inconstancy. Another argument is 
that mere representation lacks the worth of real action. Although he often quotes 
famous poets in support of arguments himself, Plato claims that Homer was not really 
the source of universal wisdom and did not truly possess technical knowledge about 
the things represented in his poetry. At the core of these thoughts is the idea that 
poetry is based on mere opinion while philosophy is based on true knowledge. 
Finally, Plato claims that poets represent a range of human actions which are not 
constant to one soul.  
For Plato, philosophy proceeds with reason and logic. Art depicts men who are 
divided within themselves. Proper education aims at the unified and coherent soul and 
is not dominated by the emotions as artists tend to be. Emotion has its use in Plato’s 
opinion, but should be limited to the warrior class and their sense of the indignant 
which drives them to battle for the sake of justice. Ultimately, for the future guardians 
of the city, art corrupts the power of rational, dispassionate thought which is essential 
to their rule. As a result, poets must be abolished in this ideal republic despite a great 
fondness and admiration that Socrates expresses. 
Ultimately the ‘divine madness’ of acting is a loss of self – undesirable in the rational, 
measured soul – if we are to believe Plato. In the Ion, Plato (1987) launches an attack 
specifically focused on the art of the actor (the rhapsode – singer and interpreter of 
poetry). Ion claims that he is only ever inspired by the poetry of Homer and lacks the 
ability to approach other poets with the same expertise (1987: 530c). Socrates (again, 
Plato’s main speaker in the dialogue) proceeds to take apart the idea that Ion’s 
performance and interpretation is a skill and suggests that it is merely a knack (1987: 
540c). He claims that there is no systematic subject matter or transferable skills in this 
so-called art of interpretation. Plato then shifts the discussion to consider whether Ion 
has any real knowledge about the art of poetry or the things that he represents in its 
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performance. If the performers had true knowledge of poetry, then they would be able 
to tell good poetry from bad and identify the characteristics of Homer’s compositions 
that make it good. Also, if Ion truly had knowledge of the things that he represented – 
being a military general for instance – then he would be performing those things in 
reality rather than merely representing them in performance. Socrates suggests that it 
is mere inspiration enabling Ion’s performances, not knowledge. Just as the stone of 
Heraclea (a magnet) can connect and raise pieces of metal off the ground, so too is 
Ion inspired by the muses, through the words of the poet, and this in turn inspires 
audience members through his performances (1987: 533d-534e). At the end of the 
dialogue, Socrates gives Ion the option of either admitting that his art is a divine 
madness of inspiration, or standing as a liar in claiming to be the possessor of real 
knowledge. Ion concedes it is mere inspiration.  
In the Laws Plato (1980) expresses legislators’ attempts to put limitations on and 
guidelines as to what the imitative arts should represent. Only noble words, simple 
and ordered rhythms, beautiful figures and measured melodies should be created by 
artists. It is integral that people believe in justice – that good men will live well and 
bad men will be unhappy. Individual freedom must be suppressed for the sake of the 
collective good, so much so that a man should be punished if he claims that vicious 
people might prosper and be happy. Tragedy seems to be the main target here, where 
justice is obscured by the strange workings of fate. 
Plato’s student Aristotle (c. 384-322 B.C.) defended the concept of mimesis in art – 
even to the point of claiming that humans are essentially imitative animals. The 
Poetics (Aristotle 1996) maintains that the representative arts are key in their 
educative value. Aristotle sees art as a continuation of what is present in nature and 
man’s practice of art is the fulfilment of forms already present in the world. Unlike 
Plato, who saw all luxury and unnecessary pleasure as things to be avoided, Aristotle 
was not opposed to pleasure per se (seeking pleasure and avoiding pain is the basis for 
his Ethics (Aristotle 2000)). Aristotle sees the theatre’s ability to arouse emotions as 
useful and capable of strengthening moral perception. Tragic mimesis, then, can train 
responses in an innocuous environment and purge the audience of destructive, 
negative emotions. This is the famous concept of catharsis by which irrational 
impulses can be released in the viewing of a tragedy. Unlike Plato, who makes no 
distinction between bad things represented and bad things actually done, Aristotle 
understands that the effect is quite different for audience members as opposed to 
witnessing a real event. In fact, he thinks, theatre is therapeutic in its ability to release 
suppressed negative emotions such as pity and fear. If Plato can be seen as a 
forerunner to much of the anti-theatrical writings that were to follow until 
contemporary times, Aristotle might be credited for laying down formal criterion for 
the composition of drama that were to be emulated and permutated over the centuries 
with a special emphasis on the written work over the performance. In fact, Aristotle’s 
(2000) list of elements important to drama in Book VI places the production or 
performance below plot, character, thought, spectacle, music. The effects of tragedy 
can be felt according to Aristotle in the mere reading of a play, thus making actual 
performance incidental. 
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For some time, subsequent writers did not engage with Plato’s arguments against 
representation with the possible exception of Plutarch (1694) (c. 46-120 A.D.) who 
produced many of the same arguments in his ‘Were the Athenians more famous in 
war or wisdom?’ The piece may well be an exercise in rhetorical argument rather than 
a position held by Plutarch himself. The arguments run along the lines of claiming the 
importance of non-artists and men of action over those who use words and engage in 
philosophical and artistic pursuits. Without the warriors, he argues, there would be no 
men of letters, and in this sense military generals achieve far greater importance than 
artists and thinkers. Similarly, military conquests are more important than their report 
by historians. Poets are inferior still since they either deal in myths – false tales made 
to sound true removed from actuality – or are parasitic on the noble deeds of warriors. 
In this measurement of concrete, material worth brought to the city by military heroes 
and politicians, artists have little to show from their dramatic festivals over fleets and 
armies. Rhetoricians and orators fail by the same account. 
In Plutarch’s Life of Solon, the historian reports one of the earliest rebukes of acting. 
In his old age, Solon the retired lawmaker and poet went to see Thespis who had just 
begun to act in tragedies (Plutarch 1975). After the performance, Solon asked the 
actor whether or not he was ashamed at telling so many lies in public. Thespis 
claimed that there was no harm done by what was said in the play, but Solon replied, 
‘if we honour and commend such play as this, we shall find it some day in our 
business’ (in Nagler 1952: 3).  This was to become one of the later attacks on acting 
which was taken up by Rousseau for instance – that the art of the theatre will find its 
way into real life dealings. 
Rome 
With the advent of Christianity and the secularisation of theatrical practices (as 
compared to Greece where they had been part of religious and fertility festivals) 
theatre had become increasingly ostracized and stigmatised in the Roman empire. A 
range of performance forms emerged including the ars ludicra in which actors wore 
masks in order to preserve their amateur status (Barish 1981). Censorship of the arts 
became increasingly common and authorities refused building permission for theatres. 
Public spectacles such as gladiatorial games, chariot races and wild beast hunts 
abounded with an increasing public appetite for blood in such performances. 
Pantomimes were frowned upon because of their lascivious performances and 
perceived exhibitionism.  Actors were more and more outcast, being stripped of their 
right to join the army, disallowed from their tribal status, and even able to be whipped 
without appeal on the decision of the authorities. Actors became outcast to the point 
that all children of actors were obliged to take up the profession. Eventually they lost 
their right to vote, take public office, serve as attorneys or even go to the theatre to see 
performances! 
The Church Fathers (early influential Christian theologians) set about suppressing the 
stage as a source of temptation and evil, seeing themselves as entrusted with the 
salvation of the souls of all humanity. Tatian (c. 110-185 A.D.), an early Christian 
writer and theologian born in Assyria, was one of the first to renounce theatre solely 
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because it gives pleasure. Tatian (1982) levels the argument that actors have an 
outward appearance that does not match up with what they really are. He also 
admonishes the content of plays for debasing the gods (which were pagan in any 
event), demonstrating adultery, acting murders and showing capital sentences. He 
explicitly states that actors identified with their roles in a way that could lead to real 
life crimes and that the mere performance of wicked deeds was tantamount to giving 
the audience lessons in how to commit such acts.  
Following along the same lines, Tertullian (c. 155-200) attacks the theatre for its 
origin and perpetuation of pagan rituals and accuses all forms of theatre of being 
idolatrous. Unlike Plato who saw human weakness as the reason for banning 
representation, Tertullian (1977) understands the theatre as part of a demonic plot sent 
to destroy mankind. In De Spectaculis, the theologian sees spectacle as damaging not 
only because of the pleasure it arouses, but also because of the frenzied state and 
excitement it brings about in audiences. He argues that the mere perceiving of wicked 
deeds performed in theatre is as shameful as the real thing and rejoices in the act. For 
Tertullian, acting is a series of falsehoods: disguising one’s true identity, 
impersonating vicious people (which will lead to vice itself), impersonating noble 
people (in which actors are pretending to be virtuous when in fact they are not), 
mimetic details such as sighs, groans and tears. These all aim at dissimulation 
according to Tertullian. Theatrical performances debase God’s creation, altering time, 
place and manner of the things represented. But this is not merely limited to the 
theatre For Tertullian: all manner of jewellery and cosmetics aim to deceive, the 
wearing of feminine clothes is female impersonation, shaving the beard is a lie against 
one’s own face, and even the actor who tones his body is disfiguring God’s work. 
St Augustine 
In an attempt to come to terms with his own youthful delight with the theatre in 
Carthage, St Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354-430 AD) wrote vehemently against 
theatrical pleasures.
3
 In his Confessions, he writes an account of his own journey 
towards a life of virtue and addresses himself to God (Augustine 1991). In reflecting 
on the nature of theatre, Augustine picks up the apparent paradox that audience 
members might delight in looking at sorrowful and tragic happenings on the stage yet 
if they saw such events in real life, they would be miserable at the occurrence of such 
an event. He thinks that the pleasure is not due to our delight in showing mercy to 
others because there is no real object of such an emotion in the case of viewing a 
performance. He also points out that actors are paid for their work (as Plato also 
noted) and that audiences feel cheated if they do not feel emotions appropriate to the 
subject matter depicted. The audience wishes the suffering of the characters and their 
own sympathy with them to be prolonged insofar as they want the pleasure of 
watching the performance to continue.  
For Augustine, theatre is not evil on the ontological grounds of being removed from 
reality, but rather because it allows the conditions for perversity and iniquity and the 
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decay caused by evil. Furthermore, theatre is symptomatic of a deeper moral disease 
rather than being the cause of man’s sinfulness. Augustine attacks the content of plays 
that direct passion towards things undeserving of such emotions – elicit lovers, for 
instance– and thinks that such depiction is tantamount to approval of such behaviour. 
Unlike Plato who grouped theatre together with intentional deception, Augustine 
realises that performances generally came from the wish to tell a story and please the 
audience rather than intentionally mislead. He saw that the rules of regular statements 
of truth did not apply in the same way in art. The problem with actors is that if they 
are true to their own nature (for Augustine, the essence of acting is representation), 
then they will only copy others and like reflections in a mirror, lack an independent 
self or soul. Instead of artistic representations, good Christians will seek indivisible, 
eternal truths derived from God. On another tack, Augustine compares spectacles to 
the preaching of sermons. In the former, audiences have their eyes defiled, but in the 
church they are cleansed. Imitation of what is seen on the stage will lead to 
wickedness, but imitation of that heard from the pulpit will lead to salvation. Again, 
unlike Plato who saw justice as unchanging and immutable, in The City of God, 
Augustine (2003) realises the need to suit justice to the relevant situation. In such a 
spirit, he undertook historical inquiry into the plan of the devil as it was trying to 
infect the souls of the human faithful. 
The Middle Ages 
During the middle ages, theatre flourished under the sanction of the Church with 
many dramatic forms such as mimetic processions, paternoster plays, liturgical plays, 
scriptural cycle plays and morality plays all gaining widespread appeal. An unknown 
author known as the fourteenth century Wycliffite preacher criticises the playing of 
miracles as a flouting and scorning of the reality they depict (Hudson 1983). As a 
precursor to later puritan thought, he also felt that all laughter was an offence against 
God and believed that life should only aim at punishing the flesh rather than indulging 
it. As with previous anti-theatrical writers, the Wycliffite preacher criticises the 
theatre for operating on a profit. The core of his attack is based on the commandment 
against worshipping false idols over God. He makes the claim that if Christ had meant 
his followers to make plays and act out miracles, then he would have done so himself. 
Again as a forerunner of later attacks, he launches into a slew of scriptural references 
supporting the case for why theatre practice should be abandoned. At the centre of his 
case, the preacher sees theatre as a threat to the primacy of reality (created by God) 
and the thought that realistic depiction might actually be mistaken for reality. This 
was a theme that was to continue for some time. 
Machiavelli, Proteus and Parading 
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) draws the key distinction between appearances and 
reality that is key to most anti-theatrical arguments. Machiavelli’s name has become 
synonymous with underhanded performances aimed at securing one’s own power and 
advantage. In the form of a series of advice and counsels for a young royal, The 
Prince outlines the principles of manipulation of appearances and control of responses 
as various social situations might require (Machiavelli 1991). While the text does not 
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concern theatrical performances directly, it introduces the social actor whose only 
goal is effectiveness. Rather than actually being virtuous, the prince is advised that 
being thought to be virtuous in more important. As a kind of late-medieval spin-
doctor, the speaker suggests executing pain quickly on subjects, but prolonging 
pleasure so as to maximize the positive effect of his actions. His view of humanity is 
that there is always someone willing to be deceived, for men judge by their eyes more 
than the hands and everyone can see, but few can feel. The prince should become 
expert in shows, surfaces and spectacles – after these, reality will shift for itself. 
Machiavelli presents a view of humanity which suggests individuals as fundamentally 
wicked and self-interested yet easily fooled and willing to believe what they see on 
the surface. 
Acting had long been equated with the changing of physical form and for this reason 
actors were distrusted for their potential dissimulation. Coupled with politicians and 
orators, actors had been equated with Proteus, the god who could change into any 
shape or appearance of its choosing and the chameleon which can adapt its colour to 
the surrounding environment (Barish 1981: 99-106). Historical references to Proteus 
are largely negative and often coupled with the feminine ability to change into many 
forms. Proteus is largely conceived of as monstrous and aligned with the lower 
animals through which he metamorphoses when caught. Likewise, the chameleon was 
reputed to be able to change into any colour but white – the colour of purity. The 
opposite symbols of the chameleon are the rock, the cube and the square that 
represent stability, durability and permanence. The significance of these symbols 
highlights the long-standing suspicion of change that is aligned with Lucifer’s 
renunciation of bliss and man’s alienation from the Being in whose image he was 
made. Thus Proteus could also symbolize man’s transforming powers that were to 
become the subject of religious attacks: pleasure, idleness, over-indulgence and the 
rejection of work. 
Another strand of the attacks against actors lay in the inordinate pleasure of parading 
their appearance, vanity and deceptive behaviour of dressing up in ornate clothing 
(Barish 1981 and Wikander 2002). This was seen as an affront to the humility and 
thrift characteristic of religious and pious life. Later, the royal court was considered to 
be highly theatrical with enacted behaviours such as grand entrances and processions 
taking their inspiration from the stage and transforming social manners. In this way, 
naturalness was supplanted by affected, premeditated behaviour and a penchant for 
ostentation. 
Puritan Attacks in England and Jansenist Attacks in France 
For the seventeenth century English puritans, theatre was high on the list of sins 
threatening the salvation of mankind. As many had put forward before, they argue 
that representational performance defiled both actors and audiences. Bourdaloue 
(1623-1704) argues against gambling and theatre going as particularly threatening 
vices. Whereas he sees gambling as particularly damaging when involving large sums 
of money in smaller amounts it was less sinful. Theatre on the other hand can be met 
with nothing short of a total ban from any God-fearing society. For Bourdaloue 
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(1805), not only does theatre depict evil things in the performance itself, it also 
involves training, rehearsal and planning, thus making it a far more serious sin. 
Early in the sixteenth century, plays were written and performed for educational 
purposes, helping to teach pronunciation and deportment to schoolboys (McManners 
1999). Later, the building of many playhouses particularly in England saw a 
flourishing of secular performance and the creation of a permanent class of 
professional actors. With the support of the monarchy, theatre was both popular and 
legally legitimate until the closing of the theatres in 1642. 
It was around this time that perhaps one of the most infamous anti-theatrical tracts of 
all time appeared in the form of Histriomastix or The Player’s Scourge by William 
Prynne (1600-1669). Rather than being an aberration of contemporary viewpoints, 
this tract was characteristic of writings against the theatre in the half century 
preceding the closure of the theatres. With its full title running an entire page of small 
print, Prynne (1974) unleashes a scathing point by point, syllogistic attempt at arguing 
that theatre is both unlawful and blasphemous concluding with a plague of biblical 
references to support his case. Like Tatian (1982), Prynne does not limit his attacks to 
theatre proper, but to a list of allegedly related sinful activities including sports, 
games, festival activities, any pleasurable recreations, anything sexual or effeminate, 
dancing, lovemaking, hair-curling, the wearing of luxurious and elegant attire, 
carnival, the parody of good society, hectic merriment that impedes orderly work and 
all other activities that pander to the devil’s rule – particularly resulting in sexual 
anarchy. With a kind of inverted logic presuming the wickedness of the activities 
under argument in advance, Prynne proceeds by way of repetition and accusation to 
prove his case. He charges audience members at the theatre with adultery, cheating 
and profanity (among other things). He sees the theatre as a threat to ordered society 
by contaminating immorality set forth by Satan himself for the overthrow of 
humanity. He attacks the use of cosmetics and indulgent costumes as a debasement 
and insult to God’s creation. Similarly, he conceives of all fictions rivalling the one 
Creator and equivalent to idolatry.  He saw all mimicry as pretension and a mismatch 
between one’s outer appearance and one’s true inner soul. In support of the argument, 
he misquotes and misinterprets philosophers and theologians from the past thinking 
that Aristotle was in favour of banning plays and that Christians in Tertullian’s age 
abstained from going to the theatre. Histriomastix was written in the context of the 
Reformation and, as such, aimed to repudiate all things associated with Catholicism 
(which was seen to be overly theatrical and blasphemous). Prynne claims that the 
sedimentation of piety into external forms, actions and liturgy was merely the 
performance of holiness rather than the sincere outpouring of faith and devotion. His 
overall censure of acting was for its hypocrisy – a mismatch between appearance and 
one’s true inner nature. 
In France, religious attacks on the theatre were somewhat more critically acute than 
Prynne’s scathing outpour of bile and disgust. They argued that the theatre was a real 
threat to the emotional and intellectual life of the community and for reasons of 
morality the stage must be suppressed. Drawing attention to legal statutes, French 
attacks on theatre classified actors as rogues and vagabonds. Pierre Nicole’s (1998) 
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condemnation of actors is based on the corrupting power of their craft rather than their 
manners. He points out that their trade requires the depiction of violent passions and 
claimed that such mimetic behaviour would cause them to take on the spirit and 
nature of the characters represented. Jacques Benigne Bossuet argues that actors 
typecast themselves into roles that extend from their private lives and thus give an 
external avenue for their base nature (McManners 1999). French disapproval of 
theatre thus began to look into the psychic life of actors rather than simply the 
morality of what was represented. Grave fears were held that the art would release 
unquenchable emotions in the actor that they would be unable to control and thus 
what is depicted on stage would overflow into personal life offstage. Unlike Prynne 
who had accused actors of being hypocrites, this showed a disparity between the 
consciously controlled actions of a model Christian and the dark impulses that actors 
release. The Jansenists denied that humans possess free will and that men can only act 
upon receiving grace from God. They thought that all pleasure makes us vulnerable to 
sinful behaviour. Again, unlike the English who had argued that acting was against 
nature, Jansenist condemnation was based on that idea that natural instincts were 
misleading, evil and in need of suppression. 
For La Rochefoucald (1613-1680), even representation of goodness merely 
caricatures it. If we are to be truly honest with ourselves, we must dispense with 
theatricality of our lives. Delving deeper into the psychic workings of the mind, in 
Maxims La Rochefoucald (2007) also presents a view of humanity in a state of nature 
corrupted by sin. Though he does not explicitly refer to actors, he does condemn the 
theatrical tendencies of Parisian social life by criticizing mimicry, self-deception and 
unquestioned custom. As a precursor to Rousseau’s attacks, he sees social life as 
increasingly involving performances, games, dissimulations and deceptions. Whereas 
the social performers might begin by mere pretending, soon after they may well be 
taken in by their own act – life becomes an illusion imposed by actors upon 
themselves. As a result, apparent virtues can be divided into the vices that can 
constitute them: friendship becomes an arrangement for mutual benefit, sincerity is 
often faked. Imitation is seen as a potent force of human life, though we have the 
propensity to mimic the bad rather than the good. La Rochefoucauld believes that true 
sincerity allows the courage to show ourselves fully to others, rather than engage with 
disguises and imitations of what we are not.  
With a somewhat more moderate view of theatre, Jeremy Collier (1650-1726) 
presents a series of suggestions by which theatre could be used as a positive force in 
Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage (1972 [1698]). 
Collier suggests that theatre should promote virtue rather than vice and delight should 
be but a secondary consequence of performance rather than its goal. The realistic 
depiction of evil should be avoided according to Collier, who understood the 
educative power of theatre. In a measure of literary criticism he looks closely at a 
number of play texts demonstrating their immoral elements (this as opposed to the 
abstract dismissal carried out by previous antitheatricalists). But while he condemns 
the contemporary stage, he praises classical drama. Needless to say, he was outraged 
that contemporary practitioners failed to heed his recommendations. 
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Rousseau and Diderot 
Following from the theme of theatre and dissimulation making its way into everyday 
life, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) launches one of the most well known attacks 
on theatre in his Letter to d’Alembert On the Theatre (1960 [1758]). Rousseau 
believes that man is created in good nature with a propensity to desire the good. Once 
upon a time, so he thinks, man was simpler and nobler (think of Plato’s ideal republic 
without luxury) though with the arrival of civilization vice, conspiracy and injustice 
also came. A deceitful mask of politeness came to conceal people’s true feelings and 
this was a direct result of the arts in Rousseau’s opinion. Men came to live according 
to the opinion of society rather than acting out of self-knowledge, deriving their sense 
of existence from others which in turn led to a false display of true inner experience. 
Like Plato and Augustine before him, Rousseau had loved the theatre as a younger 
man and used to frequent the playhouses of Paris. But inspired by the suggestion that 
Geneva would benefit from having a town theatre Rousseau saw the opportunity of 
replying to the iniquity of Voltaire. In Paris, manners had already decayed, but the 
same process could be stopped in provincial Geneva although it is in grave danger of 
becoming depraved and adulterated, in Rousseau’s opinion.  
Rousseau suggests that theatrical imitation is one degree from the truth where it ought 
to be, repeating many of the same arguments as previous writers (though with 
somewhat more eloquence). Representing things is very different and inferior from 
actually making them. Poets do not really have knowledge of the things they write 
about. And though man has a natural inclination to imitate, it has been corrupted by 
its use in ridiculing and defrauding others. Theatre itself is an idle amusement that 
should be passed over for fulfilling familial and civic duties. Rousseau thinks that the 
theatre makes us less judgmental because we begin to identify with the protagonist of 
a play in their dilemma and soften in our moral resolve to see them punished when 
faced with concrete and emotional representation of their situation. The acting of 
ancient plays is destructive because we are unable to identify with circumstances so 
different from our own and the crimes committed are heinous and bloodthirsty 
(though false). Theatre gives us pity without actually pitying someone in reality and 
we lose our personal sense of identity merged in with the feelings of the crowd-
audience. Again, Rousseau equates theatricality with women and attacked the desire 
for females to show themselves on stage that amounted to the equivalent of 
prostitution. Furthermore, the theatre is a place that brings men and women together 
in an immoral environment. Such a place as the theatre bred vice. Rousseau thought 
that actors lead chaotic lives and their trade consists of counterfeiting others while 
obliterating their own identities only to take on other ones as mere vessels rather than 
individuals in control of their own lives. Though Rousseau falls short of actually 
condemning actors for the crimes that they represent, he fails to see how crimes 
performed on stage could not make their way into real life. Actors encourage luxury, 
vanity and display, reflecting what society is already vulnerable to in its vices. 
Rousseau thinks that viewing tragedies will lead citizens to lust after power and fame 
whereas comedy will instruct in more follies. 
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Into the eighteenth century, the idea that actors identify completely with their roles 
became less widespread. Mimicry became less important in the art of the stage and 
actors were no longer thought to be feigning emotions that they did not truly feel. The 
Italian actor, Riccoboni (1676-1753) argued that actors require a sense of control 
rather than being taken away in emotions represented. But this led to a different 
charge: insincerity (Riccoboni 1978). 
Denis Diderot (1713-1784) inaugurated a debate that still runs over the emotional 
involvement of actors during performance in his Paradoxe sur le Comédien (1957). In 
this treatise, he notes that the actor should always be self-possessed to the point that 
even in a tirade, he would be able to count down the buttons on his coat. Diderot 
understands actors as too focused on producing the external signs of performance. 
Rather than view actors as mere mouthpieces of the playwright, performance is once 
more seen as an art in itself though Diderot certainly did not hold them in high 
esteem. He thinks that they were lacking in any character of their own, polite but cold, 
exhibitionists, profligates, self-interested with few friends, few morals and lacking in 
the truly felt pleasures and pains that bind human experience together. Nevertheless, 
he claims that audience members leave their vices at the door when they enter the 
theatre. Theatre, in Diderot’s view is capable of teaching virtue by allowing people to 
respond to evils they have the potential of committing in real life. 
Nietzsche 
In contrast to the Christian moralists who had established such a tradition of anti-
theatricality another attack comes from an unexpected perspective towards the end of 
the nineteenth century. Rather than praise individuation, order and morality, Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900) revels in the chaotic, disordering powers which can be found 
in the pagan origins of theatre. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche (1999 [1872]) 
considers that tragedy is the ultimate art that emanates from the deepest reality of the 
universe.
4
 In so far as humanity partakes in the aesthetic spirit he suggests that people 
should live their lives like a work of art. True tragedy for him expresses the anguish 
of humanity striving to become one with its origin once more. Tragedy is the 
supremely human experience for Nietzsche and only through the Dionysian spirit of 
chaos can the self achieve a primal unity with the rest of creation. 
The Birth of Tragedy was written before Nietzsche’s mentor, Wagner, had even 
finished his grand opera Tristan which was to be performed at the Bayreuth festival. 
So the whole work is based on an ideal drama rather than any actual performance and 
one wonders what sort of theatre could possibly live up to his expectations. Nietzsche 
wants to disintegrate the distance between the player and the role, the actor and the 
spectator, space and causality, and ultimately man’s alienation from elemental 
existence. A profound anti-theatricality comes through in his evaluation of imitative 
theatre – which he saw as an art of lies. According to Nietzsche, drama degenerated 
when Sophocles introduced a third character onto the stage and introduced a 
psychological dimension to the performance. The authentic origin of drama’s power 
                                                
4 See Schopenhauer (1958) who influenced Nietzsche profoundly. He felt that music was the closest 
representation of reality and that life should be lived like a work of art. 
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lies in the musical frenzy of the chorus and the power of the gods represented – all of 
which were cheapened by the advent of the common man onto the stage. Nietzsche 
believed that Socratic optimism and faith in reason is abolished in true tragedy which 
realises the senselessness of existence and in fact celebrates the void. The Dionysian 
theatre holds onto its origins in rite rather than succumbing to the mimetic tendency of 
modern drama and rather sweeps audiences into an undifferentiated unity. 
After his famous falling out with Wagner, Nietzsche denounced his operas with 
vitriol. He felt that Wagner had succumbed to the spirit of Romanticism and had 
begun to represent Christian morality rather than fulfil the Dionysian ideal of art 
(Nietzsche 1968). Also, as with many philosophical issues, Nietzsche prevaricated in 
his attitude to the theatre throughout many contradictory passages on art in his work. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche held the opinion, at least early on in his writing career, that 
tragedy could give humanity eyes to see itself from a distance, simplified and 
transfigured. If we are not ready to live in the truth of the meaninglessness of 
existence that lies at the depths of reality, then at least we are able to celebrate it 
through art and give meaning to our lives. But he felt that this cannot be achieved 
through a passive theatre in which we have psychological representations of 
characters enacted before us. It can only be achieved through an intoxicating frenzy 
which breaks down the barriers between individuals. This view obviously has many 
resonances with Antonin Artaud’s theatrical theory, though Nietzsche was a nihilist, 
believing that art is at best a beautiful lie to help us to come with a futile existence. 
Conclusions 
Underlying almost all of these antitheatrical writings is the idea that actors are 
somehow deceiving or distorting reality by mere appearance rather than showing 
truth. One suspects that behind most of these charges lies a deep suspicion of the 
potential subversiveness of power and propagation of beliefs that stood outside the 
control of authorities. In an unprecedented period of theory, the twentieth century sees 
a theatre that sought to reform itself and reclaim a notion of truthfulness and artistic 
integrity (remember that the notion of art also was a relatively recent invention).
5
 Of 
course, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also saw drastic social, political, 
industrial and technological changes that affected the way that humanity understood 
itself in relation to the world. This reformative spirit of theatrical practice is evident in 
the theatre theorists that I have chosen for this thesis. Each theorist moves away from 
the stale dogma of convention and engages the actor as an artist in search of truth in 
some form, bringing into question the nature of the human subject in one way or 
another. 
My suggestion is that seeing acting as lying in many instances misinterprets both what 
is actually going on on-stage and the type of truth-claims that are implicit in the act of 
performance. Rather than pretending to be something other than what they are, actors 
can potentially engage a reflexive attitude. In many cases, the audience is ‘in on the 
joke’ rather than being fooled by untruth. The meanings which audiences make out of 
                                                
5 For a consideration of modern anti-theatricality, see especially Puchner (2002). 
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seeing a performance are not such that they actually believe what is happening before 
them is something other than that which it is – a performance. In these cases, 
philosophical attacks that are based in such an argument are unfair and unfounded. 
Secondly, the concern that acting is primarily about emotion is another mis-
recognition. Diderot’s Paradoxe does somewhat of a disservice in putting emotion 
centre-stage as it were. As I will explore in Part II, some significant approaches to 
acting are less concerned with emotion as a primary thing to be manipulated in the art 
of acting so much as an incidental by-product of the process of acting. As Stanislavski 
is at pains to point out, the actor should focus on the given circumstances rather than 
go straight for emotion (which produces bad acting in his opinion).
6
 So the question is 
open as to whether there has simply been a lot of ‘bad acting’ throughout history or 
whether the spectator’s position in the audience sees the result, not the process of the 
actor’s art, thus misinterpreting what is happening in the process of performance. 
Thirdly, this history of antitheatricality shows a distinct privileging of sight in its 
interpretation of acting. If audiences believe what they see present-at-hand before 
them is what acting is all about, then they are somewhat mistaken. The distinction 
between appearances and reality which underlies these attacks on acting here fail to 
take into account a wider understanding of the human experience of theatre and 
performance. Together with an emphasis on ‘the seen’, there is also an underlying 
privilege of rationality. Performance does not fit well with a rational and logical 
account, but by its very nature engages with the bodily, the irrational and the 
subconscious. Having said this, it may well be that such oppositions between the 
rational and the irrational, the mind and the body, the conscious and the unconscious 
are not helpful in understanding, describing and giving an account of the art of acting. 
I suggest that in some key theories acting is not primarily about emotion, but rather 
discovering, exploring and creating world. This is the point at which we can turn to 
phenomenology as a mode of philosophy that attempts to take into account the lived, 
human experience of the world – not merely a visible materiality, but a world in 
which one dwells with care and concern. 
                                                
6 See Stanislavksi (1980) Chapter Nine, ‘Emotion Memory’, also discussed below in the section called 
‘How we Are: State of Mind’. 
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Phenomenology’s primary concern is with the engagement in lived experience between 
the individual consciousness and the real which manifests itself not as a series of 
linguistic signs but as sensory and mental phenomena – the ‘world’ as encountered in 
perception and reflection rather than the ‘earth’ as things in themselves. In this way, 
the emphasis is on the presence or unconcealing of the world for consciousness rather 
than its absence through language, and therefore with the interplay with the real rather 
than its inevitable deferral.  
Phenomenology is concerned with truth, no mater how mediated, provisional and 
revisable. 
 
Mark Fortier (1997: 29), Theory/Theatre  
 
4. Heidegger’s Phenomenology 
Phenomenology offers a different way of encountering truth in the world by returning 
to the things themselves. I suggest that such a premise for philosophy can be used to 
address metaphysics and the ontological queasiness of acting outlined in the previous 
chapter. As Mark Fortier (1997) points out above, phenomenology emphasises a lived 
encounter with the world and seeks to uncover the structures of consciousness through 
a radical return to experience as the basis for philosophy. Acting is also potentially an 
investigation into the nature of consciousness, psychical acts, and the intentional 
structure of our relation to the world not merely through theoretical contemplation, 
but as a practical investigation of the structures of the world. These elements of world 
are also the instruments used in the art of performance. Phenomenology is not merely 
a method of describing the phenomena of acting; theatre itself can be the articulation 
of an embodied phenomenology of the world. 
Letting Things Show Themselves 
As one of the most influential movements in philosophy of the twentieth century, 
phenomenology is currently becoming a popular term for analysis in the humanities 
and social sciences.
1
 In the discipline of performance studies, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
in particular has been used widely because of his interest in the corporeal experience 
of the world as being inseparable from the human subject.
2
 I have chosen to 
concentrate on Heidegger’s phenomenology because he emphasised the relationship 
between Being and time – for performance is a temporal art form. One of the major 
claims of Heidegger’s philosophy is that human beings have a kind of existence 
different from other things in the world, such as stones and trees. We humans have the 
ability to direct ourselves towards our own Being (1962: H15). 
I have chosen Heidegger as the main theorist for this thesis because there is the 
danger of thinking that the (material) body is all that we are.
3
 Shifting the emphasis 
too far towards the body would be a mistake in phenomenological terms, however. 
Phenomenology seeks to overcome the separation between mind and body. The 
                                                
1 For general introductions to the phenomenological movement see Moran (2000) and Spiegelberg 
(1971). 
2 For example, see Fraleigh (1987), Garner (1994) and States (1987). 
3 It should be noted the Merleau-Ponty (1962) did make a distinction between the material body 
(Körper) and the lived body (Leib) though this is often misunderstood and reintroduces another 
dualism.). 
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potential for misunderstanding is clear in my experience of introducing 
phenomenology to students through Fraleigh (1987) and Merleau-Ponty (1962). Many 
students mistake phenomenology for the description of subjective experience, stream 
of consciousness or the mere outward appearance of things.  
Heidegger defines the phenomenological method of inquiry as letting things show 
themselves in the way that they show themselves from themselves: ‘We must 
rather choose a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity 
[Dasein] can show itself in itself and from itself’ (Heidegger 1962: H16). 
Phenomenology Inaugurated 
Although the word had been used before (by Kant and Hegel among others), as a 
movement, phenomenology was inaugurated as a distinct philosophical method by 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) in his Logical Investigations, which specifically related 
to the experiences of thinking and knowing (Husserl 2001[1901]). Husserl utilised 
Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality – that all psychical acts are about or 
directed towards some object whether or not it actually exists (Brentano 1977 [1874]). 
Brentano (1838-1916) proposed that consciousness is characterised by this 
‘aboutness’. Mental acts cannot be empty or without an object: they are always 
directed towards something regardless of the actual existence of that thing. In other 
words, psychic acts are always transitive. So when I love, I love something; when I 
see, I see something – whether or not there really is a thing that I see or love, the 
psychic act has a content. There may be a secondary moment where the subject of the 
act can become conscious of itself. Following Descartes, Brentano thought that this 
moment was indubitable, since the intending subject cannot be performing an empty 
act of intuition. Husserl took on the notion of intentionality from Brentano and was 
concerned with getting to the essences of psychical experiences rather than 
empirically perceived facts as had been important in scientific naturalism. Husserl 
used the term ‘givenness’ to describe the idea that all experience is given to someone 
in the manner of experiencing. As opposed to empirical facts in the physical sciences, 
this givenness is the highest form of evidence upon which to found philosophy 
(Husserl 2001). His concept of phenomenology later grew into a transcendental 
science of consciousness (what might be said about consciousness a priori) – looking 
for the conditions for the possibility of any conscious act and describing the laws 
binding those acts and their contents. 
One of the major innovations of Husserl’s approach to consciousness was a 
suspension or bracketing away of the everyday ‘natural attitude’. He wanted to clear 
away all world-positing acts involved in intuition and suggested that the existence of 
the world should be taken as given. For Husserl, this new science of phenomenology 
was to focus on transcendental subjectivity – the conditions for the possibility of the 
perceiving subject. In this science, the subject that perceives the world is stripped 
back of extraneous and accidental features and boiled down to its essential structures. 
Specifically, Husserl proposed the ‘transcendental’ and ‘eidetic’ reductions as 
fundamental to the phenomenological method (2001). Husserl’s eidetic reduction is 
bracketing away all knowledge other than that which appears in the thing. The 
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transcendental reduction is a boiling down to that which is true in each instance of the 
thing’s occurrence. The result of this method and object of investigation is the thing’s 
essence – the proper object of phenomenology in Husserl’s system. 
Nevertheless, phenomenology might better be thought of as a practice rather than a 
system in that it aims to describe phenomena – the things that appear in the way they 
appear (Moran 2002: 4). Husserl’s reductions were meant to clear away the 
misconstructions that the perceiver brings in advance, and to get at the phenomena 
understood from within. Phenomenology is also largely a rejection of congealed 
tradition and dogmatism in philosophy, preferring rather to develop methods from the 
manner in which phenomena present themselves. In this way, the movement also 
rejected many of the metaphysical bases of knowledge that had been presented in the 
historical philosophical tradition. Instead, the practice returns to the lived human 
subject rather than an abstract floating being hovering over the world. In other words, 
phenomenology abides by Brentano’s adage, ‘experience alone is my teacher’ (Moran 
2002: 30). In this sense, the movement might be considered as a radical empiricism, 
but one which rejects the separation of the perceiving subject and the object 
perceived. 
By the same token we should be wary of apprehending phenomenology as a single 
method or approach to consciousness; Heidegger later commented, ‘there is no such 
thing as the one phenomenology’ (1982: 328). However the movement might be best 
characterised by Husserl’s famous call for a return to ‘the things themselves’ (die 
Sache dem selbst) (2001: 252 and Heidegger 1962: H24). Both Husserl and Heidegger 
rejected the representationalist view of consciousness in which the mind contains a 
copy of the outside world. In this sense phenomenology might well be seen as a 
reaction against idealism (though Heidegger later saw Husserl as encapsulating a form 
of idealism that he, in turn, rejected).
4
 Instead, for phenomenology, consciousness is 
seen as engaging directly with the world. Phenomenology is a description of the way 
that things appear to consciousness. So in another sense it is also a reaction against 
externalism: the philosophical worry about the existence of the external world is 
overcome by reduction. Phenomenology also seeks to explain why this worry arose in 
the first place. 
One typical characteristic of the phenomenological movement is this radical defence 
of the subjective view of experience as a necessary part of describing the full nature 
of knowledge and understanding. This new science ‘sought to reinvigorate philosophy 
by returning it to the life of the living human subject’ (Moran 2000: 5). This does not 
mean a privileging of the subjective, but rather takes intentionality as key to 
understanding any mode of access to the world. Phenomenology also forms an 
important part of the critique of naturalism – a view that rejects subjective experience 
and seeks an explanation of the world purely in natural, objective terms. On the one 
hand, Husserl also used phenomenology as a critique of historicism and relativism 
(through the process of the reductions), on the other, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
both re-introduced a consideration of the historical conditions of the subject and 
                                                
4 See Moran (2002: 226-33) for a discussion of Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s view of 
consciousness. 
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subjective truth personally. Lévinas focused on the importance of ‘the other’ in the 
founding of the subject whilst Sartre later introduced politics and ethical decisions 
into phenomenology (Moran 2000: 17-18). So while the movement is far from 
homogenous, it shares a common focus on getting to the truth of the things 
themselves. 
Heidegger’s Destruktion of Metaphysics 
Martin Heidegger was born in 1889, Messkirch, Germany, the son of the parish 
sexton. He briefly attended training to become a Jesuit priest and received funds from 
the bishop to study theology at Freiburg in 1909. At this time, he first encountered 
Brentano’s work on Aristotle, Husserl’s Logical Investigations and the hermeneutics 
of Friedrich Schleiermacher. In 1911 he left training for the priesthood and completed 
a doctorate at Freiburg. His habilitation was on ‘meaning’ in the work of medieval 
philosopher, Duns Scotus. Heidegger then took on lecturing at Freiburg and after 
military service in 1919 returned to become Husserl’s personal assistant. 
Heidegger was a radical transformer of the phenomenological project into 
‘fundamental ontology’ focusing on Being as the central object for philosophy. He 
shifted the emphasis from a description of intentionality and the structures of 
consciousness as described by Husserl and Brentano (rarely did he actually use the 
word ‘intentionality’ in his major work) on what he called ‘the question of Being’. 
Foremost in his writing is a rejection of dualism in its many forms, stressing instead 
the ‘involved’ nature of the human subject in the world and the impossibility of 
isolating that subject from the world. For Heidegger, it is a mistake to try to abstract 
the subject in trying to get to an objective viewpoint (essentially this is his criticism of 
Husserl’s approach to phenomenology). Also central to his work is a rejection of the 
‘representationalist’ and ‘correspondence’ accounts of truth. Heidegger understands 
human beings as also fundamentally temporal. Just as it is impossible to conceive of 
the subject without taking the world into account, so too is it impossible to consider 
time from an eternal point of view. The failure of past philosophy has been in its 
inadequate account of time and its connection to Being. Being and Time is an attempt 
at forging the important connection between these two concepts (1962: H19-27). 
Heidegger’s phenomenology differs from Husserl substantially because he claims that 
getting to the things themselves cannot simply be achieved by describing conditions 
for the possibility of intuition or consciousness, but must take into account the 
position of the enquirer too. Phenomenology for Heidegger is not simply a description 
of what the perceiver intuits, but is also an interpretation. In this way he drew on the 
tradition of hermeneutics and textual elucidation as a model for investigating human 
existence. For Heidegger, the core of philosophy is questioning – or rather finding an 
authentic way of formulating the question in the first place: the question of the 
meaning of Being. 
Heidegger’s writing can largely be seen as a reaction against what he referred to as 
metaphysics. This is a term used somewhat idiosyncratically to mean any philosophy 
that has failed to take into account or give a proper explanation for Being (which has 
been constantly overlooked especially in its relation to time). Incidentally, the term 
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metaphysics has been passed over into modern critical theory as perhaps one of the 
biggest insults to any system of thinking indicating that it is based on false or 
unfounded premises.
5
 Modern conceptions of metaphysics, however, depart from the 
fundamental principles underlying science and delve into the regions of mysticism, 
astrology, and the supernatural.
6
 Ancient problems in metaphysics include the 
question of why there is something rather than nothing. Generally, metaphysics is the 
branch of philosophy that deals with Being. Aristotle’s Physics – about the nature of 
change in the world –then the Metaphysics, deal with concepts such as time, space 
and causality.  
In the previous chapter, the most influential of these metaphysical systems operating 
historically in the criticisms of acting were those that assumed the absolute creative 
power of God, a detached, objective subject controlling and viewing the world, the 
transcendence of rationality, and (from the Enlightenment onwards) the all-pervading 
spirit of scientific investigation. As it happens, these foundations for the conditions of 
knowledge are precisely those rejected by the phenomenological movement. 
Origins of Being and Time (BT) 
The origins of BT can be seen in at least three major influences on Heidegger’s early 
thought: Lebensphilosophie, Husserl and Aristotle – though he altered and rebelled 
against those influences. Heidegger criticised Jaspers’ Lebensphilosophie for its 
inadequacy of concepts in dealing with factical life and its connection to the 
metaphysical tradition. Heidegger felt that human life cannot be approached directly, 
but rather can be seen through acts about which humans have anxious concern (Angst) 
and a renewal of self-concern (1962: H184ff). Furthermore, temporality must not 
merely be thought of as an appendage to the present moment and requires a 
hermeneutic of the historical mode which cannot be universalised (1962: H372ff). As 
an interpretation of factical life, Heidegger also drew on Christian writings such as 
those of Paul, Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard. His view of factical life was that it 
is contingent and concrete. Human life is also preoccupied with meaning and is 
founded in the structures of care (Sorge) and concern (Bekümmerung) (1962: H301ff). 
Time is encountered not as an objective passing of a series of instants, but rather as a 
transfiguring moment (Augenblick).7 We need to uncover the way that lived 
experience interacts with the environment (Umwelt) in its living fluidity, specificity 
and concreteness. 
In his lectures on the phenomenology of religion (1920-21), Heidegger took the terms 
‘care’ and ‘concern’ as being central to Aristotle’s notion of practical knowledge 
                                                
5 Together with this modern negative connotation, the word metaphysics is also widely understood as 
pure abstract speculation. 
6 This thesis does not really follow such an understanding of metaphysics, although Goodall argues that 
Artaud’s Gnostic beliefs about theatre border on the metaphysical in this sense (Goodall 1994). Even 
Heidegger’s general approach to existence that includes concepts such as falling, guilt and the call of 
conscience draw their inspiration from such sources as Kierkegaard and Meister Ekchart. 
7 ‘When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be 
more authentically “there” in the “moment of vision” as regards the Situation which has been 
disclosed’ (1962: H328). 
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(phronesis). In this interpretation of the fundamental structures of human existence, 
Heidegger sees humans as fundamentally becoming what they already are. Humans 
must embrace their finitude in ‘resoluteness’ (Entschlossenheit) towards their own 
death. Heidegger interprets Aristotle in terms of the search for articulating factical 
human life in the Physics, Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics. The crucial structure 
of care involves circumspection (Umsicht) (1962: 69). For the most part, humans are 
caught up in their everyday concern with practical engagements with the world. 
Humans are generally in a state of falling concern (Verfallen) (1962: H57). In order to 
cope with the world, we generally try to smooth things over and settle our 
anxiousness towards existence and specifically to our own death (1962: H75ff). 
As mentioned above, Heidegger remained steadfast to the task of phenomenology as 
getting to the things themselves. He also thoroughly rejected Husserl’s Cartesian 
dualism. However, he did take on Husserl’s concepts of world and environment 
(Umwelt) and a special interest in the fifth and sixth Investigations into the problem of 
Being in Aristotle and Brentano. In perception, we do not only grasp objects but their 
Being: we can grasp their Being because there are beings. Through an emphasis on 
the historical, lived nature of factical experience, Heidegger drew on Bergson, Scheler 
and Dilthey in their approaches to human being (1962: H45ff). Furthermore, it is only 
in practical engagement with the world that entities in the environment are 
encountered and the manner of engagement needs to be uncovered. Descriptive 
phenomenology needs to take into account both the historical understanding of Being 
and the active apprehension of Being within the context of the practical world. So not 
only does Heidegger reject dualism, but also all intellectualist accounts that see our 
psychic acts as fully constitutive of the way we encounter the world. 
Being and Time 
Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, originally appeared in 
1927), was rushed to publication in order to aid his nomination to the Chair of 
Philosophy in Marburg. (Incidentally, he was turned down for the position anyway.) 
Only the first two sections of the first part of the projected text appeared in print 
(though through lecture notes and subsequent writings it has been possible to glimpse 
what might have been the content of the missing parts). 
Being and Time is an investigation into the meaning of Being in general through a 
description of the conditions necessary for ‘factical life’ (lived human life).
8
 The verb 
‘to be’ can be used in many different senses and it is not clear that there is one thing it 
means. Heidegger suggests various traditional explanations as to why this is so: that 
the meaning of ‘to be’ is obvious – we already know what it means, so there is no 
reason to investigate it; that the term is indefinable under a single meaning; that being 
is not a real predicate that can be added to something (1962: H2-4). The task is to 
find a way to break into the question which has been so easily dismissed. Moreover, 
                                                
8 ‘Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic 
of Dasein’s Being – one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximately it has been thrust 
aside. The “that-it-is” of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it’ 
(1962: H135). 
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Heidegger suggests that there is a reason why we have become so forgetful of Being – 
partly because of the encrusted and mistaken philosophical tradition, but also because 
our everyday practical concerns in the world overlook the question (as one might fail 
to see the spectacles on the end of one’s nose). 
The core message of Heidegger’s most famous work is that human beings have a 
different kind of Being from mere things that are in the world. In particular, we have 
the ability to inquire into our own Being. Further, the Being of human existence is not 
simply actuality or presence as had been assumed in previous philosophical 
investigations dating back to the ancient Greeks. Being is possibility more than 
actuality such that human beings are more than what they simply are at any point in 
time, they are what they might be. This is also borne out in the way that we direct 
ourselves to the world in projects that we undertake – the outlook is futural. In other 
words we are concerned with how things will be rather than just how they are now and 
this directs the way that we act. In this sense, Heidegger also crucially stresses the 
praxis – involved human activity. This does not mean that theoria (detached 
contemplation) is inferior or derivative; it is simply another possible way of being. 
Instead of continuing the traditional understanding of man as a rational animal, or as a 
being created by God, Heidegger claims that human existence must be investigated 
radically on its own terms. 
In order to correct the misinterpretation of Being throughout the history of philosophy 
(the history of metaphysics), Heidegger chooses a new term that will not neglect the 
Question of Being. The term he introduces is Dasein – Being-there. This word had 
been used by Kant and Hegel and was generally used to refer to the type of existence 
of human beings. Dasein is that which is ‘closest’, but in this closeness, Dasein 
remains hidden (1962: H42). In trying to get at what is closest, one might suggest that 
what we are is our bodies – our materiality. However, this falls into the trap of 
thinking that we are mere things like other objects in the world – precisely the kind of 
interpretation that Heidegger wishes to avoid. 
Part of the reason that we have interpreted ourselves as mere things is because we are 
in the world (Welt) – that which surrounds us in our everyday practical concern 
(besorgen) or behaviour (verhalten). The tendency has always been to see ourselves 
in terms of the type of being characteristic of this world around. Furthermore, 
Heidegger argues that our understanding of Being has decayed over time and we need 
to reappropriate the original meaning that has been concealed since the early attempts 
at philosophy by the ancient Greeks. The historical interpretation of Being – how 
people understood what it means to be – also reveals something about the nature of 
Being itself. Being covers itself up.  
For Heidegger, phenomenology is the only proper way forward for philosophy: 
everything else is metaphysics and congealed tradition. He defines phenomenology as 
letting things be seen in the way in which they show themselves from themselves 
(1962: H34). Philosophy, then, is not a meaning imposed upon the world in advance, 
but the practice of letting the world be seen as it is. Furthermore, it is an investigation 
of the way in which things show themselves. As such, Heidegger claims that 
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phenomenology does not have any discrete subject matter or object.
9
 Phenomenology 
is the proper mode of access to beings rather than a discrete science as Husserl (and 
past ontologists) had thought. Unlike other sciences with the suffix ‘ology’ such as 
anthropology, psychology, sociology or biology, phenomenology does not just look at 
different aspects of Dasein, but rather gets to its ‘primordial existentiality’ (1962: 
H45). Devoid of such a discrete object for study, Heidegger realises the need to focus 
on something in order to set the investigation on the way and as it happens, Dasein 
itself – the being that has special access and concern for its own being – is the proper 
object for his enquiry in BT. 
The project of BT is not meant to be exhaustive in its description of all possible modes 
of human existence. And even though Heidegger thinks that this study of Being 
underpins other social sciences this does not mean that other social sciences should 
not proceed with investigating their specific areas of Being (1962: H51-52). The 
phenomenological project he wanted hoped for would provide the proper foundation 
for the social sciences, as opposed to what he saw as the spurious metaphysical 
tradition that had served as a basis up until the advent of phenomenology. 
Temporality is the key to this re-evaluation of the meaning of Being. Traditionally, 
Heidegger thinks, time has been interpreted with respect to space (1962: H18-19). In 
BT, Heidegger approaches time in a factical sense – the way that it is lived through 
experiences (Erlebnisse) (19862: H48). Death, in particular, serves as a clue as to how 
we experience time. Life is stretched out between birth and death while we attempt to 
achieve certain projects in between. But Dasein is always ‘outstanding’ in the sense 
that it is never finished: there is more to come (1962 H241ff). What Heidegger calls 
the Destrukion of metaphysics is the reinterpreting of Being with time as its horizon 
(1962: H15ff). All human experience is from a definite standpoint in time, looking to 
the future, and in a distinctive historical period which will determine its own 
understanding of Being. Being too has a history and this is to be found in the way that 
peoples have understood the term throughout the ages. However, the task of 
Destruktion is not entirely negative, but rather looks to the past and salvaging the 
truth in different understandings of Being that have been held throughout history 
(1962: H22-23). For Heidegger, this was to be found in the ancient Greeks. 
So instead of turning to Husserl as the founder of phenomenology, Heidegger turns to 
the Greek roots of the term in order to find its original meaning. Phenomenon comes 
from the ancient Greek verb ‘to show’, related to bringing something into the daylight 
or showing that which is bright (1962: H29). But things can show themselves in many 
different ways, depending on the way in which we have access to them. In order to 
head off the charge of ‘mere appearing’, Heidegger proposes that dissimulation, 
illusion and seeming are derivative of the primary showing of something: in order for 
something to seem it must be showing something and the way that it shows itself is 
precisely what is up for investigation. So not only intuition needs to be encounterable 
in phenomenology – just perceiving things – we need to be able to see how those 
things show themselves. Space and time, for instance, need to be able to be seen as 
                                                
9 In his Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger (2000) claims that ‘nothing’ is the object of 
phenomenology. 
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they are, not as objects in the world. The manner of showing of things needs to be the 
sort of thing that we can apprehend. 
Heidegger translates logos, the second half of the word phenomenology, as discourse, 
though he acknowledges that it could also mean reason, judgment, concept, definition, 
ground or relationship (1962: H32). He thinks that rather than binding two things 
together, the concept of logos is the making manifest of what one is talking about in 
discourse. Logos has the character of pointing something out, and can sometimes be 
letting things be seen together rather than joining them artificially. By defining logos 
in such away, Heidegger moves away from the idea of something as true or false 
because of correspondence. Heidegger conceives of truth as a ‘letting be seen’. 
Aletheia – the Greek term for unconcealment or unhiddenness is thus the original 
meaning of truth (1962: H33). Logos is not mere perception, nor is it judgment, but 
rather an uncovering of the manner of appearing. 
Heidegger and the Question of Being 
After the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger underwent a ‘turn’ (Kehre) away 
from examining the Being of beings to concentrate on Being itself. Instead of 
continuing his transcendental analysis of the structures of human existence and its 
relation to the world and showing how previous philosophy had failed to come to such 
an account, he turned to art, architecture, and history in order to think through the 
meaning of Being. Heidegger turned away from phenomenology (at least in explicit 
terms) though he retained the notion of truth as disclosure and unconcealing which 
stemmed from the goal of getting to the things themselves. He also turned from the 
transcendental project of describing the conditions for the possibility of human 
existence and Being which informed BT towards the notion of truth as an event 
(Ereignis). His later writings introduced an anti-subjectivist, anti-aesthetic 
understanding of the ontological status of the work of art which he saw as connected 
to the idea of world-founding. He also distanced himself from humanism (including 
Marxism), which he saw as yet another metaphysical system. Towards the end of his 
career, he changed from indicating that Being was to be recovered simply from Greek 
thinking towards the idea of Being as a futural promise; it was not a matter of Dasein 
freeing Being, but rather Being itself revealing and concealing itself. He also moved 
towards a consideration of poetry as potentially revealing the nature of Being and the 
way in which the proliferation of technology (and technological frameworks) 
threatens uniquely human modes of existence. 
Heidegger has long been shrouded in controversy and criticism for his involvement in 
National Socialism. It is still up for question whether his political beliefs pervade his 
philosophy and form a case for ruling him out of consideration in any serious 
theoretical debate.
10
 Nevertheless, his influence on the development of twentieth 
century philosophy both in Germany and internationally is still significant even today 
and his contribution to reforming the concept of phenomenology is substantial. 
Heidegger has also been attacked for his dense style of philosophical writing. His 
                                                
10 See Victor Farias’ (1989) Heidegger and Nazism, Collins (2000) Heidegger and the Nazis and 
Young (1997) Heidegger, Philosohpy, Nazism. 
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work is replete with neologisms coined to achieve descriptive precision; he constantly 
invokes word-play and often dwells extensively on the historical roots of words. His 
difficult language can be seen as an attempt to overcome what he saw as the mistaken 
pathways of the philosophical tradition that had appropriated certain vocabularies. He 
saw language as central to philosophy though later in his career he departed from 
more structured philosophical discourse towards a ‘poetic’ (Dichtung) speaking of 
Being. 
The Continuing Influence of Heidegger’s Thinking 
Even before he had produced a major publication, Heidegger was well known for his 
charismatic, convincing and magnetic teaching style and there were ‘rumours of a 
hidden king’ teaching new philosophical thought.
11
 Husserl had noticed his talents 
and helped him to publish BT. No doubt Heidegger influenced his teacher’s thinking 
though the two later fell out both intellectually and socially. Heidegger’s thinking 
shares much in common with Maurice Merleau-Ponty who also studied under 
Husserl. With such students throughout his lifetime as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Herbert 
Marcuse and Hannah Arendt, Heidegger had a direct impact on some of the most 
prominent thinkers of the century. His work and teaching had influence not only in 
philosophy but throughout the social sciences. The Frankfurt School reacted against 
his thought especially through Jürgen Habermas and Theodore Adorno predominantly 
because of his involvement in the Nazi movement. Positivists from the Vienna Circle 
and forerunners of analytic philosophy such as A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell 
attacked Heidegger for lacking any  substantial meaning in his work. Emmanuel 
Lévinas who had studied under Heidegger at Freiburg brought his influence to France 
where he has become one of the most influential thinkers of the modern era. Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Paul Ricoeur in particular incorporated his thought in the existentialist 
movement (though Heidegger (1993) rejected misinterpretations of his writing in his 
‘Letter on Humanism’). Both Derrida and Foucault acknowledged the key influence 
of Heidegger’s thinking in their own work. Foucault’s emphasis on the historical 
nature of subjectivity and Derrida’s deconstruction were both borne out of 
Heidegger’s Destruktion of metaphysics. And even today Heidegger’s thought is 
gaining a new importance in his influence on the post-structural movement in general 
and his radical rethinking of the human subject. 
Criticisms of Phenomenology 
There are several criticisms that have been launched at phenomenology. In its 
evolution as a term or way of doing philosophy, phenomenology was subjected to 
criticism from within. On the one hand, Husserl had proposed phenomenology as a 
rigorous science, opposed to life-philosophy and world-views (Moran 2000: 20). Yet 
almost immediately, Heidegger reintroduced attention to the historicity and facticity 
of human living in his analysis of Dasein. Heidegger also focused on the importance 
of the lived experience of time and the importance of inter-subjective experience as 
opposed to Husserl’s concentration on individual experience. Husserl’s original 
                                                
11 See Jones (1998), ‘Heidegger the Fox: Hannah Arendt’s Hidden Dialogue’. 
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project of a descriptive science of phenomenology was doomed to failure together 
with its aspirations for objectivity (because even a description is an interpretation). 
Every description of experience takes place within history and in specific conditions 
enabling its experience in the first place. Also, Heidegger rejected the transcendental 
ego as a basis of experience as metaphysical. Even though Heidegger moved away 
from phenomenology as a term, he was still very much concerned with the way things 
show themselves as the object of his thinking. 
From outside the phenomenological movement, criticism arose from positivism and 
the Vienna Circle (Moran 2000: 21). The movement was attacked for its emphasis on 
intellectual intuition. It was dismissed as meaningless pseudo-metaphysics by 
philosophers such as A.J. Ayer who rejected all forms of phenomenology. From a 
Marxist perspective, phenomenology was a fundamentally bourgeois philosophy, 
forming the epitome of individualism with its overemphasis on the self. Max 
Horkeimer and the Frankfurt School took phenomenology as ‘traditional theory’ from 
which they rebelled. Theodore Adorno rejected Heidegger’s project of fundamental 
ontology in Negative Dialectics. Structuralists attacked phenomenology for its naive 
trust in the evidence of consciousness and argued that hidden unconscious structures 
underlie our experiences. Derrida (1978) attacked the possibility of full presence with 
his term différance. He also suggested that there was a hidden term – ‘spirit’ – in 
Heidegger’s thought which was merely another form of metaphysics (Derrida 1989). 
Phenomenological Interpretations of Acting 
In Part II, I will explore three theories of acting as interpreting both the world and the 
practice of acting. The double reflexivity – that actors attempt to make meaning of the 
world and their own actions in making such a meaning – is the basis upon which I am 
making the claim that actors can be manual philosophers.  
The sub-heading of this thesis (‘Phenomenological Interpretations of Acting Theory’) 
indicates a new way of thinking about performance and a new interpretation of acting. 
Not only am I providing an interpretation that returns to the things themselves in order 
to discover what acting is; I am also suggesting that acting can be a return to the 
things themselves. In terms of phenomenology, interpretation is not bringing 
something new to the thing being interpreted, but rather letting that which is be seen 
to show itself in the way that it shows itself: 
[i]n interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 
‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-
hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something 
within the world is encountered as such, the thing in question 
already has an involvement which is disclosed in our 
understanding of the world, and this involvement is one 
which gets laid out by the interpretation (1962: H150). 
Such a ‘laying out’ of involvement in the world is precisely a phenomenological 
interpretation.  
Early on in the writing process for this thesis, I had considered the subtitle 
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‘Phenomenological Readings of Acting’, perhaps in parallel with many post-structural 
and critical theory accounts of performance and culture. Certainly, Schechner (2006) 
and others advocate many perspectives on performance. At best, the metaphor of 
reading is one that takes a particular relationship that we have to the world – that of 
reading signs – and transferring that as a fundamental way that we are in the world. 
Most of the time we don’t ‘read’, we just do. Heidegger points out the Cartesian error 
of taking knowing as the fundamental basis of being, perhaps ‘reading’ has taken over 
this as a metaphor.
12
 Or yet again, it may be a residual of performance studies’ 
academic debt to literary theory. In any event, ‘interpretation’ seems all the more 
appropriate given its centrality to Heidegger’s project of interpreting the meaning of 
Being. 
Phenomenological interpretation does not make the mistake of taking its object as 
merely present-at-hand in its materiality and physical presence. Heidegger takes great 
care to articulate an interconnected relationship between the being of a thing and the 
world in which it is. Of course, performance studies never really fell into the trap of 
trying to put what happens on stage under the microscope as if we would get to the 
heart of the matter simply by analysing its material properties.
13
 
In providing such a phenomenological interpretation I am not evaluating the merits or 
significance to theatrical theory of Stanislavski, Artaud and Brecht. Nor am I 
committed to saying that each theorist provides the same phenomenology. As 
mentioned in the introduction above, each might be held in dialectical tension with 
one another, or perhaps we should say hermeneutical tension. 
If ‘reading’ is not the right metaphor, then perhaps ‘seeing’ is. Certainly performance 
is about seeing. The rich ways in which we can analyse performance in terms of 
semiotics helps us to understand that process of seeing. But as I have already begun to 
indicate, this is assuming that everything that happens on the stage can be seen. 
Again, we can’t get the microscope out and come to some deep essence of even a 
particular performance, let alone theatre in general. What is presented on stage is a 
world and each of the theorists I deal with here attempted to grapple with that world 
through theatre and acting. Schechner’s ‘twice behaved behaviour’ (1981: 36) posits 
that performance is both object and mode of analysis. For Heidegger, Dasein  – 
Being-there – has the ability to inquire into its own Being. Performance is one human 
practice that can do this in a lived, bodily way. 
Phenomenology is not merely just another theoretical lens for analysing performance. 
Returning to the idea of a privileging of sight, I suggest that it is not merely what is 
seen which comes to light on stage. Certainly, the art of the actor can be very much to 
do with the way things look but it can also engage with the other senses and indeed 
                                                
12 ‘[A] “commercium” of the subject with a world does not get created fore the first time by knowing, 
nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein 
founded upon Being in the world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be interpreted 
beforehand’  (Heidegger 1962: H62). 
13 This is not to say that scientific analysis is not possible in theatre. Turner (1990: 13) turns to 
neuroscience as an explanation for his key term liminality, for example. The point is that a 
phenomenological interpretation will not say that is what performance is. 
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the structures of existence. So performance may be about seeing but it might even 
more properly about seeing Being. From the performer’s perspective, performance 
could be about being Being. (Perhaps I am at risk of entering into later Heidegger’s 
tautological language.) I suggest that acting can be about creating a world. This is a 
fitting point at which to turn to Stanislavski and his quest for fostering the conditions 
for creativity. 
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Part II: Acting as Phenomenology 
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The ‘System’ is a guide. Open it and read it. The ‘System’ is a reference book, not a 
philosophy. Where philosophy begins the ‘System’ ends. You cannot act the ‘System’: 
you can work with it at home but on the stage you must put it on one side. 
There is no ‘System’. There is only nature. My life’s object has been to get as near as 
I can to the so-called ‘System’, i.e. to the nature of creation. 
The laws of art are the laws of nature. The birth of a child, the growth of a tree, the 
creation of a character are manifestations of the same order. The establishment of a 
‘System’, i.e. the laws of the creative process, is essential because on the stage, by the 
fact of being public, the work of nature is violated and its laws infringed. The ‘System’ 
re-establishes these laws; it advances human nature as the norm. Turmoil, fear of the 
crowd, bad taste, false traditions deform nature. 
The first aspect of the method is to get the unconscious to work, The second is, once it 
starts, to leave it alone. 
 
Constantin Stanislavski, quoted in Benedetti (1983: 75) 
 
5. Stanislavski: Being-in-the-world 
Stanislavski theatre theory brings to light elements of the world not through the 
contemplative processes of philosophy or Heidegger’s explicit fundamental ontology 
– the Question of Being – but through describing the process of actor training and 
preparing for a role. In this chapter I will consider how Stanislavski’s system of acting 
might be understood through aspects of Heidegger’s analysis of Being-in-the-world. 
Acting can be manual philosophy in so far as it uncovers a human relation to the 
world in the context of theatrical artistic practice. But more than simply 
contemplating the world, Stanislavski describes making world through the artistic 
process. This world does not come from nowhere: it is rather, a composite of the 
actor’s ‘ownmost self’ crafted into an artistic performance. The role of the actor in 
Stanislavski is engaged with the specificity of human existence (rather than Being in 
general as Heidegger was interested in). Through experience, however, actors gain 
insight not just into one role, but how to approach many different parts by combining 
their own experiences with those of the director and playwright in the collaborative 
process of theatrical production. This chapter will concentrate largely on 
Stanislavski’s (1980) writing in An Actor Prepares (AP).1 
Introduction 
Constantin Stanislavski spent his entire theatrical career searching for ways to 
produce reliable artistic performances on stage through actor preparation and attention 
to the acting process. Whilst there were many previous artists whom he admired 
(Salvini, Coquelin and Shchepkin, for instance), Stanislavski felt that there had been 
no coherent thought about the process of acting from an inwards source up to that 
point. The art of the stage had largely been seen as just a knack, mere inspiration or 
the imitation of external forms. Stanislavski held the belief that there could be a 
reliable method of achieving memorable and meaningful performances. This process 
lay in understanding the totality of the actor’s organism, not just in external actions.
2
 
                                                
1 For a useful and insightful summary and analysis of An Actor Prepares, see Merlin (2003), Chapter 
Two. It would be possible to look at historical accounts of Stanislavski’s practice, but for the sake of 
this task I have chosen to focus on AP in that it provides one attempt at convying is ‘system’. 
2 ‘Moreover, and this is of primary importance, the organic basis of the laws of nature on which our art 
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Stanislavski felt that through training and rehearsal, actors need to understand their 
own creative state as well as the content of their role in order to produce a 
performance where acting is an art, or ‘living through the part’ (perezhivanie).3 For 
this reason, I suggest that Stanislavski approaches the Being of the actor as a means 
for bringing about the birth of a new entity – ‘the person in the part’ (1980: 312). This 
birth of a new Being is precisely the creation of world by combining elements of the 
actor’s own experience, emotions and imagination. Although Stanislavski opposes his 
system to philosophy in the epigraph above, I suggest that it might be interpreted as a 
phenomenology through its emphasis and reflection upon experience. 
Robert Leach notes ‘Stanislavski’s phenomenology has much in common with 
Heidegger’s, with its interest in individual consciousness and how lived experience 
interacts with the “real” world’ (2004: 50). This is precisely the premise for this 
chapter, yet I suggest that both are not merely interested in the individual 
consciousness, but rather the intermeshed relationship between self and world. Mark 
Fortier also notes that ‘what might be called phenomenological concerns figure 
prominently in the work of Constantin Stanislavski’ (1997: 32-33). Although 
Stanislavski’s writing on actor preparation has become known as the ‘system’, it is 
not ‘systematic’ in providing just one method for fostering the creative conditions for 
the art of the stage (see the epigraph to this chapter, above). So too is it difficult to 
come up with one universal definition for Being or even a systematic way of 
approaching Being in philosophy as Heidegger came to realise. Being is elusive and 
has a tendency to cover itself up in mystery.
4
 
Without doubt, Stanislavski is one of the most influential figures of twentieth century 
acting theory. As such there is an enormous literature and body of interpretations 
surrounding his writings – not in the least important is the problem of translation and 
disputation over what he really meant. His theatrical theory developed over a lifetime 
and contained many contradictions, revisions, and developments. In the U.S. and 
Soviet Union, there were considerably different interpretations which arose and 
substantial editorial differences in the editions which appeared in these different 
contexts.
5
 It is also worth keeping in mind that he was primarily a practitioner rather 
than theorist and constantly put his emphasis on action over solely intellectual 
approaches. In this respect, Stanislvaski’s account serves as a good example of acting 
as manual philosophy.  
Being on Stage: The Question of Being 
Stanislavski articulated a strange phenomenon of being on stage. Whereas in everyday 
life humans are mostly unaware of their own actions, on the stage there is a special 
heightened awareness both on the part of the audience and the actor in the theatre. 
                                                                                                                                       
is founded will protect you in the future from going down the wrong path’ (Stanislavski 1980: 16). 
3 See ‘Stanislavsky’s Lost Term’ in Carnicke (1998: 105ff) for a discussion of the translations of this 
term. 
4 ‘[Not only is] the question of the meaning of Being… one that has not been attended to and one that 
has been inadequately formulated… it has become quite forgotten in spite of all our interest in 
“metaphysics”’(1962: H21). 
5 See Part I ‘Transmission’ in Carnicke (1998). 
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Things that are done with particular ease in real life get clouded over and become 
difficult to the inexperienced actor once the curtain lifts.
6
 Just being upon reflection 
becomes strange. Yet it is particularly easy for even the untrained eye of the audience 
member to spot truthful, believable acting over ham acting, exhibitionism, mechanical 
reproduction of movements and forced acting.
7
 The challenge to the actor, from 
Stanislavski’s perspective, is to portray full human lived experience rather than 
empty, exterior forms of action. But it is not enough simply to strike upon such 
performances by chance. Rather, Stanislavski’s ideal actor has a number of tools and 
approaches to ensure consistent, reliable performances. It is not enough to just be 
there: the professional actor should understand different aspects of Being-there (to use 
Heidegger’s term) and use that understanding to create their part. This holistic 
approach to acting sees the actor’s own Being as both the artist and the material for 
the work on stage together with the peculiarly temporal aspect of performance that 
requires the ability to be creative on cue.
8
 
Stanislavski sought a way of engaging the entire organism of the creative being. The 
‘natural metaphor’ is constant throughout his work in finding the natural bases for 
human art.
9
 But Stanislavski is under no misconception that the sheer materiality of 
the actor is the be all and end all of the creative process. The unseen elements of the 
creative life of the artist are crucial for finding the pathway to compelling and artistic 
performances. As such, he reaches for language of ‘the soul’, ‘the spirit’ and various 
other metaphysical metaphors which will aid in stimulating the creativity of the 
actor.
10
 The ‘subconscious’, taken from the emerging field of psychological 
investigation burgeoning in the early twentieth century, is also important in his 
account.
11
 Furthermore, his division of the interior and exterior aspects of the actor’s 
training and performance might not be interpreted as a dualism, but rather as a 
possible way of giving support and attention to various aspects of the training and 
                                                
6 ‘During every moment we are on the stage, during every moment of the development of the action of 
the play, we must be aware either of the external circumstances which surround us (the whole material 
setting of the production), or of an inner chain of circumstances which we ourselves have imagined in 
order to illustrate our parts’ (Stanislavski 1980: 64). ‘Remember this: all of our acts, even the simplest, 
which are so familiar to us in everyday life, become strained when we appear behind the footlights 
before a public of a thousand people. That is why it is necessary to correct ourselves and learn again 
how to walk, move about, sit or lie down. It is essential to re-educate ourselves to look and see on the 
stage, to listen and to hear’ (1980: 77). 
7 See Stanislavski (1980: 12-32) Chapter Three, ‘When Acting is an Art’ for a description of these 
common errors in the art of acting. In the following chapter, ‘Action’ Kostya, the young student 
observes these problems in both himself and his fellow classmates. 
8 See Stanislavski (1980: 261-70) Chapter Fourteen, ‘The Inner Creative State’ for a discussion 
fostering the right inner creative mood for performance. 
9‘Nature’s laws are binding on all, without exception, and woe to those who break them’ (1980: 313). 
See Aristotle’s Physics Book II which makes a similar point – that art completes nature and adheres to 
the laws that are already in operation there. 
10 For example: ‘Of significance to us is: the reality of the inner life of a human spirit in a part and a 
belief in that reality. We are not concerned with the actual naturalistic existence of what surrounds us 
on the stage, the reality of the material world! This is of use to us only in so far as it supplies a general 
background to our feelings’ (1980: 129). 
11 See in particular, Chapter Nine, ‘Emotion Memory’ and Chapter Sixteen, ‘On the Threshold of the 
Subconscious’. Stanislavski also refers to French psychologist, Theodule Ribot on the physiological 
effects of emotion memory recall (1980: 166-67). 
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preparation process.
12
 
One major theme that runs through Stanislavski’s reflection on the acting process is 
the danger of ‘acting in general’: ‘We never believe in any action taken “in general”’, 
he writes (1980: 56). He argues that acting should only be based in concrete 
engagement with the world and never in the abstract. Through AP Tortsov, the teacher 
and director of the acting class warns against the impotence of generality with regards 
to action, imagination, attention, communion, the analysis of a part, and the creative 
super-objectives of the actor. Generality is useless because it creates vague and 
unbelievable performances. ‘Whatever happens on stage must be for a purpose. Even 
keeping your seat must be for a purpose, a specific purpose, not merely the general 
purpose of being in sight of the audience’ (1980: 35). 
 AP sets out the exercises, failures and learning processes of an imaginary acting class, 
but shows some real insight into Stanislavski’s different approaches to coax creativity 
from its hidden sources.
13
 It is worth noting, however, that different translations of 
Stanislavski’s texts provide different interpretations of the relationship between actor 
and role. Benedetti (1990) provides a useful discussion in ‘A History of Stanislavski 
in Translation’ where he notes the differences even in the titles given to Stanislavski’s 
works in Russian and English. AP was a version of the Russian An Actor’s Work on 
Himself and Building a Character a version of the Russian An Actor’s Work on 
Himself in the Creative Process of Incarnation. The word ‘incarnation’ suggests the 
close or even metaphysical connection between the actor and the actor in the role. 
One could argue that the Question of Being permeates Stanislavski’s dual 
investigation into the being of the actor and the being of the part. Ultimately these two 
elements are combined in the creation or incarnation of a new being. Every occasion 
of Being for the actor is a being in the there. In the context of the theatre, this has the 
dual aspect of both the real situation of the actor looking onto the auditorium and 
imaginary circumstances of the play – the two sides of ‘the given circumstances’. For 
Stanislavski, the successful actor unifies these two elements in the creation of a world 
before the very eyes of the audience through inwardly living the part.
14
 The there is 
far more than the physical space of the theatre itself, it is the world of the play and the 
imaginative capacity of the actor. Conversely, the examples of bad acting which 
Tortsov draws out in Chapter Two of AP, ‘When Acting is an Art’, are precisely 
where the inexperienced students fail to be in the there and fall prey to the desire to 
entertain the audience (which is precisely the approach that will lead to exteriority – 
                                                
12 For instance in his consideration of the Hindu concept of Prana, Stanislavski’s speaker, Tortsov says: 
‘I have no desire to prove whether Prana really exists or not. My sensations may be purely individual to 
me, the whole thing may be the fruit of my imagination. That is of no consequence provided I can 
make use of it for my purposes, and it helps me. If my practical and unscientific method can be of use 
to you, so much the better. If not, I shall not insist on it’ (1980: 199). 
13 ‘[W]e are supposed to create under inspiration; only our subconscious gives us inspiration; yet we 
apparently can use this subconscious only though our consciousness which kills it. / Fortunately there 
is a way out. We find the solution in an oblique instead of direct approach. In the soul of a human being 
there are certain elements which are subject to consciousness and will. These accessible parts are 
capable in turn of acting on psychic processes that are voluntary.’ (Stanislavski1980: 13) 
14 See Stanislavski (1980) Chapter Four, ‘Imagination’ for the process of creating a world, also 
discussed below. 
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parallel to Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysical approaches to philosophy).  
Perhaps the clearest example of this elusiveness of Being (felt in the theatrical 
context, in a practical attempt to be in a certain way) is where Maria, one of the 
students particularly prone to vanity and exploiting her good looks for the sake of the 
viewers, simply sits on a chair on the stage (1980:  33-37). When the curtain raises, 
the young student twists and turns looking very uncomfortable and trying to move so 
as to maintain the interest of her viewers. Kostya takes to the stage next in a repeat of 
the same exercise and experiences the strange and conflicting pull of the audience and 
the short-circuit of everyday being. Immediately after, Tortsov goes on stage and sits 
on the chair but this time, he manufactures something eminently watchable as his face 
passes through a series of expressions, inviting the audience to wonder what it is he is 
thinking. What was it that the teacher is doing that allows him to be there in such a 
way? Why does being there slip  away when the students attempt the exercise? As it 
happens, this is exactly what AP seeks to answer – different aspects of the ‘psycho-
technique’ which engage the totality of the artist’s Being and use that Being to create 
a ‘true’ performance rather than an exterior and superficial mere display. So 
Stanislavski uncovers the strange quality of Being which has the tendency to desert 
the actor who reflects upon it when stepping on the stage. 
The inexperienced actors of Tortsov’s class begin from an external understanding of 
human existence rather than engage with the totality of their Being in creating a 
part.
15
 They fail to get at the connectedness of the human subject – their own self – 
with their environment. Rather than begin with the things themselves, the students 
jump to mere representation of life rather than actually live it. The way Being has a 
tendency to slip away on stage might well be accounted for in Heidegger’s 
philosophy. 
As suggested in Chapter Four above, Heidegger understood philosophy as the search 
for the meaning of the word Being. He viewed the history of philosophy as a failed 
attempt to reach an adequate understanding of what it means for something to be. 
Earlier philosophical systems had claimed variously that we already know what Being 
is, or that it is indefinable, that it is the broadest of all categories and that it is not a 
real predicate (Heidegger 1962: H3-4). Part of the problem with past approaches to 
understanding Being was that they began from metaphysical assumptions that were 
unfounded – Plato’s theory of Forms, the concept of a prime mover and uncreated 
thing, Descartes’ mind/body dualism, Husserl’s transcendental ego (1962: H23-25). 
Metaphysics is any philosophical system that starts from unfounded erroneous 
assumptions about the foundation of Being. For example, metaphysical systems 
include those which see substance, presence or materiality as the basis for Being. In 
other words, metaphysics is an attempt to describe human existence from the outside 
(just as the acting students sought to approach being on stage from an exterior 
perspective). The error of metaphysics is to mistake what is seen (mere appearance) 
with what is. As such, Heidegger suggested that philosophy required a new 
foundation in the things themselves. 
                                                
15 ‘The essence of art is not in its external forms but in its spiritual content.’ (Stanislavski 1980: 37) 
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Rather than positing a thinking/perceiving subject separated from the world as these 
metaphysical approaches had erroneously begun with, Heidegger sees the subject and 
the world as being thoroughly intermeshed.
16
 The self and the world cannot be 
separated or thought of independently. Heidegger realised the impossibility of simply 
beginning with Being in general (what he really wants to get at in BT). He begins with 
an analysis of that entity who has the ability to inquire into its own Being (Dasein). If 
we are to interpret Stanislavski’s approach as phenomenological, we might note that 
he starts with work on the particular being who is on stage.
17
 That entity is not static 
but rather immersed in the world and changing throughout time, thus raising the 
difficulty of performing on cue.
18
 Rather than defining man as a ‘rational animal’ or a 
‘thinking Being’
19
, Stanislavski understood the there of the human being is a much 
more complicated interaction going on with the world. Stanislavski considers the 
unseen role of the subconscious and to the creative state which is inherently unstable. 
The subconscious can be lured into the open given the right conditions to provide 
inspiration in performance.
20
 Great art, for Stanislavski, can get at ‘the eternal’ and 
‘the universal’ but this is not something that can be approached directly. In 
Heidegger’s philosophy we glean something about the meaning of Being, though this 
also needs to be approached indirectly. Heidegger starts with the Being of a specific 
being, namely the inquirer of the investigation itself: Dasein. For Stanislavski, actors 
need to begin with concrete specificity and an understanding of their own self: their 
own Being-there. 
For Stanislavski, the world is not simply a collection of facts. Preparing for a role 
without all the information about the circumstances of a specific historical time period 
will fall short of elucidating the world of that time. Tortsov compares 
‘representational acting’ with inwardly living through the part (1980: 18-23). The 
former is not without its skill and technique: 
… you should first of all assimilate the model. This is 
complicated. You  study it from the point of view of the 
epoch, the time, the country, the condition of life, 
                                                
16 ‘The compound expression “Being-in-the-world” indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it 
stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole’ (Heidegger 1962: 
H53). 
17 ‘If to interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to be 
interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are 
asking about when we ask this question’ (Heidegger 1962: H15). Stanislavski starts from the artist’s 
own being as the beginning: ‘An artist must have full use of his own spiritual, human material because 
that is the only stuff from which he can fashion a living soul for his part. Even if his contribution is 
slight, it is the better because it is his own’ (1980: 304). 
18 In particular, see Stanislavski (1980) Chapter Nine, ‘Emotion Memory’ on the changing nature of 
human memory and Chapter Eleven, ‘Adaptation’ for the necessity of changing one’s approach to the 
given circumstances and conditions of performance. 
19 Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Z uses ‘Man is a rational animal’ as an example of a logical syllogism, 
and Descartes’ Meditation II, understands man as a ‘thinking Being’. 
20 ‘Our conscious mind arranges, and puts a certain amount of order into, the external world that 
surrounds us. There is no sharply drawn line between conscious and subconscious experience. Our 
consciousness often indicates the direction in which our subconscious continues to work. Therefore, the 
fundamental objective of our psycho-technique is to put us in a creative state in which our 
subconscious will function naturally’ (1980: 281). 
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background, literature, psychology, the soul, way of living, 
social position, and external appearance; moreover you study 
character, such as custom, manner, movements, voice, 
speech, intonations. All this work on your material will help 
you to permeate it with your own feelings. Without all of this 
you will have no art (1980: 21). 
Representational acting is analogous to a painter attending to all the characteristics of 
their object, yet still misses out on something; it fails to get emotions at the exact 
moment of performance. In other words, the actor need not simply apprehend objects 
and characteristics of the world, but must apprehend them in their Being. This is not a 
matter of scientific observation, but understanding their significance in the creative 
process and being stimulated by aspects of the world as they are related to the artistic 
presentation on stage. Bringing to life a complete world on stage is not simply a 
matter of having the details right, but also of grasping something of their 
‘worldliness’, and this requires an understanding from the inside rather than merely in 
external form.
21
 Theatre, for Stanislavski, is not merely the presentation of real life, 
but the presentation of meaningful and insightful events, people and actions that will 
have long lasting effects on the audiences rather than superficial and transient 
moments of pleasure or entertainment. In other words, art is about capturing and 
creating a world within which the actors and the audience are submerged. This 
suggests that not all acting is manual philosophy. Stanislavski rejects representation, 
exhibitionism, overacting and forced acting since they fall short of acting as an art.  
The art form rests not merely in the external forms of actions and characters; it reveals 
some indescribable, deeper qualities of life.  
Thus for Stanislavski, acting is not a science, technique or mere skill. It is an art 
requiring the engagement of the total human entity and its capacities for 
understanding Being. Stanislavski believes that there is a predisposition in nature for 
creativity to arise, but it cannot be approached directly. It can only be accessed by 
oblique methods. Like Being, creativity is not a simple term, but Stanislavski’s actor 
and Heidegger’s philosopher must find a way of approaching it. Heidegger tries to get 
at Being through that particular entity for whom Being is an issue – Dasein. If we are 
to interpret Stanislavski’s approach as manual philosophy, we can say that the actor 
approaches creativity through the artist’s own self and relation to the world. 
Being there: Dasein 
Stanislavski realises that the human subject is not primarily a ‘free-floating entity’ – a 
Cartesian ‘thinking substance’ separated from ‘extended matter’.
22
 The learning-path 
of Kostya, the main character and diarist from AP is as much a journey of self-
discovery as it is about learning the art of acting (and for Stanislavski the two are 
                                                
21 This is not to say that Stanislavski does not admire the artistic talent of the representational actor – he 
cites Coquelin the elder (1980: 21-22). ‘Nevertheless, “representing” the part must be acknowledged to 
be a creative art’ (1980: 23). 
22 ‘Thus the term “phenomenology” expresses a maxim which can be formulated  as “To the things 
themselves!” It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to 
taking over any conceptions which seem to have been demonstrated…’ (Heidegger 1962: H28). 
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inextricably linked). Similarly, My Life in Art is a recollection of the different 
pathways to creativity in his own life and an elaboration of the there of his own life 
(Fortier 1997: 32 and Stanislavski 1980a). But rather than emphasise the mind or the 
body, the psychological or the physical, Stanislavski was interested in how the totality 
of the human being worked in performance.
23
 As mentioned above, the American 
method has been criticised for taking an overly psychological approach partly due to 
the history of translation of his texts and the Soviet version too mechanical and 
physical, though Stanislavski realised the importance of both of these aspects of the 
Being that is there on stage (Carnicke 1998). 
In AP, Tortsov develops a model of the self based in a conception of the physical, 
intellectual/emotional and spiritual elements of existence. (In Chapter Twelve, ‘Inner 
Motive Forces’, Tortsov points out the tripartite model of ‘feeling’, ‘mind’ and 
‘will’).
24
 Drawing on such disparate discourses as behavioural psychology (Ribot and 
Pavlov)
25
 as well as Eastern philosophy and yogic practices (through his colleague 
Suler)
26
, Stanislavski describes exercises with his imaginary acting class designed to 
stimulate recognition of the different ways that human beings are in their ‘there’. 
Stanislavski’s language, metaphors and description of the human organism are meant 
to aid the performer in trying to activate creativity rather than provide a formal 
topology of human consciousness. Keeping this in mind, it may be unwise to dismiss 
his view of the human self as a metaphysical abomination.
27
 Stanislavski’s emphasis 
on the activity of the theatre rather than simply developing a theoretical model helps 
him to avoid the problem of metaphysics – starting with a false and predetermined 
concept of the self. 
For Stanislavski, the problem with many past approaches to acting was that they were 
largely concerned with mere appearances.
28
 The contemporary practice by which 
actors would learn their craft by apprenticeship in the industry rather than undergo a 
formal training left individuals without any hard and fast system. This external 
process of acting by which performers would take on the outward form lacked 
sincerity – as ‘mirror acting’ for Stanislavski (1980: 19) – or at the very least, failed to 
provide a reliable method for performance. Stanislavski stressed the need to ‘feel the 
part inwardly’ by tapping into the rational, emotional and spiritual sources of human 
action rather than mouthing empty forms intent purely upon pleasing the audience and 
thus missing artistic control of performance. So rather than represent being, 
                                                
23 An actor is under the obligation to live his part inwardly, and then to give his experience an external 
embodiment. I ask you especially to note that the dependence of the body on the soul is particularly 
important in our school of art” (1980: 16) 
24 See Merlin (2003: 81) for a diagrammatic representation of the self and system adapted from Jean 
Benedetti and Robert Lewis. 
25 For a discussion of the influence and intersections of science and Stanislavski’s system, see Pitches 
(2006). 
26 See Stanislavski (1980a: 468-71) and Leach (2004: 17-18). 
27 See Auslander’s ‘Just be yourself: Logocentrism and Difference in Performance Theory’, in Zarrilli 
(1995). 
28 ‘Your make-believe truth helps you represent images and passions. My kind of truth helps to create 
the images themselves and stir the real passions. The difference between your art and mine is the same 
as between the two words seem and be. I must have real truth. You are satisfied with its appearance. I 
must have true belief’ (1980: 157). 
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Stanislavski was interested in finding ways to really be on stage. Of course this does 
not mean actually becoming the character in the play, but finding the creative impulse 
and a truthful way of being in the part. 
In AP Tortsov challenges his students to really be there when acting on the stage 
(1980: 37-41). In a slight trick on the students (and upon Maria in particular), the 
teacher proposes an exercise where she go up on stage and find a brooch that had 
supposedly been hidden. If she can find the pin, then in the imaginary scene, she will 
be able to continue tuition at the school because she can sell it and receive the money 
for the fees. When the young actress performs the scene, she rushes about 
melodramatically showing suffering at the loss of the pin, but in her excitement 
forgets to actually look for it. Afterwards talking to the director, she says that it felt 
marvellous being on stage, but as the director points out, she had totally forgotten to 
do what she was up there for. Then the teacher says that if she goes and finds the pin, 
then she will really be able to stay at the school. This time, the student returns to the 
stage and looks with deliberate slowness, quietly muttering at her misfortune and 
searching for the missing brooch. The difference between the two attempts is that in 
the former, Maria was simply representing the action (badly) whereas in the second 
she was really acting with a purpose: she was really being there on stage. The upshot 
is not that Stanislavski requires actors to actually become their characters (such a 
proposition is impossible) but rather to perform real actions and really be there rather 
than simply represent a false reality. 
Just as Heidegger sought to find a new vocabulary in order to talk about human 
existence (which had been hijacked by metaphysical thought in the past) Stanislavski 
sought for a vocabulary for describing the art of acting. But even more important than 
finding the words to express different approaches to ways of being, Stanislavski was 
interested in actual experiences to teach and understand the mysterious nature of 
Being on stage.
29
 Terms such as ‘the given circumstances’, ‘if’, ‘action for a purpose’ 
were a direct reaction to tradition which had overlooked the possibility that there 
might be something systematic to be learnt about acting, or that it was just a knack 
that was picked up.
30
 Of course, Heidegger introduced the term Dasein as a radical 
dismantling of philosophy and revision of its fundamental concepts. His investigation 
of the unique entity that is able to comport itself understandingly towards Being was 
meant as a radical overturning or Destruktion of inadequate attempts throughout 
history of approaching philosophy’s basis (Heidegger 1962: H19-28). Stanislavski 
was not so much concerned with the terminology of different elements in actor 
preparation and performance, as he was getting the experience of understanding 
through doing. However, he did think that there was an inadequate vocabulary for 
talking about human experiences of the world in the contemporary theatrical 
discourse and for this reason he reached to adjacent disciplines to supplement his own 
                                                
29 Stanislavsky thinks that actors should learn by example rather than simply in an abstract sense. ‘My 
problem is: how can I talk about [the elements of the creative process] without departing from my 
habitual method, which is first to make you feel what you are learning by vivid practical example and 
later come to theories?’ (1980: 242) 
30 Stanislavski borrowed the phrase ‘given circumstances’ from the poet, Pushkin (Stanislavski 1980: 
50). 
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experiences in technique. 
Instead of using the vocabulary of these past metaphysical thinkers that included 
concepts such as subject and object, consciousness, life-world, soul, psychic acts, and 
intentionality, Heidegger attempted to invent radically new terminology that would 
escape the connotations of these erroneous beginnings.
31
 Rather than a free-floating 
substance, separated from the world, Heidegger introduced the term Dasein so that it 
could never be thought of detached from the world in which it lives. In one aspect, 
Dasein is its world.32 But what ‘world’ means is far from clear at this beginning stage 
of the inquiry. Heidegger also makes the point time and time again that Dasein is not 
just sheer materiality, corporeality or actuality – what he calls the ‘present-at-hand’ 
(vorhanden).33 Dasein is its possibilities – it is not just what is, but rather what might 
be.
34
 Dasein has different ways of being available to it. Dasein is potentiality. Dasein 
chooses ways to be (or doesn’t choose as the case may be) and what it ‘is’ is not 
exhausted in its physical properties but rather what it might be. This temporal element 
of Dasein’s Being is investigated in Division Two of BT, but to start with, Heidegger 
focuses on the way Dasein is in the world. In summary, the introduction of the term 
Dasein is not simply a matter of vocabulary, but a radical overturning of the way that 
we understand the human subject. One might well consider this overturning of 
metaphysical language in relation to Stanislavski’s attempt to reform acting and what 
being truthful on stage meant. 
For Stanislavski’s ideal actor, possibilities are always present. So rather than fix 
performance to an external form, he suggests that the actor should always be 
searching for imaginative ways in which to interact with the environment (1980: 
Chapter Five ‘Concentration of Attention’). Stanislavski suggests that the creative 
actor is adept at adapting as the circumstances require (Chapter Eleven ‘Adaptation’), 
responding to others there in the scene and with the audience there in the room, 
though not as a primary focus (Chapter Ten, ‘Communion’). The whole training 
process of AP is actually about developing the ability to perceive possibilities for 
performance with openness, rather than a dry mechanical approach which actually 
closes off potential ways of being on stage. To the untrained actor, boredom, 
stagnancy and sterility of action are commonplace. To the actor with the properly 
exercised imagination, concentration of attention, interest in the scene and the right 
spur to action, possibilities become ripe to take in the creative process. Stanislavski’s 
understanding of the human subject is not purely a physical being, or a substance 
                                                
31 ‘We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to 
destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in 
which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways which have guided us 
ever since’(Heidegger 1962: H22) 
32 ‘Ontologically, “world” is not a way of characterising those entities which Dasein is not; it is rather a 
characteristic of Dasein itself’ (Heidegger 1962: H64). 
33 ‘Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein’s Being; it is an existentiale. So one cannot think of 
it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as the human body) “in” and entity 
which is present-at-hand’ (Heidegger 1962: H54). At H42, Heidegger explains that he will use the term 
‘present-at-hand’ to denote what is traditionally referred to in Latin as existentia and use existence to 
refer to that which is solely allotted to the Being of Dasein . 
34 ‘In each case, Dasein is its possibility and “has” this possibility, but not just as a property, as 
something present-at-hand would’ (1962: H42). 
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which can be manipulated, but rather as a delicate and complex source of creativity 
that needs to be trained to see and coaxed from its hiddenness.
35
 
There are a number of elements which are for the most part overlooked and thus result 
in the pitfalls of bad acting (Stanislavski 1980: 12-32). Forced acting and the reliance 
upon inspiration for a role rather than a coherent approach (and the inability to sustain 
a performance in a controlled way) is common. Actors often pander to the audience’s 
attention rather than attend to the creation of a role. Inexperienced actors frequently 
concentrate on the external forms of the stage rather than the inward sources of 
performance. Overacting in clichés and stereotyped gestures, exhibitionism and the 
flaunting of physical beauty are common in attempts to cover up the lack of art. All of 
these mistakes are based in what is ‘visible’ on stage – what the audience sees – thus 
overlooking the technique and attention to the unseen elements that make 
performance an art. Such a privileging of the sense of sight might be explained by 
positing that previous philosophical approaches had failed to understand existence in 
terms of possibilities in that they saw the world as mere materials or substances.
 36
 
Being ourselves: Mineness, Closeness and Being-an Issue 
By interpreting Stanislavski’s description of acting as phenomenology, we might say 
that he discovers three fundamental characteristics of Dasein: mineness, closeness and 
Being-an-issue. As Heidegger begins his investigation into the meaning of Being, 
through looking at the inquirer – Dasein – so too does Stanislavski begin with the 
actor in order to get to general principles of acting and, more importantly, the personal 
response required of the actor on stage.
37
 In his theatre research, Stanislavski stressed 
the need to start from an inward source of action whether physical or mental rather 
than false, imposed exterior affectations.
38
 By the end of his life, he stressed the ‘here, 
today, now’ of the rehearsal process as the beginning point for exploring a play in 
active analysis, ‘trying out ideas in three dimensions, not just intellectually’ (Merlin 
2003: 35), though this is also quite clear even at the time of AP. For Stanislavski, the 
starting point for actors is not from the external but rather always from that which is 
‘closest’ – the actor’s own experiences. Direct understanding and connection with the 
memory and imagination, together with interaction of the senses with the environment 
are the necessary springboards for creativity and the correct triggers for emotional 
involvement of the actor in the character’s life. In fact, there really is no other 
                                                
35 Stanislavski mentions the idea of ‘truth transformed into a poetic equivalent by imagination’(1980: 
160). He goes on to say, ‘All I can do is help you feel what it is. Even to do that requires great patience, 
for I shall devote our whole course to it. Or, to be more exact, it will appear by itself after you have 
studies our whole system of acting and after you yourselves have made the experiment of initiating, 
clarifying, transforming simple everyday human realities into crystals of artistic truth’(1980: 160). 
36 ‘In ordinary life you walk and sit and talk and look, but on the stage you lose all these faculties. You 
feel the closeness of the public and you have to say to yourself, “Why are they looking at me?” And 
you have to be taught all over again to do all these things in public’ (1980:  77) 
37 ‘If only you knew how important was the process of self-study! It should continue ceaselessly, 
without the actor even being aware of it, and it should test every step he takes’ (1980: 131). 
38‘On the stage there cannot be, under any circumstances, action which is directed immediately at 
arousing feeling for its own sake. To ignore this rule results only in the most disgusting artificiality. 
When you are choosing some bit of action leave feeling and spiritual content alone’ (Stanislavski 1980: 
40-41). 
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possibility for actors other than to be themselves, so Stanislavski takes that closest 
being as the base for being on stage.
39
 
Through his emphasis on action and continual questioning of what the actor is doing 
(see especially Stanislavski (1980) Chapter Three, ‘Action’), Stanislavski also reveals 
the fact that Being is an issue for any human. We do things because they matter to us. 
Actions are not arbitrary or mechanical, but rather come from actually performing 
something. In his exercises imagining that there is a madman at the door, for instance 
(1980: 46ff), Stanislavski shows the particularly strong emotion of fear in asking the 
students to react as they would if there was someone from an asylum with an axe 
behind the door. The problem is, of course, that the first time the students attempted 
the task they were lead by the freshness and excitement of the suggestion, but when 
they repeated the exercise, they lost that initial truth of actions which they were 
thinking for the first time. The effect of repetition leads the actors to think about the 
structure of actions themselves and how humans generally react to their environment 
(this is relevant to the section below on ‘Units and Objectives’ below). Again, in the 
exercise with ‘finding the brooch’(1980: 37), or where the teacher comes into the 
theatre and asks which one of the actors is missing a heel to their shoe (1980: 74) – 
the class actually begin to search for who it is – these examples show the direction of 
action not just for its own sake, but for a purpose. 
Understanding how a character would act ‘if’ the given circumstances were true is 
one half of the equation for Stanislavski. The complete picture needs to be filled out 
with actions that matter. In the exercise of the madman at the door, the characters in 
the scene are acting to preserve their own lives. In this scenario, ultimately their very 
Being is at issue and threatened by the escaped mental patient (or would be if the 
circumstances were true). Often such a strong purpose can stimulate the actions of the 
actor in the scene and give rise to feelings and emotions because of the strength of the 
scenario. At other times, the actor will have to find a way to stimulate their own 
interest in a scene and find a personal pathway to action. This is the basis of ‘sense 
memory’ (imagination) and ‘emotion memory’ discussed below. 
As Tortsov’s exercises begin with the actors’ own experience – that which is most 
their own, and closest – they are also in the here and now, a temporal closeness. By 
beginning with what is mostly overlooked, these acting excercises help to focus the 
actor on a dual awareness and control of their relationship with the world. The 
closeness here is not meant simply in a spatial sense, but the way in which we 
experience the world in an existential sense. So emotional involvement, sense-
memory, action for a purpose, communion with others all form part of the there which 
is closest to the character (and the actor, for that matter). The reflexive nature of the 
art of acting requires actors to understand and manipulate their own relation to the 
world (because there is nowhere else to start from if they are to achieve living through 
the part).  
                                                
39 ‘Never lose yourself on the stage. Always act in your own person, as an artist. You can never get 
away from yourself. The moment you lose yourself on stage marks the departure from truly living your 
part and the beginning of false, exaggerated acting’ (1980: 177). 
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For Stanislavski, the actor must begin with experiences which are ‘mine’ in each case. 
If the actions of the actor are not their own, if they do not have the quality of 
‘mineness’ then they will fail to stimulate a truthful response and arouse action and 
will result in an external, insincere form of bad acting. Rather than finding a logical 
and coherent understanding of actions within a scene, the inexperienced actor falls 
into performing actions for their own sake, rather than justifying those actions for a 
purpose. The untrained actor often begins with experiences that are not their own, not 
‘mine’ for the performer, as the students find in their opening exhibition (1980: 1-11). 
Acting is an art for Stanislavski when there is logical coherence of action within a 
scene and where the characters act with purpose. In other words, Being is an issue for 
the performer. The character performs actions because they matter (rather than the 
actor performing acts because they please the audience). Those actions are their own, 
they have a mineness that can be seen as a truthful response. The matter is not simply 
justifying the action of the character for a purpose, but also finding a way of 
manipulating the actor’s own Being such that it is inspired to act in a true and 
believable manner. The bi-focal task of understanding both the role and the actor’s 
own self (mental and physical) is crucial to constructing such a performance for 
Stanislavski (Merlin 2003: 20). 
At the beginning of his inquiry into Being in BT, Heidegger notes at least three 
characteristics of Dasein: it is ‘that which is closest’, it is ‘most mine’ and its Being is 
‘an issue for it’ (1962: H15-16 and H53). Dasein is that which I am in each case. As it 
happens, the concept of closeness (Nähe) will later go on to reveal the way that 
Dasein interacts with its environment in terms of things which are near or far; the 
concept of mineness (Jemeinigkeit) will go on to reveal the way in which Dasein can 
‘be itself’ or ‘not be itself’ (depending on the way in which it understands the 
possibilities of its own existence); and Being-an-issue – the idea that Dasein’s Being 
matters to itself – will go on to reveal the concept of Care (Sorge). To begin with, 
Dasein has to be the sort of thing that can understand its own Being (1962: H15). 
Dasein has the capability of comprehending itself.  
In this reflexive analysis of Dasein, Heidegger argues that it is imperative to 
interrogate the inquirer as to the meaning of Being. Instead of predetermining the 
outcome of this investigation by taking a particular stance beforehand, Heidegger 
wants the being of things to ‘show themselves as they are in themselves’.
40
 
Metaphysics, Heidegger argues, falls prey to false assumptions about what a human 
subject is – precisely the mistake phenomenology attempts to avoid. As such, the 
concept of Dasein is something that is reviewed throughout BT with the uncovering of 
different aspects of Being-there. Dasein itself – the entity doing the inquiring into the 
question of Being – is a large clue for discovering what Being is, because it already 
directs itself and behaves in a particular way according to its own Being. So when 
Heidegger discusses Dasein, he is focused on the Being of that entity which can 
investigate its own Being. Already, there is a certain circularity and reflexivity in 
what is being talked about partly because we cannot separate out Being from the 
                                                
40 ‘Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – 
transparent in his own Being’ (1962: H7). 
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inquirer but also because the inquirer cannot be separated from the world in which it 
operates. But at least this is a starting point: Dasein is the type of being which can 
look into its own Being. This concern and care for its own Being is central to its very 
existence: 
We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of 
any such entity is in each case mine. These entities, in their 
Being, comport themselves towards their own Being. As 
entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own 
Being. Being  is that which is an issue for every such entity. 
(1962: H42) 
Both Heidegger and Stanislavski necessarily begin with the inquirer – the former in 
the context of the philosophical investigation of Being and the later in terms of the 
practical investigation of being there on stage. Both begin with what is closest to the 
human subject, uncover the fact that Being matters in our existence in the world. 
Dasein can be its ‘ownmost’ (eigenst) self in actions within the world – and 
experience itself in this radical mineness (Jemeinigkeit). All of these things are 
perhaps self-evident. I suggest Stanislavski is usefully approached through 
phenomenology because his description of acting is about uncovering the self-evident, 
the obvious and what gets passed over for the most part in our everyday interactions 
with the world. 
Being-in-the-world: Being-in and Worldhood 
If one reconsiders the acting course outlined in AP in terms of Heidegger’s suggestion 
that the human being cannot exist separately from its world one might gain an insight 
into the potential journey of the actor in preparing for a role. An oversight of the 
connection between world and subject is precisely behind the errors of bad acting as 
was demonstrated in the opening exhibition of the students. In Tortsov’s exercises 
aimed at developing imagination, concentration of attention and emotion memory, the 
students discover the connectedness of the world to action within an environment in 
various aspects. All of these inward exercises are supplemented by a rigid physical 
training and an awareness of the external bases for stimulating the imagination, 
emotion and body. So Stanislavski stresses Being-in-the-world (Heidegger’s term for 
the inextricably bound nature of the human subject to the world in which it exists) as 
the basis for performance. For Stanislavski, this reflection is not just a theoretically 
detached and intellectual consideration of what it means to be, but an involved and 
physically experienced understanding of different ways of being. Specifically, 
Stanislavski might be thought of as uncovering and exploiting the ineluctable 
connection between Dasein and the world to create an inwardly felt sincere 
performance. 
In order to begin exploring the given circumstances of the actor’s being on stage (or 
being in the rehearsal room/training environment) the teacher describes the ‘what if’ 
game with his niece (1980: 58-59). When drinking tea, the girl asks what if it were 
castor oil, and Tortsov recalls the taste of castor oil which brings a reaction in his 
face, thus making her laugh. With Tortsov sitting on a chair, the girl asks what if it 
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were a hot stove and the teacher wails in pain and agony recalling what it is like to 
come in contact with such a hot object making the girl cry. In each case, the teacher 
uses his real surroundings and objects within those surroundings as a fulcrum to the 
imaginary scenario.  
In the next lesson, Tortsov moves to a more general consideration of the 
circumstances of the actor initially beginning with the here and now (1980: 59). In 
gradual steps he suggests justifying how the students would react if the time of day 
were different or if the time of year or the season  were different. In this way he takes 
gradual steps away from the ‘here and now’ towards the world of the play. This 
requires a finely tuned sense of imaginative detail, logic and reasoning to discover 
what actions would be appropriate if the circumstances were to be different. I suggest 
that this is none other than the beginning of an exploration of world itself as a lived 
engagement with the environment. Although Stanislavski does not formally consider 
the question of what the world is, he elaborates on the different relations to the human 
environment that affect the way we interact with our environment. He also notes that 
external changes bring internal changes too (1980: 60) thus stressing the 
interconnectedness of environment and the involved, perceiving subject. 
Perhaps an even stronger example of the exploration of ‘worldhood’ in AP can be 
found in an exercise where Kostya imagines that he is in his house and is able to 
describe the minute details of his room (1980: 60-63). In the imagination exercise, 
Kostya comes to imagine a possible interaction with that ‘there’ – what he is doing in 
his room. The world is the ‘wherein’ humans dwell (aufhalten) and it is crucial that 
Kostya imagine the details together with what his reason for being there is. At a loss 
as to what he should do, Kostya imagines the rather melodramatic or perhaps morbid 
possibility that he go to the closet and try to hang himself. Ultimately, Kostya’s 
imagination dries up because he has failed to imagine a complete world – he is able to 
see the room around him, but not what the purpose of his own being there in that 
place is. In this realisation Kostya learns that being in a world is not just sheer 
materiality or simply ‘the way things look’; it is interaction with the environment, 
involved interaction that is not just for its own sake, but for a purpose. In BT 
Heidegger uses the example of a ‘workshop’ to describe the interactions of Dasein 
with the world, but perhaps one’s own home is an even better example because it is 
the place in which one is ‘familiar’ (1962: H71). 
Heidegger’s compound word ‘Being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-sein) encapsulates the 
idea that the subject cannot be separated from the world it is ‘in’ and denotes the type 
of existence that Dasein has (that separates humans from other ‘mere’ objects, such as 
stones and hammers, for instance) (1962: H53ff). Heidegger posits that this mode of 
Being is the basic state of Dasein and is a unitary phenomenon which must be taken 
as a whole. Nevertheless, analysis of ‘in-the-world’/‘worldhood’, ‘the entity that is in 
the world’ (Dasein), and ‘Being-in’ are all important elements of the investigation 
(1962: H53) while he hopes to keep the totality of the phenomenon in sight. Being-in-
the-world is the basis for the way in which Dasein takes on a definite character and is 
a condition for the possibility of Dasein’s Being at all. Dasein is its Being-in-the-
world. The same thoughts are discovered in Kostya’s imagination exercises: the world 
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is a totality that cannot be separated from the subject; the type of being of the subject 
is not the same as the being there of an object; the proper use of the imagination is 
able to get the whole world in sight through a rigid process of practice and 
preparation. One might well postulate that this totality of worldhood enables the actor 
to present a true and believable performance as opposed to a fragmented and 
unjustified exterior representation. 
In AP Chapter Four on imagination, Tortsov poses the questions: Who am I? Where 
am I? When am I here? Why am I here – what past circumstances have led me to be 
here? What reason am I here for – what I am I trying to do? How shall I go about it? 
(1980: 65-69). These questions suggest an insight into the existential dwelling of 
Dasein within its environment and not simply a spatial understanding of environment. 
The Being-in of the human subject is not merely a geometrical being of an object in 
space, but rather has a kind of Being-in that matters (1962: H54). In the context of 
imagination exercises from this chapter, Stanislavski notes that it is not enough 
simply to notice or imagine mere appearance of objects and the environment. What is 
important is the ability of the environment to stimulate action for the performer: 
a conscious, reasoned approach to the imagination often 
produces a bloodless, counterfeit presentment of life. That 
will not do for the theatre. Our art demands that an actor’s 
whole nature be involved, that he give himself up, both mind 
and body to his part. He must feel the challenge to action 
physically as well as intellectually because the imagination, 
which has no substance or body, can reflexively affect our 
physical nature and make it act (1980: 70). 
Passivity will result in drying up the imagination. There is never a case when the 
environment is simply present-at-hand and no more, but always holds some sort of 
relation to the viewer which can be harnessed for creative purposes. 
Far from understanding the preposition ‘in’ merely in a geometrical sense (as past 
metaphysical systems had erroneously done) or merely as present-at-hand, Heidegger 
argues that it must be understood in an existential sense.41 The ‘in’ of Being-in-the-
world has a different sense from the regular geometric meaning. A chair can be in a 
room or a piece of clothing can be in a cupboard, but this is not the same type of ‘in-
ness’ Dasein has in the world. The in of Being-in-the-world is more akin to dwelling – 
as a person might reside in a home (1962: H54). The word ‘touch’ also provides an 
example of how Dasein can be along-side the world in a sense over and above the 
mere physical location. A chair can touch a wall in a spatial sense, but it is never 
something that can encounter a wall (1962: H56). Yet Dasein sees the world around it 
and can be affected by what it sees; it is much more than physically in space. Part of 
the reason why it can be affected by its environment is that Dasein has practical 
concerns that it is trying to achieve in its being there (1962: H57). Stanislavski can be 
interpreted of as discovering this idea of dwelling in this particular thought in his 
imagination exercises. In fact, his analysis of human activity is precisely in this 
                                                
41 See Heidegger (1962: 89-101) for a criticism of Descartes’ description of world, for instance. 
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existential encounter with the world rather than the mere physical inhabitancy of 
inanimate objects. 
So instead of being a mere thing with the same type of Being as stones and trees, 
Dasein can only be understood in terms of the question ‘who?’ (wer?) as a person 
rather than a ‘what?’ (was?) as a thing (1962: H131). As will be elaborated below, 
Dasein is not merely in a world of objects, either as mere things, or even as equipment 
to be used. Dasein is there with others who have the same type of Being as itself 
(1962: H118) These others are essential to Dasein’s existential in-ness. There are 
three fundamental elements of Dasein’s particular Being-in. First, Dasein always has 
a ‘State-of-mind’ (Befindlichkeit) – the state in which one may be found – which 
includes ‘moods’ and ‘Being-attuned’. Second, Dasein also has an understanding 
(Verständnis) and Interpretation which actually precede any verbal articulation or 
assertion and are borne out of its behaviour as evidence of these preceding any action 
(1962: 133ff). Thirdly, Discourse (Rede) is the condition that allows us to 
communicate with one another and talk about the world (1962: H161ff). Rather than 
the cognitive or psychological senses of State-of-mind and understanding, Heidegger 
uses these as existential terms. Understanding and State-of-mind are ways in which 
Dasein can have a relationship to the possibilities of its own existence. The point is 
that Being-in includes much more than the sheer materiality or presence of an object, 
but already includes the totality of Being-in-the-world. 
For Heidegger, there are several different ways to understand the meaning of ‘world’. 
It could mean: the totality of things, the being of a multiplicity of things for any realm 
(i.e. the world of the mathematician), the wherein an entity might be said to live 
(public and private), or ‘worldhood’: the condition for possibility of anything having a 
world at all (1962: H64-5). For Heidegger, the world is what allows us to come across 
entities at all. We can describe the way that things look, or give an account of their 
occurrences, but this still misses something of their Being (1962: H63). ‘Things’ are 
what we encounter in the world, but it is not merely enough to describe them in terms 
of Nature (as a natural scientist would do, for instance) or presuppose objective Being 
in any sense because this misses out the phenomenon of world which we are trying to 
get at in an existential sense (1962: H65). The strange thing about the phenomenon of 
world is that it has constantly been passed over (in the history of Western 
philosophy). But Heidegger claims that there is a reason why it has been overlooked, 
and that has to do with the very nature of Being. Dasein has a tendency of falling, and 
Being decays over time. 
I suggest that the most profoundly (Heideggerian) phenomenological aspect of 
Stanislavski’s thinking is that it does not emphasise knowing as the fundamental way 
in which humans relate to the world.
42
 Knowing-that or propositional knowledge is 
but one aspect of the creative process for Stanislavski. Only through work on the 
physical, mental and spiritual can the actor achieve the holistic understanding of 
Being required for acting as an art.  Part of the mistake of metaphysics is that it took 
                                                
42‘Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its own-most kind of being gets 
lead astray, and accordingly Being-in-the-world must be exhibited even more precisely with regard to 
knowing the world, and must itself be made visible as an existential modality of Being-in’ (1962: H59). 
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knowing to be the fundamental relation between the subject and the world (1962: 
H60-62). To be sure, knowing is one possible way of Being that Dasein has, but 
Heidegger thinks that it is not as fundamental as Being-in-the-world. Knowing is one 
way to be in the world. In this mode, seeing (as perception) takes a priority such that 
Being gets overlooked (again, this is the mistake of metaphysics) (1962: H61). So, 
describing the way that things look – the way they are present-at-hand became what 
philosophers understood as the Being of things. There is much more to this Being-in 
which I will discuss below. 
During every moment on stage, during every moment of the 
development of the action of the play, we must be aware 
either of the external circumstances which surround us (the 
whole material setting of the production), or of an inner 
chain of circumstances which we ourselves have imagined in 
order to illustrate our parts (Stanislavski 1980: 63-64). 
Tortsov indicates that it is indeed difficult to get a whole world onto the stage and not 
just fragmented images from sense-memory or imagination. He uses the metaphor of 
running images together like a piece of film (1980: 64). In the end, truthful acting for 
Stanislavski is a matter of practice, experience and consistent concentration of 
attention. Such rigor will present a coherent totality rather than the fragmented flashes 
of inspiration that Kostya had hit upon in his opening exhibition. Later, Stanislavski 
goes on to include the many different elements of his psycho-technique which need to 
be woven together in order to create the actor in the part, driven by an inward source 
to action in a logical and coherent way (1980: 120-21). As Heidegger will go on to 
consider later in BT, time is not something experienced as broken and isolated 
instances run together disparately and in isolation, but rather as a coherent whole 
(1962: H334ff).
43
 The need for cohesion and consistency in the actor’s art stretches 
not only to the imaginary life of the character being portrayed, but also has a double 
in real life and creative observation of the actor. On the one hand, Tortsov suggests 
exercises for stimulating the imaginative life pertaining to the character, yet at the 
same time the actor needs to continue work on their own self in order to develop the 
capacity to do so. 
Stanislavski never explicitly questions the constitution of the world or the 
philosophical problem of what a world is because he was primarily interested in 
action and the utility of theoretical aids in the creative process. In his practical 
exercises, he highlights the experience of being in a world and using that experience 
to construct a believable and truthful performance. But in his fascination with 
preparing a role he is interested in world-creating or as he puts it at the end of AP ‘the 
creation of a “new being” – the person in the part’ (1980: 312). So while he did not 
set about determining the conditions for the possibility of the real world, he was 
interested in filling out as many aspects of the imaginary so as to maintain interest and 
supply the subconscious with material for creation. Again, his emphasis on action for 
                                                
43 Stanislavski also notes the unity of temporal experience later in his discussion of units and objectives 
and the line of your life: ‘If you join this line with the one that has gone before you, you will create one 
whole unbroken line that flows from the past, through the present into the future, from the moment you 
wake in the morning until you close your eyes at night’ (1980: 256, italics from Hapgood’s translation). 
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a purpose highlighted human interaction with the environment as revealing of the 
world and objects within that world. 
The World Around Us: Objects and Spatiality 
Apart from approaching the concept of worldhood in general (exercises of 
imagination, concentration of attention and physical training undertaken by the class 
in AP) Tortsov also considers specific objects in the environment. Stanislavski focuses 
on the connection between the actor and objects within that world both in the 
imagination and in the real surroundings of the theatre. Tortsov gives special attention 
to the way that things we perceive in our environment are revealed to us, and more 
specifically, how we can give attention to those objects, to build up a storehouse of 
experiences and perceptions that are useful in the creative process (AP Chapter Five, 
‘Concentration of Attention’). Attention to objects needs to be practiced and 
developed: ‘It becomes requisite to learn anew to look at things on the stage and to 
see them’ (1980: 75). Space is also key to the actor’s being on stage, so the physical 
exercises, dance and gymnastic classes, fencing lessons and other aspects of the total 
actor’s training are key to giving an embodied experience of being in space and the 
ability to manipulate and control the body for the purposes of artistic practice (Merlin 
2003: 46). Space is also crucial to developing the attention of the actor in the scene 
and the ability to maintain a consistency in their own performance that is the creation 
of world. Objects in the environment and space around are discovered in a very 
special way when Stanislavski investigates them with respect to the art of acting. 
Actors experience space in a peculiarly phenomenological way. 
In one of the most intriguing exercises in AP, Tortsov asks Paul, one of the students, 
to imagine himself as a tree (1980: 65-69). The teacher deliberately picks a passive 
theme because at this stage he is interested in developing the imagination of the actors 
without necessarily being distracted by actions. Paul chooses to be an oak tree on the 
Alps and after some prompting by the teacher (using the questions outlined above) 
pictures an old castle nearby, the rustling of leaves and a bird’s nest in his branches. 
When asked to do the same exercise, Leo takes the uninspired choice (according to 
Kostya) of being a tree near a cottage in a park. But Leo needs help in imagining the 
details of his scene. Tortsov explains that with practice, the imagination will develop 
in attending to details. If returned to many times, these imagined worlds will become 
more vivid and leave a lasting imprint and impression on the actor. 
In the next lesson, Paul has a more vivid imaginary experience of place, being able to 
hear cowbells, the munching of cows and the gossip of women in the nearby fields. 
Then the teacher prompts the student to imagine the time of the scene, its historical 
age. Paul chooses the medieval period and imagines festivals taking place nearby. He 
constructs a story of a baron in the castle who had cut down the forest which used to 
surround the tree for fear of being attacked by a hostile neighbour. In searching for a 
theme that excites the interest of the student, Tortsov finds that Paul is very much 
stimulated by the prospect of a fight. So in the suggestion that there is an ensuing 
battle, Paul elicits a strong impetus to action, though he is unable to protect his 
branches from the flying arrows. The point of the exercise, according to the teacher is 
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that these imaginative details of space (or place, we might say) help to springboard 
the desire for creativity and action (1980: 67). 
This exercise reveals not only the actor’s relation to the rich world of experience 
conjured up in the imagination, but also an intimate relation to objects within that 
environment. Paul dreams up an old castle nearby which stems off thoughts of 
medieval festivals and gossiping women. Leo has trouble with the detail of his tree in 
a cottage park, in particular the pattern of a steel fence surrounding the cottage. The 
historical period imagined in the scene affects how the actors relate to their 
environment indicating that the world is bound up in historical and temporal 
circumstances. The vividness of individual objects comes to life when the totality of 
the scene is developed more and more though practice. The objects in the 
environment are never isolated simply in their material properties (what Heidegger 
calls the present-at-hand). The actors cannot be concerned with mere appearances of 
objects, but rather in their relation to the whole (imagined world or scene) and the 
activity of the perceiver. In the battle that springs from Paul’s imagination, the castle 
becomes a threat. The owner of the castle defends his property and a shower of arrows 
rains down on the tree. Paul is able to do nothing about it because of the passivity of 
his imagined object – a tree. Yet Tortsov is interested in the stimulation brought about 
by imaginative engagement with this object. Objects thus reveal themselves in the 
environment in relation to the viewer. In this case, relation is one of danger because of 
the shower of arrows from the nearby castle. 
Stanislavski notes that in regular life, we have a tendency to overlook the details of 
our surroundings. This deficiency is a threat to the creative potency of the actor’s 
imagination. So, at the end of Chapter Four, Tortsov challenges the students to return 
to their imaginations to recall whether it is cold outside. He wants the students to 
avoid mechanically answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to his questions. He wants them to 
remember how others on the street were wrapped up, how the snow crunched under 
foot (1980: 71). Rather than overlook the experiences of the world and particular 
objects within that world (the snow, the clothes of other people for example), 
Stanislavski challenges actors to reflect with a heightened awareness on different 
ways that we encounter the world and to build up a repertoire of memories and 
sensations which can be used as a resource for creativity. The objects of these 
imaginative experiences can only ever be encountered in relation to the totality of the 
actor’s imaginative world. 
In the context of creating a role or a scene, there is no sense in simply describing mere 
physical properties of objects in the environment. Things are never simply there in 
their materiality around the actor whether on stage or in an imaginary scene; they 
always have a relationship to the creative imagination of the actor. In fact, 
Stanislavski even thinks that actors need to learn to see again – to get past the 
familiarity with which we interact with the world and notice aspects of the 
environment that are overlooked in everyday life: 
Remember this: of all the acts, even the simplest, which are 
so familiar to us in everyday life, become strained when we 
appear behind the footlights before the public of a thousand 
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people. That is why it is necessary to correct ourselves and 
learn again how to walk, move about, sit or lie down. It is 
essential to re-educate ourselves to look and see on the stage, 
to listen and hear (1980: 77). 
In phenomenological terms, the way of looking is the process of ‘reduction’: trying to 
attend to things as they are. Such a way of looking brackets off previous knowledge 
brought to the situation. Ultimately for Heidegger, pure objectivity is impossible 
because the observer is always involved in some activity or another. This is true of 
any Dasein whether looking down the barrel of a microscope or building a house, for 
example. We never experience things merely as present-at-hand – the objective 
materiality of a thing devoid of any relationship to other objects or the perceiver. We 
only ever come across things in our environment in the context of involved activity.
44
 
The Being of those things that we use in our work, for instance, is where those things 
are ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden).45 Whilst the world generally recedes from 
consciousness and the involved subject in practical activity, Stanislavski reveals how 
the human organism also has the capacity for imagination – to perceive possibilities – 
how things might be. Strictly, he thinks that the creation of art is not about positing 
scientific truths about the world and showing how things are in reality, but coming up 
with a true belief that if the given circumstances were such then things might be so 
and so.
46
 Ultimately, this can be understood as a kind of existential seeing – more than 
just mere objects in the environment, but perceiving the Being of things in their 
possibilities. In the actor’s case, it is the possibility of action on stage. Humans also 
have the ability for reflection upon the nature of the world itself. However, that 
reflection is never from an objective, eternal point of view, but always as a subject 
involved in the world. For Stanislavski, it is a matter of perceiving the existential 
possibilities of a certain set of given circumstances which allows artistic creativity. 
It is one thing to train the imagination and power of observation in our engaged 
activity in the world, but it is another matter entirely putting this resource to use when 
in the theatre. According to Tortsov, the darkened auditorium and unnatural setting of 
the stage tend to strain away the natural engagement with the world that humans have 
in everyday life. The problem is that when the curtain is raised, the auditorium opens 
up as a black void drawing the actors’ attention from the scene. In this way, the real 
circumstances and the imaginary life of the characters become lost to distraction 
(1980: 72). Not even a scene with a lot of drama and tragedy can hold the attention of 
the actors in training (1980: 73-4). Yet when the director asks the actors which one of 
them has lost a shoe heel, they become involved in the task of finding out. In such an 
involvement, they become oblivious to the fact that Tortsov’s assistant had just come 
into the auditorium to get him to sign some papers. This event shows how engrossed a 
                                                
44 ‘The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited 
phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our 
dealings in the world and with entities within-the-world’ (1962: H67) 
45 ‘The kind of Being which equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we 
call readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]’ (1962: H69). 
46 Consequently, in ordinary life, truth is what really exists, what a person really knows. Whereas on 
the stage it consists of something that is not actually in existence but which could happen  (Stanislavski 
1980: 128). 
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person becomes in a real activity, to the point that they may miss what is happening in 
their environment. The challenge seems to be finding a way to keep the actors 
interested in what is happening on stage: 
In real life there are always plenty of objects that fix our 
attention, but conditions in the theatre are different, and 
interfere with an actor’s living normally, so that an effort to 
fix attention becomes necessary. It becomes requisite to learn 
anew to look at things on the stage, and to see them (1980: 
75). 
Rather than trying to strip back the act of looking to a sheer objectivity, Stanislavski 
moves in the other direction towards strengthening the connection between the 
observer and the object. When acting something out on stage, there is a breakdown in 
the regular way that we encounter things in the environment. Ultimately this is 
because they are not being put to a real use. At the same time, Tortsov wants to 
exploit the way that objects in the real environment can be put to use in their 
involvement in the creative process. So Tortsov aims to get the actors in his class to 
engage in that imaginative relationship with object and discover aspects that will 
stimulate the creative capacities of the actor. Actor training and preparation for a role 
is also a process of making the world of the stage and the world of the imagination 
familiar. Initially, this means breaking down the way that we experience the world in 
ways that may seem awkward and unnatural. But the teacher claims that with practice, 
this examination of the connectedness of things in the environment and the actor’s 
own Being will become second nature and stimulate creative action on the stage. 
Heidegger points out the idiosyncrasy of the word ‘equipment’ (das Zeug) in that it 
does not really have a singular form on its own (1962: H68). The same is true of the 
English –  you can’t have ‘an equipment’ (you would have to add in the word ‘piece’ 
or ‘item’ to make the phrase grammatically correct). Equipment already refers to the 
totality of items that go in to make the tools for a particular task. As mentioned, we do 
not encounter objects in the environment as stripped of this equipmental context, but 
rather as things available for use in our work within that environment. This type of 
encounter with objects has the type of Being that Heidegger calls the ready-to-hand. 
We grab things and we use them, like a hammer, to make a plank of wood fast (1962: 
H69). While at work in the workshop, for example, we have a particular type of 
seeing that we engage – what Heidegger calls ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht).47 We look 
around for objects in our environment that we can put to use, and use them for a 
specific task. The other strange thing about equipment – things that we experience in 
our environment – is that they are for the most part invisible. Mostly, we don’t even 
see the objects we are using because we are too busy using them. Objects do become 
visible when our work is prevented in some way – something gets in the way of 
completing a task, something is missing, something is broken. At these times, the 
objects become apparent in their stark materialness because of the fact that they are 
                                                
47 ‘Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the “in-order-to”, 
and the sight with which they accommodate themselves is circumspection’ (1962: H69). In other 
words, we look around us for objects which help us with action for a purpose. 
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not working in the way that they should. Heidegger thinks that these deficient modes 
reveal something about the Being of those things. When equipment is in breakdown, 
the equipmental whole becomes apparent because it means the task cannot be 
completed. This equipment context is useful in describing the theatre world too. 
What the actors find when they go up on stage is that the regular use-contexts and 
daily activities that bring meaning to objects that surround them are missing. Not only 
do the objects loose their capacity for completing a particular task (a broken or 
missing hammer, for example), they actually fail to have any equipmental context in 
the first place. So for Tortsov, the task to manufacture a world of concern in which the 
character is operating lies ahead. This is done with much practice and attention to all 
of the tasks, goals and activities that we take for granted in everyday life. Ultimately, 
this rests in finding out what the actor and character are doing at any particular point 
in the performance and carefully preparing each action so that it contains the fullness 
of activity in real life while invested with an artistic quality as part of the work as a 
whole. Stanislavski’s emphasis on ‘action for a purpose’ thus highlights a 
fundamental characteristic of human involvement with the environment. 
According to Heidegger the world rarely becomes visible in its relation-structure. 
Tortsov’s concentration of attention exercises however, highlight those relations 
especially in their ability to feed and stimulate the imagination and creative action. 
(Anxiety, for example, as a State-of-mind reveals the uncanniness of the world devoid 
of relations (1962: H184ff). What we find here is that the structure of the world is also 
revealed in the creative process of the actor.) 
When asked simply to look at an object – an embroidered cloth with a striking design 
– the members of the class strain to the point that it seems as though their eyes are 
going to pop out of their sockets (1980: 77). The director points out the contorted 
faces of the students and, eventually, they settle down to just looking at the cloth. 
There is a difference between looking and imitating looking and Tortsov asks the 
class members to note the difference themselves. 
Then the teacher returns to a light demonstration to depict the way in which the 
inexperienced actor focuses attention on the stage. Lights flash in a scattered way 
across the auditorium. Kostya notes that this was similar to his scattered attention at 
the opening exhibition of his scene from Othello (1980: 79). Then a strong light 
comes from the auditorium – an imaginary theatre critic who is there to review the 
show. And a dim light, the partner of one of the actors who is being passed over for 
attention. 
The point of the exercise of just looking at the embroidered cloth shows that there is 
no such thing as pure seeing devoid of any involvement – the objective scientific 
eye.
48
 Heidegger’s term ‘circumspection’ covers this idea that when we look towards 
our environment, we are looking for ways in which to use objects that surround us. 
This term is apt for accounting for Tortsov’s exercise in class to find a way of looking 
                                                
48 ‘Intensive observation of an object naturally arouses a desire to do something with it. To do 
something with it in turn intensifies your observation of it. This mutual inter-action establishes a 
stronger contact with the object of your attention’ (1980: 76). 
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that is real rather than staged, external or strained as the class members fall into. Part 
of the problem with this lack of interest or concern for objects in the environment is 
that the actors are not able to sustain concentration upon those objects for very long. 
So the light display depicts the scattered attention of the actors who are unable to 
locate what it is that they are doing in the scene – what they are looking at and for 
what purpose. The temptation is to shower attention on those in the audience the 
actors are trying to impress, while neglecting other people who are there. In this case, 
the actor’s fellow performers on stage are not deemed so important. The problem with 
this wavering attention over to the auditorium side of the proscenium is that 
inexperienced actors start to forget what it is that they are doing on stage and thus fail 
to live through the part. 
Next, the director helps the class members develop ‘circles of attention’ in order to 
strengthen their attention to different regions of the stage and scene (1980: 81-85). In 
these exercises, Stanislavski is uncovering the concept of space as Heidegger explains 
it – not as mere geometrical co-ordinates, but as areas within the lived human world 
that are illuminated and discovered because of the involved human activity of the 
actors. First, Kostya has a lamp shining above his head illuminating a nearby desk and 
a number of different objects upon it. Everything else is in darkness as the lamp 
makes a neat circle dividing the light from the dark. This is the smallest circle. 
Kostya’s head and hands are at the centre of the light. Kostya describes how this set-
up made him feel very alone and even more comfortable than when he was in his own 
room at home. The director calls this mood ‘solitude in public’ (1980: 82) The teacher 
then places a larger light on the stage, this time taking in several other pieces of 
furniture and students sitting around the stage – the medium circle. And finally an 
even larger light which took in the whole room of the set on stage – the largest circle. 
Kostya notices that the larger the light, the less defined the edges are to the 
illuminated area and the more difficult it is to take in all of the objects within that 
light at once. Then taking a step further in the exercise, the students are required to 
create their own imaginary circles of attention with the lights on. The teacher suggests 
that if their concentration fails, they should go back to a smaller circle in order to 
regain their attention. In a few final adjustments, the teacher suggests a circle where 
the actor is not the centre of the lighted area. In this case, the actor becomes an 
observer of an external object. And finally, the director gets a spotlight to follow 
Kostya around the stage, thus showing that the circle need not be static, but moves 
with the actor around the stage (and perhaps even in real life). 
These concentration of attention exercises show that both objects and space around us 
are revealed through involved practical activity. Kostya even notices that it is easier to 
concentrate on objects which are nearby rather than those at a distance. This may be 
explained by a phenomenon of Daseinwhich , according to Heidegger, has a tendency 
towards drawing things near, making them close – in the technical term, 
‘deseverance’ – literally, taking the farness away from a thing (1962: H105). 
Heidegger thinks that we have the ability to ‘give things space’ or let them be 
encountered in our practical dealings. We can also discover regions of space because 
we might expect to find objects there. (1962: H103) (For example, the space of the 
wall becomes starkly visible to me because the hammer that I was expecting to find 
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there is missing.) So space, like objects within space, becomes visible in certain 
circumstances relative to our practical involvement with it. As an aside, we also 
discover ‘directionality’ – left, right, up and down – not merely as a system of 
difference, but also relative to practical activity within an environment – in the ‘lived 
world’ if we can put it that way (1962: H108). 
The lived human experience of space and objects within space is key to the following 
exercise. The director investigates the way in which space and environment can 
stimulate the emotional, creative interest of the actors (1980: 89). Kostya is asked to 
look at a chandelier but is unable to fix his attention for very long. Tortsov suggests 
an emotional engagement with the thing rather than simply an intellectual or rational 
approach. When was the chandelier made? Did it date back to the days of the 
emperor? In other words, actors should dig into their own imaginations in order to 
draw out an interest in the objects around, thus stimulating a real and inward spring to 
action, in this case looking. At first, of course, it is difficult for the untrained actor to 
concentrate on so many aspects of the craft at once. The teacher realises that they 
must simultaneously manage to hit their cues, attend to the techniques, their part, the 
audience and so on. But with time and practice, Tortsov claims that the attention will 
develop in the actor and allow a much firmer grasp of their overall task (1980: 89-90). 
Again, the role of the actor is in learning to see again. This is not merely perceiving 
material objects, but in engaging with the total human organism and the lived 
experience of the imaginary life of the character. 
This special type of seeing developed by the actor should not look merely with the 
absent-minded attention of a passer-by, but penetratingly. Tortsov explains that 
concentration is something that needs to be developed. Such development will 
include: grasping facial movements, look of the eye, tone of voice; observing the 
beautiful side of nature and the darker side; looking at human creation in art; using the 
imagination to stimulate creative activity; observing the intangible things in life 
(1980: 92). These are parts of life that are only internally perceivable. The teacher 
explains that it is not easy to see someone’s inmost being, because rarely do people 
open up their souls. By training and observation, one can get closer to intuiting 
another’s soul. But he goes on to note that we can’t reduce this study of the psychic 
life of others to a scientific technique. Because the human subject is largely immersed 
in activity within the world, rarely does the world itself become visible, except 
perhaps in circumstances where it breaks down. At the same time, the theatre seems to 
have an uncanny ability to highlight objects in their Being because they are not just 
there – but because the actor (and audience) is invited to ponder the significance of 
their being there. 
What is also interesting in Stanislavski’s exposition of attention and imagination is the 
language he uses to describe it. Heidegger also uses metaphors of ‘light’, of ‘grasp’ 
and of ‘seeing’ to describe different aspects of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. The 
similarity between these respective descriptions of the artistic process of discovery 
and the uncovering of truth is revealing. In the theatre of course, this involves the 
actual lighting of things, seeing of surroundings and grasping of objects. Later in his 
writing, Heidegger talks of the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung) of Being which seems to resonate 
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with the image of the actor who carries a circle of attention with her wherever she 
goes. In Stanislavski’s case, it is literally ‘bringing to light’. Of course, for Heidegger 
this was not meant simply in the context of perceiving but Being as if we were to 
stumble upon it in a clearing in the woods. I argue that the theatre is such a clearing in 
the forest. By reading Stanislavski through Heidegger’s notion of uncovering truth, 
one might note that he was not content with a material explanation of the world. Truth  
about what cannot be seen is thus uncovered in the artistic process. And Stanislavski 
also reached for a language to talk about souls, spirit, communion and rays. 
As mentioned above, it is not possible to think of Dasein as a ‘what’ and get a hold of 
the totality of its Being or get at what it really is (even though past philosophical 
approaches have tried to go down that route and eventually landed at a dead end). 
Heidegger is interested in finding out what the there is of the Being-there of Dasein. 
This Being is not closed off from the world (as the sceptic might accuse the idealist of 
solipsism) but rather the world is always already disclosed to us in advance. Dasein is 
a type of clearing in the world in such a way that it allows things to be illuminated and 
appear as they are. Dasein is its disclosedness (1962: H133). 
Dividing the World Up: Involvement and Understanding 
In approaching a role, Stanislavski’s ideal actor will be able to break down individual 
actions within a scene and show how those are related to the over-all scene and play.
49
 
In such analysis, the actor might be seen as uncovering the ‘involvement’ of objects 
within the environment – what (ready-to-hand) things are used for, the structure of 
equipment as such – as well as how both actor and character relate to those 
involvements. Ultimately, the performer becomes part of this over-all structure of use. 
The role of the actor is within the signifying context of the theatre mechanism as a 
whole. The character is also assigned to the world of performance – their actions are 
worked out in the context of the given circumstances and what they are trying to 
achieve through their actions. Most of this interpretative work is done in relation to 
textual analysis and preparation of the play itself, by developing an understanding of 
the role and its internal logic. We should, perhaps beware of over-intellectualising the 
whole process, however. By the end of his career, Stanislavski emphasised working 
on one’s feet to analyse a role. His method involved a process of improvisation where 
actors had their lines fed to them by the production manager (Merlin 2003: 33).  
Considering the bi-focal task of the actor, Stanislavski suggests that any play needs to 
be divided up by the actor preparing for a role. First, the actor should get an overall 
sense of the direction and action of the work (1980: 114). Nevertheless, Tortsov states 
to the class that it is impossible simply to apprehend all of the play, the role and the 
actions of the character in one go. Instead, it is necessary to divide up the action into 
‘bits’ (units) and the creative objective of what the actor is doing in each of those 
places (objectives) (1980: 116-21). Kostya also uses this model to analyse units in his 
own life – he counts each part of his journey home to bed, for instance (1980: 112-
13). 
                                                
49 See especially AP Chapter Seven, ‘Units and Objectives’, Chapter Thirteen ‘The Unbroken Line’ and 
Chapter Fifteen, ‘The Super-objective’. 
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In considering a play such as Othello, Kostya is overwhelmed by the many thousands 
of bits that the play could be divided into and wonders how an actor could possibly 
get at them all (1980: 113). Tortsov reassures the student explaining that he need not 
remember every single one, but rather stick to the ‘channel’ of the part – a kind of 
flowing through of action in order to steer individual actions at any one point. The bad 
actor will focus on the results of these actions, rather than working out the creative 
objectives of each bit. The danger is also to tend towards the audience and indulge in 
exhibitionism, thus detracting from the action of the character and inward life of the 
role. In analysing a simple action such as a handshake, the teacher breaks the action 
down into its elements: the mechanical action itself – the physical act; a rudimentary 
psychological action – e.g. shaking a hand in order to show gratitude; and a 
psychological action – e.g. shaking a hand to apologise for something (1980: 119-21).  
Heidegger’s claim that the world is only discoverable through our involved activities 
is apparent in this analysis of different specific actions in this way. Generally, the 
structure of that involvement lies hidden because we are just involved in ‘doing 
stuff’.
50
 The Being of equipment is such that each item is related to the totality (1962: 
H83-88). So, for instance, the hammer is involved in hammering, the chair for sitting, 
the stone in making concrete. Hammers are for making things fast and for protection 
against bad weather. Ultimately these are for the sake of Dasein itself. If we didn’t 
have roofs above our heads, then we would perish in the environment. So the structure 
of involvements of a hammer is ultimately for the sake of Dasein’s own Being (1962: 
H84). Dasein’s Being also ‘frees’ objects to be discovered in the environment. They 
are also discovered in their involvements (Bewandtnis). 
Dasein already understands the world in which it lives because it is involved with 
practical activities. That understanding is guided by Dasein’s own possibilities of 
Being. Dasein is already familiar with the world and ‘assigns itself’ to the worldhood 
of the world (1962: H86). In such familiarity with the world in which it dwells, 
Dasein understands (verstehen) the significance of objects around it and knows how 
to use them (or at least the possibility that they might be used). In this context, Dasein 
already has an understanding (Verständnis) of its own Being. This familiarity with the 
world is precisely why Stanislavski’s actors are not able to repeat simple actions on 
stage. They are largely unaware of their understanding of the world and it is not 
largely explicit. Dasein also stands ‘in submission’ (Angewiesenheit) to the world 
because the world hands over the possibilities for Dasein’s own existence (1962: 
H87). The important point to reiterate is that Dasein never encounters the world 
simply as present-at-hand but rather goes through the ready-to-hand to discover 
qualities and properties of objects (approximating the present-at-hand, though never 
truly so).
51
 One might read this submission to the world as the given circumstances 
                                                
50 ‘If such possibilities of Being for Dasein can be exhibited within its concernful dealings, then the 
way lies open for studying the phenomenon which is thus lit up, and attempting to “hold it at bay”, as it 
were, and to interrogate it as to those structures which show themselves therein’ (Heidegger 1962: 
H72). 
51 ‘Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering 
entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, 
and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves’ (1962: H87). 
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both of a play and the actor’s real situation on the stage. 
Although it comes much later in AP, the super-objective is related to the overall flow 
of the units and objectives of this kind of analysis (1980: 271ff). The teacher looks at 
various authors and tries to draw out what the over-all purpose of their writing is. 
Chekhov, for instance is concerned with the triviality of bourgeois life, Tolstoy the 
struggle for self-perfection, or Dostoyevsky the life-long search for God (1980: 271). 
These large actions are manifest in the specificity of individual units of a play or 
story. The same is true of the actor’s art as it is for authors and playwrights. In a play, 
the minor movements, imaginative thoughts, feelings and actions of a plot help to add 
to the overall super-objective of the plot. If the super-objective is theatrical, it will 
only approximate the right direction. If it is fully human then it will add to the life of 
the play and the actors. Tortsov tells the story of an actress who used to act through 
inspiration and spontaneity and then took on a system of acting but soon found it to be 
dry and unpleasing to the audience (1980: 274-75). It happened that she did not 
understand the totality of the system – the through line of action – like breaking up a 
beautiful marble statue into bits without getting the overall effect. Each bit of the play 
should be headed in a coherent way towards the super-objective. After close attention 
to the way the parts fit into the whole of the play, the actress was able to play with 
great success. 
We might say that ultimately the super-objective is the Being of the role. This Being 
is difficult to grasp in its entirety, though through working out the individual moments 
of the part with respect to the possibilities available at that time (both for actor and 
character), the actor can actively create that Being and its world. At the end of the 
chapter on the super-objective, Kostya expresses his disappointment (1980: 279-80). 
He has come so far in his learning: he is comfortable on the stage, he acts for a 
purpose, he believes in what he is doing there. Yet still, Kostya yearns for the elusive 
quality of inspiration that defies practical construction. Tortsov rebukes the student, 
saying that he should concentrate on what is within his control and leave inspiration 
alone much to the disappointment of his young actor. 
The director suggests that the students look within themselves in order to find a super-
objective that is harmonious both to the play set down by the playwright and to their 
own sense of creative development (1980: 276-279).
52
 In this moment of artistic self-
reflection, Stanislavski also contemplates the Being of the actor: some devote 
themselves to the poetic rendering of parts, others who use their own success to 
convey their own thoughts and feelings (1980: 307-08). One night, Tortsov is 
reminded of the importance of his art, when he sees people freezing on the streets of 
St Petersburg, waiting for tickets to a show (1980: 308). In light of this grand purpose, 
he thinks it is important not to get bogged down in personal problems and entangled 
in difficulties that are not our own. The Being of an actor, for Stanislavski, is artistic 
creativity and this is the involvement structure to which the actor is assigned when 
they are on stage, living through the part. 
                                                
52 ‘What we need is a super-objective which is in harmony with the intentions of the playwright and at 
the same time arouses a response in the soul of the actors. That means that we must search fro it not 
only in the play but in the actors themselves’ (1980: 301). 
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There are three elements of Being-in according to Heidegger: (1) Understanding 
(Verständnis), (2) State-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) and (3) Discourse (Rede) (1962: 
H133).
53
 Heidegger identifies these three different aspects of the unique way that 
Dasein is in the world. Dasein understands the world in which it lives. It always has a 
State-of-mind – a way in which it finds itself. Dasein also lives within a discourse – it 
is able to convey and communicate things about the world. Understanding in this 
sense should not be mistaken for a cognitive description of a mind understanding that 
which is external to it. Heidegger thinks that in our very Being-in-the-world we 
already have an understanding of that world. He notes that the German word for 
understanding also means being able to manage something, thus highlighting the 
practical way that we understand the world. (1962: H143) Understanding is therefore 
being able to do something – competency for a task. So in becoming involved in 
practical activity at all, Dasein already has an understanding available. The art of 
acting can be seen as deeply involved in excavating the world-understanding of both 
the actor and character. 
But Dasein is not merely another object in its environment. Dasein understands both 
itself and the world as possibilities.54 When looking around, Dasein does not just see 
the way that things are, but rather in its practical concern sees how they might be. It is 
understanding that frees things in the environment to be discovered as they are in their 
very Being (1962: H144). It was hinted above that Dasein already arrives in a world 
which is largely decided for it. The structures of involvements are already there and to 
a great extent, the possibilities available to Dasein are ‘handed over’ to it by the 
environment. Heidegger calls this ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit). In certain instances, 
Dasein can also be an active element in the choices that it makes – it can project 
(entwerfen) itself onto itself out of the possibilities that are available (1962: H145). 
This becomes important later because Dasein is not just an actuality, it is rather what 
is not yet and what might be. The working out of possibilities might well be seen in 
the improvisation exercises throughout AP. They are aimed at fostering the creative 
impulse to action which is not boring, tired or ossified in mechanical action, but rather 
deeply enmeshed in this structure of the not-yet. 
Understanding also has its own kind of sight. In this existential kind of sight, Dasein 
does not see things in the environment, but rather possibilities for its own Being 
(1962: H146). Ultimately, this kind of sight is also the means by which Dasein can 
have an understanding of the meaning of Being in general. The development of 
understanding is what Heidegger calls ‘Interpretation’ (Auslegung) (1962: H148). 
Understanding becomes itself. Interpretation is not adding something new to its 
object, but rather showing itself as it is. One might well interpret what is being 
explored in Stanislavski’s units, objectives and super-objective as different aspects of 
understanding.  It is not a matter of artificially bringing something new to a part or 
play, but rather letting what is already there in the play and in the actor’s own life 
combine and become what they are. This may be interpreted as the crux of 
                                                
53 I will discuss the first two here in relation to Stanislavski, but leave the third – Discourse – for the 
next chapter on Artaud. 
54 ‘Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a 
way that this Being discloses  in itself what its Being is capable of” (1962: 44). 
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Stanislavski’s sense of artistic and creative truth. 
The development of the actors’ connection with the real and imaginary world of the 
play is a strengthening of this kind of sight which is able to open up possibilities of 
action on the stage. The crucial point for this thesis on acting as manual philosophy is 
that understanding is not necessarily a knowing in the sense of a conscious set of 
propositions about the world or state of affairs, but is also perceived in involved 
activity within the world. The actor’s knowing is not a theoretical and detached 
knowing of something as present at hand, but rather an existential knowing and 
exploration of the possibilities of existence. 
How we are: State-of-mind 
Stanislavski realises the immense complexity in human interaction with the world 
around. Tortsov’s exercises can be seen as revealing that we are not mere objects with 
no concern for the way we are, but rather engaged entities involved within that world. 
Part of the problem is that we are not mere data-receiving perceptual machines. 
Humans are also always emotionally involved in the world because it matters. In fact, 
as we will see in the next section, the world around does not consist of mere objects. 
There are others there with us with the same kind of care for the environment and 
their own Being that we have. The problem of emotion in acting and the extent of 
emotional involvement in a character has been a long problem in discourses on acting 
at least since Diderot (1957) who formulated the paradox of how an actor could be 
both emotionally involved and yet detached so as to be controlling their own actions. 
The complexity with which we understand both our own emotional involvement and 
the emotional states of others is well observed when Tortsov says: 
Average people have no conception of how to observe the 
facial expression, the look of the eye, the tone of the voice in 
order to comprehend the state of mind of the persons with 
whom they talk. They can neither actively grasp the complex 
truths of life nor listen in a way to understand what they 
hear. If they could, life, for them, would be easier, and their 
creative work immeasurably richer, finer and deeper (1980: 
92). 
Again, the over-arching theme of Tortsov’s course is in getting the students to see the 
world again, as it were, with an eye to analysing actions in real life and being able to 
perform them on stage as part of the artistic process. And part of that seeing involves 
a kind of emotional attunement or awareness of how humans relate to the 
environment and others within it. 
The difficult artificiality of the stage environment mentioned in the last section 
(concentration of attention exercises) can be overcome by the ability of the actor to 
maintain a freshness to performance each time the actor carries out a scene. One 
technique is to introduce new imaginative suppositions into a scene so as to maintain 
the actor’s interest. But even in such an emotionally charged scenario as the one 
where there is a madman at the door, the actors find that they simply retreat into 
mechanical reproduction of what they had done on previous occasions without feeling 
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an inward impetus to action each time (1980: 163-65). Actions on the stage can be 
repeated many times but in real life they happen only once. The challenge, according 
to Tortsov, is to bridge this gap through the use of ‘emotion memory’(1980: 166-67). 
Just as the imagination exercises helped to fill out the students’ eye for detail in filling 
out the sense-engagement with the environment for use as a creative resource, so too 
does he claim that emotional interaction with the environment is key to filling out the 
full inward life of the actor in the part. From time to time, the unexpected could enter 
into the scene – something falls over for instance – which produces the real response 
that the actor must pick the object up but this can not be relied upon. Actors need to 
have a technique to produce a natural impulse to action and this can be achieved by 
recalling past emotional responses to a situation in order to produce the right external 
reaction required by a role (1980: 167). 
Stanislavski cites the French empirical psychologist Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), 
who noted the capacity of memories to stimulate a physiological reaction in subjects 
(1980: 166). As Tortsov goes on to expand, the actor need not even actually have 
experienced a situation in order to be emotionally moved by it – the mere observation 
of an event can often trigger an emotional response. As such both the actor’s own 
experience together with events they have witnessed, and even plays that they have 
seen before which set off an affective reaction can be used as a resource for the 
reliable creation of the actor in the part. Nevertheless, sometimes the pull of the 
theatricality of the stage can overpower the natural use of emotion memory and as 
such, the faculty needs to be developed like a muscle, just as the imagination, 
concentration of attention, observation of actions and sense experiences. This view of 
emotional involvement in the world might well be elucidated by Heidegger’s 
description of ‘moods’. 
In his analysis of the unique ‘Being-in’ that Dasein has in its Being-in-the-world, 
Heidegger identifies ‘State-of-mind’ (Befindlichkeit) as at least partially constitutive 
of the way that we are in the world (1962: H134). Unlike the English translation 
which unfortunately seems to emphasise a mental state, Heidegger is more interested 
in the general way that we are. The term is more akin when someone asks ‘how are 
you?’ or ‘how are you going?’
55
 If State-of-mind is the general way in which we are, 
or the way in which we find ourselves, the mood (Stimmung) is the specific way that 
we are. We also find ourselves ‘attuned’ (gestimmtsein) to the environment, thus 
stressing the way that we are intimately connected with the world that surrounds us. 
Interestingly, the word also means ‘to be in tune’. Note how Stanislavski refers to the 
actor as playing an instrument that is their own self: ‘your inner instrument is at 
concert pitch’ (1980: 252). The interesting thing about moods is that we do not even 
notice them for the most part. It is only when we slip into a bad mood, for instance, 
that the way we are becomes apparent to us. 
The way that Dasein is has the quality of thrownness (1962: H136). How we are, how 
                                                
55 What ‘we indicate ontologically by the term “state-of-mind” is ontically the most familiar sort of 
thing; our mood, our Being-attuned’ (1962:  H134). Also, a ‘mood makes manifest “how one is, and 
how one is faring”. In this “how one is”, having a mood brings Being to its “there”’ (ibid.). 
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we are faring, is much of the time handed over to us by the world in which we arrive. 
We are thrown into the world because the totality already precedes our individual 
experience and our individual experience is already part of a totality. The Facticity of 
the world is given to us – not just the material restrictions of our environment, but the 
existential possibilities handed over by our there. Heidegger thinks that mood cannot 
be reduced to a fixed scientific investigation (though psychology may be related to the 
concept, it does not get at the totality of our there) (1962: H138). Mood is not 
something present-at-hand that can be put under a microscope. Yet at the same time it 
is not something that can simply be dismissed as irrational and irrelevant to the 
analysis of our Being-in-the-world. Mood is actually an enabling condition that allows 
us to discover the world at all and direct ourselves towards our environment.
56
 
I suggest that these emotion memory exercises can be understood as an engagement 
with this key part of our ‘existential there’. On the stage, however, it is not simply a 
matter of observing one’s own mood, but having gathered a complex storehouse of 
experiences from which to draw upon in the creation and performance of a part. Over 
and above the analysis of our relation to the world, Tortsov’s actors also need to 
contend with the tricks that memory can play (1980: 173-74). Memory is not stable 
and fixed, but rather constantly changing, yet it needs to be used by the actor in 
creating action on the stage. Some emotional responses to memory are strong, others 
are weak and frustrating, some responses change over time, along with our 
recollection of them. In pondering this thought, Kostya remembers witnessing an 
accident where an old beggar is hit by a car on the street. In his memory, the scene 
gets transformed into a poetic scene where the tragedy of the accident is in contrast to 
the natural beauty of the sky (1980: 171).  Later, Kostya realises that his memory of 
the incident becomes conflated with an even older experience where a train trolley 
had come off its tracks, and then yet a third memory where an Italian street performer 
was standing over his performing monkey that had died and trying to feed it a piece of 
orange peel (1980: 172). Thus, memory, mood and our emotional responses are never 
something static and fixed, but rather changing and mutating to provide a rich inward 
source of action for actors to maintain freshness in a scene.
57
 
The problem with the ‘how I am’ (mood) of the actor is that it more or less needs to 
be controlled on cue. Thus all the exercises and preparation for a role can help to 
channel the concentration of the actor into the creative mood. Actors need to lure their 
emotions into the open, rather than force them (1980: 191). They need a broad base of 
experiences in order to be able to represent many parts, many different worlds, 
ranging from the past to the future and from circumstances similar to their own lives, 
to situations that are quite foreign and unfamiliar. Fuelling the state of affairs, the 
actor’s own self is not fixed and stable, but rather flowing and becoming along with 
their own accumulated experiences and relation to the world. Added to all of this is 
the heightened attention with which actors are watched on the stage: ‘When the 
external production of the play is inwardly tied up with the spiritual life of the actors 
                                                
56 ‘The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible 
first of all to direct oneself towards something’ (1962: H137). 
57 Time is a splendid filter for our remembered feelings – besides it is a great artist. It not only purifies, 
it transmutes even painfully realistic memories into poetry” (1980: 173). 
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it acquires more significance than it does in real life’ (1980: 180). 
Stanislavski also explicitly points out the way that our emotional state can be changed 
by our physical environment too. When the students arrive at class one day, they are 
disappointed at the way in which the whole stage has been changed around because 
the furniture was needed for another production being staged at that time (1980: 178-
82). The actors find that the cheap replacement furniture fosters a mood of depression 
in what was deemed to be Maria’s apartment. With the aid of his technical assistant, 
the director then puts on a demonstration as to how different lighting and sound-
effects can affect the mood of the actors: he creates a storm, the ticking of a clock, a 
piano playing in a distant room, a mouse scratching at midnight, cars in the street 
outside and finally the breaking of dawn. Paul notes the intensification of these effects 
compressed into such a short space of time compared with real life. This displays the 
particular heightened awareness of the there in a theatrical environment. 
Next, the director notes that the actors gravitate to places on the stage which reflect 
their inner moods (1980: 182). Alternatively, when asked to respond to different 
stage-sets and circumstances, the actors need to create a parallel inner mood 
appropriate to those circumstances. Again, sometimes the outer circumstances may 
contradict the inner emotion required in a scene. The mise-en-scene is thus one source 
for the creation of emotions. Sometimes, an actor might strike on the right mood by 
chance – Tortsov relates a particular role where this happened and how he went over 
everything that had happened to him that day that might have stimulated such 
emotions. But rather than heading straight for the emotion itself – the result – he had 
tried to find the source of that emotion and this, he suggests is how the part should be 
approached in technique. 
Such a complex set of exercises demonstrating the way in which environment can 
affect the emotional state of the actor might well be understood as a demonstration of 
mood (in Heidegger’s existential sense). Mood is not something that is simply felt 
psychologically, but involves the total Being of the actor and the way in which they 
find themselves. To a certain extent we humans stand in submission to the world in so 
far as we have the way we are handed over to us. We always have a mood even if it is 
not apparent to us at the time. Sometimes mood can become apparent in behaviours, 
which is exactly the phenomenon that acting exploits in the external display of Being 
on stage. Heidegger notes the long history of philosophy of emotions going back to 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1962: H138-39). This was the first systematic inquiry into 
everydayness and Being-with-one-another. (1962: H139) The public needs moods and 
makes moods for itself. But rather than see emotion’s connection with Being, moods 
have been relegated to psychology in traditional thinking. Far from relegating them, 
Heidegger thinks that moods are key to uncovering the meaning of Being and the 
constitution of our there – the world. 
A World with Other People: Being-with-others 
At the beginning of AP Chapter Ten, ‘Communion’, Tortsov asks the class the very 
general question of whom they are in communion with at that moment. Kostya replies 
impulsively, ‘everyone and everything’ (1980: 193).  Another student claims that if 
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no-one is addressing him then he is not in communion with anyone. Yet the teacher 
challenges the proposition that one need necessarily be in verbal communication in 
order to be communing with others. Kostya thinks back and supposes that he has 
found a time when he was not in communion – at a concert the previous night when 
he was bored and found his mind wandering. Again, the teacher finds this hard to 
believe. Receding back into his imagination, Kostya finds himself looking at a 
chandelier on the ceiling (1980: 195). The teacher suggests that an imaginative 
engagement with this object can bring out a relation to the artist who created it. Even 
just looking at an inanimate object can bring out a relation to other people – 
communion.
58
 
As mentioned above, Heidegger claims that Dasein does not merely go around in a 
world of objects or sheer materiality but rather (primarily) exists in a world which it 
shares with others that have the same kind of Being (1962: H118). Again, Heidegger 
was critical of the idea of the human subject as a thing which had been passed on by 
the metaphysical tradition – whether it be defined as ‘I myself’, the ‘subject’, or the 
‘Self’. So, just as Dasein is not to be considered in isolation from the objects and tasks 
it is involved with, so too do others there with Dasein go in to form a crucial part of 
its world. Heidegger thinks that the apparent obviousness of the ‘I’ should not scare 
us off from investigating what it is – indeed, that obviousness is as much a 
characteristic in need of investigation in the first place (1962: H114-15). Just as the 
world of objects around us tends to recede into the background, so too does our own 
self and others there with us in the world. So the task for Heidegger is to show what 
the Being of those different entities are – the self and others. 
My suggestion here is that Stanislavski’s ‘communion’ an be interpreted in terms of 
Heidegger’s concept of ‘Being-with’ since both articulate a unified and lived 
engagement with others in the world and point towards an essential part of the way 
that we make meaning out of our own existence. I will expand upon the ‘with-world’ 
in the next chapter on Artaud, but it is difficult to pass this crucial aspect of 
Stanislavski’s method of physical actions. Tortsov stresses the importance of actors 
communing with each other on stage and not merely staring mechanically at someone 
who is not really even there in front of them (1980: 196). The teacher divides the 
topic of communion up into three parts: self-communion (between the intellectual and 
emotional parts of the self, for instance), communing with an imaginary object 
(people and things) and communion with many people (the public audience of the 
theatre, for instance, or a mob in a scene) (1980: 197-209). As with the previous 
exercises, Tortsov also considers the external and internal manifestations of 
communion (1980: 210-213). The way that we are with others is not always physical 
and observable, but sometimes merely felt and on the inside: 
One word in conclusion, about the active principle 
underlying the process of communication. Some think that 
our external, visible movements are a manifestation of 
activity and that the inner, invisible acts of spiritual 
                                                
58 ‘It’s like an underground river, which flows continuously under the surface of both words and 
silences and forms an invisible bond between subject and object’ (1980: 214). 
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communion are not. This mistaken idea is more regrettable 
because every manifestation of inner activity is important 
and valuable. Therefore learn to prize that inner communion 
because it is one of the most important sources of action 
(1980: 205). 
As with the over-all method of the psycho-technique, the challenge for Stanislavski’s 
actor is to find an inward source of action. Initially, the students might learn from 
observing the exterior effects of interacting with others. But the mere representing of 
communion is not good enough to produce a believable performance. The teacher 
points out that it is much easier to actually be in communion with one’s acting partner 
than to pretend to be (1980: 213-19). Even observing such truthfulness in oneself is 
quite difficult. Kostya actually thinks that he is quite good at it, but upon testing by 
the director, he finds that others in the class who he thought were much worse are not 
judged to be so by the teacher. 
Both Heidegger and Stanislavski note how our interaction with others in an 
environment fades into the background in regular life because of our focused attention 
on involved activity. But on the stage such a natural involvement is absent, thus 
requiring special attention to the relation between self and others. Rather than 
thinking of others as those who are not myself, Heidegger suggests that the others are 
those from which I do not differentiate myself (1962: H118). The others are not 
determinate and differentiated subjects, but rather those in the ‘with-world’ (Mitwelt). 
Dasein’s Being is Being-with (Mitsein). Strangely, we are always with others even 
when we are factically alone. Heidegger gives the example of the way in which we 
encounter a farmer when we walk around the perimeter of a crop field, or a ship-
builder when we encounter a boat (ibid.). Most of the time we simply pass by other 
members of the ‘public’ in their undifferentiated sense not as individuals with the 
same type of Being as our own. At other times, we can have a genuine care (Sorge) 
for others in who they are (1962: H121). Stanislavski also draws explicit attention to 
the ways that we are with both others and ourselves. 
In the ensuing exercises, Tortsov’s students are made aware of the physical means by 
which we communicate our feelings and senses with one another (1980: 213ff). After 
he asks the class to stage an argument with one of the other class members, the 
teacher points out how much Kostya uses his hands and wrists to communicate his 
point. In order to draw attention to the fact, Kostya has his arms bound and repeats the 
exercise. Then one by one his torso, facial gestures and eye movements are denied 
him in the exercise, and he is left with nothing but his internal psychical presence. 
Kostya complains the he requires the whole of his organism in order to communicate 
his emotions and the teacher agrees – this is the principle of the art of acting. 
Tortsov introduces the Indian concept of prana to describe the way that we commune 
with one another and with ourselves. He also draws on the metaphor of irradiation – 
describing ‘rays’ which emanate from our eyes and both give and receive communion 
with others (1980: 217). The class practices achieving this invisible bond with others 
in a series of exercises. The teacher points out that it is not good enough in a scene 
merely to have flashes of communion, but rather a coherent flow of awareness, 
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response and reception to others: 
A long coherent chain of feelings is what we call grasp. The 
power to seize with the eyes, ears and all of the senses. In 
everyday life, we do not need grasp all the time – sometimes, 
mechanical actions can take over. But on the stage, we need 
to have it always. Grasp is inner activity (1980: 207). 
The fact that ‘grasp’ is the metaphor used at this stage is no mere accident. Just as 
Heidegger had emphasised the way in which we grasp the ready-to-hand in order to 
use it, so too do actors try to manipulate their Being-with-others and their own Being 
in order to create the inward life of the character. The actor is both tool and user, or as 
Stanislavski puts it – the actor’s own Being is the Stradivarius upon which they play 
(1980: 211). 
In the practice studio, these exercises are difficult because the actor needs to invent 
and imagine a justification for their interaction with others but on the stage, the world 
of the play gives a great deal of material for the artist to work with. Just as a rescuer 
might resuscitate a drowned victim, so too can the actor breath life into their own 
actions initially by physical means. (1980: 219). And just as a syphoning tube initially 
requires the air to be sucked out of it in order to establish a good flow of water 
through a tube, so too do these mechanical exercises focusing on the physical 
sensation of communion provide the possibility of the inward life of the character 
flowing out. Tortsov ends by pointing out the two types of exercises: those 
transmitting and receiving emotional experiences, and those concentrating on the 
physical awareness of sensations in the process which necessitates a body free of 
muscular tension (1980: 221). Kostya complains how difficult the process is, but the 
teacher asks how it could be difficult to do something that is natural. With practice, he 
promises, the initial difficulty will fade and what was formerly physical and 
mechanical will engage the total organism and flow from an inward source. 
One might read these exercises in terms of Heidegger’s distinction between the ready-
to-hand and others there with the same kind of Being as ourselves. One is visible and 
physically manipulable, and the other is existential and approachable in other more 
oblique methods. Ultimately, Dasein already understands itself and the world in terms 
of Being-with-others. Those others are there in the structure of involvements. 
Similarly, Knowing-oneself is grounded in Being-with because Dasein understands 
itself in terms of that which is closest – the world (H124). Nevertheless, Dasein is 
mostly deficient in solicitude towards others in just passing one another by: 
And when indeed, one’s knowing oneself gets lost in such 
ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a 
disguise, Being-with-one-another must follow special routes 
of its own in order to come close to Others or even to ‘see 
through them’ (1962: H124). 
So rather than being two separate minds present-at-hand with one another, Heidegger 
thinks that Being-with is already basic for the way Dasein is in the world.  In 
Heidegger’s view, empathy is not a projection of emotions and understanding from 
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one mind to another, but is rather made possible by Being-with in the first place. 
(1962: H124-5) Being with one another is Dasein’s Being. Just as knowing was 
thought as the foundation of our relation with the world, empathy was mistaken as the 
foundation for our Being with others. Heidegger shows that it is in fact, the other way 
round: Being-with-others is a precondition for the being of Dasein itself.  
I have been arguing up to this point that Stanislavski’s metaphors of the 
internal/external, mental/physical/spiritual, and prana/rays/irradiation are merely aids 
to the acting process.
59
 Heidegger is adamant that we do not live in an empathy 
between separated minds, but rather that Being-with makes it possible to empathise in 
the first place. We are not isolated subjects connected via a mental capacity to guess 
what is happening in someone else’s head. We share a world – and that world is what 
enables us to be with each other, mentally, emotionally, physically and 
psychologically. The mistake of metaphysics is to overlook this underlying unity. 
Stanislavski points out the interconnectedness of the physical, psychical and spiritual. 
Just as in the everyday world we tend to overlook this connection, the art of acting 
necessitates a reconsideration of our relation to the world, to objects within it and 
ultimately with others who are there with us. There is much more to be said on the 
who we are as Dasein – the theme of the next chapter. At the very least, the self-
reflection of the actor’s art in Stanislavski’s system opens up that question and 
engages with a multitude of different aspects of our own Being. Most importantly, 
this is explored in experience itself: 
Your own physical and spiritual state will tell you what is 
right. You will sense what is true and normal when you 
reach the sate that we call ‘I am’ (1980: 288). 
Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to show how various key aspects of Heidegger’s 
concept of Being-in-the-world are useful in understanding the practical way in which 
Stanislavski’s method of physical actions enables an actor’s work on their own self. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to the question of Being requires Dasein to 
turn its inquiry on itself. Awareness of one’s own being also confronts the actor on 
stage. This awareness of Being is doubled when the actor is faced with embodying an 
imaginary role – not only do they need to have an awareness of their own Being, but 
also a complex filled out conception of the Being of their character. Stanislavski 
emphasises both the external and the internal aspects of the actor’s experience of life 
and the inextricable connection between the two. Over and above this, actions on the 
stage acquire a special significance for the audience that needs to be well worked out 
in advance and felt from a truthful inward source. Fostering the creative conditions for 
such a state is an arduous and complex process that necessitates experience over mere 
intellectual understanding. Far from Being separated from the world, as was 
hypothesised by past metaphysical approaches (in Heidegger’s terminology), 
Stanislavski discovers the way in which the actor’s Being is intertwined and reliant 
                                                
59 ‘Scientists may have some explanation of the nature of this unseen process. All I can do is to 
describe what I myself feel and how I sue these sensations in my art’ (1980: 213). 
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upon different aspects of their world – objects within the environment, the temporal 
and historical context, the purpose of their actions, the material characteristics of the 
world, and ultimately the existential possibilities of both the actor and character. In 
order to discover these aspects of Being, Stanislavski starts with the actor’s own self – 
the thing which is ‘closest’ and ‘most my own’. Rather than positing an intellectual 
relation as foundational for human existence, Stanislavski recognises the importance 
of action (for a purpose) and ultimately draws a keen awareness of the involvement 
structures of human action within the world. Above all, he realises that the human 
subject is no mere thing in the world in a material or geometrical sense but a 
conscious Being with projects and objectives. The key way in which we are 
emotionally involved in the world is highlighted by the important technique of 
emotion memory, thus showing that our there is not just a material world but a world 
that matters. And finally, the there of the world is not just an environment of material 
objects or tools, but a world which we share with others who have the same kind of 
Being and care as we do. 
Stanislavski ends AP with a ‘natural’ metaphor in equating the preparation of a role to 
the birth of a human being (1980: 312). Stanislavski himself raised the question as to 
whether his method of physical actions is indeed systematic in the sense that it 
provides a coherent and methodical approach to the art (see the epigraph to this 
chapter, ‘There is no system. There is only nature’). No ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is 
correct for every part, and each role needs to be developed in its own way. Nor need 
the system be bound to naturalistic representation on stage. The best that Stanislavski 
could manage was a series of suggestions for ways to provide the necessary 
conditions for creativity on stage. Nevertheless, the systematicity of his system lies in 
the organism that is the creator and subject of the theatrical project. In the same way, 
Heidegger struggled to investigate the concept Being and relied upon the 
phenomenological method of returning to the things themselves as the basis for his 
analysis. The only guide to Being in general is our own experience of Being and 
rather than begin with spurious metaphysical propositions as the basis for our 
understanding of Being, Heidegger wanted to return to what is within our capacity for 
understanding. 
There are several major implications of this chapter, which has considered the art of 
acting in light of Heidegger’s investigation of Being. The phenomenological way of 
seeing needs to be developed. Getting away from the natural attitude requires practice, 
concentration and development. In a practical sense, the actor takes a 
phenomenological stance in that their everyday involvement in the world is broken 
and they are required to construct a world using the words of the playwright and their 
very own Being, experiences and creative capacities. Just as phenomenology is 
related to getting at the truth so too does Stanislavski stress the need for truth in his 
own art. It is not a truth of scientific understanding but rather comprehending the real 
and imagined world of the actor. Above all Stanislavski was concerned with 
embodied, physical understanding of Being rather than a theoretical, disengaged, 
objective knowledge of the world.
60
 This raises the question as to whether 
                                                
60 See especially Stanislavski (1979) Building a Character. Also, ‘[I]n order to express a most delicate 
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phenomenology should include a physical, embodied aspect over and above the 
philosophical approach taken in BT.  
Apart from the physical, Stanislavski was also conscious of the temporal element of 
acting and theatrical production. Rather than being a stable entity, he realised that the 
essence of the art is in its becoming – which turns out to be simultaneously the 
greatest strength and bane of the art form. The way that inspiration seems to slip away 
from the actor’s grasp if consciously sought after might be explained by the tendency 
for Being flee from itself when we try to comprehend its meaning. This raises a 
psychological objection to phenomenology: that we might be able to apprehend Being 
consciously or rationally or that any systematic investigation of the concept might be 
possible at all. Despite all of this, the art of acting is a practical activity and finds a 
way of overcoming the theoretical indeterminacy of meaning in ‘just doing it’. This 
may well be exactly why Stanislavski emphasised activity so much.  
Finally, Stanislavski provides an extremely open concept of what the human being is 
including spiritual and mystical elements of our relation to one another, leaving the 
idea that acting on the stage is somehow engaging with the eternal and the universal – 
the eternal play of Being hiding and revealing itself. And that is an excellent point at 
which to turn to Antonin Artaud. 
This is the beginning of the right road. You have found it 
through your own experience. For the present, there should 
be no other approach to a part or a play… [R]emember for 
all time that when you begin to study each role, you should 
gather the materials that have any bearing on it, and 
supplement them with more and more imagination, until you 
have achieved such a similarity to life that it is easy to 
believe in what you are doing. In the beginning, forget about 
your feelings. When the inner conditions are prepared, and 
right, feelings with come to the surface of their own accord 
(Stanislavski 1980: 53).  
                                                                                                                                       
and largely subconscious life it is necessary to have control of an unusually responsive, excellently 
prepared vocal and physical apparatus. This apparatus must be ready instantly and exactly to reproduce 
most delicate and all but intangible feelings with great sensitiveness and directness. That is why an 
actor of our type is obliged to work so much more than others, both on his inner equipment and also on 
his outer physical apparatus, which should reproduce the results of the creative work of his emotion 
with precision’ (1980: 16). 
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The Germans – think of Fichte or Heidegger – have always tried to take back their 
language from Rome. Artaud too, and this isn’t the only thing they have in common, 
however horrifying this may seem to some. In other conditions, with time enough and 
taking the necessary precautions, I would be tempted to insist on the possible 
encounters which did not take place between Heidegger and Artaud. Among many 
other themes, the one of the innate and the Ungeborene in Heidegger’s reading of 
Trakl, and the question of being, quite simply, and of throwing (jeter) and of giving 
(donner). 
 
Jacques Derrida (1994: 161), ‘Maddening the Subjectile’. 
 
6. Artaud: Language and Being-one’s-Self 
Being on stage was one of the only times Artaud truly felt he was himself. His vision 
for performance is a radical revision of the concept of self not as an entity separated 
from the world but as a united mind, flesh and soul. In this sense, acting can be 
manual philosophy in that it proposes a drastic interrogation of Western 
understandings of personal identity not through dialectical thought and spoken or 
written language but through the theatrical process. Artaud does not ask the question 
of Being explicitly in words. He intends Being itself to become manifest directly 
through performance and what he calls ‘cruelty’. Key themes of Heidegger’s analysis 
of Being are useful in interrogating Artaud’s poetry, writings and manifestos for 
theatre. A cluster of ideas from BT surrounding the notion of selfhood are pertinent in 
providing an interpretation of Artaud’s theatre. These include the Destruktion of 
tradition, the domination of the ‘They’ (an understanding of self handed over from the 
world rather than from an authentic individual choice), and what it means for a self to 
be whole or total. In this way, acting is an investigation of the self not through merely 
intellectual, theoretical, rational and dialectical processes but through embodied 
experience. 
Introduction 
For Antonin Artaud (1896-1948), performance is one true hope for authenticity in 
existence: ‘When I live I do not feel myself live. But when I act, it is then that I feel 
myself exist’ (1988: 275). Acting is not just a theoretical contemplation of the world 
for Artaud; it is the physical, spiritual, mental and metaphysical return of Being to his 
ownmost self. This chapter is not simply a straightforward application of Heidegger’s 
theory to the case of Artaud but rather an exploration of performance as an 
uncovering of Being.1  Artaud saw non-Western performance in particular as the 
apotheosis of manual philosophy: 
In the Oriental theater of metaphysical tendencies, as 
opposed to the Occidental theater of psychological 
tendencies, this whole complex of gestures, signs, postures, 
                                                
1 Leo Bersani’s essay, ‘Artaud, defecation and birth’ in Scheer (2004) notes the problem of situating 
Artaud in any literary or conventional context because he resisted the notion of derivation altogether 
even to the point of denying his own birth (the ultimate derivation). In ‘La parole soufflée’ Derrida 
(1978) previously pointed out the impossibility of considering Artaud as a ‘case’ for the medical and 
critical discourse. 
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and sonorities which constitute the language of stage 
performance, this language which develops all its physical 
and poetic effects on every level of consciousness and in all 
the senses, necessarily induces thought to adopt profound 
attitudes which could be called metaphysics-in-action 
(‘Metaphysics and the Mise en Scène’, 1958: 44).2 
Up to this point, I have considered how Stanislavski’s approach and preparation for 
text-based performance could be revealed by many elements of Dasein’s world. 
Stanislavski’s world was amidst Soviet revolution and the rise of realism and 
naturalism as theatrical form. Now I move to early twentieth century Paris amid the 
theatre avant-garde, surrealism, dadaism and experimental performance and poetry. 
Antonin Artaud’s dream for theatre was obviously very different in that he 
progressively moved away from the dominance of texts towards a theatre emphasising 
the physical and metaphysical basis for performance.
3
 I have suggested that actor-
training and preparation can bring about a phenomenological attitude. Artaud was also 
concerned with a heightened awareness of Being, which he felt required preparation.
4
 
He wanted to release performance from reliance upon language, words and a literary 
approach to drama. Artaud was interested in using theatre as a practical medium in 
which to challenge and transform the concept of self through the performance event. 
Just as Heidegger saw phenomenology as potentially revealing of an authentic 
understanding of human existence and therefore transformative of life itself (1962: 
H267ff) so too did Artaud see theatre as smashing our regular understanding of 
existence and replacing it with a full and unseparated experience of Being: 
It seems, in brief, that the highest possible idea of the theatre 
is one that reconciles us philosophically with Becoming, 
suggesting to us through all sorts of objective situations the 
furtive idea of the passage and transmutation of ideas into 
things, much more than the transformation and stumbling of 
feelings into words (from ‘Letters on Language’, Artaud 
1958: 109). 
A consideration of Artaud in relation to Heidegger is not without precedent. Derrida 
suggests (in the epigraph to this chapter) investigating the non-meetings of Artaud and 
Heidegger in his readings of Georg Trakl with themes of the ‘innate’ or ‘unborn’. I 
will consider Derrida’s third proposed intersection: the question of Being. For Artaud, 
Being in theatre overcomes the separation of mind and body. Susan Sontag notes 
‘[w]hat he bequeathed was not achieved works of art but a singular presence, a 
                                                
2 Victor Corti (1970: 33) translates this last phrase as ‘active metaphysics’, which I have taken as the 
title of this thesis. 
3 Bear in mind that Heidegger’s definition of metaphysics is different from the term widely employed 
in usage. Heidegger was interested in destabilising past unfounded bases of epistemology and the 
meaning of Being. The relationship between Artaud and Heidegger with respect to metaphysics is not 
simple. In many respects, Artaud took on the Platonic idea of Forms and this may well be the basis for 
his apprehension about the separation of Being from itself. Yet at the same time, Artaud refused to 
separate philosophical thought with lived and embodied experience. 
4 ‘[T]he essential thing is to believe that not just anyone can recreate [theatre which touches life], and 
that there must be preparation’ (1958: 13). 
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poetics, an aesthetics of thought, a theology of culture, and a phenomenology of 
suffering’ (in Artaud 1988: xx, my italics). Lisabeth During ponders ‘perhaps 
[Artaud] has been talking to the philosophers. Between Heidegger, Blanchot and 
Bataille, the suspicion of taint returns to the way we find ourselves in the world’ 
(Scheer 2000: 201). Jane Goodall (1994) urges caution in that: 
[a]lthough Artaud appears together with Nietzsche in the 
work of Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari to serve 
as one of the primary challengers to the assumption of 
constituted subjectivity, the terms of his challenge tend to be 
absorbed into the Nietzschean/Heideggerian terms with 
which these theorists can more easily put themselves into 
dialogue. It may be illuminating, then, to set the terms of the 
two challenges against each other (1994: 210). 
As Derrida points out, there are several intersections between these thinkers that 
might be investigated. Yet the thoughts of each may neither be identical nor 
necessarily reach the same conclusions. I suggest that theatre lends itself to a radical 
questioning of subjectivity, the relation of the individual to others and to Being, and 
how consciousness might in some way take hold of existence once more. 
It is worth noting that Artaud has been appropriated by various theories and practices 
for their own ends. The name of Artaud is invoked in Derrida’s deconstruction, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) critique of psychiatry, Foucault’s (1988) account of 
madness, Grotowski’s (1969) theatre laboratory and physical theatre, alternative 
theatre practices of the ’60s and ’70s such as the Happenings, Peter Brook’s (1968 
and 1988) theatre and so on, in a wide field of discourses. There is an inherent quality 
of Artaud’s writing that invites readings – psychoanalytic, post-structuralist, post-
colonialist, deconstructive etc. It is perhaps ironic that Artaud yearned for immanence 
in his art that would overcome interpretations.5 Yet at the same time, there is a force 
and conviction in his writing that can hardly fail to inspire and provoke. 
This phenomenological interpretation is not merely adding to the Artaud industry. If 
phenomenology involves letting things be seen in the way that they show themselves, 
as I have presented, Artaud’s theatre project is also a return to the things themselves. 
Just as the question of the meaning of Being has no single determinate answer and is 
rather a practice of inquiring, Artaud’s famous vision of the Theatre of Cruelty defies 
explicit definition. Artaud’s theatre is a practice and process to do with uncovering 
Being, truth, and the self by revealing the ‘implacable necessities’ of existence.
6
  
As with the other theatre theorists dealt with in this thesis, the body of literature 
dealing with Artaud is mountainous. The issues of translation and language 
interpretation are significant, yet this is precisely the issue addressed by much of his 
                                                
5 For an example of this kind of broad-spectrum approach, see Ed Scheer’s (2000) collection of essays 
in 100 Years of Cruelty. 
6 ‘I use the word cruelty in the cosmic sense of rigor, implacable necessity, in the Gnostic sense of the 
vortex of life which devours the shadows, in the sense of the pain outside of whose implacable 
necessity life could not go on’ (‘A letter to Jean Paulhan 12 September 1932’, Artaud 1988: 303). 
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own theoretical writing.
7
 It is impossible to sort through the forest of interpretations of 
Artaud and reach back to any authentic or original thoughts that he may have 
expressed. Instead, it may be worth asking ‘whose Artaud?’ In this sense it is not a 
matter of simply returning to the texts and traces that he left behind but also 
considering his continuing existence. To a certain extent, Artaud still lives among us 
as an inspirational prophet who is himself a mise en scène able to cause thinking.8 
Finally, it is difficult not simply to quote Artaud and let his own words (or rather their 
translations) hang over this reading like some mystical force. Where possible, I have 
tried to draw out his thinking about theatre and articulate his dramatic concepts as far 
as they are intelligible at all. And rather than see his writings as manifestations of 
madness and paranoia, this reading suggests that Artaud experienced a unique 
Anxiety about existence and responded in his own way to call for authenticity in art 
(which he could not conceive separately from life).
9
 
Some key existential philosophical issues raised in Artaud’s vision for the theatre are 
independently explored in Heidegger’s phenomenology.10 In this chapter, first I offer 
an interpretation of the metaphor of the plague as a Destruktion of tradition in 
theatrical practice. Second, Artaud wished to usurp the traditional understanding of 
the self (in Heidegger’s terms, the dictatorship of the They) towards a radically 
individuated self materially present in performance. Then I contend that Artaud’s 
discussion of language is a critique of inauthentic expressions of Being in text-centred 
theatre. His Gnostic understanding of Being might well be understood in terms of 
Heidegger’s conception of ‘Falling’ (the tendency for Dasein to interpret itself in 
terms of the world) which is characteristic of Western theatre practice. Rather than 
view Artaud’s thinking as a psychotic, warped world view, I put forward that his 
Anxiety towards existence uncovers the world and it is precisely this Anxiety which is 
played out in the Theatre of Cruelty. In a radical act of resistance to the structures of 
existence, Artaud attempts to destabilise any traditional foundation for epistemology. 
Specifically, Artaud wishes to overcome the temporal structure of the world which 
Heidegger unpacks as ‘Being-towards-death’. Artaud desires an authentic temporality 
on stage. And finally, I consider the notion of ‘authenticity’ and question what type of 
authentic experience of Being can be found in the Theatre of Cruelty. So, I begin with 
the key aspect of Heidegger’s philosophical method: the re-thinking of tradition and 
debunking of metaphysical myths. 
                                                
7 ‘All true feeling is untranslatable. To express it is to betray it. But to translate it is to dissimulate it. 
True expression hides what it manifests. It sets the mind in opposition to the real void of nature by 
creating in reaction a kind of fullness of thought’  (1958: 71). 
8 Artaud was a prophet who ‘raised his voice in the desert’ (Brook 1968: 54). ‘Once we regard this 
language of the mise en scène as the pure theatrical language, we must discover whether it can attain 
the same internal ends as speech, whether theatrically and from the point of view of the mind it can 
claim the same intellectual efficacy as the spoken language. One can wonder, in other words, whether it 
has the power, not to define thoughts but to cause thinking, whether it may not entice the mind to take 
profound and efficacious attitudes towards it from its own point of view’ (‘Oriental and Occidental 
Theatre’, 1958: 69). 
9 For a discussion of Artaud’s anguish and Heidegger’s concept of Angst, see Lisabeth During’s 
‘Anguish’ in Scheer (2000). 
10 The word existential here is not in the sense of dwelling on mortality or sheer meaninglessness of 
existence, but rather inquiring into the nature of existence itself. Heidegger denied that he was an 
‘existentialist’ in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1993). 
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Destruktion: Dismantling Tradition  
Both Heidegger and Artaud propose a radical questioning of tradition and attempt to 
express Being by taking hold of the world authentically. This questioning of Being is 
a Destruktion of tradition. Both thinkers accuse that tradition of understanding the 
world in a misleading way. Acting is manual philosophy for Artaud in the clearing 
away of counterfeit understandings of Being and the world. 
Artaud wanted to uncover the truth of existence by reconnecting with Being through 
performance. In his preface to The Theatre and its Double (TD), Artaud identifies a 
modern obsession with culture ‘which has never been coincident with life, which in 
fact has been devised to tyrannize over life’ (1958: 7). He notes an apparent mismatch 
of signs and the things they represent, and of philosophical systems and life: 
[a]ll our ideas about life must be revised in a period when 
nothing any longer adheres to life; it is this painful cleavage 
which is responsible for the revenge of things; the poetry 
which is no longer within us and which we no longer 
succeed in finding in things suddenly appears on their wrong 
side: consider the number of crimes whose perverse 
gratuitousness is explained only by our powerlessness to take 
complete possession of life (1958: 8-9). 
Artaud’s theatrical quest was to recover a unity of existence which he felt could be 
fulfilled through the power of performance. He interpreted theatre as a unique 
opportunity to crush the idea that culture and civilisation can be thought of as separate 
from life. In theatre, he sought living expression, thus reclaiming language back from 
Rome (as Derrida puts it in the epigraph above). Artaud proclaimed that ‘[t]he library 
at Alexandria can be burnt down’ (1958: 10). Rather than the dead and static language 
of Latin, and the stale philosophy of books, Artaud challenged the traditional 
understanding of the human subject claiming that ‘[t]o break through language in 
order to touch life is to create or recreate theatre’ (1958: 12-13). 
According to Heidegger, we need to destroy the ontological tradition that has failed to 
investigate Being and time properly. The task of the philosopher is to show how these 
traditions have passed themselves off as self-evident. Heidegger thinks that the 
phenomenological method is precisely the way in which to carry out such a task of 
Destruktion (1962: H19ff). But the task is not entirely negative in toppling tradition. 
Heidegger also claims that an authentic philosophical understanding of Being and 
time will be able to preserve the advances in past investigations and approaches while 
not falling prey to the blind philosophical tradition which underpins and guides them 
for the most part. Phenomenology is not aimed at the past, however: 
its criticism is aimed at ‘today’ and the prevalent way of 
treating the history of ontology, whether it is headed towards 
doxography, towards intellectual history, or towards a 
history of problems. But to bury the past in nullity is not the 
purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative 
function remains unexpressed and indirect (1962: H22-23).  
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The rejection of metaphysics is not completed by taking historical approaches apart 
but by simply returning to the things themselves in the here and now. Such a return to 
experience is predominant in Artaud’s writing on theatre. 
Both Heidegger and Artaud suggest a questioning of tradition and usurping of 
everyday social life towards a more essential and primordial experience of authentic 
existence. There are several points of contact between Heidegger’s plan for the 
obliteration of metaphysics (the erroneous and unquestioned tradition that has been 
handed down to our modern philosophical understanding of Being) and Artaud’s 
metaphor of ‘the plague’ (his vision for the way in which the theatre will operate). 
The concept of the Plague (la peste) is perhaps one of the most well known and vivid 
of Artaud’s images in describing the power he hoped for in theatre. Citing the story of 
the Viceroy of Saint-Rémy who had a dream in which he saw himself plague-ridden 
and his state ravaged by the disease Artaud goes on to dwell upon the strange effects 
of this epidemic (1958: 15ff). As Artaud relates, the Viceroy turned away a ship – the 
Grand-Saint-Antoine – which he thought carried the disease. The ship sailed on to 
Marseille where it spread the original Oriental virus of the plague (it is significant that 
Artaud thinks the origin of the plague and its power to be in the East). Artaud claims 
that the ruler had a mental contact with the disease, yet it was not so strong for him to 
actually catch it (1958: 17). Artaud believes that there is a psychic connection 
between the plague and its human victims. He suggests that even without physical 
contact, it is possible to become infected.11 The Viceroy was attuned to the coming 
danger, perhaps as the Israelites in the Old Testament were warned of the coming 
plague over Egypt. Artaud saw all historical plagues to be of the same metaphysical 
origin despite any scientific or medical evidence to the contrary (1958: 17-18).  
According to Artaud, the plague somehow stands outside of history. He claims that 
the Egyptian, Oriental and medieval (Black Death) plagues are one and the same 
(1958: 22).  He also seems to conflate the individual and social aspects of the virus. 
The physical manifestation of disorder and disruption in the body is also felt in 
society as a whole: 
[f]or if the theater is like the plague, it is not only because it 
affects important collectivities and upsets them in an 
identical way. In the theater as in the plague there is 
something both victorious and vengeful: we are aware that 
the spontaneous conflagration which the plague lights 
wherever it passes is nothing else than an immense 
liquidation (1958: 27). 
Artaud dwells on the breakouts of immorality in plague ridden towns, with acts of 
incest and immoral behaviour amongst citizens and in between the ever rising piles of 
burning bodies in the streets (1958: 23-25). Even those who survive the disease are 
                                                
11 Compare the metaphor of the plague, for instance, with the many historical metaphors for the way in 
which actors can convey emotions to their audience: magnetism (Plato), ether (theory of the humours) 
and later irradiation (Stanislavski). The importance of the plague for Artaud is that it is both physical 
and psychic. In other words, the plague is a metaphysical force. 
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drawn back to the stinking, infected cities. 
For Artaud, the plague is neither just a metaphor nor simply a biological reality. One 
might even say that it is a combination of the two. Created symbols become real and 
powerful forces in bringing real and physical change.
12
 This is in complete 
contradiction to what he felt was a passive, fictional and disinterested understanding 
of art that was around at the time.
13
 For Artaud, the metaphor of the plague does not 
focus on beauty, the sublime, the perfection of form and the capacity for moral 
instruction, which much aesthetic theory had concentrated on.
14
 Artaud envisioned 
theatre as a site of struggle for the disruptive elements of social order to be brought 
out, like symptoms of the plague victim.
15
 Though he uses much abject and visceral 
symbolism, for Artaud, the physical condition of the plague was not purely meant as 
pain and suffering (in a negative sense), but the fulfilment of a higher spiritual and 
divine force of fate beyond the visible materiality of this world (see discussion of 
cruelty below).
16
 In this sense, Artaud is searching for a truth through this physically 
effective illness rather than the concealed social etiquette that dominated Western 
civilisation in his view.
17
 This materialisation of truth is a recurring theme in Artaud’s 
work. By threatening and disturbing the world, Artaud’s theatre brings Being into 
view. The plague simultaneously destroys the city and brings it to life: 
These symbols, the sign of ripe powers previously held in 
servitude and unavailable to reality, burst forth in the guise 
of incredible images which give freedom of the city and of 
existence to acts that are by nature hostile to the life of 
societies (1958: 28). 
This could be seen in terms of how Heidegger posits that, for the most part, Dasein 
                                                
12 The theatre ‘recovers the notion of symbols and archetypes which act like silent blows, rests, leaps of 
the heart, summons of the lymph, inflammatory images thrust into our abruptly wakened heads’ (1958: 
27). 
13 ‘To our disinterested and inert idea of art an authentic culture opposes a violently egoistic and 
magical, i.e., interested idea’ (Artaud 1958: 11). 
14 ‘If we have come to attribute to art nothing more than the values of pleasure and relaxation and 
constrain it to a purely formal use of forms within the harmony of certain external relations, that in no 
way spoils its profound expressive value; but the spiritual infirmity of the Occident, which is the place 
par excellence where men have confused art and aestheticism, is to think that its painting would 
function only as painting, dance which would be merely plastic, as if in an attempt to castrate the forms 
of art, to sever their ties with all the mystic attitudes they might acquire in confrontation with the 
absolute’ (1958: 69). 
15 ‘The theater restores us all our conflicts and all their powers, and gives these powers names we hail 
as symbols; and behold! Before our eyes is fought a battle of symbols, one charging against another in 
an impossible melee; for there can be theater only from the moment when the impossible really begins 
and when the poetry which occurs on the stage sustains and superheats the realized symbols’ (1958: 
27-28). 
16‘The state of the victim who dies without material destruction, with all the stigmata of an absolute and 
almost abstract disease upon him is identical with the state of an actor entirely penetrated by feelings 
that do not benefit or even relate to his real condition’ (1958: 24). 
17 ‘Perhaps it means that at the point where we are we have lost all touch with the true theatre, since we 
confine it to the domain of what daily thought can reach, the familiar or unfamiliar domain of 
consciousness; – and if we address ourselves theatrically to the unconscious it is merely to take from it 
what it has been able to collect (or conceal) of accessible everyday experience’ (1958: 47). 
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‘falls back’ on the world and ‘falls prey’ to the tradition that has taken hold.
18
 The 
tradition itself keeps Dasein from inquiring into its own basis and stops Dasein from 
choosing for itself. Tradition makes the way that it transmits itself inaccessible and 
passes itself off as self-evident (1962: H21). Tradition covers over the fact that it too 
has an origin and inhibits access to that idea. In this way, for the most part, Dasein 
loses the ability to go back to the past and make it genuinely its own: 
If the question of Being is to have its own history made 
transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened 
up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be 
dissolved.  We understand this task as one in which by 
taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy 
the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at 
those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first 
ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways which 
have guided us ever since (1962: H22). 
The phenomenon of falling back is not only present in culture and civilisation. 
Philosophy also fails to take hold of Being in an authentic way. Heidegger claims that 
the question of Being has been forgotten despite our interest in metaphysics. 
According to him, past approaches have covered up an authentic way of formulating 
the question ‘What is Being?’ Ever since the Greeks, we have understood Being in 
terms of the world and subsequently came to be see the term as self-evident (1962: 
H22). Christian theology took the human subject as a created thing; Descartes then 
overlooked the connection between the thinking thing and time; during the 
Enlightenment nature took over as the way of understanding ourselves as materiality; 
and then Hegel pushed the dialectic centre stage which understood Being as logos 
(discourse). The philosophical investigation of time also has a history that has been 
forgotten (1962: H23-27). Temporality was first interpreted by Aristotle, and ever 
since, errors have been passed down through Kant, Descartes and Bergson. The 
proper task of philosophy is to correct these errors in understanding Being and time. 
However, the Destruktion of philosophy is not a matter of showing how these 
previous answers got it wrong, but rather finding the right way of asking the 
question.
19
  
Rather than see theatre as being peripheral to our understanding of Being, Artaud 
believes it is at the centre. Theatre, for Artaud, is the connection between the 
individual and society.
20
 In fact, Artaud slips imperceptibly between talking about the 
                                                
18 ‘Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms 
of that world by its reflected light, but also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition of 
which it has more or less explicitly taken hold. This tradition keeps it from providing its own guidance, 
whether in inquiring or choosing’ (Heidegger 1962: H21). 
19 ‘The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the 
process of destroying the ontological tradition. In this way we can fully prove that the question of the 
meaning of Being is one that we cannot avoid, and we can demonstrate what it means to talk about 
“restating” this question’ (1962: H26).  
20 ‘Extending this spiritual image of the plague, we can comprehend the troubled body fluids of the 
victim as the material aspect of a disorder which, in other contexts, is equivalent to the conflicts, 
struggles, cataclysms and debacles our lives afford us’ (1958: 25). 
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plague and talking about the theatre (1958: 27ff). Like many ideas he conflates the 
two, seeing them as ‘doubles’ of each other.
21
 Theatre, or more specifically, the actor 
is the site of intersection of metaphor and reality, of signs and materiality. Jane 
Goodall (1994: 51-52) mentions Paolo Uccello, the 15
th
 century perspective painter 
who experimented with the vanishing point and chiasma ‘whose point of closure is a 
switching point reopening onto another creation, of his own’ (1994: 52).
22
 This 
concept of the chiasma (a ‘crossing’) is apt in describing Artaud’s understanding of 
theatre as self-creation. Theatre’s double is a point of crossing: both metaphor and 
reality. 
In order to bring such a self-creation about, Artaud advocates a destruction of 
contemporary understandings of theatre. The distinction between theatre and reality 
dissolves in this image of the theatre as plague. In an infamous performance of his 
lecture ‘The Theatre and the Plague’ at the Sorbonne  that took place on 6 April 1933, 
Artaud gradually ceased talking in order to manifest affects of the plague itself, 
hoping to infect his own audience (Leach 2004: 160-61). Needless to say, the 
audience who were expecting an academic discussion were less than impressed and 
even outraged. It is no mistake that the ship carrying the plague in his story was the 
Grand-Saint-Antoine: Antonin Artaud undoubtedly considered himself to be in 
psychic connection with the plague and transmitter of its effects. 
For Artaud, psychological acting also needs to be destroyed. The actor penetrated by 
feelings not their own is like a plague victim who shows none of the outward signs of 
the illness but whose organs are taken over.
23
 Artaud may also have been influenced 
by medieval theories of the body and acting including Galen’s theory that the body is 
composed of four cardinal humours (see Roach 1986: 38-40). Furthermore, he was 
engaged with and enlivened by the history of acting, noting Diderot’s idea ‘that on 
stage the actor does not really feel what he is saying, that he retains absolute control 
over his actions, and that he can think about something else at the same time, like 
what he is going to have for dinner’ (1988: 211). Certainly, Artaud is not without 
knowledge of the history of attacks on acting, quoting Augustine’s criticisms of the 
theatre (1958: 26-27). He deliberately turns the idea of theatre as an infectious 
madness (a criticism that has been launched at actors from Plato onwards) into a 
positive and creative aspect of the force of theatre. Although Augustine condemned 
theatre and acting, Artaud is interested in the idea of contagion because it is not just a 
matter of art but something real that is happening. Far from being a radically 
solipsistic and idiosyncratic (or neologistic/incomprehensible) theory of theatre, the 
metaphor of the plague also connects with one of the earliest theories of theatre in 
Aristotle’s Poetics – that of catharsis. The plague purges society by a power sent from 
the divine; it is ‘action at a distance’ which is able to transform both individuals and 
societies. But unlike Aristotle, Artaud sees performance not as cathartic, but as a 
                                                
21 Brian Singleton (1998) uses the idea of ‘doubles’ to analyse TD in some detail which he understands 
as Artaud’s ‘philosophies or sources of inspiration’ (1998: 21). 
22 Also see ‘Uccello the Hair’ (Artaud 1988:133-34). 
23 ‘Everything in the physical aspect of the actor, as in that of the victim of the plague, shows that life 
has reacted to the paroxysm, and yet nothing has happened’ (1958: 24). 
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destructive force which will bring either death or cure.
24
 Though the effects of the 
plague are horrible, they were sent by a divine force and have redeeming effects. 
Destruction is necessary. In this way, Artaud is engaging with the history of attacks 
on acting and turning them round to be precisely why theatre is so important at 
revitalising life. 
And the question we must now ask is whether, in this 
slippery world which is committing suicide without noticing 
it, there can be found a nucleus of men capable of imposing 
this superior notion of the theater, men who will restore to all 
of us the natural and magic equivalent of the dogmas in 
which we no longer believe (1958: 32). 
Artaud asserted that morality and God also need to confronted and destroyed.
25
 
Throughout his life, he constantly swung between radical piety and hostility towards 
faith. At various stages, he saw blasphemy, pain, cruelty, and evil as the appropriate 
response to life’s deficiency.26 The key point is that Artaud wanted a theatre which 
actually had an effect. This call for theatre to return to its ritualistic power has been 
taken up in performance theory by Richard Schechner and Victor Turner (for instance 
see Schechner 1981).  
Above all, Artaud is interested in how created symbols are transformed into real 
powers. Because society is largely determined in its values and morality prior to the 
individual’s existence, Artaud seems to think that power can arise by pushing those 
systems to their brink. He used theatre as an act of rebelling, profaning and subverting 
the very systems of culture and civilisation. Just as Artaud seeks to destabilise social 
custom and morality, so too does he wish to undercut rationality and any 
intellectualist view of human nature. Through the use of symbols which connect the 
unconscious workings of the mind, Artaud believes theatre can communicate with a 
deeper and more profound level of being than can be articulated using words.
27
 So his 
destruction is social, cultural, moral, spiritual and ultimately, physical. 
Heidegger is interested in dispelling false metaphysical grounds for understanding 
Being. Artaud sees the destructive power of the plague to be a metaphysical force 
capable of bringing life, vitality and true existence to the world which he felt had 
                                                
24 ‘The theater like the plague, is a crisis which is resolved by death or cure. And the plague is a 
superior disease because it is a total crisis after which nothing remains except death or an extreme 
purification. Similarly the theater is a disease because it is the supreme equilibrium which cannot be 
achieved without destruction’(1958: 31). 
25 For an extensive elaboration of Artaud’s abolishing of god, see ‘To Have Done with The Judgement 
of God’ (1988: 555-70) and a discussion in Goodall (1994), Artaud and the Gnostic Drama Chapter 
Seven, ‘To Have Done…’. 
26 For an extensive discussion of this issue in relation to Gnosticism and Manichean beliefs, see 
Goodall (1994). 
27 ‘To make metaphysics out of a spoken language is to make the language express what it does not 
ordinarily express: to make use of it in a new, exceptional and unaccustomed fashion; to reveal its 
possibilities for producing shock; to divide and distribute it actively into space; to deal with intonations 
in an absolutely concrete manner, restoring their power to shatter as well as really to manifest 
something; to turn against language and its basely utilitarian, one could say alimentary sources, against 
its trapped-beast origins; and finally to consider language as the form of Incantation’ (1958: 46). 
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otherwise been lacking especially in theatrical forms. The projects are not identical, of 
course; one is philosophical and ontological whereas the other is theatrical or 
mystical. Put simply, however, both Artaud and Heidegger suggest a radical return to 
the things themselves, through an understanding of the world not separated from the 
individual subject, but existentially aware of the world through experience. Each 
thinker seeks to address the disjunction between philosophical and theoretical 
attempts at understanding the relation of the human subject with the world and our 
experience of that world. Such an understanding can bring about a self-awareness and 
self-unity felt not in the alienation of language but in chosen possibilities of existence.  
Heidegger calls this authenticity; Artaud calls it cruelty. As I argued above, 
Stanislavski attempted to create world on the stage. Artaud similarly claims that the 
creative act of the stage reunites his own capacity to create himself and have a power 
over his own possibilities.
28
 This is a creation of world. Like Aristotle, Artaud feels 
that theatre is to do with investigating the possibilities of human existence. But rather 
than see those possibilities as merely played out in a fictional drama, he envisages 
theatre as the real materialisation of possibilities as if by a process of alchemy.  
Finally, Artaud also sees the destructive power of humour. In his note on the Marx 
Brothers, Artaud notices a surreal element in their films which detaches words, 
language and symbols from their regular use. ‘The poetic quality of a film like Animal 
Crackers would fit the definition of humor if this word had not long since lost its 
sense of essential liberation, of destruction of all reality in the mind’ (1958: 142). 
Through the anarchy of the Marx Brothers jokes, Artaud sees a ‘kind of boiling 
anarchy, an essential disintegration of the real by poetry’ (1958: 144). To sum up, 
Artaud’s destruction is total; it heralds a radical return to experience as the basis of 
theatre. 
Jacques Derrida’s (1978) deconstructive practices owe much to both Artaud and 
Heidegger. In Derrida’s interpretation, Artaud is attempting to push the metaphysical 
systems to their own limits from within: the destructive power of the plague is such 
that it destroys the organs whilst keeping them in tact. By trying to equate Artaud and 
Heidegger’s destruction, one might well fall back into the metaphysics which both 
were attempting to destroy. Derrida shows that it is indeed difficult to deconstruct 
metaphysics from within itself without falling into contradiction: 
The concepts of madness, alienation, or inalienation 
irreducibly belong to the history of metaphysics. Or, more 
narrowly: they belong to the epoch of metaphysics that 
determines Being as the life of a proper subjectivity. Now 
difference – or deferral, with all the modifications laid bare 
by Artaud – can only be conceived as such beyond 
metaphysics, towards the Difference – or Duplicity – of 
which Heidegger speaks. It could be thought that this latter 
                                                
28 ‘The plague takes images that are dormant, a latent disorder and suddenly extends them into the most 
extreme gestures; the theatre also takes gestures and pushes them as far as they will go: like the plague, 
it reforges the chain between what is and what is not, between the virtuality of the possible and what 
already exists in materialized nature’ (1958: 27). 
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Difference, which simultaneously opens and conceals truth, 
and in fact distinguishes nothing – the invisible accomplice 
of all speech – its furtive power itself, if this were not to 
confuse the metaphysical and metaphorical category of the 
furtive with that which makes it possible. If the ‘destruction’ 
of the history of metaphysics, in the rigorous sense 
understood by Heidegger, is not a simple surpassing of this 
history, one could then, sojourning in a place which is 
neither within nor without this history, wonder about what 
links the concept of madness to the concept of metaphysics 
in general: the metaphysics which Artaud destroys and 
which he is still furiously determined to construct or 
preserve within the same movement of destruction. Artaud 
keeps himself at the limit, and we have attempted to read 
him at his limit (Derrida 1978: 194). 
If we can interpret Artaud as performing a destruction of metaphysics, it is useful to 
note that Heidegger shows the difficulty of destroying tradition whilst simultaneously 
preserving any position from which to conduct that destruction.  In a way, both could 
be metaphysicians themselves – Heidegger by simply inaugurating a metaphysics of 
Being and Artaud by mystical ontology. But Heidegger hopes phenomenology would 
avoid metaphysics by attending closely to experience. And Artaud engages the 
destruction of tradition not by intellectual analysis and argumentation, but by bodily 
means through a ‘philosophy of the flesh’. 
Who am I? Being-with and the ‘They’ 
One might see Artaud in relation to Heidegger in that he proposes a radical re-
thinking of the notion of self and its relation to others and the world. Artaud’s concern 
is that his very self is lost when he attempts to articulate his own Being in language.
29
 
I suggest that Artaud’s separation from himself can be understood in terms of 
Heidegger’s ‘They’ (das Man). Through such a re-thinking, Artaud’s vision of acting 
is manual philosophy in recovering a true understanding of the self. 
Artaud felt that literature and art had become trivial and superficial compared to the 
true power that he felt theatre to possess. Yet capturing the redeeming power of 
language in poetry is difficult: 
I suffer from a horrible sickness of mind. My thought 
abandons me at every level. From the simple fact of thought 
to the external fact of its materialisation in words. Words, 
shapes of sentences, internal directions of thought, simple 
reactions of the mind – I am constantly in pursuit of my 
intellectual being. Thus as soon as I can grasp a form, 
however imperfect, I pin it down, for fear of losing the 
whole of thought. I lower myself, I know, and I suffer from 
                                                
29 ‘I am adding another language to the spoken language, and I am trying to restore to the language of 
speech its old magic, its essential spellbinding power, for its mysterious possibilities have been 
forgotten’ (Artaud 1958: 111) 
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it, but I consent to it for fear of dying altogether (from ‘A 
Letter to Jacques Rivière 5 June, 1923’, Artaud 1988: 31). 
Artaud suggests that theatre can overcome the stolen essence of language in text-
based drama through a return to the bodily elements of performance. The regular use 
of words to convey meaning and more importantly, Western psychological theatre, 
falls away from a truth that can be found in the material presence of theatre. For 
Artaud, traditional text-based drama, wherein language is given from the outside, 
deprives actors of their own voice whose words are ‘spirited away’ (Derrida 1978: 
175).  Like words whispered to the actor from the hidden prompt box in the middle of 
the stage, Artaud claims that traditional drama whispers a voice for the actor which 
does not come from an authentic Being. In fact, Artaud rejects the entire institution of 
literary criticism and seeks to wrench theatre away from dominance of the written 
word (see ‘No More Masterpieces’ in Artaud, 1958: 74ff). 
Heidegger also proposes that most of the time we have our possibilities handed over 
to us by the world. This handing over of the possibilities of existence comes both 
from the tendency for Dasein to interpret itself in terms of the world (as a material 
thing) and from tradition (interpretations that get passed down in history). These two 
aspects are the object of his Destruktion of metaphysics too. So whereas Artaud thinks 
that separation from authentic existence can be overcome by the material truth of 
performance, Heidegger resists viewing the world as simple materiality. For 
Heidegger, a true or authentic understanding of Being requires Dasein to truthfully 
grasp itself as ‘thrown possibility’.
30
 Possibilities of existence for any individual are 
both handed over by the world and chosen by Dasein. Nevertheless, rather than see 
these two views as diametrically opposed (materialism versus existentialism, for 
instance), Artaud’s return to the materiality in theatre is not through static forms, but 
what he saw as metaphysical forces at play driving the primordial drama of the 
Theatre of Cruelty. Cruelty is the implacable necessity of existence that unleashes its 
reality through true theatre. Such a reality overcomes the blindness of everyday, 
tranquillised culture. 
On the surface, we might interpret the ‘alien robbery’ of Artaud’s self as a 
misrecognition of the nature of reality and a type of extreme Platonism (or, rather, 
Gnosticism).
31
 This is consistent with Derrida’s (1978) understanding of the Theatre 
of Cruelty as an attempt both to preserve and destroy metaphysics.  On the other hand, 
we might interpret the bodily aspect of his theory as a return to the things themselves 
                                                
30 ‘Possibility, as an existentiale does not signify a free floating potentiality-for-Being in the sense of 
the “liberty of indifference” (libertas indifferentiae).  In every case, Dasein, as essentially having a 
state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite possibilities. As the potentiality-for-Being which it is, 
it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly waiving the possibilities of its Being, or else it 
seizes upon them and makes mistakes. But this means that Dasein is Being possible which has been 
delivered over to itself – thrown possibility through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free 
for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible is transparent for itself in different possible 
ways and degrees’ (Heidegger 1962: H144). 
31  See Goodall for an extensive discussion in her chapter ‘Becoming the Alien Protagonist’ where she 
notes ‘The plotting and enactment of the gnostic drama reaches a new level of teleological 
determination in the transition from text to theatre as the laboratory for the alchemical recovery of 
presence’ (1994: 100).
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in the sense of a return to experience as the basis of thought rather than starting from a 
dualist outlook: 
[t]he theater is the only place in the world, the last general 
means we still possess of directly affecting the organism and, 
in periods of neurosis and petty sensuality like the one in 
which we are immersed, of attacking this sensuality by 
physical means it cannot withstand (1958: 81). 
If one can broaden the notion of philosophy to include this physical understanding 
and experience of Being, then the theatre is not bound to the metaphysical limits of 
traditional philosophy and literature. Artaud’s words suggest that the destruction of 
metaphysics can be carried out by the body. 
Artaud’s conception of theatre was to rebel against a dull and anaesthetised passivity 
in the audience safe from any understanding or impact by the real. Throughout TD he 
calls for the re-institution of danger into performance.
32
 In perhaps one of the most 
striking images of the Theatre of Cruelty, Artaud describes the poetic and balletic 
scene of a police raid on a brothel, where we are implicated in the drama, as cruel as 
the police and as guilty as the women arrested:  
[t]his is really total theater. Well, this total theater is the 
ideal. This anxiety, this guilt feeling, this victoriousness, this 
satisfaction, set the tone, feelings and state of mind in which 
the audience should leave our theatre, shaken and irritated by 
the inner dynamism of the show. This dynamism bears direct 
relation to the anxieties and pre-occupations of their whole 
lives (Artaud 1971: 16). 
For Artaud, the point of this quest for immediacy in theatre is to gain the self back 
from a disinterested art of dilettantes. He sees intellectual interpretations as making no 
difference in the real world and seeks a kind of performance that can have a direct 
impact on life. Artaud hopes to address the mismatch between the actor’s state and 
reality. This disconnection with reality is not limited to the theatre audience, but 
society in general which dupes itself with culture, civilisation, morals and 
philosophical systems. Artaud also challenged ineffectual theatre and theatre that 
induces passivity. This passivity is equivalent to an interpretation that is simply 
handed over to the audience, pre-digested rather than engaging the actors and 
audience in their own Being. Artaud felt that performance can reignite the uniqueness 
and individuality of existence; this might be understood in terms of what Heidegger 
understood as the ‘dictatorship of They’. Rather than see the individual self as 
somehow cut off from the world in a radial duality of existence (the mind-body split), 
Artaud wanted to dissolve the idle trivialities and sickness of the masses though 
deindividuation of spectacle.
33
 Mind and body are not seen as separate in his proposed 
                                                
32 ‘The contemporary theater is decadent because it has lost the feeling on the one hand for seriousness 
and on the other for laughter; because it has broken away from gravity, from effects that are immediate 
and painful – in a word from Danger’ (1958: 46). 
33 Victor Turner (1982) investigates the strange phenomenon experienced in the liminal phase of ritual 
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Theatre of Cruelty and there is a radical material continuity with existence brought 
about by the hidden forces of (impossible) unmediated symbols directly reacting on 
the spectators’ minds.
34
 In the throw of performance, everything becomes a radical 
materiality where the separation between the self and the world is dissolved. 
In the previous chapter, I introduced Heidegger’s idea that Dasein is not merely in a 
world comprised of objects and sheer materials but rather dwells with other people. 
Dasein lives in a with-world and encounters others everywhere it turns. Stanislavski 
was particularly interested in emotional involvement and interaction with objects and 
others there in our world; but here, Artaud is interested in the idea of who we are 
ourselves.
35
 He intends to investigate that Being through performance: ‘Theater is no 
thing, but makes use of everything – gestures, sounds, words, screams, light, darkness 
– rediscovers itself precisely at that point where the mind requires a language to 
express its manifestations’ (1958: 12). Heidegger too wants to begin the question over 
again and avoid the assumption that we are separated from the world and others 
within it as the relation between subjects and object. 
On Heidegger’s account, traditional ontology has understood the answer to the 
question ‘who?’ of Dasein as the ‘I myself’, ‘the subject’, or ‘the Self’. ‘Who a person 
is’ was thought of as a thing which maintained itself through different experiences 
and behaviours (1962: H114). A person’s identity was seen as something constantly 
present-at-hand. The human subject was born from the Latin word subjectum which 
already assumed such a separation. Alternatively from the Christian/Aristotelian 
tradition, a person was identified with their soul or substance that underlies manifest 
change in the physical world. As pointed out above in the tendency for tradition to 
cover itself up, the ‘who I am in each case’ was taken as given (Husserl) and beyond 
doubt or analysis (Descartes). Far from being simply transparent, Heidegger also 
thinks that the Self has a tendency to overlook itself (1962: H116). In fact, Heidegger 
suggests that for the most part, Dasein is precisely not-itself in so far as it fails to 
understand its ownmost possibilities and interprets itself as simply another thing 
alongside other things in the world (1962: H115). Mostly, Dasein has lost itself to the 
world. This is the mode of ‘everydayness’ (Alltäglichkeit) in which Dasein does not 
comport itself to its own existence in an authentic way. In this mode, Dasein fails to 
ask the question ‘who am I?’ and mistakenly asks ‘what am I?’36 
                                                                                                                                       
where participants both lose themselves to the event yet strangely that is when they are most 
themselves. 
34 ‘These symbols, the sign of ripe powers previously held in servitude and unavailable to reality, burst 
forth in the guise of incredible images which give freedom of the city and of existence to acts that are 
by nature hostile to the life of societies’ (1958: 28). 
35 No doubt Artaud (1958) is interested in emotion too – see ‘An Affective Athleticism’ – but this is not 
separate from the total organism. ‘In order to reforge the chain, the chain of a rhythm in which the 
spectator used to see his own reality in the spectacle, the spectator must be allowed to identify himself 
with the spectacle, breath by breath’ (1958: 140). 
36 ‘But if the Self is conceived “only” as a way of Being of this entity, this seems tantamount to 
volatising the real “core” of Dasein. Any apprehensiveness however which one may have about this 
gets its nourishment from the perverse assumption that the entity in question has at bottom the kind of 
Being which belongs to something present-at-hand, even if one is far from attributing to it the solidity 
of an occurrent corporeal thing. Yet man’s “substance” is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it 
is rather existence’ (1962: H117). 
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Artaud too was interested in the idea of answering ‘who?’ He constantly maintained 
that his own existence was unique and untranslatable into words. Yet rather than 
reject past metaphysical systems he sought to replace them with new ones which are 
directly present rather than split off from reality by transferring meaning of the sign. 
When Artaud writes about metaphysics, he is referring to hidden forces at work in the 
world, doubles that can be revealed in the theatre, signs which speak of hidden 
meaning, and symbols which conceal the reality that they communicate. In everyday 
life, we are for the most part asleep and unaware of the hidden connection between 
material and the true essence of reality that lies behind it. Artaud rejects being 
interpreted in terms of a literary tradition, what we might call the superficial talk of 
the They that has always been interpreted by the masses, always known, grasped. He 
wants to understand himself as a radically individuated and unique Being irreducible 
to mere words.
37
  
On this point, it may be useful to consider Heidegger’s account of others there in the 
world. By introducing the idea of the Others (die Anderen) Heidegger is not indicating 
isolated and separate entities that exist present-at-hand to Dasein. The Others are, 
rather, those from whom Dasein does not distinguish itself.
38
 Like the ready-to-hand, 
Others are discovered through the concerned involvement of Dasein within the world 
– environmentally and in terms of the projects and activities of Dasein at the time. In 
fact, just as Dasein can encounter others within the world, so too can it encounter 
itself: in what it does, uses, expects, avoids – those things in which it is most closely 
concerned (1962: H119). The important thing to remember is that Dasein does not 
encounter itself or others merely in terms of materiality – the present-at-hand – but 
rather in terms of its own existence.  Like the ready-to-hand, Others can be missing 
(1962: H121). When Dasein deals with tools it does so in concern (Besorge) whereas 
when it relates to Others, it does so in solicitude (Fürsorge). The overall way that 
Dasein relates to the world – including objects, tools, others with the same kind of 
Being and Dasein and itself – is in care (Sorge). So there is a second 
misunderstanding in Dasein to interpret itself not only in terms of objects within the 
world, but also in terms of Others there rather than who Dasein is itself. 
Most of the time, then, the ‘who’ of Dasein is not its own self (although this sounds 
like a paradox). For the most part, Dasein is anonymous, unindividiuated and 
determined by its relation to Others there in the world. Strictly, this is a way of being 
for any self. It is not the assertion that Dasein is not identical with itself, but rather 
whether or not it brings its self understanding from its own possibilities or from the 
world around. Heidegger calls this self given from the outside the ‘They-self’.
39
 The 
‘who’ of everyday being is where Dasein is not itself – it is the ‘They’ (das Man). In 
                                                
37 Again, in ‘La parole soufflée’ Derrida (1978) ponders the impossibility of dealing with the unique, 
the non-relational case of Artaud which refuses to be an example of clinical or critical discourse. 
38 ‘By “Others” we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the “I” stands out. 
They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among 
whom one is too’ (1962: H118). I am always reminded of when someone turns up and asks ‘where is 
everyone?’ – as if you were not one of the ones whom they care about or identify with… 
39 ‘Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The “they”, which supplies the answer to the question 
‘who’ of everyday Dasein, is the “nobody” to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in 
Being-among-one-another’ (1962: H128). 
Active Metaphysics 
 
 133 
English, das Man might be translated as ‘one’, the impersonal pronoun, as in ‘one 
does what one can’, for instance. In this impersonal mode, Dasein stands in subjection 
to the Others and to the world. Instead of understanding who it is in itself, Dasein 
understands itself in terms of what it is not. 
And when indeed, one’s knowing oneself gets lost in such 
ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a 
disguise, Being-with-one-another must follow special routes 
of its own in order to come close to Others or even to ‘see 
through them’ (1962: H124). 
Generally, Dasein does not know itself nor does it really know Others there with it in 
the world in an authentic way. Mostly, Dasein just passes by Others in ‘publicness’ 
(Öffentlichkeit).  Dasein also takes on this kind of Being in everydayness in relation to 
its self-understanding – it does not see itself as unique in its own Being (as 
possibilities). In ‘distantiality’ (Abständigkeit) Dasein constantly sees itself in 
comparison to the way Others are, whether it ‘lags behind’ or ‘forges ahead’ (1962: 
H126).  In ‘averageness’, Dasein takes on the general opinion of the Others – ‘what 
they say’. In publicness, Dasein’s understanding gets ‘levelled down’ (Einebnung). In 
this state, there is nothing that is new, interesting or unthought except that which has 
already been interpreted by the They.  
The They is an existentiale – a possible way of being. It is how we are for the most 
part everyday. ‘Everyone is other and no one is himself’ (1962: H128). Everyday 
Dasein is a kind of ‘nobody’ and ‘everybody’, surrendered to Being-among-one-
another. The They is inauthentic in so far as it fails to stand on its own. It is 
indifferent to genuineness and individuality and does not have a special relationship to 
Being related to things, or transparency that authentic Dasein has. Publicness never 
gets to the heart of the matters; everything gets obscured, everything gets passed off 
as familiar and accessible to everyone. The They-self is a radically unindividuated 
self that denies all responsibility, particularity and visibility. The They are ‘alongside 
everyone everywhere’ but they steal away whenever there is a definite decision to be 
made (1962: H127). The They presents every judgment as its own, and deprives 
Dasein of every individual answerability. In its everydayness, Dasein is disburdened 
(entlasten) by the They. Dasein has a tendency to make things easy and let them come 
easily. The They disburdens Dasein of its Being and strengthens its dominion. But the 
They is hard to grasp, behaves more and more openly and becomes slier. It shows the 
real subject of everydayness. 
Heidegger’s description of the They is an uncanny sketch of Artaud’s alienation from 
himself. Instead of standing in subjection to the world and having possibilities handed 
over to him by the world, Artaud wants to usurp his own relation to the world 
drastically together with that of the actor and audience. As Derrida (1978) argues, he 
wants to step outside the relational structure of the world that constitutes the 
possibility of representation. By creating performance, by controlling the hidden 
forces behind material reality, Artaud thinks that he is able to be himself. In this way, 
Artaud claims not to know himself (in a way expressible in words), but rather to 
coincide with himself in a way that is not reduced to intellectual or cognitive 
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understanding of Being. I argue that this understanding is existential in that it sees the 
self as a total relation to existence which includes feeling, emotion, physicality, and 
materiality. It is an embodied understanding of Being. Artaud’s ideal spectator is not 
lost or disburdened by a sense of anonymity or social norm, but rather transgresses 
society’s conventions, moralities, traditions and becomes themself. In this 
interpretation, Artaud’s understanding of theatre maintains the possibility of 
overcoming the subjugating, subjecting dominance of the They by reforging a radical 
continuity with materiality, meaning and the world. For Artaud, theatre is the way to 
smash the tranquillised everydayness of the They; for Heidegger it is philosophy. In 
this sense, for Artaud acting is a practical and visceral philosophy. 
In the World of Signs: Understanding, Language and Discourse 
Both Heidegger and Artaud begin from a wider conception of human understanding 
than mere knowing. Action, whether in creativity on the stage or in everyday life, is 
the basis for existence. Artaud’s writing points towards actors as manual philosophers 
because they engage with the total human organism rather than from a merely 
intellectual standpoint. As such, language is part of the way we are in the world, but 
not the totality. 
From an early age, Artaud struggled with the problem of expressing something he 
held to be secret or inaccessible in language and felt that he was separated from his 
own existence.
40
 Even when he ventured into poetic means of expression, he felt that 
something was missing in transmission or more precisely something was stolen by 
unseen metaphysical forces.
41
 He turned to theatre as a possible medium in which he 
felt the presence of the body coincided with the act of communication (rather than in 
the written word where the sign was always outside or cut off from himself as 
speaker).
42
 In fact, he moved towards the idea of doing away with words altogether 
and usurp the traditional understanding of literature as the basis for theatre. He 
continually called for ways in which to make Being imminent through performance. 
For Artaud, theatre was the place where his true self could be reunited with itself. In 
order for that moment to happen Artaud believed that a destruction needs to be 
brought about. 
Language is a crucial issue to both Heidegger and Artaud. On the one hand, Artaud 
                                                
40 ‘I am that eternal absent from itself/ Who always walks beside his own path./ And one day when my 
souls left me, tomorrow /  I shall awake in an ancient town’ (‘The Poem of St Francis of Assisi’, 
Artaud 1988: 4). 
41 ‘There is something which destroys my thought; something which does not prevent me from being 
what I might be, but which leaves me, so to speak, in suspension. Something furtive which robs me of 
the words that I have found, which reduces my mental tension, which is gradually destroying in its 
substance the body of my thought, which is even robbing me of the memory of those idioms with 
which one expresses oneself and which translate accurately the most inseparable, the most localized, 
the most living inflections of thought. I shall not go on. I do not need to describe my state’(‘A letter to 
Dr Jacques Rivière’ 1988: 35). 
42 ‘It has not been definitively proved that the language of words is the best possible language. And it 
seems that on the stage, which is above all a space to fill and a place where something happens, the 
language of words my have to give way before a language of signs whose objective aspect is the one 
that has the most immediate impact upon us’ (‘Letters on Language’, Artaud 1958: 107). 
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wishes the impossible hope of a hieroglyphics with the ability to communicate 
directly with an audience (and the self).
43
 On the other hand, Heidegger thinks that we 
are born into language and it is as much handed over to us as the material constraints 
of the world but that language has the ability to reveal something about Being. The 
traditional understanding of Being is handed over through language, and through a 
process of digging back to the origin of words, the inquirer can glean a truth that has 
been covered up throughout history.
44
 Heidegger’s work has been attacked for being 
particularly obscure and inaccessible to the philosophically lay reader yet part of the 
design of his treatise is aimed at ‘taking back their language from Rome’ as Derrida 
puts it. The density of his language is aimed at overcoming the metaphysical ways of 
thinking that have been handed over and sedimented into words. For Heidegger, 
articulation and interpretation are merely part of a wider understanding of Being-in-
the-world which comes before the logic of propositions and the world.
45
 Ferdinand de 
Saussure identified the arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified, but 
this is a firmly entrenched dualistic understanding of Dasein’s relation to language. 
According to Heidegger, we do not experience the world in a radical separation of 
words from things, but rather as a unified whole which we do not even notice for the 
most part.
46
 Artaud felt separated from his own words which failed to service his 
desire to express Being itself. His solution was to return to the mystical, spiritual and 
forceful origins of theatre. In a way, Heidegger and Artaud both want to let Being 
speak for itself. 
One of the extreme examples of Artaud’s understanding of language can be found in 
Derrida’s (1994) essay, ‘Maddening the Subjectile’. Derrida unpacks the strange 
word, ‘subjectile’, which Artaud mentions just a handful of times in his letters to 
various correspondents. The word has a relation to the material surface or support of a 
painting used in textile and design discourse. Derrida draws the word out in its 
resonances and connotations as subject/object, projectile, lying beneath. In one letter 
Artaud claims to have been betrayed by the subjectile. On one of the letters in which 
                                                
43 THE LANGUAGE OF THE STAGE: It is not a question of suppressing the spoken language, but of 
giving words approximately the importance they have in dreams. 
Meanwhile new means of recording this language must be found, whether these means belong to 
musical transcription or some other code. 
As for ordinary objects, or even the human body, raised to the dignity of signs, it is evident that one can 
draw one’s inspiration from hieroglyphic characters, not only in order to record these signs in a fashion 
that permits them to be reproduced at will, but in order to compose on the stage precise and 
immediately readable symbols” From ‘The Theater of Cruelty (First Manifesto)’(1958: 94). 
44 Take Heidegger’s analysis of the word phenomenology (1962: 28ff) as a kind of archaeology of 
original meaning of the term, for instance. 
45 ‘The fundamental existentialia which constitute the Being of the “there”, the disclosedness of Being-
in-the-world, are states-of-mind and understanding. In understanding there lurks the possibility of 
interpretation – that is, of appropriating what is understood. In so far as a state-of-mind is 
equiprimordial with an act of understanding, it maintains itself in a certain understanding. Thus, there 
corresponds to it a certain capacity for getting interpreted’ (1962: H161).  
46 ‘The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. Language is a totality of words – a totality 
in which discourse has a “worldly” Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality 
thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. Language can be broken up into 
word-Things which are present-at-hand. Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose 
disclosedness it Articulates according to significations, has, as its type of Being, Being-in-the-world – a 
Being which has been thrown and submitted to the “world”’ (1962: H161). 
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he refers to the subjectile, Artaud had scratched off, mutilated and burnt a portion of 
the page where presumably the subjectile itself had appeared by his hand. In a sense, 
the subjectile is an extension of Artaud’s earlier conception of theatre as a physical 
manifestation of thought and Being itself. Again, rather than see the world in dualistic 
terms, Artaud seems to be pointing towards the materiality of the mind and his own 
eternal struggle to find its manifestation (on the stage or in real life). The subjectile is 
neither subject nor object, sign nor signified. The throwing of the subjectile (Derrida’s 
extracts ‘projectile’ form this mysterious word) is related to Heidegger’s concept of 
thrown subject. Cruelty lies in the determinism of the world and its handing over of 
possibilities to the individual subject. Yet the subjectile has a force over and above its 
physical materiality, a force that has the power to betray the true nature of reality. 
Throughout TD, Artaud hints towards the invention of a new language unhampered 
by words, tradition and interpretation based on Oriental language and symbolism 
(hieroglyphics, Chinese ideograms, Japanese symbols, Balinese dance gestures, 
Mexican mythology and Indian yogic practices). Whether or not we choose to see 
Artaud’s ideas as radical cultural misinterpretation and culturally imperialist 
appropriation, he believes that language should be returned to its materiality, sonority, 
texture, sensibility and touch, rather than be constrained and constructed by rational 
meaning. In fact, Artaud was very much interested in releasing the unconscious 
relations connecting symbols, words, gestures and sounds.
47
 In this way, he refuses to 
reduce man to the definition of a ‘rational  animal’. For Artaud, the ultimate 
possibility for communication over and above the text lies in its physicality and 
materiality – something that he feels contemporary theatre overlooks in its obsession 
with words, character and psychology. But hidden in that physical reality is a force. 
For Artaud, Being is not reducible to rational processes. 
In overturning the dominance of the text, Artaud champions the mise-en-scène – 
comprising the scenic and physical elements of staging – over intellectual and 
psychological approaches.
48
 Poetry is thus transferred into physical gestures which 
offer a far greater potential to affect the audience not merely on a rational level but on 
all aspects of the organism.  
Heidegger is adamant that Dasein first comes to understand the world not from a 
detached and theoretical point of view, but in involved activity. Our understanding of 
the world is not something that is even necessarily articulated explicitly because we 
are just busy doing stuff. Nevertheless, our understanding develops as we go about 
our daily tasks and that is reflected in the way that our behaviours change. Humans 
develop an interpretation of the world and act accordingly (see 1962: H148ff). 
Dasein can make assertions about the world, but this is making a break from pre-
reflective, involved activity. So, when a hammer is too heavy for instance, we point 
out its deficiency because of a relation to that involvement. Assertion (Aussage) is the 
                                                
47 ‘Considered in this light, the work of the mise-en-scène assumes a kind of intellectual dignity from 
the effacement of words behind gestures and from the fact that the esthetic, plastic part of theater drops 
its role of decorative intermediary in order to become, in the proper sense of the word, a directly 
communicative language’ (1958: 107). 
48 See especially ‘Metaphysics and the Mise en Scène’ in TD (1958: 33-47). 
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pointing out of a particular characteristic of the thing (1962: H156) in relation to 
involved activity. Past philosophy of language (Sprache), has been mistaken in seeing 
language as the combination of different propositions about things rather than from 
the involved whole. To put it another way, when saying that a hammer is too heavy, 
we are making a judgment about the tool and its usefulness for the task. Heidegger 
thinks that our regular relation to the world is not about making judgments, which 
presupposes a separation of the subject and the object, but is rather always predicated 
on an understanding of world as a whole. Assertion is not simply the mode of pointing 
things out that are present-at-hand. Assertions are already nested in the overall 
involvements structure of signs, and more generally, tools. This is the ‘as-structure’ of 
the world where we can come to see things as good for a particular use with respect to 
our involved activity. This structure reveals the very worldhood of the world (1962: 
H158). 
Language has its basis in ‘talk’ or ‘discourse’ (Rede) (1962: H160-61). Discourse 
makes things intelligible. The idea of discourse is also linked to the way that we are 
with others in the world. Rather than being isolated subjects expressing things to each 
other, Heidegger suggests that discourse precedes the individual speech act. As such, 
discourse or talk is a precondition of our Being-there. It also determines the possible 
ways that we are able to interpret ourselves. We are thrown into the world which 
already has a general intelligibility that is passed on to us. Language is thus not 
something simply ready-to-hand, but rather has a different kind of Being. Heidegger 
leaves the question open as to whether that Being is the same kind of Being that 
Dasein has (1962: H166).  Nevertheless, language and poetry have a particular 
importance in their ability to uncover Being: 
Being-in and its state-of-mind are made known in discourse 
and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the 
tempo of talk, ‘the way of speaking’ In ‘poetical’ discourse, 
the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s 
state-of-mind can become an aim in itself and this amounts 
to a disclosing of existence (1962: H162). 
These physical and poetical aspects of speech and language are those Artaud focuses 
on as providing a deep connection to Being and his own existence. Yet Artaud’s 
world and use of language is one in constant breakdown and deficiency. Finding the 
right poetic expression is difficult for him because as soon as a thought occurs, it is 
lost in inadequate words and restricted by a fixed meaning. Heidegger also recognises 
the difficulty of pinning Being down with language as he famously quoted Hölderlin, 
‘poetically man dwells on this earth’. Poetic language for both Heidegger and Artaud 
moves away from assertion and judgments of everyday understanding towards a 
disclosure of Being.  
The Tempting View: Falling Understanding 
For both Heidegger and Artaud, everyday life overlooks Being. For Heidegger, this is 
simply a matter of ontology (rather than any moral objection to everydayness as a 
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mode of Being).
49
 Dasein has the tendency of ‘falling’ (verfallen) in its everyday 
understanding of Being. For Heidegger, the movement of falling is tempting and 
'tranquillising' (beruhigend). Falling is a kind of forgetfulness of Being. It is an 
understanding of Being that deteriorates and decays. The tendency of falling is 
‘tempting’ (versucherisch)  because it allows the everyday subject to escape from the 
painful reality of life and existence. Artaud felt a separation from true understanding 
of Being too. He felt that he was not of this world in the same way as he thought 
others were.
50
 He sought to overcome the ‘falling temptation’ of the world by pushing 
the cruel structures of existence to their own limits within themselves.
51
 He felt that 
true Being could be uncovered in performance where the everyday structures of the 
world could be suspended (in what Schechner and Turner later called liminal 
experiences). In the world of play, a true force could be unleashed which overcomes 
falling – the worldliness of the world and the timeliness of time which constrict the 
possibilities of our own existence.
52
 
Artaud sees both his own self and culture in general to be in a fallen state. He rejects 
the ‘idle talk’ of interpretation and literary chatter situating himself outside such a 
superficial world. By rejecting this interpretation of the They, he posited himself as a 
unique existence outside idle talk and scribbling. He rejected contemporary theatre 
with its penchant for fashion and curiosity of the new. He rejected the ambiguity of 
interpretation in words and sought after a material presence in performance. The 
Theatre of Cruelty rejects tranquillising morality and attempts to shake up life. Far 
from disburdening the self in anonymity, the Theatre of Cruelty makes that burden 
heavier to crush the tranquillised everyday understanding of the subject. No doubt 
Artaud believes that the antidote to the fallen state can be found in a theatre which 
abandons psychology, stages natural conflicts, releases forces, induces trance, 
addresses the human organism, and provides a primal, tribal music. Yet Artaud is not 
sure whether it is even a world worth saving: 
[t]here is a risk involved, but in the present circumstances, I 
believe that it is a risk worth running. I do not believe we 
have managed to revitalize the world we live in, and I do not 
believe it is worth the trouble of clinging to; but I do propose 
something to get us out of our marasmus, instead of 
continuing to complain about it, and about the boredom, 
inertia and stupidity of everything (1958: 83). 
                                                
49 ‘Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of 
everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations of a “philosophy of culture”’ (1962: H167). 
50 ‘This lack of connection to the object which characterizes all of literature is in me a lack of 
connection to life. As for myself, I can truly say that I am not in the world, and this is not merely an 
attitude of mind’ (‘A letter to Jacques Rivière, 25 May, 1924’, 1988: 44). 
51 For Artaud, theatre ‘invites the mind to share a delirium which exalts the its energies; and we can see 
to conclude that from the human point of view, the action of theater, like that of plague, is beneficial, 
for, impelling men to see themselves as they are, it causes the mask to fall, reveals the lie, the 
slackness, baseness, and hypocrisy of our world’ (1958: 31). 
52 ‘Like Jesus Christ there is also the one who never descended to earth because man was too small for 
him and who remained in the abysses of the infinite like a so-called divine immanence who tirelessly 
and like a buddha of his own contemplation, waits until the BEING is sufficiently perfect to come 
down and enter his body…’ (‘A letter to Henri Parisot, 7 September, 1945’, 1988: 441). 
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Artaud can be interpreted in at least two ways with respect to Heidegger’s concept of 
falling in BT. Either his metaphysical claims are a symptom of an inauthentic falling 
and a misunderstanding of the world, or he saw something deeper and more truthful 
about human existence. In a way, neither of these interpretations is correct because 
Artaud wanted to reject the structure of Being and the world in the first place. He 
wanted to lose himself in a radically unindividuated experience of performance and 
spectacle.53 But remember that Artaud’s vision was of a cruel theatre, not a passive, 
tranquillising distraction, a trivialising performance which he saw as the norm in 
contemporary practice. The term ‘cruelty’ is meant as a signifying world that is 
outside our control, not simply physical violence: 
One can very well imagine a pure cruelty, without bodily 
laceration. And philosophically speaking what indeed is 
cruelty? From the point of view of the mind, cruelty signifies 
rigor, implacable intention and decision, irreversible and 
absolute determination (1958: 101). 
According to Artaud, the symbolism of imminent natural disasters that threaten our 
very existence should be thrust to the heart of the theatre.
54
 Rather than run from the 
meaningless and unjust world outside of human control, Artaud wants theatre to 
reawaken a new understanding of our existence unhampered by social, moral and 
aesthetic distractions. 
The alienation of Artaud from his own true self is born out of his lack of control and 
power over his own existence or inevitable forces operating in the cosmos. This is 
what he calls cruelty, and could be interpreted by what Heidegger calls the same 
phenomenon: the ‘null’ (nichtig)  ground of existence; the thought that at the root of 
it, there is no meaning in Nature. We must accept the baselessness of our own 
existence and take on the possibilities handed over to us and make them our own 
(eigen). Artaud too wants a kind of surrender to cruelty wherein performers can 
transcend their own limited existence and pass over into a mystical universal thus 
coinciding not with the being of a particular entity but rather with Being (itself).
55
 For 
Artaud, theatre has the unique capacity to give us back our Being because it is not 
limited by signification and knowing, but by a total human understanding, engaging 
the whole of the human organism. Therefore, we stop interpreting ourselves in terms 
of what we are not (a falling interpretation in terms of the world) but simply as what 
                                                
53 Compare this with Nietzsche’s Dionysian theatre. Goodall quotes Allen Weiss, suggesting that 
Artaud’s ‘Gnostic project of self-creation involves combating the work both of Apollo as ‘the body 
traced by the Gestalt of “good form, by identity, order, memory” and of Dionysis as “the body marked 
by difference, disorder, the unformed, disintegration, forgetting”’ (1994: 38). 
54 Writing about Lucas van den Leyden’s painting ‘The Daughters of Lot’, Artaud claims that ‘there is 
no better way of expressing this submission of the different elements of landscape to the fire revealed 
in the sky of this painting than by saying that even though they possess their own light, they remain in 
spite of everything related to this sudden fire as dim echoes, living points of reference born from it and 
placed where they are to permit it to exercise its full destructive force’ (1958: 35). 
55 ‘These howls, these rolling eyes, this continuous abstraction, these noises of branches, noises of the 
cutting and rolling of wood, all within the immense area of widely diffused sounds disgorged from 
many sources, combine to overwhelm the mind, to crystallize as a new end, I dare say, concrete 
conception of the abstract’ (1958: 64). 
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we are. In performance Being is. It is not simply spoken about. 
Heidegger describes the task of philosophy not only as a destruction of the erroneous 
history of metaphysics whilst preserving what was good in past investigations, but 
also as explaining why Being has been misunderstood. This is partly because Being 
has a tendency to hide and conceal itself. This tendency needs to be reversed in a 
movement of ‘unconcealing’ or ‘uncovering’ (entdecken) of truth (which happens to 
be the phenomenological method in this case). Heidegger also claims that Dasein has 
a tendency to interpret itself in terms of the world – as just another thing present-at-
hand. Dasein also tends to be drawn along by the interpretation of the They in an 
unindividuated, anonymous way.  
This tendency for Dasein to interpret itself in this way is what Heidegger calls falling. 
The word falling has obvious resonances with the Christian conception of the Fall and 
other negative connotations but Heidegger is adamant that he is neither trying to 
present a moral judgment on our everyday mode of being nor contribute to a 
philosophy of culture. He claims that the term is meant purely in an ontological 
sense.
56
 So he is not saying that everydayness is good or bad. It is simply how we are 
for the most part. 
For Heidegger, falling has three characteristics tied up with the general way that 
Dasein is in the world: idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity (1962: H167ff). These are 
also intertwined with the existential aspects of Being-in: understanding, state-of-mind 
and discourse. Idle talk (Gerede) is found in the way that Dasein speaks out of the 
traditional way of understanding things. It is a superficial kind of talk that seems to be 
more about talk itself rather than truly getting at the matters in question. Idle talk is 
the general ‘chit-chat’ and gossip based in hearsay rather than any truthful 
understanding of things. An ‘average intelligibility’ gets passed along in idle talk 
which pretends to understand everything. Writing too has its own kind of idle talk 
which Heidegger calls ‘scribbling’ (Geschreibe). Idle talk is a general intelligibility of 
the public which suppresses new inquiry and holds it back. Dasein grows up in this 
understanding of idle talk, which determines its state-of-mind (specifically, moods) 
and what one sees. In this ‘there’ Dasein gets uprooted and the general opinion 
becomes its reality. The second quality of falling is ‘curiosity’ (Neugier) where 
Dasein gets taken up by the mere ‘look’ of things rather than delve into a deeper 
understanding of what is before them. Abandoned and absorbed in the world, 
everyday Dasein does not look and observe what is close by, but rather continually 
seeks novelty and is constantly driven by distraction. In this way, everyday Dasein 
never dwells anywhere; it is continually uprooted in this curiosity. Idle talk shows 
what one should be curious about and tells Dasein what to read and see. Nothing is 
closed off for curiosity in seeing, and nothing is understood in idle talk. Thirdly, 
everydayness is characterised by ‘ambiguity’ (Zweideutigkeit) whereby it is 
impossible to say what is disclosed in genuine understanding and what is not. Not 
only does Dasein think it understands things in the world, but also Others there and its 
own Self. This affects how we manage the world, how we understand it and Dasein’s 
                                                
56 Incidentally, Falling is largely seen as a secularisation of elements of Kierkegaard’s thought. See 
Philosophical Myths of the Fall, Mulhall (2005a). 
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own possibilities for Being. Everyone has already ‘sniffed out’ what needs to be done, 
taken hold of what is up for discussion and has a power over the possibilities of 
Dasein. Everything that gets done is not original – they could have done it – and there 
is a constant moving on of attention. Idle talk moves on at a faster rate, and covers up 
what has become ineffective, once the common interest has died away. Superficial 
talk gets passed off as what is really happening. Dasein’s understanding is constantly 
going wrong in its projects and genuine understanding of the possibilities for its own 
Being. The other constantly dominates Dasein, it is constantly there. Everyone keeps 
an eye on the other watching what others will do and say. What seems like a for-one-
another is actually an against-one-another (1962: H175). As thrown Being-with-one-
another in the world, disguise and distortion enters the scene. But publicly, this 
disguise is always hidden. 
Artaud’s Gnostic understanding of existence can be seen as a ‘fallenness’ in humanity 
which is in need of redress. For Heidegger, philosophy can overcome the existential 
blindness of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity by authentic attention to the question of 
Being. Artaud sees acting and physical expression as the antidote to our superficial 
everyday understanding of Being. 
For Heidegger, everyday Dasein understands everything and compares itself to 
everything and drifts along in alienation (Entfremdung). Its own potentiality for Being 
is hidden from it. This alienation closes Dasein off from authentic possibilities and 
forces it into inauthenticity as a way of Being of itself. Dasein gets entangled in itself. 
In the same way, Artaud felt alienated from himself as a totality, though he saw 
theatre and acting as a key way in which to reunite the whole self. 
Artaud’s claim that he is not entirely himself may well be interpreted as an acute 
awareness of what Heidegger calls falling. Instead of turning to philosophy as a 
means to discover the authentic Self, Artaud believed that physical exploration of 
Being offers a fullness that words will always fail to express. Falling is the tendency 
for Being to conceal itself and already part of the characteristic way that Dasein 
understands itself. Dasein already seeks the tranquillising interpretation of the They, 
hoping to disburden itself of responsibility and jump from new experience to new 
experience without ever authentically trying to understand anything. For Artaud, 
overcoming what Heidegger would call falling is the purpose of theatre. For 
Heidegger, such an overcoming is the role of philosophy. In this sense, Artaud’s actor 
is a manual philosopher. 
World-revealing and Anxiety 
For Heidegger, Anxiety is a mood in which the worldhood of the world is revealed. It 
is an important mood for phenomenology because it reveals the structures of human 
involvement in the world through a kind of disengaged absence. Anxiety, as explained 
by Heidegger, is the non-specific fear about nothing, or rather the world itself (1962: 
H188ff). Existence itself becomes something feared in Anxiety and in this mood, the 
regular falling understanding of the world is confronted. Artaud saw this 
confrontation as possible in performance. I suggest that Artaud is not expressing 
mental illness in the description of his own condition, but rather articulating an 
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existential Anxiety (Angst) about the world itself.57 For Artaud, acting is manual 
philosophy precisely because it can reveal the structures of existence. When watching 
a performance of the visiting Balinese dance troupe to Paris in 1931, Artaud saw the 
vision of theatre he had been trying to express: 
[h]ere we are suddenly in deep metaphysical anguish, and 
the rigid aspect of the body in trance, stiffened by the tide of 
cosmic forces which besiege it, is admirably expressed by 
that frenetic dance of rigidities and angles, in which one 
suddenly feels the mind begin to plummet downwards (1958: 
65). 
The metaphysical anguish is the performers’ encounter with the truth of existence. 
Artaud’s very self was in breakdown and might reveal what Heidegger calls the 
‘uncanny’ (unheimlich) nature of the world from which he was trying to flee. By 
arguing that Artaud’s self is in breakdown we might say that the very world itself 
becomes visible as what it is.58 Artaud claimed that his words were not the ravings of 
a madman or descended from some illness (unless it be the truth-revealing effects of 
the plague) but rather a deeper truth about existence that could not be expressed in 
regular language.
59
 
By citing Artaud as one who was existentially anxious, we might be able to make 
some sense of what he was talking about. In one sense his mental state denied any 
dualistic interpretation of the world and representation as a subject separated from the 
world because he saw a unity of existence in the materiality of the body and 
experience. Perhaps even ‘subjectile’ is a word from which Heidegger may have 
benefited (Derrida 1994). If the self is thrown into the world which is largely beyond 
its own control in determining available possibilities and even its understanding of its 
own Being, then the subjectile could be that which throws itself into the world. It may 
even be that the subjectile is thrown through the work of art: Heidegger later came to 
ponder that works often have a similar (if not identical) type of Being as Dasein 
itself.
60
 In this sense, humans relate to a work of art not merely as an object but more 
in the way that we comport ourselves towards other Daseins. 
Cruelty for Artaud reveals the true nature of the universe. Rather than running away 
                                                
57 On the issue of Artaud’s madness, see Sylvère Lotringer’s ‘The Art of the Crack Up’ (Scheer 2000) 
and ‘Interview with Jacques Latrémolière’ in Scheer (2004).  
58 See, for instance, Heidegger’s analysis of equipment and the way in which tools become visible 
when they are missing, broken or in the way, ‘How the Worldly Character of the Environment 
Announces itself in Entities Within-the-world’  (H72ff). 
59 ‘One must not be too quick to judge men, one must trust them to the point of absurdity, to the dregs. 
These ventured works which often seem to you the product of a mind which is not yet in possession of 
itself, and perhaps will never be, who knows what a brain they conceal, what power of life, what 
mental fever which only the circumstances have reduced. But enough of myself and my works to be, I 
no longer ask anything but to feel my brain’ (‘A letter to Jacques Rivière 6 June 1924’, (1988: 46). 
60 ‘The artwork opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e. this revealing, i.e. 
the truth of beings happens in the work. In the artwork, the truth of beings has set itself to work. Art is 
truth setting itself to work. What is truth itself, that it sometimes propriates as art? What is this setting-
itself-to-work?’ (‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, 1993: 165). 
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from the truth, we should be facing the void.
61
 Artaud is suggesting that we let the 
forces of cruelty show themselves as they are in the theatre, but not in a totally 
disinterested and passive way as traditional theatre had come to be. For Artaud, the 
poetry of the stage can release real forces from the unconscious and from materiality 
itself. 
The state-of-mind of Anxiety is a special mood which can reveal the Being of the 
world to Dasein according to Heidegger. Heidegger begins with the concrete analysis 
of falling (how it manifests itself in a particular mood) (1962: H184ff). Dasein is 
absorbed in the They and the world of concern where it flees from something away 
from its own authentic potentiality-for-Being-itself. Dasein avoids coming face to 
face with itself and this is in accordance to the inertia of falling.  Being one’s-Self has 
been closed off by falling. But the turning away of falling understanding also 
discloses the there. In this way, we can see the Self as that which Dasein turns away 
from. Anxiety is related to fear but rather than shrinking back from something specific 
in the environment as fear does, Anxiety shrinks back from Being-in-the-world in 
general. There is no specific entity in the world that is threatening in Anxiety, but it is 
not nothing. That which is feared seems to be nowhere. When Dasein is anxious, it 
doesn’t know what it is anxious about. What threatens is close, oppressive and 
stifling. But this ‘nothing’ and ‘nowhere’ reveals the world as such. What threatens is 
not some object present-at-hand, but rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in 
general. Dasein is anxious about the world. Anxiety is also about something, which 
turns out to be the potentiality of Being. Anxiety takes away the possibility of Dasein 
understanding itself. Neither the world nor others offer this anymore. In this way, 
Anxiety individualises Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world and shows Dasein 
as Being-possible. Anxiety shows that Dasein can be free for choosing itself and free 
for the authenticity of its Being and authentic possibilities. Anxiety reveals Being-in-
the-world. 
Consider this description in relation to Artaud’s later writings which reveal a mental 
state which he claims to reveal Being: 
It is done. I have really fallen into the Void since everything 
– that makes up this world – has just succeeded in making 
me despair. / For one does not know that one is no longer in 
the world until one sees that the world has left you... / Now 
no longer existing myself, I see what exists. / I really 
identified myself with that Being, that Being which has 
ceased to exist. / And that Being has revealed everything to 
me. / I knew it, but I could not say it, and if I can begin to 
say it, it is because I have left reality (from ‘New 
                                                
61 ‘What exists, I see with certainty. What does not exist, I shall create, if I must. 
For a long time I have felt the Void, but I have refused to throw myself into the Void. 
I have been as cowardly as all that I see. 
When I believed that I was denying this world, I know that I was denying the Void. 
For I know that this world does not exist and I know how it does not exist. 
What I have suffered from until now is having denied the Void. 
The Void is already within me’ (‘The New Revelations of Being’, 1988: 413). 
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Revelations of Being’ 1988: 414). 
State-of-mind shows ‘how one is’ and in Anxiety, Dasein feels ‘uncanny’ 
(unheimlich) (1962: H188ff). Dasein is not at home in the world anymore, not in a 
geometrical sense of Being-in, but in the existential sense of Being at home which is 
related to dwelling. Everyday familiarity collapses and Dasein is not-at-home. In 
falling, Dasein flees towards entities so that it can dwell in tranquillity but in this 
uncanniness, Dasein is delivered over to itself in its own Being. No longer is Dasein 
lost in the They, nor can it assure itself in everyday concern. It is not a darkness in 
which there is nothing to see. The world is still there, but it is there more obtrusively. 
Everyday Dasein turns from this uncanniness and gets dimmed down. But Heidegger 
thinks that this uncanniness is the more primordial phenomenon. Real anxiety is 
uncommon, and may even be based in physiological causes, but this does not take 
away what it reveals about the existential there of Dasein. Anxiety offers a distinctive 
disclosing of the world, Being-in and the Self and shows authenticity and 
inauthenticity as possibilities of Being. They are undisguised as entities within the 
world to which Dasein regularly clings. 
We might even read Artaud as having left the structures of the world altogether if this 
were not impossible: 
It is a real Desperate Person who speaks to you and who has 
not known the happiness of being in the world until now that 
he has left this world, now that he is absolutely separated 
from it. / The others who have died are not separated, They 
still turn around their dead bodies. / I am not dead, but I am 
separated (1988: 414). 
Heidegger claims that real Anxiety is rare (1962: H190), but I suggest that if anyone 
was really anxious, it was Artaud. 
Being Whole: Being-towards-death 
Both Heidegger and Artaud see death as crucial to understanding existence. Acting is 
manual philosophy for Artaud because in performance it is possible to face the totality 
of life and Being. He turns to the theatre as an art form because it offers the 
unrepeatable gesture, the uniquely individual moment. In the ephemeral moment of 
performance lies a death. But for Artaud that death is liberating (or perhaps cruel). In 
the moment of acting, he believes he transcends representation: 
Let us leave textual criticism to graduate students, formal 
criticism to esthetes, and recognize that what has been said is 
not still to be said; that an expression does not have the same 
value twice, does not live two lives; that all words, once 
spoken are dead and function only at the moment when they 
are uttered, that a form, once it has served, cannot be used 
again and asks only to be replaced by another, and that the 
theater is the only place in the world where a gesture, once 
made, can never be made the same way twice (from ‘No 
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More Masterpieces’ 1958: 75). 
For Artaud, the singularity of the theatrical gesture is the individuating moment of 
death. In fact, his view of this unrepeatability is beyond the structures of life and 
death, of incomplete existence. The Theatre of Cruelty is a singular gesture beyond 
representation. 
Artaud constantly claimed that he lacked totality.
62
 This is partly because of the very 
structure of the world which of its nature is incomplete. Heidegger notes the inherent 
structure of human existence in that as long as we are there is always something 
outstanding – there is more to come (1962: H236). Dasein is  always a not-yet. Artaud 
also notes the significance of Becoming and one might suggest that this is exactly the 
reason why he felt that theatre was the proper medium in which to reunite Being with 
itself because it is entirely immersed in the temporal structure of the world.
63
 So not 
only do we lack control over the world in which we have arrived as human beings, we 
also lack totality because we are still not yet what is to come. Artaud claimed that he 
was his own father, mother and daughter:
64
  
I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and 
myself; leveller of the idiotic periplus on which procreation 
is impaled, the periplus of papa-mama and child, soot of 
grandma’s ass, much more than of the father-mother’s” 
(from ‘Here Lies’1988: 540). 
In other words, he was his own past and future generating from himself his own 
possibilities rather than have them handed over to him by the generational structure of 
the world. Not only does Artaud rebel against and reject having the structures of the 
world, but also the temporality in which those structures are based. 
As mentioned, Heidegger singles out the particular state-of-mind of Anxiety as 
revealing of the world and its structures.  Rather than being afraid of a particular thing 
from which to flee, Anxiety is a general apprehension about the world and it is the 
world as a whole from which the anxious person runs. Unlike the everyday self of 
Dasein, the They-self which overlooks Being, Anxiety is a state of acute awareness of 
Being. So rather than an absorbed involvement in the world, Anxiety reveals that the 
world matters. Artaud takes the matter even further and describes the physical 
manifestation of anxiety, taken over bodily: 
Who in the depths of certain kinds of anguish, at the bottom 
of certain dreams, has not known death as a shattering and 
marvellous sensation unlike anything else in the realm of the 
                                                
62 ‘A man possesses himself in flashes, and even when he possesses himself, he does not reach himself 
completely. He does not realize that constant cohesion of his forces without which all true creation is 
impossible. Nevertheless, this man exists’ (1988: 43). 
63 Theatre’s ‘object is not to resolve social or psychological conflicts, to serve as battlefield for moral 
passions, but to express objectively certain secret truths, to bring into the light of day by means of 
active gestures certain aspects of truth that have been buried under forms in their encounters with 
Becoming’ (1958: 70). 
64 See Leo Bersani’s essay ‘Artaud, Defecation and Birth’ in Scheer (2004).  
Acting as Manual Philosophy 
 146 
mind? One must have known this suction-like rise of anguish 
whose waves cover you and fill you to bursting as if driven 
by some intolerable bellows. An anguish which approaches 
and withdraws each time more vast, each time heavier and 
more swollen. It is the body itself that has reached the limit 
of its distension and its strength and which must nevertheless 
go further. It is a kind of suction cup placed on the soul, 
whose bitterness spreads like an acid to the furthest 
boundaries of perception. And the soul does not even possess 
the ability to burst. For this distension itself is false. Death is 
not satisfied so cheaply. In the physical sphere, this 
distension is like the reverse image of a contraction which 
must occupy the mind over the whole extent of the living 
body (from ‘Art and Death’, Artaud 1988: 121).  
In Part II of BT, Heidegger goes on to elaborate on the concept of temporality. Dasein 
is constantly ‘ahead of itself’ and ‘outside itself’ because it undertakes projects and 
deals with the world not merely as it is, but rather as possibilities. As such, BT Part II 
is a reinterpretation of all the elements of world with respect to time. Heidegger goes 
so far as to say that Dasein is its possibilities. The there of Being-there is the world 
and Dasein’s world is not mere matter present-at-hand, but rather possibilities of 
Being. Being is deeply intertwined with Dasein’s temporality. 
Artaud attempts to rail against temporality through the magic of theatre. By 
reawakening the mystical forces possible in performance, he seeks unity with himself.  
Big as a conch, it can be held in the hollow of the hand, this 
secret; it is thus that Tradition speaks. / All the magic of 
existence will have passed into a single chest when Time has 
been locked away again” (from ‘The Theater of Seraphim’ 
1988: 275). 
The unity of the moment of performance transcends time for Artaud, uncovering a 
secret language handed down in tradition but forgotten in everyday language and 
ways of being. 
The temporal structure of Dasein complicates things for the philosopher because 
unlike past metaphysical approaches to an understanding of Being, the 
phenomenological interpretation can’t reduce existence to what is present-at-hand in 
the here and now. Dasein is constantly becoming not merely in a physical way, but in 
the sense of taking up possibilities. Anxiety reveals another thing about Dasein: that 
the world matters for it. Rather than dwell alongside the world of things that are 
simply present at hand, Dasein’s standpoint relates to objects and others there in the 
world because they impact on Dasein’s own possibilities. Anxiety reveals Dasein’s 
own Being is an issue for it. 
The fact that Being is an issue for Dasein forms the totality of the structure of the 
world in Care (Sorge). Care is a thoroughly temporal phenomenon in that it is the way 
that Dasein comports or directs itself to the possibilities of existence. Dasein can 
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direct itself towards objects that are ready-to-hand in concern (Besorge) and towards 
others there in-the-world in solicitude (Fürsorge). Care shows that Dasein is always 
ahead-of-itself. 
Rather than simply dwell on the not-yet of existence, Artaud struggled to keep himself 
whole and resist falling away from himself. This feeling is most manifest in relation 
to his own language and thought: 
I am the man who has most felt the stupefying confusion of 
his speech in its relations with thought. I am the man who 
has most accurately charted the moment of his most intimate, 
his most imperceptible lapses. I lose myself in my thought, 
actually, the way one dreams, the way one suddenly slips 
back into one’s thought. I am the man who knows the inmost 
recesses of loss (from ‘The Nerve Meter’ Artaud 1988: 85). 
Derrida (1978) would perhaps characterize this loss as the deferral of meaning, yet for 
Artaud it is not simply a matter of words or expression, but a loss of his very 
existence. He is denied the possibility of totality or self-unity. 
For Heidegger, the problem of the totality of Dasein comes into view in the temporal 
structure of Care. Heidegger tries to get the whole of Dasein into view. As it happens, 
the key to this totality lies at the limit point of Dasein’s very existence: death. Death is 
also the thing that Dasein is afraid of in Anxiety too. Death is the possibility which 
ends all possibilities. Death is not just the transition of a living thing to a merely 
corporeal thing present-at-hand. 
The problem with death is that it denies any experience or knowledge of itself. By the 
time death comes around, Dasein is no longer there to experience it; and we cannot 
experience the death of another. Death also has the strange quality in that no-one else 
can take it on for a person. ‘No one can take the Other’s dying away from him’ (1962: 
H240). A person can die for another in the sense of sacrificing themself, but this is not 
taking the death of that other away. Every Dasein must take death upon itself at the 
time – death is in every case mine. Death is a unique possibility-of-Being in which the 
Being of Dasein is an issue. Mineness and existence characterise death. Death is an 
existential phenomenon. To analyse it in terms of physiology or biology would only 
get at perishing, but not this existential nature of the phenomenon, even though the 
structures of the present-at-hand seem to be the best way of understanding it. 
For Heidegger, the only truly individuating moment of our lives, paradoxically, is our 
death. ‘Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life’ (1962: H246). Death is 
most of all a certain possibility; it can come at any moment. At the same time, we try 
to smooth over this fact by our idle talk (1962: H253), convincing ourselves that death 
is something that happens to other people or at least it will happen to us at some time, 
but not yet. 
So instead of thinking of death as a thing, Heidegger sees it most of all as a 
possibility. As a phenomenon in life then, we can take up a relation to our own death 
as something that is certain and something that is most our own. Heidegger calls this 
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mode Being-towards-death. Death is the point at which Dasein can take up no more 
possibilities; it is non-relational. But as Being-towards-death, Dasein can see itself as 
a whole.  If Dasein is its possibilities, then authentic Dasein is where it takes up those 
possibilities and becomes itself. 
Who am I really? Authenticity and Being Oneself 
Heidegger felt that we can comport ourselves to our own Being ‘authentically’ 
(eigentlich) by attending to Being. This thought can help to interpret why Artaud held 
the life-long belief that the theatre could reveal our existence truthfully.
65
 Acting is 
manual philosophy for Artaud because it is a truthful uncovering of Being that is 
overlooked in everyday life. In German, eigen means ‘own’. So authenticity might 
also be interpreted as really being oneself. For Heidegger, authenticity is facing up to 
existence as possibilities rather than a present-at-hand thing and an interpretation of 
the self as who it is in itself rather than through the interpretation handed over by the 
others (the They-self). On one level, Artaud hoped to return us to our own materiality. 
He saw true theatre as overcoming the cognitive and intellectual understanding of 
humanity that was propagated especially by the contemporary fascination with 
psychology and talk that dominated the stage. Reducing man to materiality, the 
present-at-hand, is in fact the opposite of what Heidegger described as authentic 
Dasein and resolutely projected possibility. But in his description of the mental states 
that the Theatre of Cruelty was supposed to elicit, we do not perceive ourselves as 
scientific objects devoid of meaning but rather as filled with meaning and in 
continuity with the world around us. Rather than being cut off by the uncanny, 
unhomely nature of the world, theatre can return the self through the flesh. Just as 
base metals could be converted into precious metals in alchemy, so too did Artaud 
think that the theatre could have a deep and real effect on its participants. He felt that 
this effect was inexpressible in rationalist discourse. In other words, we need to widen 
our view of what it is to be human, to be oneself, to be authentic. For Artaud, man as 
a rational animal stinks of separation. The magic of theatre offers the possibility of 
deeper forces at play in the world to which society must become attuned. In a way, 
Heidegger too wanted to reawaken the sense of mystery in the birth of philosophy in 
the ancient Greeks and a sense of wonder and awe that things are at all. This openness 
is part of the poetic appreciation of Being. 
This everyday self can be distinguished from the authentic Self because it has not 
been taken hold of in its own way. As They-self, Dasein has been dispersed into the 
They. This is concernful absorption in the world which is closest to us. The They 
decides what is significant, and frees the world within the limits of averageness.  The 
‘I’ is not that which I am, but rather, the Others. In terms of the They, I am given to 
myself. In discovering authentic Being, Dasein will clear away concealments, 
obscurities and break up the disguises with which the They bars its own way. Dasein 
draws its pre-ontological understanding of its Being from this everyday self. The 
                                                
65 True theatre ‘shakes off the asphyxiating inertia of matter which invades even the clearest of 
testimony of the senses; and in revealing to collectivities of men their dark power, their hidden force, it 
invites them to take, in the face of destiny, a superior and heroic attitude they would never have 
assumed without it’  (1958: 32). 
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meaning of Being gets passed over by this subject. Everyday being misses itself and 
covers itself up as merely something present-at-hand. Authentic Dasein does not 
understand itself as a ‘thing’ but rather as possibilities. I will follow on the discussion 
of authenticity in the next chapter.  
Conclusions 
Artaud’s radical view of theatre indicates a type of performance that offers a unique 
method for investigating Being. It also poses some problems about the limits of 
philosophy as it has traditionally been conceived. By utilising Heidegger’s philosophy 
to interpret Artaud together in this chapter I have raised the possibility of an embodied 
mode of authentic Being. In a way, Artaud’s concentration on the body goes much 
further than Heidegger’s attempt to escape metaphysics. Heidegger later turned to 
poetry in search of Being, yet Artaud looks to a poetry of the senses. In this way, 
words and language are part of but not the whole of our relationship to Being that can 
be discovered in the forces at play in theatre. Without doubt, both thinkers seek to 
smash the traditional view of subjectivity. For Heidegger this means choosing oneself 
and one’s ownmost possibilities found in Anxiety and Being-towards-death. For 
Artaud, cruelty released into the theatre like a plague will purge the individual and 
society of its false Being and replace it with mystical forces and energy. Each thinker 
provides a different insertion point into the question of Being and attending to the 
things themselves. 
Performance is certainly a powerful tool through which to affect people, as are 
philosophy and poetry. Perhaps we need to be wary of all these ways of understanding 
existence which might be put to nefarious ends. The Nazis hijacked philosophy and 
the powerful impact of aesthetic performances to further their own political ends 
(Thamer 1996). Nor is the matter settled today. More than ever, performance has 
come to dominate everyday life and there is a need to understand and critique its 
power which is supposedly outside the realms of rationality. Questioning the ends of 
performance is an important part of performance studies. This is an excellent point at 
which to turn to Bertolt Brecht and his political critique of contemporary German 
theatre in early twentieth century. Brecht fled the Russian Communists, the German 
Fascists and the American capitalists because of his discovery of theatre as critique. 
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How can [the theatre] be divorced from spiritual dope traffic and turned from a home 
of illusions to a home of experiences? How can the unfree, ignorant man of our 
century, with his thirst for freedom and his hunger for knowledge; how can the tortured 
and heroic, abused and ingenious, changeable and world-changing man of this great 
and ghastly century obtain his own theatre which will help him to master the world and 
himself? 
 
Bertolt Brecht (1964: 135), ‘On Experimental Theatre’ 
 
7. Brecht: Authenticity, History and Time 
Bertolt Brecht’s idea of epic theatre is an explicit attempt at staging philosophy and 
requires the Brechtian actor to respond to philosophical problems practical way 
through rehearsal and performance. Brecht understands the power of performance to 
coerce audiences. He feels that art, put to the purposes of untruth and propaganda, can 
serve as a tranquillising drug to the masses. Yet he yearns for a new type of theatre 
that would allow people to see themselves as they are, or rather the contradictions in 
their own existence, and take action in their own lives. The Brechtian actor must 
therefore engage and show these philosophical problems on stage. In this way, 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, as a search for truth as possibility, is useful in 
interpreting Brecht’s theatrical theories, practice and writings. For Brecht, theatre and 
the actor have the ability to disclose historical circumstance, a human concept of the 
self that evolves through time, and can be used as a tool for seeing authentic 
possibilities for individual and communal existence. These issues are at the core of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. Brechtian acting can thus be manual philosophy in that 
it questions notions of selfhood, history and time. Temporality and Historicality, 
together with Being-in-the-world, form the basis for any human understanding at all. 
Through his collaborative efforts with actors, Brecht also aims at revealing, 
questioning and altering social relations. In this way, he emphasises ‘Being-with’ as a 
fundamental concern of existence. Rather than begin from metaphysical assumptions 
about the nature of reality and the self, ‘the spiritual dope traffic’ of theatre as 
illusion, Brecht sees the act of theatre-making as a search for truth. But far from being 
a detached and merely contemplative activity, he offers the actor an opportunity for 
the practical enactment of philosophy and a revolutionary social activity capable of 
transforming thoughts and actions. 
Introduction 
‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating’, director, poet, playwright, lyricist and 
theorist, Bertolt Brecht liked to say.
1
 What matters is what works. But his theatre was 
not just about representing the world; Brecht thought it was precisely the place where 
actors and audiences could be inspired to face up to possibilities of action in their own 
lives. He saw the theatre as a place for staging philosophy, not just somewhere the 
minute psychological and physical details of life can be represented.
2
 Brecht also 
                                                
1 See Fuegi (1987: 87), Eddershaw in Thomson and Sacks (1994: 254) and Brecht (1964: 248). 
2 See The Messingkauf Dialogues for a theatrical treatment, unfinished by Brecht (1965). Willett notes 
‘The philosopher wishes to apply the theatre ruthlessly to his own ends. It must furnish accurate images 
of incidents between people, and allow the spectator to adopt a standpoint. The actor wishes to express 
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liked to quote Marx’s saying that the point of philosophy is ‘not just a matter of 
interpreting the world but of changing it’ (originally from Marx’s ‘Eleventh Thesis on 
Feuerbach’) (Brecht 1964: 248). In the program notes to his production of In the 
Jungle of Cities (Im Dickicht der Städte) (1928) Brecht commented that ‘[t]his is a 
world and a kind of drama where the philosopher can find his way about rather than 
the psychologist.’ (Brecht, 1964: 24). The next year, he wrote, ‘At present it’s 
Germany, the home of philosophy, that is leading in the large-scale development of 
the theatre and the drama. The theatre’s future is philosophical’ (Brecht 1964: 24). 
Up to this point I have concentrated on the theatrical theories of Artaud and 
Stanislavski. With Brecht, consideration must also be given to his theatre practice 
itself, his work with actors and his play-texts. As much as any practitioner in the 
twentieth century, Brecht emphasised theatre and acting as an ensemble effort. The 
action of the individual should always be considered in relation to the work as a 
whole. In this chapter, which considers Brecht’s theatre as a philosophical theatre, the 
actor is central to the displaying of social relations. For Brecht, content and form are 
necessarily and intimately related.
3
 He rarely worked in a purely theoretical way with 
his actors, but rather always through rehearsal and experimentation.
4
 Working with an 
ensemble of actors then, the group is engaged in experimentation, meaning-making, 
questioning and in short, philosophy. The enactment of theatrical practice was meant 
to be an embodiment of the philosophical ideas of those involved in the production.  
It is possible that many of the plays attributed to Brecht were actually written or co-
written by various friends and colleagues (see Fuegi, 1995). Undoubtedly, he was a 
man of great charm and influence, winning the immense devotion of those close to 
him. When talking about Brecht here, I should perhaps say ‘the Brecht collective’. In 
any case, this points towards the importance of theatre as a fundamentally 
collaborative art form founded in the phenomenon of Being-with, or inter-
subjectivity.
5
 As such, this chapter will not focus solely on the actor but the collective 
effort of theatre-making. Furthermore, it was never Brecht’s intention to produce 
classics in the sense that a certain set of dogma or prescriptions would be appropriate 
in future generations. His works are a product of his own time and are steeped in the 
concerns of that age. As such his work should not be seen as mechanical or 
deterministic but rather as experimental, dynamic and reactive to the world of the 
day.
6
 
In Heidegger’s terms, the Brechtian actor can place Being-in-the-world on the stage in 
theatrical productions, thus considering possibilities for social action. When we look 
                                                                                                                                       
himself. Story and characters serve his purpose… The Dramaturg  puts himself at the philosopher’s 
disposal, and promises to apply his knowledge and abilities to the conversion of theatre into the theatre 
of the philosopher. He hopes theatre will get a new lease on life. The Electrician represents the new 
audience. He is a worker and dissatisfied with the world’ (Brecht 1964: 170). 
3 See in particular ‘On Form and Subject-matter’ (Brecht 1964). ‘Simply to comprehend new areas of 
subject-matter imposes a new dramatic and theatrical form. Can we speak of money in the form of 
iambics?’ (1964: 30). 
4 He published his theoretical writings under the title Versuche (Experiments). 
5 For a specific probing of this issue, see Fuegi (1997). For a good survey of the context of Brecht’s life 
and theatrical practice, see Ewen (1970) and Leach (2004). 
6 Peter Brooker, ‘Key words in Brecht’s theory and practice’ in Thomson and Sacks (1994: 186). 
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closely at the ideas borne out of Brecht’s productions and work with actors, there are 
many of the same themes found in Heidegger’s description of the world. Brecht’s 
world is one firmly recognised as being within history and time. I suggest here that 
several key concepts from Heidegger’s account of Being in BT are also investigated in 
Brecht’s epic theatre theory and practice. Brecht sought to use theatre for the 
description and analysis of phenomena inherent in human social interaction and as a 
call to authentic living. In many ways, it is the ultimate heresy to propose any kind of 
equation between Brecht’s theory of popular culture enacting philosophy and 
Heidegger’s rejection of the masses and their possession by the They-self.
7
 But 
Heidegger and the Brechtian actor are in search of truth not as a static, unchanging 
thing. For Heidegger, philosophy can enable a ‘moment of vision’ (Augenblick) and 
the same is true of Brecht’s ideal theatre. Both theatre and philosophy can transform 
life and this requires a radical destruction of traditional notions of subjectivity. Rather 
than radically reject the structures of the world as Artaud did, Brecht sought to engage 
with the world and change it.  
Brecht’s theatrical revolution came at a time when naturalism had taken over as the 
dominant stage convention.
8
 It was against this background that he developed his now 
famous theatrical techniques to bring the audience away from Wagner’s darkened 
auditorium.
9
 Of course, since Brecht’s death, his plays and productions have been 
reproduced, his works taught in schools and his theories pawed over. And after the 
failure of Soviet Communism, even his politics were treated with some apprehension 
for a time. Ironically, his legacy treated like a museum overlooks the revisionist 
experimenter that Brecht was. He always stressed the need for relevance to the times 
– both form and content. As Heiner Müller noted, ‘to make use of Brecht without 
being critical of him is to betray him’ (quoted in Leach 2004: 142).  
Brecht’s theory was never static. He constantly shifted his theoretical opinion in 
relation to his theatrical practice. Indeed, the dialectic itself is borne out in his 
continual experimentation of what worked on the stage. The dialectic is the critical 
examination of the truth of an opinion, generally characterised by the unification of 
opposites of thought or material. Heidegger’s investigation of the meaning of Being 
also changed throughout his life as he shifted from thinking about the specific Being 
of Dasein towards thinking about Being in general. Heidegger would not characterise 
                                                
7 Brecht’s friend Sergei Tretyakov notes that he has ‘seen foam appear on the lips of dignified German 
professor as they screamed that Brecht has no resemblance to a poet, that he had smuggled himself into 
literature like a fox: a man who rhymed “sein” with “Dasein” could not call himself a poet’ (Witt 1974: 
79). I wonder whether Tretyakov is referring to Heidegger. I have not been able to find out. See Collins 
(1999: 68) who places Heidegger and Brecht in opposition with respect to popular culture. 
8 See Leach (2004: 111) for a brief discussion of Socialist realism, formalism, naturalism and realism. 
Naturalism generally shows the human being as part of the forces of nature, yet Brecht wanted to show 
man as capable of changing his social situation. ‘The stage’s inaccurate representations of our social 
life, including those classed as so-called Naturalism, led it to call for scientifically exact 
representations; the tasteless rehashing of empty visual or spiritual palliatives, for the noble logic of the 
multiplication table’ (Brecht 1964: 179)  
9 ‘Those composers who stem from Wagner still insist on posing as philosophers. A philosophy which 
is of no use to man or beast, and can only be disposed of as a means of sensual satisfaction… We 
maintain the whole highly-developed technique which made this pose possible: the vulgarian strikes a 
philosophical attitude from which to conduct his hackneyed ruminations’ (Brecht 1964: 40). 
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this as dialectical, so much as a ‘path to thinking’. 
This chapter will consider the way in which various themes of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology are also independently explored in Brecht’s writings on theatre, 
productions and work with actors.
10
 I will look at some comments on Brecht’s 
rehearsals that support his notion of philosophical theatre not merely in theory but in 
practice. I will consider Brecht’s theatre theory (epic theatre, Verfremdungseffekt and 
gestus) as a call to authenticity in performance, moving away from a passive self 
given from the world towards a self chosen from the possibilities for action. Through 
examples from his productions I will look at how Heidegger’s themes of Historicality, 
Temporality, Duration, the Self and Totality are integral to Brecht’s epic theatre. 
These themes are taken primarily from BT, Division II, Part V, ‘Temporality and 
Historicality’ (1962: H372ff). 
Theatrical Practice and the World 
During rehearsals Bertolt Brecht sits in the auditorium. His 
work as a director is unobtrusive. When he intervenes it is 
almost unnoticeable and always in the ‘direction of flow’. He 
never interrupts, not even with suggestions for improvement. 
You do not get the impression that he wants to get the actors 
to ‘present some of his ideas’; they are not his instruments. / 
Instead he searches, together with the actors, for the story 
which the play tells, and helps each actor to find his strength. 
His work with the actors may be compared to the efforts of a 
child to direct straws with a twig from a puddle into the river 
itself, so that they may float (from ‘Theaterarbeit, 1952’, in 
Witt 1975: 126). 
For all his theory, Brecht was ultimately more concerned with what actually worked 
on stage and was willing to revise his previous thoughts with this goal in mind.
11
 He 
very rarely mentioned his theoretical writings in rehearsal.
12
 Through a collective 
effort, the rehearsal room was transformed into a laboratory for Brecht in which to 
work out the possibilities of performance: 
Brecht used his theatre as a laboratory, to experiment with 
plays and players. Human behaviour, human attitudes, 
human weaknesses – everything was explored and 
investigated, to be exposed finally to a public which often 
enough refused to recognize its image in this very clear, but 
                                                
10 In Bodied Spaces, Stanton Garner (1994) also provides some analysis of Brecht in terms of 
phenomenology. He specifically focuses on the subversion of presence, the body in pain and the 
objectification of the body in the Verfremdungseffekt. In this chapter, I do not focus on the body, but 
rather Dasein and the possibility of authenticity. 
11 ‘In any case he always tries out proposals. “Why explain the reasons? Show the proposals,” and 
“Don’t talk about it, do it,” are what he says. If a proposal is good it is adopted. If a proposal is poor, 
the absence of applause convinces an actor better than a long argument would’ (Witt 1975: 129). 
12 ‘The directorial method was based on investigation and varied experimentation that could extend the 
smallest gesture – eyes, fingers… Brecht worked like a sculptor on and with the actor’ (Eddershaw in 
Thomson and Sacks 1994: 257). 
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sometimes perhaps too well-framed, mirror... For him, the 
stage was a model of the world – the world we all have to 
live in (Weber 1967: 107). 
Ultimately, it is story-telling in collaboration with the actors that is important for him 
together with deriving pleasure from the learning process.
13
 The actor is no mere 
pawn for the dictatorial director, but rather a fellow searcher for the truth of the 
performance through the stories told in a practical way. Just as Stanislavski’s 
theatrical truth is not a truth of correspondence to objective reality, so too is Brecht’s 
a truth of discovery in through practice:  
On Brecht’s stage everything must be ‘true’; but he prefers a 
particular sort of truth, the truth which comes as a discovery. 
During the presentation he will point beamingly with an 
outstretched hand at an actor who has just shown something 
special or something important in human nature or human 
circumstance (Witt 1975: 127). 
The beaming outstretched hand is the moment of discovery or we might even say 
disclosure of Being; it is a disclosure based in negotiated meaning, not an ‘internal’ 
source of truth. Rather than words to describe world, the showing of Being is worked 
through in actions. Such an emphasis on the practical mirrors Stanislavski’s emphasis 
on action and points towards theatre as a practical and embodied hermeneutic process. 
However, Brecht was not concerned with the psychology of the character. He wanted 
his actors to seek out observed behaviours as they fit into the overall task of telling the 
story.  
Brecht’s epic theatre never ceased to understand itself as a process of working out 
possibilities and evolving over time, willing to adapt and change according to the 
world. In his exercise ‘not… but’, actors would first perform the scene as it didn’t 
happen (prefaced with the statement ‘not’) and then proceed with the scene as written 
(saying ‘but’ before going on and playing it). This effect of showing alternatives was 
meant to show through in performance itself.
14
 In this sense, Brechtian acting is about 
displaying possibilities. 
In his diary of the production, Hans Bunge comments about Brecht’s method of 
rehearsal in his detailed production notebook of the rehearsal process for The 
Caucasian Chalk Circle:  
                                                
13 ‘Everything hangs on the “story”; its is the heart of the theatrical performance. For it is what happens 
between people that provides them with all the material that they can discuss, criticize, alter. Even if 
the particular person represented by the actor has ultimately to fit into more than just the one episode, it 
is mainly because the episode will be all the more striking if it reaches the fulfilment in a particular 
person. The “story” is the theatre’s great operation, the complete fitting together of all the gestic 
incidents, embracing the communications and impulses that must now go to make up the audience’s 
entertainment’ (‘Short Organum for the Theatre’, Brecht 1964: 200). 
14 ‘When [the actor] appears on stage, besides what he is actually doing he will at all essential points 
discover, specify, imply what he is not doing; that is to say he will act in such a way that the alternative 
emerges as clearly as possible, that his acting allows the other possibilities to be inferred and only 
represents one of the possible variants’ (‘Short Description of a New Technique of Acting’, 1964: 137). 
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All the inter-relationships were checked out, changed, holes 
filled, new ideas and changes introduced wherever he had 
second thoughts. His work as a director is dialectics made 
visible (Fuegi, 1987: 149). 
Brecht’s attention to detail in rehearsal with actors was renowned. For example he 
rehearsed for hours how Grusche (the main character) should pick up a baby, or make 
an entrance onto the stage through a door. In order for actors to understand their parts, 
he would get them to translate the words into their own dialect. He devised exercises 
for actors to practice such as folding linen, attitudes of smoking, and singing songs 
(Brecht 1964: 129). This attention to detail was not for naturalistic depiction, 
however, but to investigate the social relations between people involved. In his 
famous exercise ‘The Street Scene’ (1964: 121-29) actors are invited to provide 
alternative perspectives on the event of an incident on a street corner. Rather than 
detached observers, each performer’s recounting of the scene comments on the 
actions of those involved, acts some bits out to demonstrate and forms an opinion. In 
this case, acting is demonstration of the role rather than becoming a character.
15
 For 
this reason, Brecht was quite happy to view the work of untrained actors as epic, if 
they had the capacity to present observed behaviour.
16
 The need for observation is key 
to the performer’s success. Like Stanislavski, Brecht indicated that his actors should 
always be on the lookout for material that might be useful in performance.
17
  
In addition to highlighting the human possibilities of existence (of the human subject 
thrown into the world), the actor’s role in epic theatre is about bringing the 
connectedness of the world into view. The world, in the context of the theatre, is 
composed of the different elements of the production that go together in order to 
construct the meaning of the play. The actor is part of a collaborative process. Brecht 
is adamant that form and content are inseparable. In his short tract on theatre, ‘Last 
Stage: Oedipus’, Brecht claims that ‘[c]oncern with subject and concern with form are 
complimentary. Seen from inside the theatre it appears that progress in theatrical 
technique is only progress when it helps to realize the material; and the same with 
progress in play writing’ (Brecht, 1950: 24). 
In ‘The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre’ Brecht argues that just as epic theatre 
and the actor seek to elicit judgements about a fictional reality, the audience should 
never lose sight of their own social reality: in this case, the apparatus of the theatre 
(Brecht, 1950: 33ff). Staging, set design, costumes, music, and acting combine as a 
                                                
15 ‘Brecht in fact almost never spoke about the character of the stage figure during rehearsals, but 
rather about his way of behaving; he said virtually nothing of what man is but rather what he does. And 
when he did say anything about character, he related it not to the psychological but to the sociological’ 
(Rülicke-Weilter in ‘Brecht and the Contradictory Actor’, Rouse 1984: 39). 
16 See ‘Two Essays on Unprofessional Acting’ (Brecht 1964: 148-53). ‘Good or bad, a play always 
includes an image of the world. Good or bad, the actors show how people behave under given 
circumstances’ (1964: 150). 
17 ‘Above all other arts/ You, the actor, must conquer / The art of observation. / Your training must 
begin among / The lives of other people. Make your first school / The place you work in, your home, / 
The district to which you belong, / The shop, the street, the train. / Observe each one you set eyes upon. 
/ Observe strangers as if they were familiar / And those whom you know as if they were strangers’ 
(Brecht 1961: 17). 
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totality – not because of the essential unity of those elements, but because of the 
context of the theatre itself. Unlike Wagner’s concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk, where 
each element adds to the unity of the whole, in epic theatre, Brecht forces each 
element into productive conflict. Brecht’s famous Verfremdungseffekt is aimed at 
bringing these elements of the world under scrutiny. By interrupting the illusion of 
reality, each of the elements of the world becomes significant and available for 
analysis. So, elements like acting style (telling the story rather than becoming the 
character), set design (aimed at interrupting realistic depiction), the curtain which falls 
half way down the proscenium arch (so that the audience can see the mechanisms of 
the stage operate), all show up as elements of the world because of their 
disconnectedness and resistance to absorption on the part of the viewer. The unity of 
Brecht’s plays comes when the audience member forms a judgement about the world 
only after the elements of that world have been brought to light. The same is true of 
Brecht’s approach to acting. Rather than show the unity of a character and their 
psychology, he wanted actors to show the contradictions, disunities, breaks, and the 
irrational in their behaviour. 
Exploring all of these possibilities in rehearsal, Brecht’s process for actors is an 
example of philosophy in action. Of course this process continued to evolve and adapt 
throughout his career and as Robert Leach points out, many aspects of his process 
were formalised in the Berliner ensemble model after his death (Brecht 1964: 240-46 
and Leach 2004: 122). However, a general schema for his process might include 
elements such as a general introduction to the text and its central oppositions by the 
director. From there, the cast would perform a naïve reading of the play, with no 
allocation of parts yet, simply changing reader with each new speaker. The company 
would then discuss the play and its specific circumstances, as well as its historical, 
political, social, moral and aesthetic aspects. Rather than come with a prepared plan, 
the designers would work in parallel with the actors’ preparation, letting choices 
emerge from the process itself rather than be imposed before. From here provisional 
casting was carried out (in the Lehrstücke actors would change rolls even in 
performance).
18
 The actors were required to remember their initial reactions to the 
play and hold onto the ways they were astounded at the contradictions of the story and 
actions within it.  Always with a mind to the ‘super-task’ of the play, the actors would 
then work out the actions, status and choices of their character.
19
 All the time, the 
players were meant to demonstrate their roles and show how the particular actions 
were never inevitable. The blocking of action would arise from this process. 
                                                
18 ‘To play epic theatre means to tell the story of the play. All the work is subordinated to this end. For 
Brecht the director it is therefore irrelevant which actor-individual plays a part. Brecht does not cast 
parts in accordance with individuality. He demonstrates persons as the product of the conditions in 
which they live, and capable of change through the circumstances which they experience. Abstract 
psychology is unimportant to Brecht. By an unusual and daring distribution of parts he expands the 
range and ability of many actors’ (Angelika Hurwicz, ‘Brecht’s Work with Actors’ in Witt: 133).  
19 ‘In a discussion on his work as a director Brecht once stated that his aim was to show the mode of 
conduct of people in specific situations; it was irrelevant to him whether the actor was cold or hot in the 
process. This remark included the thought that Brecht is by no means hostile to drama exercises aimed 
at ensuring the truth to life and the warmth of the presentation of the role; in fact he regards them as 
pre-requisite. Brecht simply starts with what Stanislavsky calls the “super-task” of the actor’ (Hurwicz 
in Witt 1975: 132). 
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Movement would never be for its own sake, but always for a purpose; straight lines 
were avoided with preference to unequal groupings demonstrating social relations, 
and emphasising the over-all message of the scene. The text was split into processes, 
elements of the scene and ‘nodal points’, discovered where a significant change in the 
story occurred. At points in a naïve reading, the actors were encouraged to shout out 
‘stop’ and interrupt the flow of action.  
At a point in the rehearsals once the overall shape of the text had been worked out, 
run-throughs would begin. Each part of the play was meant to relate to the whole as a 
series of causes and effects. Throughout the process, the text was never considered 
holy and unchangeable but always subject to constant revision. A ‘tempo’ for the 
performance would be found in these runs with the element of costumes added. 
Before the performance, speed runs helped to consolidate what each actor is doing 
when. These were carried out with accuracy and clear articulation. Then the results 
might be recorded and photographed for the modellbook. Even after opening night, 
Brecht would give notes and make small changes to both the acting and the text. 
Finally, the whole process and performance was supposed to be invested with a sense 
of fun and humour. 
Brecht’s work with actors fostered an implicit critique of the idea that there is ever a 
final meaning produced either in the world or on stage. This is precisely because of 
the temporal nature of human existence.
20
 Brecht considered no individual 
performance or moment in rehearsal as final, but only ever as process.21 He would 
frequently alter lines only to change his mind again the next day – he would ironically 
chastise himself in rehearsal asking the actors ‘what idiot wrote this?’ (Fuegi, 1987: 
87).  
Rather than see theatre and acting as radically separated from life, Brecht saw them as 
opportunities for illuminating the world itself: ‘By creating this distinction between 
the world and yourselves / You banish yourselves from the world’ (1961: 7). The 
Brechtian actor is thus not separated from reality, but engaged with it:  
As for the world portrayed there [in the theatre], the world 
from which slices are cut in order to produce these moods 
and movements of the emotions, its appearance is such, 
produced from such slight and wretched stuff as a few pieces 
of cardboard, a little miming, a bit of text, that one has to 
admire the theatre folk who, with so feeble a reflection of the 
real world, can move the feelings of their audience so much 
more strongly than does the real world itself (1964: 187).  
Now I turn to look more closely at some of the technical terms of his theatre theory in 
relation to acting that display a phenomenological attitude to the world. 
                                                
20 In Marxist terms, the process of movement (of ideas and materiality) is the Dialectic. In 
phenomenological terms, it is the temporal basis of Being – the structure of Dasein is such that it is 
always outstanding in time. 
21 ‘That is to say, our representations must take second place to what is represented, men’s life together 
in society; and the pleasure felt in their perfection must be converted into the higher pleasure felt when 
the rules emerging from this life are treated as imperfect and provisional’ (Brecht 1964: 205). 
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Epic Theatre and Authenticity 
The role of the Brechtian actor is to depict and  comment upon society while 
challenging the audience members to change the world: 
The epic theatre is chiefly interested in the attitudes which 
people adopt towards one another, wherever they are socio-
historically significant (typical). It works out scenes where 
people adopt attitudes of such sort that the social laws under 
which they are acting spring into sight. For that we need to 
find workable definitions: that is to say, such definitions of 
the relevant processes as can be used in order to intervene in 
the processes themselves. The concern of the epic theatre is 
thus eminently practical. Human behaviour is shown as 
alterable; man himself as dependent on certain political and 
economic factors and at the same time as capable of altering 
them (Brecht 1964: 86). 
Brecht originally defined ‘epic theatre’ in opposition to Aristotle’s ‘dramatic theatre’ 
in his notes to his play The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahogany in an essay entitled 
‘The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre’ (Brecht, 1964: 33). For Brecht, dramatic 
theatre provides a pre-interpreted, illusory experience. It is characterised by linear plot 
development, encourages the spectator to absorb plays passively and provides a view 
of the human being as a fixed, unalterable entity determined by fate.
22
 Epic theatre, on 
the other hand, emphasises its own constructedness.  It is characterised by non-linear 
narrative, presents a picture of the world in flux and invites spectators to form 
judgements about the world (Brecht 1964: 37). In epic theatre, rationality and critical 
distance are favoured over emotion and immersion. Brecht’s innovations aimed at 
rejecting empathy (identification with the characters and emotional involvement on 
the part of the audience) as the basis of theatre. He challenged Aristotle’s unities of 
time, place, plot and character and hoped to provide an alternative to catharsis 
(purging of negative emotions) as the purpose of performance. In short, Brecht hoped 
to revive theatre by actively engaging audiences, forcing them into an opinion and 
challenging them into action in the world. He wanted to bring theatre out of the 
auditorium and into the streets. Although his theory of epic theatre had formal 
prescriptions, his process of performance was always guided by this practical concern. 
One of Brecht’s foremost aims was to gain and communicate an understanding of the 
historical age in which he was living.
23
  
                                                
22 Epic theatre is a destruction of the traditional theatre institution, its techniques and the traditional 
human subject: ‘Only in the opera does the human being have a chance to be human. His entire mental 
capacities have long since been ground down to a timid mistrustfulness, an envy of others, a selfish 
calculation. The opera survives not just because it is old, but chiefly because the situation which it is 
able to meet is still the old one. This is not wholly so. And here lies the hope for the new opera. Today 
we can begin to ask whether opera hasn’t come to such a pass that further innovations, instead of 
leading to the renovation of this whole form, will bring about its destruction’ (1964: 41). 
23 ‘The “historical conditions” must of course not be imagined nor will they be so constructed) as 
mysterious Powers (in the background); on the contrary, they are created and maintained by men (and 
will in due course be altered by them): it is the action taking place before us that allows us to see what 
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In other words, the Brechtian actor challenges the conditions of their own individual 
and social construction. The term ‘epic theatre’, however, was already in use by the 
time Brecht applied it to his own practice. Contemporaries such as Erwin Piscator and 
German agit-prop theatre had previously evoked the term epic. Traditionally epic 
form usually dealt with larger than life heroic characters, singing the praise of their 
deeds, speech in various voices both narrated and in indirect speech, spanning a grand 
scale of time and locations and somewhat tangential plot lines Brecht took on some of 
these characteristics while leaving others behind. The significant shift in this new 
employment of the term ‘epic’ (by Brecht and his contemporaries) was that it did not 
deal with larger than life heroes, but rather regular people, caught up in circumstances 
and forced to act from necessity because of the oppressive social structures around 
them. Illusionistic theatre, according to Brecht, covered up these structures to the 
point that he felt any theatre that did not revolt against the status quo was an implicit 
support for it (1964: 196). In this sense, Brecht considered himself a proponent of 
realism; rather than construct an illusory representation of the world on stage, he 
wanted actors to depict believable and problematic social relations. 
Brecht fundamentally denied that the importance of theatre was in its mimetic 
capacity. His theatre was strictly anti-Aristotelian in that he did not want a unified 
stage in order to purge the emotions. Performance was meant to incite action and 
create resoluteness in the spectators, so that they would bring about social change. 
The epic actor was meant to place particular emphasis on depicting social 
relationships and class structures on stage. At the same time, he hoped to interrupt the 
numbing effect of illusion prevalent throughout the history of Western drama. Brecht 
wanted audiences to approach theatre in a philosophical way. He wanted to evoke 
rational and reasoned judgements about his plays and incite audiences to apply those 
judgments to their own lives. This was to be an authentic theatre founded in Being-
with-others. For both Brecht and Heidegger, life is fundamentally structured by our 
relationships to others with the same type of Being as ourselves.
24
 
Not unlike Artaud, Brecht also emphasised performance over the text. In a sense, this 
was his fundamental revolution against Aristotle and the formalist tradition (and also 
why Brecht has been considered so important for the discipline of performance 
studies).
25
 So rather than concentrate on theoretical principles he engaged actors and 
audiences through practice. In fact, when communicating with actors he rarely used 
the theoretical terminology for which he has become so famous.
26
  
Instead of being detached from the concerns of everyday life, Brecht hoped that 
performers would not flee from the world as a They-self – an un-stated, reassuring, 
                                                                                                                                       
they are’ (1964: 190). 
24 ‘So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being’ (Heidegger 1962: 
H125). 
25 See for instance The Drama Review Autumn, 1967 (Vol. 12, No. 1) devoted to Brecht and Richard 
Schechner’s appropriation of the agenda of social revolution. Schechner was greatly influenced by 
Brecht’s theories in his own call for a return of ‘efficacy’ in performance (see ‘From Ritual to Theatre 
and Back’ in Schechner, 1976).  
26 See Eddershaw, ‘Actors on Brecht’ in Thomson and Sacks (1994) and McDowell, ‘Actors on Brecht: 
The Munich Years’ in Martin and Bial (2000). 
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illusory reality (Heidegger’s term), but rather expose it.
27
 Rather than construct a 
unified picture of the world as a stable subject, Brecht’s actors were faced with 
contradictions, the fragmentary and episodic nature of life as opposed to the smooth 
narrative offered in the-well made play. He employed a full range of technical means 
to achieve this intention in productions including the use of a spare stage, minimal 
lighting, the half curtain, tableaux and an acting style of ‘showing’. The goal to all of 
these effects was to attain the analytical perspective in the audience’s consideration of 
the social problems being presented. The audience was to become ‘alienated’, 
‘defamiliarised’ or ‘distanced’ from identification, traditional narrative form and 
passive mode of understanding.
28
 It is important to remember that the sense of 
alienation here is not in becoming detached from the action so as not to be able to 
understand it; the opposite is true. Brecht employs the term Verfremdung in terms of 
seeing the events portrayed afresh. As such, the mere employment of techniques does 
not constitute epic theatre. The goal of the actor is to provoke both analysis and social 
change in the audience rather than be submerged in the illusion.  
Along with formal techniques, epic theatre was to take on a new subject appropriate 
to the modern age (Brecht 1964: 29-30 and 183ff). In this sense, Brecht sought a 
realism not steeped in illusion, but taking on a new social subject matter characteristic 
of realism.
29
 For Brecht, the stale recreation of past classics was no longer viable. If 
the theatre is to stage a new meaning relevant to contemporary social concerns, it 
would have to reach for new forms suited to those concerns. Brecht felt that the rise of 
market capitalism and growing importance of the scientific method also caused a 
considerable change to the social structure of human societies.
30
 Technological 
innovations, the growing domain of human knowledge and control over the 
environment and new developments in the understanding of human culture (namely 
Marxism) all contributed to significant upheavals in the way that humans relate 
towards each other.
31
 Brecht’s epic theatre was an attempt to analyse, evaluate and 
decide upon future action impacting upon how we are to live together.
32
 Mere 
empathy with the characters on the stage was not enough to stimulate such an attitude 
to the events presented. For Brecht, character-driven theatre merely supports the 
playwright’s point of view and offers no alternatives for action to the audience. He 
wanted to challenge audiences to think of how things might be different and then take 
action in their own life based on the experience. But rather than offering the solution 
                                                
27 See discussion of the They in the previous chapter. 
28 See Leach (2004: 118-19) and Willet (1959: 177-81), for instance, for a discussion of translations of 
Verfremdungseffekt. 
29 ‘One cannot decide whether a work is realist or not by finding out whether it resembles existing, 
reputedly realist works which must be counted realist for their time. In each individual case the picture 
given of life must be compared, not with another picture, but with the actual life portrayed’ (‘The 
Popular and the Realistic’, Brecht 1964: 112). 
30 ‘Petroleum resists the five-act form; today’s catastrophes do not progress in a straight line but in 
cyclical crises…’ (Brecht 1964: 30). 
31 ‘[W]e have to think of ourselves as children of the scientific age. Our life as human beings in society 
– i.e. our life – is determined by the sciences to quite a new extent’, (Brecht 1964: 183). 
32 ‘But let us understand each other. / You may perform better than he / Whose stage is the street. / Still 
your achievement will be less / If your theatre is less / Meaningful that his, / If it touches less / Deeply 
the lives of those who watch, / If its reasons / Are less, / Or its usefulness’ (‘On the Everyday Theatre’ 
in Brecht 1961: 9). 
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to the problems demonstrated, Brecht asked his actors to engage with everyday life 
where choices are not so clear-cut and at times, even contradictory.
33
 
Brecht later moved away from the term epic and substituted it for dialectical theatre 
(see Willett’s editorial note in Brecht 1964: 281-82). This emphasised the constantly 
changing, eternally incomplete nature of the twin artistic and political roles of theatre 
practice. Later he described his practice as a philosophical folk-theatre expressing 
both the philosophical and culturally engaged sides of theatre making (Brooker in 
Thomson and Sacks 1994: 191). Rather than settle on a final technique and subject 
matter, Brecht saw theatre as deeply intertwined with society’s needs and requiring 
development along with society rather than becoming frozen at any point (which Peter 
Brook 1968 later called ‘deadly theatre’). 
The epic actor as philosopher takes a critical stance required by the audience to 
demonstrate the events and story. In Heidegger’s terms, rather than simply being 
involved in the world, the actor and audience member take the attitude of considering 
the meaning of Being.
34
 Further than that, the social, historical and temporal 
conditions for such a critical examination are also placed under scrutiny. Both actors 
and audience members are supposedly asked to bring their own opinions and 
judgments under consideration. In the same way, Heidegger realises that to 
investigate Being, one needs to investigate the entity that is, namely, Dasein. Dasein 
is for the most part overlooked, taken for granted, misunderstood, or seen as self-
evident. Both Heidegger and Brecht bring self-evidence into question, especially in 
relation to the human subject. This thought will be followed up below in considering 
Brecht’s representation of the human subject in his productions. 
In phenomenological terms, Brecht realises that the world and the human subject, 
Dasein, are not separate from Others there in the world. In fact, for the most part the 
Others constitute the subject itself in so far as Dasein is involved in the world and 
unreflective upon itself, its own Being and its ownmost possibilities.
35
 But rather than 
simply be dragged along by the interpretation of the They, lacking any will or choice, 
Brecht thinks that theatre represents an unique opportunity to consider collectively, 
act out an interpretation of our own Being-with and call Dasein to action. 
In Heideggerian terms, Brecht highlights Care (Sorge) as the basis of human 
existence. Care is the structure of our relation to the world – that it matters. 36 Like 
Heidegger, Brecht articulates a world which presents possibilities. Dasein is not 
                                                
33 ‘Thus all your acting / Leads back to daily life. / Our masks, you should say, / Are nothing special / if 
they remain mere masks’ (from the poem ‘On the Everyday Theatre’ Brecht 1961: 8). 
34 ‘In short, the spectator is given a chance to criticize human behaviour from a social point of view, 
and the scene is played as a piece of history. The idea is that the spectator should be put  in a position 
where he can make comparisons about everything that influences the way that human beings behave’ 
(Brecht 1964: 86). 
35 ‘One’s own Dasein, like the Dasein-with of Others, is encountered proximally and for the most part 
in terms of the with-world with which we are environmentally concerned. When Dasein is absorbed in 
the world of its concern – that is, at the same time, in its Being-with towards Others – it is not itself’ 
(Heidegger 1962: H125).  
36 ‘If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then, like our 
circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world… it must be Interpreted in terms of 
the phenomenon of care; for as “care” the Being of Dasein is to be defined’ (Heidegger 1962: H121). 
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simple materiality capable of investigation simply by the scientific gaze; Dasein 
always exists in a specific context, invested in projects, yet with a unique capability of 
understanding the world. In Heidegger’s terminology, Care is not simply to do with 
emotional relation to others or rationality but with Dasein’s total organism. Care is 
Dasein’s total relation to the world.
37
 By exploring issues such as the dehumanising 
effects of war, science, blind faith in economic relations, crime and, ultimately, death, 
Brecht faces the conditions of Dasein’s Being-with as objects of choice for both the 
individual and society. But Dasein’s relationship of Care to the world is not static. It 
is thoroughly within time and within history. 
Heidegger’s explication of time moves away from a scientific understanding of ‘a 
series of moments that pass one by one’ towards the notion of time experienced by a 
perceiver that is not segmented but whole (this thinking is taken from Henri Bergson 
and Edmund Husserl). The same can be said of the human subject: Dasein does not 
experience itself as a series of selves that pass from one moment to another. Quite the 
opposite is true for the most part. Dasein experiences itself in flow with the world (in 
fact, the self is mostly not even apparent when Dasein goes about its daily business). 
Time is important as a condition for the possibility of being insofar as we can never 
experience anything outside of the structures of Temporality (Heidegger 1964: 323ff). 
Heidegger was also interested in the notion of Historicality, the ‘within-time-ness’ of 
society as a whole.
38
 Heidegger thought that Being unfolds historically to people of 
the age and has a general tendency to conceal and hide itself (1962: H19-26). The task 
of philosophy is to unconceal Being that has been covered up throughout history. 
In BT, Heidegger argues that we have long since forgotten how to ask the Question of 
Being: what does it mean to be? The only way that we can approach this question 
phenomenologically is to inquire into the being of that thing which is closest and most 
mine: Dasein. Dasein is never a thing that can be separated from the world, but is 
most fundamentally its own possibilities. Dasein is essentially founded in the 
temporal structure of the world: what is not yet, but might be (1962: H334-71). At the 
same time, it is thrown into the world from the past; Dasein’s own possibilities are 
always already handed over beforehand. Dasein is essentially a nothing in its own 
Being but Being-in-the-world. Dasein is nothing in and of itself, other than the world 
into which it has been thrown. Heidegger’s concept of Being-in-the-world emphasises 
the basic unity between the Self, environment and time within which all experience is 
to be found. Dasein has a tendency to misrecognise itself because it is absorbed in its 
dealings with the world. This is the everyday, pre-ontological mode in which Dasein 
goes about its business. Nevertheless, Dasein has the possibility of gaining itself back 
from simply being absorbed in the world, by authentically choosing its ownmost 
possibilities and becoming what it really is. Such a movement is authentic 
resoluteness, the projection of one’s possibilities: 
                                                
37 ‘The most primordial and basic existential truth, for which the problematic of fundamental ontology 
strives in preparing for the question of Being in general, is the disclosedness of the meaning of the 
Being of care. In order to lay bare this meaning, we need to hold in readiness, undiminished, the full 
structural content of care’ (Heidegger 1962: H316). 
38 ‘Dasein factically has its “history”, and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this 
entity is constituted by historicality’ (1962: H382). 
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Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s Self, does not 
detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so 
that it becomes a free-floating ‘I’. And how should it, 
when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is 
authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? 
Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current 
concernful Being-alongside what is ready to hand, and 
pushes it into solicitous Being with Others (Heidegger 
1962, H298). 
In such a grasping of one’s own possibilities, Dasein finds itself in the world along 
side others there in the world with the same kind of being as itself. Authentic living is 
caring about those Others there with us and working together for a common goal 
rather than in rivalry and mistrust (1962: H122). Authenticity is thus bound up in how 
and who Dasein is. This mode of being is where Dasein perceives its own possible 
futures and takes them over to itself. Authenticity is an existential way of seeing. This 
is not a passive interpretation of ‘I’ handed over by the world but rather a re-vision-
ary taking hold of self as possibilities for Being, as an authentic Self.
39
 
Epic acting is the theatrical embodiment of authenticity as a challenge to win one’s 
Self back from the world. Rather than fall into the tranquillizing illusion of bourgeois 
theatre (and politics) – the interpretation of the They handed over by the world – epic 
theatre practice faces life concretely as thrown possibilities for existence. For the 
Brechtian actor Dasein is not simply handed over by the world, but has the 
opportunity to seize itself resolutely in the possibilities that are its very own. But these 
possibilities are not without contradiction. This contradiction is part of the temporal 
structure of making decisions, facing situations and enacting choices that is always 
intrinsically incomplete and in process. In his rejection of the tragic inevitability of 
fate, Brecht firmly asserts a self and a world that is changeable and capable of 
adopting an attitude in which it can understand itself as such. 
Verfremdungseffekt as a Return to the Things Themselves 
Brechtian epic theatre represents a shift away from naturalistic representation towards 
an attitude of rational contemplation and critical engagement in the audience and the 
actors. Brecht proposed his famous Verfremdungseffekt to describe such a relation to 
his productions. Through distanciation from what is obvious and self-evident in an 
object of analysis, the observer sees the object in a new light and becomes aware of 
aspects of that thing which are for the most part overlooked in involved activity. This 
is true of both the phenomenological attitude and the aims of epic acting. Both offer a 
return to the things themselves. 
Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt is in fact a most splendid description of 
phenomenological reduction (Husserl’s terminology) or the disclosing, clearing space 
                                                
39 ‘Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial individualisation of the reticent resoluteness which 
exacts anxiety of itself. As something that keeps silent, authentic Being-one’s-Self is just the sort of 
thing that does not keep on saying “I”; but in its reticence it “is” that thrown entity which can 
authentically be’ (Heidegger 1962: H324).  
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of Dasein (Heidegger’s terminology) outside of philosophical discourse. Brecht 
writes: 
The achievement of the [Verfremdungseffekt] constitutes 
something utterly ordinary, recurrent; it is just a widely 
practised way of drawing one’s own or someone’s attention 
to a thing, and it can be seen in education as also in business 
conferences of one sort or another. The [Verfremdungseffekt] 
consists in turning the object of which one is to be made 
aware, to which one’s attention is to be drawn from 
something ordinary, familiar, immediately accessible, into 
something peculiar, striking and unexpected. What is 
obvious is in a certain sense made incomprehensible, but this 
is only in order that it may then be made all the easier to 
comprehend. Before familiarity can turn into awareness the 
familiar must be stripped of its inconspicuousness; we must 
give up assuming that the object in question needs no 
explanation. However frequently recurrent, modest, vulgar it 
may be it will now be labelled as something unusual (1964: 
144).  
The notion of drawing one’s attention and awareness to the Being of an object is what 
Heidegger was trying to articulate in BT. Ultimately, Heidegger was trying to get at 
the meaning of Being in general. But in drawing such interest to the Being of an 
entity, that thing becomes strange, unfamiliar or uncanny in Heidegger’s terms.
40
 
Being itself, is for the most part inconspicuous, as are things themselves, time and 
other phenomena of existence. Being for both Brecht and Heidegger is intimately 
linked with social relations rather than sheer materiality of the world. 
In Brecht’s approach to acting, one aspect of the Verfremdungseffekt is brought about 
by actors who narrate their character together with the events and behaviours that they 
are depicting.
41
 The audience is meant to take a detached, rational and scientific 
consideration of those events put forward.
42
 The self-reflective nature of such a 
technique also shares the phenomenological concern with the observer. For 
Heidegger, any understanding of Being must take into account the Being conducting 
the investigation. In Brecht’s theatre both the actor and the audience are supposed to 
be conscious of their own contingent perspective. In order to get at the Being of the 
thing in itself, the Being doing the observing must first become self-aware as forming 
the condition for the possibility of perception and understanding in the first place. But 
Brecht’s Verfremdung is not merely supposed to strike the viewer as strange but also 
startling, creating a sense of astonishment and evoking curiosity and consideration as 
to how things might be different. The laws of nature are revealed as astounding and 
                                                
40 The Being of things and the structure of Being-in-the-world comes into view in the mood of Anxiety. 
Anxiety is precisely the state of not being at home in the world as discussed in the previous chapter. 
41 See ‘A Dialogue about Acting’, ‘Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting’, ‘New Technique of Acting’ 
and ‘From a Letter to an Actor’ in Brecht (1964). 
42 The attitude of smoking and the spectator at a boxing match are two examples of the type of 
spectator Brecht hoped for (Brecht 1964: 6-9 and 44).  
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more importantly, human behaviour as capable of change.
43
 
Brecht is often placed in opposition to both Aristotle and Stanislavski. He rejected an 
emphasis on both empathy (in Aristotle) and psychology (in Stanislavski). 
Nevertheless, especially later in his career, Brecht acknowledged the usefulness of 
emotion at some points in a production and the importance of a naturalness of acting 
style.
44
 And after all, Brecht was interested in what was useful and successful in the 
art of acting rather than dogmatically instituting formal devices. In this sense, 
performance for Brecht was not solely about rationality, but rather an exploration of 
all human aspect of the social. 
The term ‘alienation’ might also cause some confusion in that it differs from both 
Marx’s notion of the alienation of workers from their labour and the Russian formalist 
‘defamiliarisation’ as an aesthetic concept (Brooker in Thomson and Sacks 1994: 
192-93). Brecht was interested in uncovering social relations and assisting in the 
ideological struggle against oppression rather than covering it up. Rather than a 
formalist technique of estrangement (ostrannenie in Russian), Brecht not only wanted 
his actors to make the events look unfamiliar but to incite the response that things 
need not be like this as can be seen in his exercise ‘Not… but’ (Brecht 1964: 137). In 
other words, the Verfremdungseffekt is meant to reveal the dialectical progression of 
social change but one which is inherently unfinished, requiring action on the part of 
the audience to bring about change. 
Verfremdung refers to a wide range of aspects of theatre production. Brecht’s 
description of acting style in ‘The Street Scene’, for instance, is one of demonstration 
rather than becoming the character – an estrangement from psychology and empathy 
as conventional approaches to theatre (1964: 121-29). Inspired by Mei Lan-Fang from 
the Peking Opera, Brecht admired many aspects of what he saw from this foreign 
style.
45
 In his production of The Mother (1932), Brecht used a sparse set and projected 
images onto a canvas. Many alienating effects are in Brecht’s texts themselves, in the 
fragmented narrative, particular turns of phrase, the use of songs. Other effects are in 
the mise-en-scène: the half-raised curtain, exaggerated costumes, the stylised 
backdrop painting (see Casper Neher’s design in The Caucasian Chalk Circle (1954), 
for instance in Fuegi 1987). The difficulty of pin-pointing estrangement is that it is 
always culturally and historically relative.
46
 What one audience sees as strange, 
another sees as natural. As a result, many of Brecht’s techniques have become 
commonplace today and arguably less effective (see Leach 2004: 145). At the core of 
the Verfremdungseffekt is the call for social change, revealing current social relations 
                                                
43 ‘Thus when a family is ruined I don’t seek the reason in an inexorable fate, in hereditary weaknesses 
or special characteristics – it isn’t only the exceptional families that get ruined – but try rather to 
establish how it could have been avoided by human action, how the external conditions could be 
altered; and that lands me back in politics again’ (1964: 68). 
44 See ‘Some Things that can be Learnt from Stanislavsky’ (Brecht 1964: 36) and Hurwicz in Witt 
(1975). 
45 Perhaps, like Artaud, another tinge of misrecognition and appropriation. Also see ‘On Chinese 
Acting’ in Martin and Bial (2000). 
46 ‘What needs to be alienated, and how this is to be done, depends on the exposition demanded by the 
entire episode; and this is where the theatre has to speak up decisively for the interests of its own time’ 
(Brecht 1964: 201). 
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and the fact that the world is still in need of social change.
47
 
‘Making strange’ is in essence a description of the process of phenomenological 
reduction in Husserl’s terminology or a return to the things themselves because it 
involves an attitude detached from regular involvement in the world. Of course, no 
observer can ever get back to the thing in itself if by that we mean an objective God’s 
eye view of the world. Human perspective always brings with it a fore-conception 
through which it interprets the world (Heidegger 1962: H150ff). Brecht’s point is not 
to substitute one view of a stable reality (the ideological state apparatus) with another, 
his own revolutionary agenda. The point is in questioning: a mode of critical 
examination that is not available in everyday involved activity. For Brecht, 
illusionistic theatre which relies on the passive reception of ideas in the audience 
overlooks the possibility of change.  
Gestus, Acting-style and Authentic Being-with-others 
Gestus is a theatrical exploration of Being-with-others. On the one hand Brecht hopes 
to make strange the events, decisions, actions and choices depicted in performance. 
On the other hand, he also wants to present the audience with a multi-layered image 
of the way that the characters and actors are related to each other in social terms. For 
Brecht, the world is not inevitably unconquerable. The world is capable of social 
change. At the core of Brecht’s theory of acting is the rejection of inner psychological 
depiction of characters and its replacement with the depiction of attitudes that are felt 
between the individuals in the story. Rather than emphasise a fixed, stable identity of 
the individual Brecht wanted to demonstrate the fragmentary, dislocated behaviours 
driven by the circumstances of the story, thus understandable, but also changeable. 
Brecht explains that the term 
‘[g]est’ is not supposed to mean gesticulation: it is not a 
matter of explanatory or emphatic movements of the hands, 
but of overall attitudes. A language is gestic when it is 
grounded in a gest and conveys particular attitudes adopted 
by the speaker towards other men (Brecht 1964: 104). 
So the idea of Gestus is the representation of the fundamental and relational attitude 
by means of an image, words or other form of communication, between those figures 
depicted on stage.
48
 According to Willett gestus is both ‘gist’ and ‘gesture’ (Brecht 
1964: 42).  For Brecht, gestus is meant to highlight the social relations between 
characters and invites the audience to question those attitudes in thinking about how 
things might be different. In this sense, the term is primarily concerned with acting 
style and provides a method of presentation. At the same time, the gest also allows the 
actor to comment upon the situation having chosen that particular way of presenting 
                                                
47 Consider the different political circumstances that Brecht lived in when he returned to Berlin and 
took charge of the Berliner Ensemble under the GDR. Even within his own lifetime, the world political 
environment changed greatly. 
48 According to Brooker in Thomson and Sacks (1994) and Willett in Brecht (1964), the term was used 
by Lessing in 1767 and Kurt Weil on the gestic nature of music. It appeared in Brecht’s own writings 
with his notes to the ‘Rise and Fall of the City of Mahogany’ and ‘On Gestic Music’ (Brecht 1964). 
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things, constituting a political attitude in that choice. The gest is not a simple action in 
itself. The gest is always in relation to the artistic presentation as a whole and the 
surrounding circumstances of that action. Brecht gives the example of a man chasing 
away a dog. On its own this is not gestic. But a badly dressed man’s continual 
struggle against watchdogs is gestic (1964: 104). Brecht comments on (the Elder) 
Brueghel’s paintings as depicting social relations in a gestic way. Gestus is related to 
artistic depiction, more than simply in terms of action, gesture and pose, but also 
bringing a meaning with it in its depiction of attitudes (1964: 157-59). Apart from 
anything then, the economy of gestus lies in its direct impact as an image together 
with an element of surprise for the audience. Grundgestus is the overall social attitude 
being depicted, perhaps not unlike Stanislavski’s super-objective, though with a 
distinct social emphasis. Brecht was more concerned with behaviours shown through 
the image than psychological reasoning behind the character. So actions are not 
supposed to be justified by an internal process but demonstrated, considered and seen 
as being alterable. 
Like Brecht, Heidegger emphasises the fact that our world is constituted by a 
relationship with others there in the world with us. The world is not made up just of 
stones, trees, tools etc., but people with the same type of Being as ourselves – Mitsein. 
The way that we comport ourselves to others is in ‘solicitude’ (Fürsorge) (1962: 
H121). We can take up an authentic or inauthentic understanding of others. The 
former is to recognise others as Dasein with the same type of Being as ourselves. The 
latter is to treat others as mere objects, or faceless numbers (1962: H125). So gestus is 
a theatrical expression of this with-world showing how we might treat others in 
accordance with self-interest or to acknowledge the ‘who’ of others there with us in 
the world.
49
  
In ‘On Gestic Music’ Brecht notes that the ‘look of pain in the abstract’ is not a social 
gest (Brecht 1964: 104). At this level it does not rise above the animal realm. But on 
adding the image of a man’s degradation to the level of animal, the gest becomes 
relevant to society. Pain depicted by a man reduced to nothing more than a beast is 
gestic. Thus, everything hangs on story and what happens between those involved.50 
The story is the complete fitting together of gestic elements (1964: 200).
51
 For Brecht, 
then, the gestus is also central to acting style and more broadly, the rehearsal process. 
By beginning with the social relations between the characters and developing the 
                                                
49 ‘A Being-with-one-another which arises from one’s doing the same thing as someone else, not only 
keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-
with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust. On the other 
hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the 
manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become 
authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the 
Other in his freedom for himself’ (Heidegger 1962: H122). 
50 Brecht agreed with the Marxist idea that the basic social unit is two people. ‘And the learning process 
must be co-ordinated so that the actor learns as the other actors are learning and develops his character 
as they are developing theirs. For the smallest social unit is not the single person but two people. In life 
too we develop one another’ (Brecht 1964: 197). 
51 Perhaps out of interest, compare this to Stanislavski’s description of psychological actions. The 
context and surrounding situation also adds meaning to actions over and above their physical aspects in 
each case. 
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overall attitude that they adopt to one another, a sense of fragmentation is already 
achieved. As mentioned above in the exposition of Brecht’s epic theatre, events and 
actions are not meant to be seen as purely causal and progressive, but rather 
questionable and capable of being different. 
Examples of gestus from Brecht’s practice often highlight the problem of simply 
relying upon language in order to convey the meaning of a performance. Brecht 
wanted meaning to be duplicated in words, action, music, set, physical relations and 
in short through the entire mise en scène. So in the medium of the silent film of Man 
is Man, Peter Lorre is cited as displaying the character’s contradictions.52 Brecht 
claimed ‘[t]his way of acting was perfectly right from the new point of view, 
exemplary even’ (Eddershaw in Thomson and Sacks 1994: 258). 
When rehearsing his production of Galileo in New York, Brecht worked with Charles 
Laughton in the lead role. Having no common language, the two worked together in 
rehearsal and used physical actions to convey the meaning: 
[t]his system of performance-and-repetition had one 
immense advantage in that psychological discussions were 
almost entirely avoided. Even the most fundamental gests, 
such as Galileo’s way of observing, or his craze for pleasure, 
were established in three dimensions by actual 
performance… We were forced to do what better equipped 
translators should do too: to translate gests. For language is 
theatrical in so far as it primarily expresses the mutual 
attitude of the speakers (Brecht 1964: 165). 
For Brecht, philosophical concepts might be represented on stage through a multitude 
of different aspects of the production other than words. This is precisely the sense in 
which Brecht’s theatre and acting process constitute a manual philosophy. Like 
Artaud, Brecht was interested in the alternative forms of communication that the 
theatre offered to actors and audiences. For Brecht, there were different means of 
exploring philosophical issues specifically pertaining to social relations. So by 
uncovering a physical depiction of our Being-with-one-another Brecht is inviting 
open reflection upon the type of solicitude we take towards our Mitsein, Being-with-
others. But rather than suggest a simple solution of care for one another, the practical 
challenges of Being-with-others, the world presents conflicting and competing 
demands and interests. 
A third example of the gestus, or more precisely the mode of acting that Brecht was 
hoping for, can be found in his last note to the Berliner Ensemble before their 
production of Mother Courage and Her Children in London (1956): 
[f]or our London season, we need to bear two things in mind. 
First: we shall be offering most of the audience a pure 
pantomime, a kind of silent film on stage for they know no 
German… Second: there is in England a long-standing fear 
                                                
52 See ‘The Question of Criteria for Judging Acting’, Notes from Mann ist Mann in Brecht (1964). 
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that German art (literature, painting, music) must be terribly 
heavy, slow, laborious, and pedestrian… The audience has to 
see that here are a number of artists working together as a 
collective (ensemble) in order to convey stories, ideas, 
virtuoso feats to the spectator by a common effort (1964: 
283). 
The essence of Brecht’s thoughts on acting is that performers should concentrate on 
the socially situated depiction of the story (and the social context of the performance 
itself) rather than the internal, psychological workings of the individual. Brecht 
introduced some practical measures to achieve this way of working. For instance, he 
suggested that the actors rehearse in their own accents rather than take on the 
characters’; actors should convert the present tense of their scenes in to the past tense; 
narrate what their characters are doing, saying ‘he said’ and ‘she said’; should switch 
roles to avoid identifying too closely with one or the other.
53
 Brecht also took on 
untrained actors whom he felt were better at displaying the attitudes necessary rather 
than the psychologically trained actors from actor-training institutions of the time. In 
short, gestic action consciously redeploys everyday behaviour and portrays characters 
as strangers or as if recounted from memory. Through such demonstration the actors 
can show the contradictory emotions, motives and actions rather than try to smooth 
these over through an illusionistic narrative. Different parts of the story are challenged 
by the different perspectives portrayed as bystanders to an accident, for instance (the 
stance of ‘not… but…’). Rather than act out what happened, the participants show 
what it was like and adopt an attitude to the scene. As such, the audience is invited 
make a judgment and see possible un-adopted alternatives to the action. In this way, it 
is hardly possible merely to consider these methods theoretically. The gestus is 
necessarily a physical embodiment on stage of different possibilities and perspectives. 
The gestic mode of acting removes the actor from submersion in the character, refuses 
to take for granted that their social relationships must be as they are, and puts Being-
with up for question. In other words, Brecht wanted both actors and audiences to 
question everyday Being-with-one another (which is for the most part inauthentic) 
and investigate possible alternatives.
54
 To a certain degree, Brecht sought a 
philosophical and intellectual naivety, leaving it up to the audience to learn, critique, 
enjoy and be incited to action. But this naivety is not meant in terms of a superficial or 
erroneous understanding on events depicted but rather as a fresh look avoiding the 
habitual received understanding of those events. The emphasis of the social comes to 
reflect on human beings not as mere things, but rather as people who care about one 
another; and live in world that is not exhausted by description of material objects. 
‘Brecht sought in this context particularly, so it seems, to combine theory and practice 
                                                
53 See for instance, ‘The Street Scene’ (Brecht 1964). 
54 Heidegger makes the point that for the most part, we dwell inauthentically with one another: ‘But 
because solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at least the Indifferent 
modes (in the indifference of passing one another by), the kind of knowing-oneself which is essential 
and closest demands that one become acquainted with oneself. And when, indeed, one’s knowing 
oneself gets lost in such ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a disguise, Being-with-
one-another must have special routes of its own in order to come close to Others, or even to “see 
through them”’ (Heidegger 1962: H124). 
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in a shared and undemonstrative working philosophy’ (Brooker in Thomson and 
Sacks 1994: 198). 
The Productions I: Historicality and Temporality 
In BT, Heidegger challenges the view that history is simply a collection of facts about 
the past.
55
 He refuses to acknowledge that the study of history has objectivity equal to 
the physical sciences (1962: H375). He claims that our understanding of the past is 
always constructed through a world-view specific to the present.
56
 For Heidegger, 
Historicality is an enabling condition for Being in any age. History is a fundamental 
part of the uniquely human way that we experience the world and forms a key 
enabling condition for the human subject. All experience is always from within 
history. As such, Historicality is a necessary part of Being-in-the-world that we have 
as humans.
57
 
The concept of Historicality is particularly crucial to epic theatre and acting in that 
Brecht rewrote and adapted plays from the past with a view to making them relevant 
to contemporary audiences and debates.
58
 He wrote extensively on the need to make 
theatre relevant to modern audiences in ‘A Short Organum for Theatre’ (Brecht 1964: 
179-205). In this piece, Brecht expressed his wish to view historical events in light of 
a contemporary understanding of the world through his historical adaptations on 
stage. He hoped to highlight the historically contingent values of the past and likewise 
show the equally conditional values of the present-day. Living through the rise of  the 
Nazi Party in Germany, Brecht felt that he was living in an especially significant age 
that would be of crucial importance to world-history. He wanted to communicate the 
importance of contemporary events to his audiences by looking to lessons from the 
past. Walter Benjamin recalls a conversation with Brecht on this very matter in which 
Brecht reportedly said:  
We must neglect nothing in our struggle against that lot. 
What they’re planning is nothing small, make no 
mistake about it. They’re planning for thirty thousand 
years ahead. Colossal things. Colossal crimes. They 
stop at nothing. They’re out to destroy everything. 
Every living cell contracts under its blows. That is why 
we too must think of everything. They cripple the baby 
                                                
55 ‘Only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of existence which has-
been-there, and because the latter exists factically in a way which is world-historical, can it demand of 
itself that it takes its orientation inexorably from “facts”. Accordingly this research as factical has many 
branches and takes for its object the history of equipment, of work, of culture, of the spirit, and of 
ideas’ (Heidegger 1962: H395). 
56 ‘Thus the historical character of the antiquities that are still preserved is grounded in the “past” of 
that Dasein to whose world they belonged. But according to this, only ‘past’ Dasein would be 
historical, not Dasein in the present’ (Heidegger 1962: H380). Heidegger goes on to say that the 
present Dasein is also historical. In fact only through the present world can we come to understand the 
past. 
57 ‘The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger 1962: H388). 
58 ‘We need a type of theatre which not only releases the feelings, insights and impulses possible within 
the particular historical field of human relations in which the action takes place, but employs and 
encourages those thoughts and feelings which help transform the field itself’ (Brecht 1964: 190).  
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in the mother’s womb. We must on no account leave 
out the children (Benjamin 1973: 120). 
The challenge to the Brechtian actor is to depict actions as historically situated – a 
task that is aided in the subject matter of Brecht’s plays.  Historicality is central to his 
production of The Life of Galileo (1947), for instance (Brecht 1986). Dealing with 
Galileo’s discoveries in astronomy, Brecht highlights the power-struggles in 
determining Truth in the objective sciences while showing human aspects of daily 
existence in presenting this historical character on stage. The Vatican resists Galileo’s 
assertions that the earth is not the centre of the universe, while at the same time, the 
great scientist needs to find a way earn a money for survival in daily life. Brecht 
highlights Galileo’s financial strain to pay the milkman, the necessities of tutoring in 
order to survive, and the opportunism that drives economic needs. Galileo’s daughter 
pleads for him to recant his discoveries when his life is severely threatened. Despite 
the watchful eye of the Inquisition the near blind scientist completes the Discoursi in 
secret. At the end of one version of the play they are smuggled out of Italy by 
Galileo’s long-time pupil, Andrea. 
The Life of Galileo draws attention to the development of history not as a series of 
Facts, but rather as founded in the daily concerns and social responsibilities that drive 
life. The values, actions and beliefs of the characters are always formed from an 
historical-world-view and a specific social perspective (consider the Pope’s inability 
to accept the scientific discoveries that Galileo presents because of the ramifications 
they will have on the power of the Church). Objective Facts are by no means self-
evident for Brecht, but are always seen from the perspective of individual actions and 
interests. In practice, Brecht was loose with historical facts in his adaptation of the 
historical character. He hoped to draw out these human, social elements of his plays. 
Well aware of the way in which a historical age determines our understanding of 
Being, he tried to show the connection between the manipulation of science for the 
sake of political power in Galileo’s time and the contemporary development of the 
nuclear bomb. Galileo opened in New York shortly after the bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in 1945. The play was poorly received in America (Fuegi 1987: 91). 
Even in the rehearsal and collaboration between Brecht and Charles Laughton, a well-
known Shakespearean actor, both men closely negotiated history and the lived 
experience of the present.  Working in Laughton’s house, the two would meet in the 
garden and run barefoot over the damp grass, discussing gardening. ‘The gaiety and 
the beautiful proportions of the world of flowers overlapped in a most pleasant way in 
our work’ (Brecht 1964: 166). Drawing from all manner of sources, from Leonardo’s 
drawings to Hokusai’s graphics and Brueghel’s paintings, Laughton was not turned 
into a bookworm, but rather sought out behaviour to aid in his performance. In the 
actual production itself, maps, historical documents, and works of art were projected 
onto the stage, highlighting the notion of history being played out (Brecht 1964: 203). 
In this way, Galileo itself and the process by which it was produced showed the 
connection and contradictions between the everyday experience of life and the 
historical movement of power. Ultimately, the everyday always has its place within 
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59
 
In BT, Heidegger asserts that time and Temporality also serve as a basis for Being. All 
human experience is not only situated within a world but also experienced within 
time. Like the concept of Historicality, time is not some thing we can put under the 
microscope and discover independent of human experience. Time is not a thing at all 
(there is no way of understanding time as being like a rock or a hammer). Heidegger 
argues that there has been a long history of misunderstanding surrounding the concept 
of time in terms of this spatial analogy. Time is not a series of nows, like boxes 
passing on a conveyor belt, filled up one by one (1962: H422ff). Heidegger thinks that 
Temporality is one of the necessary pre-conditions for existence and experience at all. 
He claims that the world becomes visible only through our relation to objects in our 
environment and others that exist there with us in the world (1962: H416ff). Things 
become significant only in the context of our daily concerns and specific tasks that we 
undertake. Similarly, Temporality is revealed only through the interaction with the 
world around us. Time is neither simply something objectively there in the world (the 
position of realism), nor completely in our minds (idealism). Time is a precondition 
for any experience of the world and forms a basis for the type of Being that we have 
as humans. In the jargon, Temporality is equiprimordial with Historicality as a basis 
for our Being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962: H377). 
Obviously, theatre is an art-form that takes place within time  – a specific duration (in 
the period that the audience watches the performance, for instance) – but does not 
exist outside that time. Brecht understood that the conception of time was particularly 
important in allowing a critical engagement with events in the drama. He played with 
the discrepancy of dramatic and real time as it passed in the performance. His theory 
of epic theatre recommends the fragmentation of narrative, jumping montage of 
scenes and a general lack of adherence to the Aristotelian unities of time, action and 
place draw attention to the constructedness of the drama. By interrupting the realistic 
depiction of events, Brechtian acting was meant to bring the theme of Temporality 
explicitly to the fore. Benjamin notes in his essay, ‘What is Epic Theatre’ (second 
version), ‘Epic theatre and tragic theatre have a very different kind of alliance with 
the passing of time. Because the suspense concerns less the ending than the separate 
events, epic theatre can span very extensive periods of time’ (Benjamin 1973: 17). In 
dramatic theatre the audience is concerned with the outcome of events as they unfold 
in the fictional time. In epic theatre, the audience should not be concerned with the 
outcome of the action, but rather be freed up for rational analysis of the events that 
take place. In this way, the audience stands outside of time in order to judge (whereas, 
of course they are always within real time of the performance). The goal-oriented 
actions of the characters within time become available for rational criticism by the 
                                                
59 Laughton’s ‘collaboration in the rewriting of the play showed that he had all sorts of ideas which 
were begging to be disseminated, about how people really live together, about the motive forces that 
need to be taken into account here. L.’s attitude seemed to the author to be that of a realistic artist of 
our time. For whereas in relatively stationary (“quiet”) periods artists may find it possible to merge 
wholly with their public and to be a faithful “embodiment” of the general conception, our profoundly 
unsettled time forces them to take special measures to penetrate the truth. Our society will not admit of 
its own accord what makes it move. It can even be said to exist purely through the secrecy with which 
it surrounds itself’ (Brecht 1964: 164). 
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audience because they have a detached, temporal relation to the events.  
Again, the  Brechtian actor is aided in the way that he constructed his stories. The 
interruption of time in epic theatre is demonstrated in The Caucasian Chalk Circle, an 
adaptation of a Fourteenth Century Chinese play (Brecht 1988).
60
 The play begins 
with a prologue: two groups of Soviet collective farmers meet to settle a dispute over 
land ownership in a fertile valley. The main action is a parable told to the disputing 
farmers and traces the story of Grusche, a servant girl. Grusche takes possession of a 
baby left behind by the Governor’s wife when a town in Georgia is overthrown by 
revolution. The action jumps back to follow the story of Azdak, the village fool who 
is appointed judge after the revolution. In the final scene, Azdak settles a dispute 
when the Governor’s wife returns to lay claim to the child that Grusche has come to 
love. Azdak settles the ownership of the child by placing it in a circle he has drawn on 
the ground. He says that the real mother will be the one to wrench the child out. 
Because of her love for the boy, Grusche lets go. In the end, the competition is 
revealed as a test when Azdak declares Grusche’s love to be shown and gives her 
possession of the child.  
Temporal estrangement (Verfremdung) is evident throughout The Caucasian Chalk 
Circle as actors depict a series of ethical and social dilemmas that the protagonist 
faces. The framing of the parable told to the Soviet farmers helps to heighten the 
ability for criticism of the events presented. In a sense, the device is similar to that of 
a Greek chorus which doubles as both spectator and commentator. Instead of 
providing an interpretation of the events, however, Brecht leaves it open for the 
audience to decide and judge the action of the play. Through presenting the events in 
this way, he is hoping to show that Grushe’s tribulations are not just a story, but have 
real ramifications and relevance to life – both of the Soviet farmers and of the 
audience. By use of this framed parable, the theatrical time and real time are melted 
into one. Brecht makes a break from unity in the fiction, allowing the audience to see 
how Temporality shapes Grushe’s actions; the unravelling of events mirror her own 
turbulent perspective of time. 
Tempo and an increased pace of performance were important for Brecht in his notes 
to the production. So his attention to time is not simply in terms of the fictional reality 
of the play, but in the lived experience of the production in the auditorium. This pace 
doubles the effect of Grusche’s own frenetic journey. ‘A stepping up of the tempo 
serves not only to shorten but even more to enliven the performance. The majority of 
scenes and figure gain by higher speeds’ (Brecht 1967: 99) 
And the actor can only be understood in relation to other elements of the production. 
Music, for instance, was a crucial means by which Brecht interrupted the action of the 
play and the audience’s submersion into the time of the story. By taking a step back 
from everyday absorption in the world and even what he calls Aristotelian dramatic 
absorption in the story, Brecht hopes to give his audience a critical awareness of the 
events unfolding. And rather than support the action in a scene, Brecht wanted music 
to disrupt the audience’s illusion: 
                                                
60 For an extensive discussion of the production of The Caucasian Chalk Circle see Fuegi (1987). 
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...[I]n The Caucasian Chalk Circle the singer, by using a 
chilly and unemotional way of singing to describe a servant 
girl’s rescue of the child as it is mimed on stage, makes 
evident the terror of a period in which motherly instincts can 
become a suicidal weakness. Thus music can make its point 
in a number of ways and with full independence, and can 
react in its own manner to the subjects dealt with; at the 
same time it can also quite simply help to lend variety to the 
entertainment (1964: 203). 
For Brecht, everyday time and temporality can become apparent through disconnected 
‘showing’ by the actor. But in this detached awareness of how time conditions 
Dasein’s response to its environment, the audience is permitted to reflect on the 
temporal aspects of their own actions within time. 
The Productions II: Duration and the Total Self 
Brecht recognised that acting is an art form suited to engaging with the human 
experience of time and its relation to the transitory subject.  Time is also the central 
concept in Heidegger’s revisionary formulation of both the human subject and the 
concept of Being. One of Brecht’s earliest plays, Man Equals Man, takes subjectivity 
(what it means to be a human subject) as its main concern: ‘tonight you will see a man 
reassembled like a car / Leaving all his individual components just as they are’ 
(Brecht, 1979:1). In this play, the actors are staging an argument about subjectivity. 
Set in British India the story looks at Galy Gay, an Irish dock worker who is 
transformed into a ruthless soldier through the events of the play. Three soldiers 
blackmail and trick Galy Gay into believing that he is someone else – their missing 
companion: 
[a]cross the stage strode giant soldiers, holding onto a rope 
so as not to fall from the stilts concealed in their trousers. 
They were hung about with rifles and wore tunics smeared 
with lime, blood and excrement. According to the story they 
were soldiers of a British detachment in India, murderous 
machines and marauders preparing for a frontier attack, an 
attack called ‘defensive war’ in the play. And side by side 
with these three giants, shaped not only by the crust of their 
uniforms but also by the logic of bourgeois laws, statutes and 
regulations, there dangled the soft-hearted and friendly petty 
bourgeois Galy Gay, ‘a man who cannot say no’ (Tretyakov 
in Witt 1975: 72). 
Galy Gay’s story brings into question the idea of the human subject as a linear 
progression within time. Heidegger also asserts that it is a mistake to think of time 
merely as a series of nows (what he would call a Cartesian understanding of 
spatiality). He also proposes a radical rethinking of the concept of the human 
subject.
61
 According to Heidegger, Western philosophy has understood the human 
                                                
61 For Heidegger’s reading of the notion of selfhood, see BT paragraph 64 (1962: H 317-32). 
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subject as something that remains constant throughout time, separated from the body. 
This thing, ‘the subject’, has been theorised variously as the ‘soul’ (Plato’s eternal 
Forms) through to a ‘transcendental subject’ (Descartes’ thinking thing).
62
 Heidegger 
follows his teacher, Husserl, in his demand for a return to the things themselves, a 
radical empiricism of objects available to consciousness (Husserl, 1970). Heidegger 
questions whether we really do experience the world as a disjointed series of 
phenomena brought together in consciousness and whether we really do gather 
disparate moments into a unified subject (Heidegger, 1962: H373).  
In Man Equals Man Brecht comments on the mutable nature of character and identity, 
given the circumstances of human existence and contingent upon the social 
environment of any given subject.  The play purports to demonstrate that subjectivity 
is not a stable constant, but rather performed in relation to desires and the survival of 
the individual. Brecht questions the concept of personhood and whether identity 
papers and pay slips can verify who anybody is. The title itself, ‘Man Equals Man’, 
highlights the ease with which society can substitute one person for another.
63
 The 
numerical value of the characters are projected onto the stage: ‘4-1=3’ when three 
soldiers lose their fourth member, ‘3+1=4’ when Galy Gay takes his place and ‘1=1’ 
in scene 8 it is demonstrated that man equals man.
64
 
For Heidegger, there is nothing in our regular experience of the world that suggests 
that time is something present-at-hand. On the contrary, experience comes first as an 
undifferentiated whole, what Henri Bergson called duration (durée). Bergson claims 
that the actual experience of consciousness is in constant ‘flow’, the continuous 
progress of the past that gnaws into the future (Bergson, 1950). Generally, we do not 
see the passing of discrete moments, but rather see time as continuous and 
uninterrupted. It is only after this human experience of connectedness within time that 
we can start to think of discrete, separable moments rather than vice-versa. Time is 
not the passing by of seconds, or the turning of the sun, but rather relative to how long 
it takes for the kettle to boil and when the day is cool enough to water the garden. 
Brecht’s play critiques the idea of a core self that persists throughout a series of nows 
in much the same way as Heidegger sets out philosophically. Human experience is 
based on a continuity of duration, not a fragmented integration of discrete events. 
Galy Gay is swept along by the actions of those around him while the one thing that 
                                                
62 See Plato, (1976) and Descartes (1986). Plato considered visible reality to be a mere reflection of a 
true reality that could be accessed through philosophical contemplation. He differentiated between 
instances of an object (e.g. a particular horse) and the Form of object (the universal form of horse or 
‘horseness’). The ‘soul’, for Plato, belongs to the realm of the Forms, outside physically perceived 
reality. For Descartes, the world is made up of two distinct substances: res cogitans (thinking matter) 
and res extensa (extended matter) – a dualistic theory. The ‘transcendental self’ (self separated from 
the world) is guaranteed by thinking matter and connected to the world ultimately by God. 
63 This is remarkably similar to the concept of Heidegger’s concept of das Man – the anonymity of 
social interpretation from the outside. The They-self is an inauthentic understanding of subjectivity in 
so far as it lacks individuality (Heidegger 1962: 126). 
64 Heidegger notes that such a numerical understanding of Dasein in inauthentic. ‘So far as Dasein is  at 
all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being. This cannot be conceived as a summative result 
of the occurrence of several “subjects”. Even to come across a number of “subjects” becomes only 
possible if the Others who are concerned proximally with their Dasein-with are treated merely as 
“numerals”’ Heidegger 1962: H125).  
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remains constant is his desire to profit from his situation. Despite the farcical elements 
of such a scenario (i.e. Galy Gay gives a eulogy at his own funeral and sells an 
elephant which is really several men holding a hose pipe), Brecht is commenting 
seriously upon the changeability of human nature. Subjectivity is not something 
constant throughout a series of moments, but rather contingent upon circumstances. In 
a direct address to the audience in the interlude, Brecht highlights this point: 
[Galy Gay] has some kind friends by whom he is pressured / 
Entirely in his own interest / To conform with his world and 
its twists and turns / And give up pursuing his own fishy 
concerns (Brecht, 1979: 38). 
The Brechtian actor’s depiction of subjectivity is consistent with Heidegger’s 
argument that the Self is not something separate from the world that remains constant 
throughout time. On the contrary, the Self is fashioned by the environment, and 
experiences a flow in the duration of events rather than measurably discrete moments. 
For Brecht, however, the self is capable of making choice and taking action; it is 
never wholly decided by the world.65 
Any theory of the subject as a series of moments unified into a whole presents the 
major problem of explaining exactly what that whole is. Heidegger thinks that if only 
the now is actual (the current segment in the series) then it is impossible to apprehend 
the past and future as constitutive of the human subject (they are not available in the 
same way as the current segment). Heidegger’s thinking in BT is very much 
influenced by Bergson and Husserl on this point. The now is the only available aspect 
of the subject that we can truly have before our eyes, yet it seems to lack the 
wholeness of who we would say a person really is. With such a difficulty of getting 
the whole of human existence into view, Heidegger proposes a revision of the 
metaphysics of subjectivity. Metaphysics, for Heidegger, is any philosophical system 
that proposes an explanation of Being based in the false presumption that Dasein is a 
thing like other things in the world. Heidegger’s phenomenology begins with the 
things themselves, the way phenomena present themselves to experience. Experience 
is primary. In order to find out what a self is, we need to begin with the human 
experience of a self rather than assuming it as a thing, available for scientific 
(physical and material) analysis. 
As a lived experience, the whole of the Self consists of the past, the present sensory 
environment and future possibilities. The present already contains the past and the 
future in memories and anticipations. This way of thinking proposed by Heidegger 
                                                
65 As if in foresight of the Nazi’s blind following of orders, Brecht sees the danger and strength in this 
new type of man who cannot say no: ‘I imagine also that you are used to treating a man as a weakling 
if he can’t say no, but this Galy Gay is by no means a weakling; on the contrary he is the strongest of 
all. That is to say that he becomes the strongest once he has ceased to be a private person; he only 
becomes strong in the mass. And if the play finishes up with him conquering an entire fortress this is 
only because in doing so he is apparently carrying out the unqualified wish of a great mass of people 
who want to get through the narrow pass that the fortress guards. No doubt you will go on to say that 
it’s a pity that a man should be tricked like this and simply forced to surrender his precious ego, all he 
possesses (as it were); but it isn’t. It’s a jolly business. For this Galy Gay comes to no harm; he wins. 
And a man who adopts such an attitude is bound to win. But possibly you will come to a quite different 
conclusion. To which I am the last person to object’ (Brecht 1964: 19). 
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denies that the subject is something present-at-hand (a mere thing to be observed 
under the microscope). Rather than model the human subject on a spatial analogy (as 
a physical thing), we should begin from the totality of our human experience which 
already includes the past and the future. In other words, the whole is constituted by 
the given circumstances of our environment, the projects that we wish to achieve and 
the possibilities that lie in that situation. 
Brechtian actors, too, were concerned with making sense of life as a whole. Mother 
Courage and Her Children (1939) follows the life tragedies of a woman who runs a 
canteen wagon during the Thirty Years War (Brecht: 1962). She loses two sons to the 
army, and has a third killed by the enemy during an armistice. Her only remaining 
child, the dumb daughter, Kattrin is killed trying to warn the village of an oncoming 
attack from the opposing soldiers. Throughout all of this, Mother Courage maintains a 
determination to survive and profit from the war – even amidst such personal loss. 
The whole of her life is brought into view in this unifying feature of survival at any 
cost.  
As a series of scenes run together, epic acting in this case brings the whole of life into 
view with stark reality. Brecht’s theatre is precisely a reflection on that whole. He 
hoped to engage audiences to think about other possible outcomes for his plays. If 
Mother Courage had acted differently, would the outcome have been the same? By 
encouraging such counterfactual thinking, Brecht shows that possibilities are as much 
a part of subjectivity as actuality. He points towards the meaning of ‘the whole’ not as 
something that can be understood ontically (as a scientific, physical thing) but rather 
existentially (already invested with meaning and possibilities).66  
In Brecht’s (1951) production of Mother Courage the is a unmistakable image of the 
gestus – Helene Weigel’s ‘silent scream’ depicts a clear moment of vision of life as a 
whole: 
As she hears the salvo that signals the execution of her son 
Swiss Cheese, Weigel’s Courage is seated on a low stool 
with her hands in her lap. She clenches her rough skirt, 
leaning forward with a straight, tense back against her 
shoulders; her mouth tears open until it seems that her jaw 
will break, but no sound comes forth. For a moment, her 
whole physicality has the impossible, angular contortion of 
one of Picasso’s screaming horses in Guernica. Then she 
snaps her mouth shut, brings her torso and head back into 
alignment, and collapses the tension in her torso, slumping in 
on herself (Rouse 1984: 34). 
This superlative example of gestus reveals a conception of time not merely as a 
scientific measure, but as a fully human conception of lived experience. It is as though 
the whole story of the play were encapsulated in this one moment. Yet even Courage 
                                                
66 For Heidegger, the ontic is the brute materiality of the world – the type of being that belongs to mere 
objects. Existentiality is the type of being that belongs to Dasein – the uniquely human way of 
experiencing the world. 
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continues on and it is up to the spectator to suffer outrage at her actions. This sense is 
repeated in the final scene when Mother Courage herself is epitomised in Weigel’s 
actions: 
Courage’s daughter has been shot trying to alert the city of 
Halle to an impending enemy attack. Courage is now alone 
She must drag her wagon herself back into the war, back into 
the train of the army that feeds her. She cannot afford to wait 
to bury Kattrin herself, so she pays a peasant family to bury 
her daughter for her. She fishes a handful of coins from the 
leather purse at her waist, starts to hand them to the peasants, 
looks at the coins, hesitates, slowly puts one coin back in her 
purse, then gives the rest over in payment. Even as she 
displays her character’s total collapse, Weigel demonstrates 
once again the basic contradiction between businesswoman 
and mother that has led to that collapse (Rouse 1984: 37). 
This moment brings the meaning of life into clear relief against Mother Courage’s 
actions. Death which is so near to this Dasein is met with an inauthentic response of 
self interest. It is up to the audience to realise that authentic Being-with-others, care 
and love for those close is the basis for authentic existence. 
Conclusions 
If we can interpret acting as a call to authentic (i.e. truthful) understanding of the 
possibilities of social action, Brecht’s approach to acting highlights some important 
aspects of Being examined by Heidegger in BT. But this is not a concept of truth that 
can be detached from the lived human experience – unproblematic, unchanging and 
unalterable. Brecht’s practice can be understood through the complex interaction 
between Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and the social, temporal and historical world 
itself. It makes no sense to conceive of the human subject outside of time and history 
and this is precisely why theatre is such a powerful vehicle for showing these 
elements. Acting is essentially both historical and temporal. By choosing the theatre 
as a medium for philosophical communication, Brecht emphasised a uniquely human 
relation to the world not as simply scientific and physical, but rather as an 
engagement already invested with meaning that constitutes human Being-there. 
The Brechtian actor has the challenge of drawing attention to the temporal and 
historical structures that are key to this human understanding of the world. Through 
the influence of dialectics Brecht stressed process both in a fictional context (drawing 
attention to the social and environmental formation of actions performed by his 
characters) and in his practical engagement with theatre (denying any form of finality 
in his rehearsals and writing, always being open to criticism and revision). He 
maintained that the analysis of social relations in the fictional reality should be 
equally applicable to the real world. In this way, he overcame the metaphysical 
tendency to understand the human subject merely as another thing alongside other 
things in the world. Epic theatre’s emphasis on social relations as fundamental to our 
historical and daily existence extends beyond a spatio-physical conception of 
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humanity towards an understanding of human life as a unique site of Being. Finally, 
by inciting the possibility of social change in the audience, Brechtian acting highlights 
the world not as fixed and unalterable, but what Heidegger describes as inter-meshed 
with our own Being-in-the-world, a radical continuity between the human subject and 
its environment that unfolds throughout time.  
This phenomenological interpretation sees Brecht as demonstrating Being through the 
temporal structures of the world. He wished that both actors and spectators would 
seize an authentic understanding of their own existence and resolutely take action as 
grasping their ownmost possibilities. That is the theory, anyway. Of course, his 
theatre was also very entertaining which is no doubt the reason for much of Brecht’s 
success.  Brecht himself emphasised humour, entertainment and a sense of fun that he 
felt was essential to successful acting: 
If the critics could only look at my theatre as the audience 
does, without starting out by stressing my theories, then they 
might well see theatre – a theatre, I hope imbued with 
imagination, humour and meaning – and only when they 
began to analyse its effects would they be struck by certain 
innovations, which they could then find explained in my 
theoretical writings (Brecht 1964: 248). 
180 
Our type of creativeness is the conception and birth of a new being – the person in the 
part. It is a natural act similar to the birth of a human being. 
If you follow each thing that happens in an actor’s soul during the period in which he 
is living into his part, you will admit that my comparison is right. Each dramatic and 
artistic image, created on the stage, is unique and cannot be repeated, just as in nature. 
 
Constantin Stanislavski (1980: 312), An Actor Prepares.1 
 
8. Active Metaphysics: Performing Being 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This thesis began with the observation that actors have been attacked as untruthful, 
dangerous, and destructive to society (Barish 1981). At least in part, this attack has 
been based on the ontological queasiness of theatrical practice. From a 
phenomenological viewpoint, acting poses a threat to the conception of the stable 
human subject simply as thing, soul, essence or material substance. Phenomenology 
emerged as a way of doing philosophy to challenge such a constitution of the human 
subject. In particular, Heidegger’s phenomenology proposed an analysis of Dasein to 
replace what he thought was the erroneous history of metaphysical thinking with 
respect to subjectivity. More precisely, he was concerned with Being and the history 
of ontology. 
Because the process of acting can be based in activity rather than a detached 
metaphysical understanding of the world, I have suggested that acting also engages 
with the human subject as process. Rather than simply being just another human 
activity, acting shares a certain reflexivity with philosophy; both reflect on existence. 
Yet acting, in this sense, has the potential to share not just a theoretical exploration of 
Being; it can be a practical and embodied practice. In this way I have suggested acting 
might be considered as manual philosophy. 
By considering the potentiality of acting as an embodied form of philosophy, I have 
examined various aspects of Being explored in theatre making. I have considered how 
the art of the stage reveals the way that we encounter both objects and other people in 
our environment through rehearsal and the process of performing. In this way, acting 
and philosophy (as phenomenology) both attend to aspects of Being, bringing 
existence to light, and ‘letting things show themselves in the way that they show 
themselves’. 
Acting has been seen as ontologically queasy because of a metaphysical 
understanding of the relation between subject and the world. But the art of 
performance is not mysterious or ontologically troubling if viewed in 
phenomenological terms. If the antitheatrical prejudice is at least partly based on the 
history of metaphysics then it is not surprising that those systems saw acting as a 
                                                
1 Incidentally, compare this with Plato’s metaphor of Socrates as a midwife to the young student in the 
art of philosophy: ‘Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs in most respects. The difference is that I 
attend men and not women, and I watch over the labour of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most 
important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine 
whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.’ Theaetetus 
(Plato 1990: 150b-c). 
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threat. By viewing acting in terms of phenomenology, however, the art is not 
ontologically problematic, but rather I might even say paradigmatic for an 
understanding of Being within time. Further to this, acting can be an investigation into 
Being understood in a phenomenological sense. 
Acting as a Phenomenological Interpretation of Being 
Rather than considering acting in general (as if there was such a thing) I have limited 
myself to looking at three specific theories of acting and the way in which they reveal 
aspects of how Dasein encounters the world. 
The three different theories of acting discussed here put forward differing 
phenomenologies, interpreting Being in distinctly different ways. Stanislavski 
uncovered many aspects of worldhood in his system of acting and which can be 
understood through many of Heidegger’s observations about human involvement in 
the world in a practical way. Artaud sought to destabilise everyday understanding of 
the world and reach towards particular experiences which could be thought of as 
transcending the structures of equipmentality and other Daseins there in the world. I 
compared this view with Heidegger who argued that authentic Dasein grasps its own 
mortality in Being-towards-death and faces the possibilities available with authentic 
truthfulness. Artaud sought a direct and imminent language of Being for the theatre 
and rejected the notion of authenticity instead embracing the implacable cruelty of 
Being. Brecht saw theatre and acting as an important way of questioning and 
changing the world. Rather than be submerged in the illusion of theatre, he wanted 
audiences to critically and rationally engage with political and ethical problems of 
society. In Heideggerian terms, Brecht saw the actor’s task as a potential call to 
authenticity. Brecht rejected performance as mindless, pre-digested meaning handed 
over by traditional theatre forms and advocated an active, scientific and above all else, 
a philosophical theatre. 
One of Heidegger’s most significant contributions to twentieth century philosophy 
was a critique of the traditional notion of subjectivity. Rather than see the individual 
as radically separated from the world in which it lives, his phenomenological 
understanding of Dasein posits an intermeshed relation of what has been called the 
subject and its life-world. Each of the theatre-theorists that I have looked at here 
acknowledges the inter-dependence of the self with the world; each is based in the 
practical art of acting rather than abstract philosophising. Because acting is a practice 
and activity, it avoids the errors of philosophical metaphysics which tended to start 
from an unsubstantiated account of Being. 
In this way, acting can be manual philosophy as a return to the things themselves. But 
rather than see the investigations of Being carried out by Stanislavski, Brecht and 
Artaud as identical to Heidegger’s account of Being in BT, I have presented each 
theory as displaying different aspects of Being or what might be called ‘regional 
ontologies’. Rather than see them as contradictory, we might see each approach as a 
different insertion point into our understanding of Being as a whole. 
Equally it would be possible to delve into the phenomenologies presented by many 
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other influential acting theorists throughout the ages and from traditions outside the 
West. Diderot, Grotowski, Boal, Barba, Brook and many others also engaged in very 
philosophical issues. These are areas for future discussion. 
Emotion, the Human Condition and Language 
Rather than being at the periphery of a philosophical understanding of subjectivity (or 
a by-product of that understanding), the history of acting theory can be seen as a key 
manifestation of metaphysical thought throughout the ages. In fact, Jonas Barish 
(1981) maps out the history of ontological concern with actors and acting that runs in 
parallel with the history of metaphysics. The complex relationship between acting, 
theatre, performance and philosophical world-views may well be the subject of future 
investigation of philosophy and theatre. That project brings with it a consideration of 
performance in the present day and what it betrays about present understandings of 
Being. 
There are several key ideas about what acting is that betray such metaphysical 
thought. The first is that acting is predominantly to do with emotion. From Plato’s 
criticisms in the Republic, through Diderot’s Paradox of Acting, to the ‘Method’ 
prevalent in many American acting schools, emotion has been taken as what acting is 
really about. Perhaps a modern day understanding of the connection between acting 
and emotion has had more to do with the rise of psychology and psychoanalysis. But 
the survey of these three theories of acting shows that emotion may be part, but not 
the totality, of what acting is about. The practice of acting requires not only a mastery 
of emotional relation to the world and other, but physical, social and existential 
aspects. In short, acting investigates Being. 
Another metaphysical current in historical theorisation of acting is that it uncovers the 
human condition. The idea that acting reveals something universal about what it is to 
be human betrays the hidden thought that being human is one thing. Heidegger’s 
investigation into the meaning of Being started with an analysis of Dasein – the 
conditions for the possibility of Being-there. Yet in trying to put down what those 
necessary conditions for Being are, Heidegger realised that there was no determinate 
answer. In his ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger rejects the notion of humanism as 
yet another manifestation of metaphysics. He moved away from a formal attempt of 
describing the meaning of Being of any particular Dasein towards a poetic 
understanding of the meaning of Being in general in what is known as the Kehre 
(turn) in his thinking after BT.  
Parallel to the notion of acting as reaching to the core of humanity is the idea that 
acting will put one in touch with one’s core self. There is a discourse of acting as self 
discovery or acting as therapy. Underlying this notion of self-discovery is the 
metaphysical notion that there is a stable, real self ‘in there’ somewhere, waiting to be 
discovered by creative means. Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation of Dasein 
rejects the notion that there is a core thing that the self is; the existence of Dasein 
should radically be taken on its own terms. Dasein is its ownmost possibilities. So 
rather than seeing acting as a search for some stable core self (a metaphysical 
understanding) we might posit theatre as an investigation of the possibilities of Being 
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(the existential or phenomenological understanding). I argued above that Artaud’s 
theatre of cruelty is an attempt to reunite with his own self, but it is a self rooted in the 
presence of performance, unique and unrepeatable. 
A fourth metaphysical understanding of the art of acting can be found in the 
predominance of the text and language as what acting is about. Even Heidegger 
famously said that ‘language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell’ 
(‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger 1998: 239). But all of the acting theorists 
investigated above stress the importance of both the physical and the verbal. In other 
words, language is part of, but not the totality of Dasein’s relation to the world. 
Heidegger claims that ‘thinking gathers language into simple saying’ (1998: 276). Yet 
by considering acting as philosophical, we might well consider a thinking of Being 
which includes the body in a manual philosophy. 
Finally, as I have been hinting at already, yet another metaphysical understanding of 
acting lies in seeing acting as solely about the material body. This falls into a dualistic 
understanding of human existence and replaces one metaphysical system with 
another. Dasein’s experience of its body is part of but not the totality of its 
relationship to the world. Rather than see ourselves in Cartesian co-ordinates, our 
experience of spatiality is first and foremost in relation to our practical dealings with 
the world and ultimately to the possibilities of our own existence. 
The so-called antitheatrical prejudice might be explained as a reaction against, and 
unmasking of, metaphysics in the art of acting. Theatre potentially has a destructive 
power over traditional metaphysical systems. This is precisely why it has been 
attacked, bound, silenced and spurned. But, by presenting a phenomenological 
interpretation of these theories of acting, I am simultaneously suggesting that they are 
phenomenological interpretations themselves. Both theatre and phenomenology 
present possible ways of destroying metaphysics. In such a destruction, they also 
uncover Being and explore the possibilities of Being-in-the-world. 
Drama, Theatre, Performance 
This consideration of acting as manual philosophy has significant implications for the 
study of theatre and performance: namely a move away from metaphysical modes of 
analysis. This idea is hardly new and is currently part of the emerging field of 
performance studies. The history of academic approaches to theatre practices, for 
instance, has also shown metaphysical tendencies. For a long time, drama studies 
largely focused upon the study of texts, considered as a stable locus of meaning. With 
the evolution of theatre studies, the study of performance challenged the stability of 
such meaning and introduced the problematic element of the human body. Recent 
emphases on embodiment have attempted to address this blind spot for the discipline. 
But rather than shift too far to an understanding of acting as materiality, I suggest that 
scholars might remember the total engagement with Being and Being-in-the-world. 
After the study of play texts, academics became interested in audiences and the 
meaning making process and the reception of performance (Sauter 1997 and 
Schechner 2006). From this point, the actor’s process then became an important area 
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of concern, not just in the moment of performance but also in rehearsal development. 
Moving away from an ideal spectator’s viewpoint, performance began to be 
understood as a concrete physical, cultural, social, political and (I suggest) 
philosophical practice. Techniques have been adapted from anthropology, 
ethnography and sociology to study actual performances rather than their ideal textual 
counterparts. All of these academic approaches help to locate parts of Being-in-the-
world important to understanding what acting is, yet none encapsulates the totality of 
Being that is performance. 
By the same token, as I have posited from the beginning of this project, acting can be 
understood as manual philosophy in that it serves to broaden what we might consider 
as philosophy. In this way, the theories of acting presented here also serve to critique 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. Rather than privilege thinking, or language, or formal 
analysis of the structures of Being, Stanislavski, Brecht and Artaud all sought to 
explore Being in their theatrical practice. In this way, performance offers a unique 
mode of human activity that is both object and mode of enquiry. The heightened 
awareness of performance in the theatre draws attention to its own Being while 
simultaneously inquiring into the meaning of Being in general. I have noted 
throughout this work how this can be seen through one pertinent characteristic of 
Dasein: it is both the object and the inquirer. In fact, we might even say that theatre 
and performance are a communal and inter-subjective manifestation of Dasein – 
Being there. For this reason, performance is an important site for the investigation of 
possible ways of being-together. 
Seeing acting as a practical form of philosophy destroys the idea of philosophy simply 
as an abstract contemplative activity. As Heidegger points out knowing is simply one 
mode of Being-in-the-world. Our wider understanding of Being is not founded in this 
mode of knowing, but rather in our involved dealings with the world, in our activity. 
But acting is not merely an unreflective, pre-ontological mode of involved activity, at 
least in the theories I have considered here. Acting is aware of its own Being: it is 
self-conscious. Theatre investigates what it means to be in the movements, gestures, 
dialogue, music, sounds, images and in fact, all the elements which go in to make the 
theatrical event. The concept of acting as manual philosophy is a practical articulation 
of Heidegger’s move away from knowing as the foundational mode of our 
engagement with the world towards Being. 
Future Directions: Phenomenological Theatre and Theatrical 
Phenomenology 
In this project I have looked at three particular theories of theatre and considered what 
aspects of Being each discover through acting. I have used Heidegger’s analysis of 
Being-there laid out in BT. Obviously philosophy has come a long way since 
Heidegger and his theoretical Copernican turn in the analysis of subjectivity. Instead 
of seeing the mind and body as separate entities, BT lays out (or at least begins to lay 
out) the inter-dependence of the Being of Dasein, the world and importantly, the 
relation of both to time. Derrida critiques Heidegger for being yet another in the long 
line of metaphysicians which he is attempting to destroy. Perhaps in order to 
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transcend metaphysics, performance offers a way of using the flesh, experience and 
Being to investigate our relationship to the world, rather than fall into a dualistic 
understanding, or spurious foundations for philosophical systems. 
Future directions of this kind of study will go beyond Heidegger to study the work of 
other philosophers and how their concepts may be discovered and investigated 
through theatrical practice. For instance, it might be important to consider Emmanuel 
Lévinas and the ethics of the other as explored through acting. This may well serve to 
critique Heidegger’s ethical blindness or claim to neutrality in BT. That is but one 
example. Many others are possible. The work of Arendt, Foucault, Kristeva, Peirce, 
Derrida and, of course, Merleau-Ponty all offer interpretations of the world that might 
be enacted in theatrical practices too. 
In a sense, considering the importance of theatre and performance as philosophical 
modes of engagement is already going on, though not always explicitly. Of course 
philosophical ideas will be picked up in performance texts and practices. The 
twentieth century saw a radical engagement with performance as expressing a 
philosophical position from the futurists, the dadaists, the surrealists, and theatrical 
avant-garde through ‘performance art’ and ‘post-modern’ performance (Goldberg 
1988). Just as Victor Turner (in Schechner and Appel 1990: 17) proposes a braided 
interaction between performance and society, so too is there a complex feedback loop 
between philosophy and performance. Indeed, as I proposed above, performance 
practices are an important manifestation of historical understandings of Being. 
Again, I have chosen phenomenology as a mode of philosophy is consistent with and 
describes the lived experience of the actor in process. Equally, it may be possible to 
explore other aspects of philosophy that are explored in theatrical practice. 
Performance might be seen in relation to epistemology, (how we know the world), 
ethics, (how we ought to act in the world), logic (what are the relations between 
things in the world), philosophy of mind (what is the relationship between mind and 
world and other minds), political philosophy (how we are best to organise society) 
and so on. Krasner and Saltz (2006) provide a range of different intersections between 
philosophy and theatre. I believe that this area of thinking is set for a veritable 
academic bourgeoning. 
Alongside this interest in the intersections between philosophy and theatre, it may 
well be that a variety of methods of analysis could be developed. Apart from simply 
theorising the philosophical nature of theatre, it may well be important to get out there 
and see some actual theatre being made, listen to the practitioners who are doing it, 
ask them what they think they are doing, observe their practices, describe the 
processes and experiences of theatre making. From this point of view, the 
development of phenomenological description is an important area for performance 
studies because it seeks to preserve the lived experience of this human activity rather 
than slide off into stiff theoretical analysis. The challenge is to get to what Clifford 
Geertz (1983) calls ‘experience-near’ description. From an insider’s perspective, it 
may also be possible to teach actors to observe their own practices in such a way. 
On the other side, rather than the analysis of theatre and performance, I also envisage 
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an explicitly philosophical theatre that might draw on the ideas of philosophy for its 
creation. What would a philosophical theatre look like? Imagine a performance 
practice developed explicitly to investigate aspects of Being – the Being of the ready-
to-hand, spatiality, the They-self, Authenticity, Historicity, Temporality. Rather than 
launch on such a grand, ambitious and potentially pretentious project, perhaps there 
might be another way of staging philosophy. Perhaps performers might consider how 
to stage a Platonic dialogue, how to represent Descartes’ meditations in a performance 
or Nietzsche’s writings in performance. As mentioned, ‘performativity’ (Butler 1990) 
has become an important buzz-word in the humanities and social sciences. Might it 
even be possible to consider the activity of philosophy itself as a performance? These 
questions are for the future. 
For now, it may be time to move beyond Heidegger, and perhaps even beyond 
phenomenology though this might be a humble yet fruitful beginning point. This 
project has been an attempt to apply a rigorous analysis of the complex problems of 
phenomenology and apply them to the practice of acting. Heidegger also later moved 
to reject the term phenomenology that was at the heart of BT: 
And today? The age of phenomenological philosophy seems 
to be over. It is already taken as something past which is 
only recorded historically along with other schools of 
philosophy. But in what is most its own, phenomenology is 
not a school. It is the possibility of thinking, at times 
changing and only thus persisting, of corresponding to the 
claim of what is to be thought. If phenomenology is thus 
experienced and retained, it can disappear as a designation in 
favor of the matter of thinking whose manifestness remains a 
mystery (‘On Time and Being’, Heidegger 1962a: 82). 
I suggest, however, instead of understanding philosophy merely as thinking, we might 
also consider how philosophy might also be a doing; a manual philosophy. 
Of course, this all sounds very high-brow. Perhaps we might turn once again to 
Bertolt Brecht who wanted a philosophical theatre. He was aware of the importance of 
entertainment, a sense of fun, enjoyment in the theatrical event. His concept of acting 
entailed providing not only analysis but also entertainment. The question remains 
whether it is possible to find an enjoyable way of exploring, questioning, thinking and 
experiencing the meaning of Being through theatre, performance and the art of acting. 
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Epilogue 
After the moment of sheer terror the line is there. Breathe and continue. No chance to do it 
over. The danger. One chance – to be experienced but once. Crisis avoided. The lights black 
out. There is a pregnant pause in the audience. Something is breathed in at that last moment 
– to extend the instant of reflection – to come back into the now after having lost the self. 
Waking up from a dream, the possessed body is returned to its owner. The heightened 
awareness slips away. Breathe and catch breath. Having exhausted the body in performance 
now smile and relax. Be there in a new and changed way. Lights black out. The curtain 
comes down. I am here. 
CHORUS:  
Attackers of our wond!rous trade have said 
That nought of truth have actors shown. Instead 
Of insight and sincerity to play 
We lie dissimulate and take our way. 
They think we are but mere "things! here to wrought 
But we reveal "the possible! for thought.  
 
And so we have concluded here to say 
That art might truth so possibly convey 
A true reflection of just what we are 
In body, mind and thought both near and far. 
With "time! and "Being! under scrutiny 
In life "becoming! is at source "to be!. 
 
(Stepping back behind the curtain) 
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